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African countries have recently experienced an extraordinary and largely unanticipated 
boom in the uptake of mobile phones, and increasing rates of access to the internet. This 
thesis investigates how and why these information and communication technologies (ICT) 
are being adopted for use in Tanzanian micro and small enterprises (MSEs), and explores the 
changes they are bringing about to the existing business culture of marginalised economies. 
 
The study covers three sub-sectors of the Tanzanian economy: perishable foodstuffs trading, 
the informal construction industry and the export of African blackwood carvings. The 
analysis is based on fieldwork undertaken over a total of 15 months in 2002 and 2003, during 
which time business networks were revealed by physically following entrepreneurs and their 
contacts operating in different locations throughout the country. Entrepreneurs were asked to 
draw their own comparisons between the traditional pre-ICT situation and the improved ICT 
access of today. The discussion is informed by the findings of semi-structured interviews 
with these individuals, excerpts of which are presented in the text to give voice to the 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Various ingenious and at times unconventional methods of access to, and appropriation of, 
ICT is uncovered. Together these suggest that official indicators underestimate the thirst for 
digital consumption, especially for mobile phones, and help explain the flourishing informal 
economy of handset acquisition. Internet penetration and uptake for use in business, on the 
other hand, is revealed to be far slower. Nevertheless, the research does reveal that a sizeable 
amount of poorer entrepreneurs are using a triumvirate of hired or shared ICT – mobile 
phones, the Internet and the ‘old’ ICT of fax – to create what can appear to be a more formal 
enterprise than it may actually be. The ‘mobile office’ effectively allows poorer 
entrepreneurs to operate without premises, thereby saving costs on rent and allowing the 
enterprise to remain informal. This heralds a considerable change in the working practices of 
a significant branch of informal sector operators who have gone unnoticed, and calls for a 
reconstruction and redefinition of this crucial source of entrepreneurship in developing 
economies. 
 
Despite the huge uptake of mobile phones in particular, the work also cautions that some 
traditional pre-ICT aspects of the African business culture look set to remain for some time. 
It becomes clear that where entrepreneurs do decide to use ICT, reputation and 
recommendation are still very significant. This information is usually passed on when an 
entrepreneur meets in person with contacts from his very fluid informal networks of 
knowledge. Trust, and the need for direct, personal interaction through face-to-face contact – 
one of the most pervasive features of African MSE economies – emerge as a common theme 
across the case study industries and are likely to remain a crucial aspect of the way most 
MSE business is conducted. 
 
Mobile phones are seen to play a crucial role in improving the exchange of supply-and-
demand information domestically, while a combination of applications (particularly e-mail) 
appear to act as tools with which to refresh relationships with sources of market information 
outside the country. It is suggested that ICT may be able to help entrepreneurs in moving 
from the personal to the impersonal exchange – a challenge that many other African 
businesses will also have to come to terms with as the Internet becomes an ever more 
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starehe  pleasure, comfort, ‘the high life’ 
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The research goal 
Since visiting Tanzania in my early teens, living in a rural community later for a year 
as a teacher and in subsequent visits, my greatest interest in the country has always 
been how its inhabitants ‘get by’, how they ‘manage with difficulty to live or 
accomplish something’ (Pearsall 2001: 770). Strategies for getting by in East Africa 
have been analysed by Wallman (1996) who shows how as serious HIV/AIDS-
related infections and the formal economy were on the increase in the early 1990s so 
women in urban Uganda developed strategies to exploit – as much as they are 
exploited by – the informal economy. Women’s tireless role in this crucial means of 
generating income for the wellbeing of their households prompted me to conduct my 
first empirical field study (Molony 2000c) examining the methods women of rural 
Upare in north-east Tanzania apply to meet these ends. Far from resolving any issues 
the academic community were not aware of (or, for that matter, most Tanzanians), 
this early work served only to fuel my thirst for further study of the ‘ordinary 
economy’, an area that I was soon becoming convinced was hugely relevant to so 
many people’s wellbeing under very difficult circumstances. 
 
It became clear during this early intimate exposure to people’s socio-economic 
realities that while the experience for many of the informal sector is one of over-
competition and bare necessities, there is a different reality for a sizeable number of 
entrepreneurs. For these people, success appears to be their ability to move beyond 
the saturated and highly price-sensitive mass markets into the niches where there are 
better opportunities for a focus on innovation, diversification and quality. Compared 
with the majority of owner-operators I had covered so far in the earlier rural study 
whose well-known constraints (e.g., lack of capital and market) which I felt were 
long-standing and who to graduate required a massive range of assistance that 
realistically was not going to come, I questioned how some other operators whose 
businesses I observed in 2000 in the local Pare town of Same had been able to – I 
assumed – ‘graduate’. I had in mind a couple of enterprises supplying upscale 
 
 2
secretarial services and found it intriguing that, since my previous period living in 
the study area in 1995, somehow a tiny number of entrepreneurs in this small 
settlement had managed to overcome so many obstacles and were offering their 
customers access to the internet. 
 
More recently, over the last five or so years, information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in the form of the internet and, especially, mobile phones, have 
taken Africa by storm. Few technologies have been embraced by Africans over such 
a short period of time, and this in turn has spurred much interest in the potentialities 
of applications that can help the continent’s development, not least in terms of aiding 
enterprise. Unfortunately much of this evidence is anecdotal and of little analytical 
value, or else is based on reports of unsustainable donor projects that fail to represent 
the typical situation for many ICT users. 
 
The motivation for this study originates from a desire to provide a systematic, 
empirically-generated account on how ICT is being adopted for use in micro and 
small enterprises (MSEs) – a crucial source of income to the majority of Africans, 
and an area where these technologies are often regarded (e.g., UNDP 2001) as being 
of great benefit in helping alleviate poverty. The study is based on fieldwork 
undertaken on three sub-sectors of the Tanzanian economy over a total of 15 months 
in 2002 and 2003, during which time it became clear that some aspects of the context 
within which these technologies are (or are not) being used are quite different to 
those of the developed countries where much of the policy debates on the 
technologies have hitherto been generated. The risk here of extrapolating our 
external models of how these new technologies may be accessed and used more 
effectively, however, is that the particular needs, usages and especially the ways of 
doing business in African economies are ignored. In this light we ask how ICT is 
being integrated into the existing business culture, and what changes this is bringing 
to how entrepreneurs are making money. Based on the replies to these questions, we 




The bulk of the following chapter fleshes out the debates surrounding the use of ICT 
in business. We begin with the ‘third way’ account of globalisation concerning the 
future of the world’s economies and the distribution of knowledge, a debate that I 
argue did not anticipate the liberalisation of the ‘Fourth World’ telecommunications 
industry. We then explain why it is valid to consider MSEs, and discuss the 
particular needs and challenges these technologies bring to how business is 
conducted. This is situated within debates surrounding the different levels of the 
‘digital divide’ and how policy and on-the-ground initiatives have responded to the 
perceived requirements of ICT users in Africa within the context of potentially-
transformative ICT for development. These debates provide background to the 
research questions that we sketch out towards the end of the chapter. We then 
conclude with an outline of how the remainder of this thesis addresses the ways in 
which ICT is being adopted for use in Tanzanian MSEs, and the implications of this 
for the business development of MSEs.
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1 ICT and ‘Fourth World’ development 
We are resolute to empower the poor, particularly those living in remote, rural and 
marginalized urban areas, to access information and to use ICT as a tool to support their 
efforts to lift themselves out of poverty. World Summit on the Information Society. 
2003. Geneva Declaration of Principles, Principle 14 
You have taught us Africans to have starters, followed by a main course and then a 
dessert. Please, Africa has had enough starters. Africa needs no more ICT projects. 
We’re ready for the main course. Venâncio Massingue, Minister of Science and 
Technology, Mozambique. Chair of the Interactive session with Africa, World Summit 
on the Information Society. UNESCO, Paris. 12 May 2005 
 
1:1. The Liberalised Economy: social, political and 
economic background to Tanzania 
The United Republic of Tanzania, whose current population is 34m (URT 2004c), 
was formed in 1964 by the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. From  
1965-95 Tanzania was a one-party state, governed by the current ruling party Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution, CCM) under the leadership of the late 
President Julius Nyerere. In the Arusha Declaration (1967) Nyerere embarked on a 
socialist experiment of ujamaa (African Socialism), based broadly on the Chinese 
Communist model but with African characteristics. This era was marked by a hostile 
business environment that discriminated against the private sector and, in the 
Leadership Code, attempted to inhibit indigenous entrepreneurship (Rugumamu & 
Mutagwaba 1999). The long lasting effects of this period have been to engender 
among Africans high risk aversion, low self-confidence, low creativity and low 
independence (Themba et al 1999: 6). It is argued (Kristiansen 1999: 81) that the 
period has also adversely influenced the investment patterns of the country’s 
entrepreneurs.1 
                                                 
1 Kent and Mushi point out that the repression of bona fide operators presented something of an 
ideological paradox for the socialist state since the characteristics of informal sector activities in many 




Yet as we briefly argue in chapter four, despite Nyerere’s efforts to eliminate the 
capitalist informal sector it never ceased to exist but just lived a quieter life (Trulsson 
1997: 289) because the state’s incapacity forced people to find their own solutions 
(Tripp 1997).2 This was especially the case with the introduction of the structural 
adjustment programme in the mid-1980s when the ranks of the informal sector 
suddenly swelled with graduate retrenchees who the government made no attempt to 
redeploy. Until these cut-backs the civil service, for example, provided high job 
security because like most formal sector employment at the time it basically varied 
with capacity creation, not capacity utilisation (Wuyts 2001: 431). These retrenchees 
were joined by others who still held jobs in the formal sector but who were 
increasingly finding that with the erosion of real wages during 1980s they could no 
longer survive on government salary alone. Their solution was to engage in a process 
that has been referred to as the ‘informalization of formal work’ (King 2001: 99), 
switching back and forth from their ‘main job’ to informal sector.3 Such white collar 
informalisation marked the beginning of an growing interest among professionals 
and public sector workers in ‘education services’ and ‘other personal services’ (URT 
2002b: table 5.7), with worrying consequences to their formal sector job, particularly 
                                                                                                                                          
mentality are still evident in the latest employment policy paper, which now states that one of main 
aims of the policy is ‘[t]o ensure that activities initiated on self employment act as a basis for the 
development of the economy and are an inspiration for the culture of self reliance’ (URT 1997c: 6). 
2 In their analysis of the ‘African [read: Kikuyu] business creed’, Marris and Somerset (1971: 91 fn1) 
note that one interpretation as to why Kenya was sympathetic to private African enterprise while 
Tanzania was not lies in the fact that the colonial presence in Tanganyika saw little European 
settlement so was principally political rather than commercial, and they speculate that for this reason 
Tanzania is more concerned with asserting political achievements. They do add, however, that at this 
stage in his speeches and writings Nyerere was still referring to these achievements by Western 
European standards, especially the appeal to the liberal tradition of political thought derived from John 
Stuart Mill and the Fabians, rather than Marxism. This is particularly interesting given that while at the 
University of Edinburgh (1949-1952) Nyerere was exposed to Mill’s writings and other historical and 
philosophical staples at the same time as he was frequently engaging in discussions on Marxism with 
(mainly Nigerian) undergraduates. George Shepperson, who taught Nyerere at Edinburgh, believes that 
his formal education in the city (supplemented by much wider reading and debate), played an even 
greater part in influencing his political beliefs than even Nyerere himself admits in letters to his former 
close friend (Molony 2000a). 
3 In 1993 the Minister for Home Affairs, Augustine Mrema, sensing that many government officials 
were spending office hours on personal business, ordered that chairs used by government officials 
should be confiscated and surrendered to the police stations if the officials reported for duties later than 
7.30 in the morning. The government’s reaction in true ‘Bwana Ruksa’ style (fn 6 below), drafted ‘Act 
10’ to give workers enough time to rest and attend to their private ventures (Mbogora 1998).  
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among teachers in what has been termed the ‘improper economy’ (Kerr 2005).4 In 
another turn in the privatisation of public authority (MacGaffey 1987), public sector 
workers also increasingly subsidised their poor salaries by asking for bribes before 
performing their duties.5 
 
Under Mwinyi, Nyerere’s successor as President, the state slowly began to turn a 
blind eye and gradually gave way to legalisation, liberalisation and privatisation.6 
The official line of the Tanzanian government was that the state had recognised early 
that because of structural adjustment ‘the informal sector was offering not only a 
source of alternate employment but a source of income supplementation to formal 
sector workers who were being badly effected by the erosion of their real wage 
incomes’ (URT 1991a: 3.4). Like many other African governments in the 1990s, 
Tanzania thus began acknowledging what to many had been obvious for a long time: 
that the bulk of the working population of developing countries have not depended 
on government to assist them to survive and develop but have utilised their own 
resources, their family labour and informal credit to find new ways to become more 
productive (McGrath & King 1994: 119). Unsurprisingly, there was little mention 
from African governments that the significant shift to acceptance of the informal 
sector came at the same time that opposition parties were emerging who had the 
                                                 
4 It is difficult to argue against teachers using their skills in after school tuition as an opportunity for a 
better wages under difficult circumstances, but it clearly is an abuse of their authority when it impinges 
on their official duties and responsibilities as occurs in some schools in Tanzania when teachers use 
pupils as labourers in construction programmes (see Molony (2000b), for example). However in 
Bulgaria similar work conducted by women has been defended by Roth (2002: 87) as an attempt at 
‘managing everyday life’ under the constraints of a deficit socialist economy. 
5 Hyden argues that the lasting effect of this bribery was a disintegration of the work discipline in 
formal sector institutions, especially government departments, and the inability of these institutions to 
serve society (Hyden 2000: 43). A recent study confirms that this attitude remains, with the mindset of 
many government officials still regarding entrepreneurs as a source of personal revenue undermining 
confidence in the government: ‘Officials request bribes to do most things within a reasonable period of 
time, and even then the entrepreneur is not guaranteed to come away with a license or registration at 
the end of the day. The examples of frustration circulate, discouraging other entrepreneurs from such a 
risky undertaking and undermining the credibility of the government in its role of economic guide’ 
(UNDP et al 2004: para.12). 
6 Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s presidency symbolised the government’s changing attitudes towards private 
entrepreneurship, although according to Magesi (1997) few economists are willing to categorise this 
move towards massive economic liberalisation as policy because it was obviously haphazard and 
wickedly corrupt. The pro-capitalist Mwinyi’s tenure was marked by ruksa (permission) politics which 
eroded respect for law and order and accelerated corruption and the incursion of business interests into 
the decision-making machinery for public affairs (Hyden 1999), and for this reason Tanzanians 
derisively refer to Mwinyi as ‘Bwana Ruksa’ (‘Mr.Do-as-you-please’). 
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potential to take the votes of the increasing majority who were not being cared for by 
the state.  
 
In the 1990s new environment of multi-party democracy (CCM have 
overwhelmingly won every election) and the formal abandonment of socialist 
policies, Mwinyi’s government undertook the National Informal Sector Survey (URT 
1991b) (hereafter NISS). His administration brought in a wave of changes during the 
early 1990s that saw the informal sector formally permitted under the Zanzibar 
Declaration (1991); the effective permission of party and government officials to be 
involved in the hitherto forbidden informal sector activities under the Amendment of 
Leadership Code (February 1991); the abolition of price controls and confinement 
policies and an increase in producer prices and improvement in agricultural 
marketing. It took a number of years for these early moves to be followed by further 
policies, until an increasing support for the informal sector came in various 
government policy documents during the late 1990s.7 The Sustainable Industrial 
Development Policy (1996), National Employment Policy (1997c), Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (2000) and Vision 2025 (2001) then all began pointing to 
the potential of the informal sector in generating employment and self-employment.8 
Many of these policies have been criticised for lack of ‘joined-up government’, 
however, as supportive initiatives from one line ministry are frequently counteracted 
by regulations from another (ESRF 2000: 12; Pfander & Gold 2000: 12).9 This 
                                                 
7 A JASPA study (ILO 1993: 25), for example, revealed that there was still no institutional framework 
for promoting development of the informal sector in 1993. 
8 Hereafter SIDP, NEP, and PRSP respectively. PRSP seeks to make efforts to bolster private 
investment into informal sector, facilitate access to credit and training, and ensure an enabling 
environment for the sector, while Vision 2025 sees a role for education to innovatively engage 
Tanzanians in entrepreneurship and self-employment, and the need to strike a balance between state 
and other institutions in economic management, particularly informal sector. 
9 This was a main criticism of the NEP, for example, which fails to provide a co-ordinating mechanism 
between the Ministry of Labour and Youth Development and the local government authorities who 
were supposed to have committees for employment promotion in place and to create a conducive 
environment for employment and growth (ESRF 2000: 12). The NEP is under review at present (URT 
2003c: 65) and according to Pfander and Gold is now to have a stronger commitment towards 
supporting (self-) employment within the informal sector and MSE sector (2000: 11-12) under the 
coordination of the Labour Department of the Ministry of Labour and Youth Development and 
monitored by the National Planning Commission (ESRF 2000: 32). In consultation papers for the new 
policy document the need for more practical support for the informal sector in urban and rural areas 
has been argued (Mbilinyi & Nyonyi 2000: 14), a case that has been made for some time by Lugalla 
who has consistently called for the need to address the process of rural-urban migration as a long-term 
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significant shortcoming has been addressed by the SME Development Policy (2002d) 
(SMEDP, section 1:19), which is the closest the government has got to producing an 
informal sector policy document.10 In a tone that suggests the wish for a clear cut 
from the past, it recognises the importance of informal sector SMEs to the economy 
and acknowledges that policy thus far has been uncoordinated (URT 2002d: 11). In 
part, admits SMEDP, this is because of the government’s own actions and 
unfavourable operating environment that has served only to create ‘a persistent 
culture that has not recognised the value of entrepreneurial initiative in improving the 
lives of the people’ (URT 2002d: 1). The policy also makes a start at amends for the 
government’s poor record by tying in with the Sustainable Industrial Development 
Policy (SIDP) (URT 1996) and Vision 2025 (URT 2001) documents to facilitate 
coordination. This time it is realistic on its own capability by setting only three aims: 
improving infrastructure, creating a conducive legal and institutional framework, and 
enhancing service provision (URT 2002d: 13). 
 
1:2. Present state of the economy and economic outlook 
With Nyerere no longer overseeing Tanzania’s course, the present government has 
now felt comfortable to openly criticise the Arusha Declaration, as can be seen in the 
Tanzania Development Vision 2025 policy document (URT 2001: 6), ‘an in-depth 
assessment of our country’s history and direction’ (ibid.: vi) that states a clear break 
from policies of the past. Under the leadership of Benjamin Mkapa (who was elected 
president in November 1995 and re-elected for a second term in 2000) the country 
has embraced economic liberalisation and sound macroeconomic management, 
which has led to impressive growth rates unknown during the socialist era, and 
allowed the economy growing resilience against adverse shocks (OECD 2005: 
432).11 Real GDP growth has been strong, averaging almost 6% in the past three 
                                                                                                                                          
solution to the informal sector (1997: 450). See Van Donge (1992a; 1992b), for example, on the pull of 
Dar es Salaam for rural youth. 
10 In this policy the SME nomenclature is used to mean micro, small and medium enterprises (URT 
2002d: 3). 
11 In a convergence of ‘New Broom’ and ‘Critical Juncture’ theses, Kjaer has recently (2004) argued 
that as a new leader Mkapa has more easily been able to initiate reform than an old leader might have. 
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years (EIU June 2004) and is forecast to remain around this rate in 2005-06, 
reflecting both the continued strong performance in the manufacturing, mining and 
construction sectors, as well as the solid growth in the agricultural sector. Inflation is 
expected to be low and stable, at 4%, in 2005-06 (EIU March 2005), having declined 
from an average of over 30% during the previous two decades. 
 
According to the IMF’s most recent Public Information Notice (IMF 2004), 
Tanzania’s sharply improved growth performance, aided by sizable donor support 
(from 4.8% of GDP in 1998-99 to 11.9 projected for 2004-05 (IMF 2005a: 13)), has 
had a notable impact on poverty.12 Yet the country remains very poor with many 
structural constraints to growth.13 The mortality rate of Tanzanian children under five 
years is 165 per 1,000 children, life expectancy is just 43 years (World Bank 2004c) 
and the most recent Household Budget Survey (URT 2002a) shows 25% of citizens 
have no formal education and 29% can neither read nor write. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit remarks that if the economy is to achieve improved rates of growth, 
the performance of the agricultural sector, upon which the economy remains heavily 
dependent (chapter four), will have to improve (EIU 2004: 26). 
 
1:3. Government policy on new ICT 
A further reason the present government has attributed to the overall weakness of 
many sectors, including agriculture, is the low level of utilisation of science and 
technology (URT 2001: 10), and here criticism has been aimed in particular at the 
lack of official initiatives and policies towards the digital economy (Kassim 2000: v). 
Yet while calls are still being made for the constraints to ICT development in many 
countries to be addressed in national strategies (e.g., Nair & Kuppusamy 2004: 29-
30), Tanzania has been quicker than many other African countries to develop its 
National Information and Communications Technologies Policy (URT 2003b), 
                                                                                                                                          
Mkapa has indicated that he will not amend the constitution in order to stand for a third term. The 
presidency looks certain to be taken by Jakaya Kikwete (Africa Confidential 2005). 
12 The IMF’s June 2005 economic review puts the projection of net foreign inflows to the budget 
equivalent to 10.8% of GDP in 2004-05, noting that significant increases are crucial for the country to 
meet its Millennium Development Goal targets (IMF 2005b: 9). 
13 See Wedgewood (2005) for a recent assessment of this, with a particular emphasis on the country’s 
efforts at poverty alleviation through improving the education and training foundation. 
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NICTP. The policy does well to recognise many of the challenges of the digital 
divide raised in chapter one, and is more realistic than the policies of some of its 
neighbours.14 Tying in explicitly with the goals of Vision 2025, the mission of the 
policy is,  
 
to enhance nation-wide economic growth and social progress by encouraging beneficial 
ICT activities in all sectors through providing a conducive framework for investments 
in capacity building and in promoting multi-layered co-operation and knowledge 
sharing locally as well as globally. (URT 2003b: 2) 
 
NICTP emerged from the ‘eThinkTankTz’ that was established in 1999 to bring 
together different Tanzanian stakeholders, and more recently an e-secretariat 
comprised of a more diverse set of stakeholders has been designated to coordinate 
the activities of the eThinkTankTz and to play a critical role in the follow-up and 
implementation of the national e-strategy. The main weakness of the NICTP, 
however, is that the role of the eThinkTankTz is not made explicit in the document. 
The implementation of the policy and the achievement of its goals and objectives is 
rather loosely attached as ‘the responsibility of the entire government at all levels and 
in all sectors’ (URT 2003b: 23). Unlike the SMEDP, where the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade is clearly charged with overall responsibility of coordinating its 
implementation (URT 2002d: 28), in NICTP the ambiguity over who is ultimately 
accountable for execution and follow-up runs the risk that Tanzania could lose its 
favourable position in the e-readiness rankings, which it is already showing signs of 
doing over the last two years.15 This placing is shown in the Global Information 
Technology report which assesses the overall preparedness of a country to participate 
in and benefit from the networked world and where in 2004 the government’s 
readiness came an impressive 36th place overall, with ICT as an overall priority for 
the government coming in 28th place (only three places behind Britain), while the 
                                                 
14 Rwanda’s ICT policy, for example, has been criticised as being ‘incredibly ambitious’ and 
accompanied by ‘unrealistic targets’ that fail to relate to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
emphasis on agricultural development in its plans for economic change (Hayman 2005: 17). 
15 Overall Tanzania came 71 out of 102 countries in the networked readiness index rankings of 2004, 
with only five African countries (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Morocco and Egypt) ahead of her 
(WEF 2004). By 2005 she has slipped to 83rd place (WEF 2005). 
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government’s procurement of ICT puts it in 17th place, ahead of any other developing 
country (WEF 2004). These commitments to ICT procurement show the 
government’s seriousness in further transforming the prospects of a country where 
many technologies were banned under Nyerere’s 1974 Prohibition Order on 
Electronic Computers and Television Sets (when in 1980 there were only three 
punched card computers in the entire country, all imported by special dispensation 
(Olomi 2001: 251-252)), to a situation where since 2001 all taxes and duties on 
computers and peripherals have been abolished.16  
 
1:4. The telecommunications regulatory framework in a liberalised 
market 
As part of Mkapa’s efforts to transform Tanzania from a state-centred economic 
flyweight to one of Africa’s success stories (Versi 2004: 16), the country has made 
considerable progress with privatisation and its steady withdrawal from running 
business. In terms of its response to the new challenges of the 21st century’s digital 
economy, this has been most visible in its early start on deregulation of the 
telecommunications sector, as outlined in the landmark National 
Telecommunications Policy (1997d) where the government states its central objective 
of ensuring that telecommunication services are provided in a liberalised and 
competitive manner. (This began some years before the United Kingdom promoted 
deregulation of the sector in its White Paper on International Development (DFID 
2000: 42)). Liberalisation opened the way for new mobile communications and data 
and internet service providers (ISPs), whose performance targets are enforced by the 
recently established Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) which 
– as the pre-merger Tanzania Communications Commission (TCC) – has been in 
place longer than most telecommunications regulators. Largely because of its 
initiation of an effective regulatory regime for cell phones and a more competitive 
market than most countries of its size, TCRA is regarded as one of the most effective 
                                                 
16 A tax waiver in 2002 led to a sudden mushrooming of I.T. vendors and ‘box pushers’ who, though 
bringing prices down for end-users, rarely offer customers a value-added service (Sebastian 2005). 
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in Africa (Støvring 2004: 21).17 Nevertheless, there are concerns about how truly 
independent of government the TCRA is, whether it is independent of lobbying for 
preferential treatment by powerful stakeholders (Vodacom is often mentioned) and 
whether the regulator has the technical capacity to foster a level-playing field for the 
benefit of the consumer, without penalising participants, and of being proactive 
rather than reactive. There are some recent steps in the right direction, including 
forming a Consumer Consultative Council, but the capacity and ability of this useful 
body is also in doubt. Overall, however, Tanzania does have a far superior policy 
framework and regulatory regime to other countries in the region. 
 
1:5. The Knowledge Economy 
1:6. ‘Black holes of informational capitalism’ 
The contemporary world is moving towards a new network-based economy in which 
there have been fundamental changes to the role and significance of information 
(Bell 1973) and knowledge (Paganetto 2004) as inputs to economic processes. This 
has been called ‘the thin-air business’ (Leadbeater 2000). In terms of globalisation, it 
is argued (Castells 1996; Held et al 1999) that economies largely rest on advances in 
information and communication technology by creating perpetually changing 
networks of interaction.18 This is in contrast to previous times, when society was 
fixed in space and time. 
 
The highly exclusionary networks of the global economy link only segments of 
economic structures, countries, regions and populations, depending on their position 
in the newest international division of labour concerning usefulness in the ‘real time’ 
flow of capital, knowledge and information (UNIDO 2000). By 2006 it is expected 
that this will favour almost half of the workforce in developed countries who will be 
                                                 
17 The TCRA was formed under the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act (Act 12 of 
2003) which merged the Tanzania Broadcasting Commission and the Tanzania 
Communications Commission (the former independent regulator under the Tanzania Communications 
Act 18 of 1993). 
18 See King and McGrath (2002, especially chapter 2) for discussion on the implications for Africa of 
globalisation and the new knowledge economy. 
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employed by enterprises that are either producers or intensive users of ICT products 
and services (Roy 2005). In sub-Saharan Africa on the other hand, the average 
teledensity is a mere two lines in 100 inhabitants and only 0.6% of internet users 
worldwide are on the continent. Despite the growth of mobile phones, which has 
outstripped that of fixed lines, Africa still lags behind in the transition to an 
information economy (Commission for Africa 2005: 235; Hamel 2005). Africa looks 
set to remain sidelined for some time since its economies are rarely a viable entity 
under the dominance of free market conditions where Africa’s reliance on primary 
commodities is unable to match advanced economies producing things that cannot be 
weighed (Castells 1996: 135-136). From the perspective of informational capitalism, 
African economies are therefore largely non-valuable and risk being bypassed 
completely by flows of wealth and information and shifted to a position of structural 
irrelevance (Castells 1998: 92; NEPAD Secretariat 2001: 6-7). Ultimately, it is 
argued, this will widen the digital divide (section 1:7) by depriving Africa of a basic 
technological infrastructure (Castells 1996) and lead to structurally irrelevant ‘black 
holes of informational capitalism’ (Castells 1998: 162). Together these herald a 
‘Fourth World’ (Castells 1998: ch.2) of already economically peripheral economies 
that risk further marginalisation. 
 
1:7. The Digital Divide 
1:8. What is the digital divide? 
Definitions of the digital divide vary greatly and the lack of universal criteria in 
assessing what the divide actually is means that there is little consensus on the extent 
of the divide and, as a consequence, whether it is widening or narrowing. It is clear, 
however, that it is more than a question of the gulf between those with physical 
access to ICT and those without, but is the cumulative effect of many missing pieces 
(Bridges 2001: 86). It is also inequality resulting from this gulf, the disparity between 






Barriers to ICT use in the South 
More specifically, aspects forming the divide include the state of infrastructure in 
marginal areas, the high initial costs of hardware and software, and the various costs 
of training locals to use a new technology when they may never have used electricity. 
‘Facilitating skills’ (Mansell & Wehn 1998: 111) are also required for the design, 
installation and maintenance of this equipment if it becomes available and, if it is to 
be sustainable, the skills need to be possessed by local technicians. 
 
Of even greater importance to the subsequent sustainability of an ICT in the South is 
that it needs to be affordable or it will not be used, and this requires local economic 
conditions that can sustain its use. In each case study, however, it does become clear 
from looking at individuals’ access to phones that ownership of a handset and SIM 
card certainly does not preclude access to mobile telephony. The International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) indicators, which have shown a consistent, 
tremendous growth in sub-Saharan Africa customers over the last few years (chapter 
two), ignore the many options open for non-owners of mobile phones who wish to 
call and receive calls and to send and receive text messages. In particular, the ITU 
figures do not account for the multiple use of ICT, and therefore underestimate 
efforts that Africans are already making to access and use these latest tools of 
globalisation to their advantage. As Pekka Tarjanne, the Executive Director of the 
United Nations ICT Task Force and a Former Secretary-General of the ITU astutely 
saw the situation in 1998,  
 
most Africans will not gain access to telecommunications without African initiatives, 
taken by individuals. The individual who sublets his or her phone line or sets up a phone 
shop or telecentre does more to close the development gap than the great corporations 
and businesses of the world.19 
 
The case studies expose other means of appropriation that today continue to 
contribute towards closing the digital divide in more subtle ways than are revealed by 
                                                 
19 Pekka Tarjanne speaking at ‘Africa Telecom 98’, 3 May 1998. 
http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press_releases/1998/19.html. Full quote from Benjamin (2000b).  
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ownership statistics alone. In locations where phone reception can be obtained as a 
consequence of more blanket coverage intended primarily to serve other areas we  
find what we call ‘network reception spots’ (section 3:10) that serve to illustrate well 
some of the innovative methods which individuals – and, later, communities – have 
adopted to take maximum advantage of what local coverage is on offer. Where 
reception is then made available we also reveal ways of recharging handsets in areas 
where electricity is not covered by the national supplier, and of paying for 
communicating by mobile phone when individuals cannot afford to purchase the 
equipment themselves.20 ‘Non-owning users’ not only pay for using huduma ya simu 
but can also use friend’s phones, in which case the repayment need not necessarily be 
immediate and can even be in kind. 
 
Of course, locals need to understand how to use the technology and its potential use 
needs to be understood and trusted, and relevant and appropriate to the needs of the 
user.21 Often this will need to be experienced personally over time to convince a 
cash-strapped sceptic, and for this to occur the ICT needs to be able to be used by 
non-English speakers and, if it is text based, requires the user to be literate. In many 
Southern countries this will prevent women from using these technologies effectively 
because their literacy rates are usually lower than those of men. Other socio-cultural 
variables such as cultural restrictions on the education of girls and female social 
mobility more generally also come into play, adding to the range of context-specific 
constraints to the access and use of ICT. 
 
International digital / development divide 
These barriers to effective and equitable ICT use in the South should come as little 
surprise since the international digital divide is an integral part of a much broader 
                                                 
20 In July 2005 Vodacom introduced Vodadukas (‘Vodacom shops’) powered by solar energy to serve 
areas where electricity is not available (Guardian 2005). 
21 Duncombe and Heeks (2001b: 1.14) show how ICT-mediated information is often irrelevant 
because it lacks proximity to the source. 
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and intractable development divide of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.22 Efforts by 
inhabitants of Southern countries to improve their lot through ICT is limited not just 
by domestic constraints that a national ICT policy may strive to address, but also the 
broader constraints imposed by the structure and dynamics of the global economic 
system. Domestic policies that attempt to use the internet to improve trade and 
employment opportunities, for example, will be impeded from the start by the 
inequalities of the current global financial and trade regime. Similarly, a seemingly 
local initiative such as the provision of the internet to a school in the South cannot be 
realised easily when the country has a debt burden to pay off, nor can an underpaid 
and demoralised civil service gain much from attempts to use ICT to improve public 
administration. The international policy environment is therefore very important 
since the macroeconomic system prevents ICT use at the local level from reaching its 
potential. This can only be achieved either through substantial aid flows to narrow 
the technology gap, or by dialogue between those at the policy level of the 
organisations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
whose decisions have far reaching implications over their counterparts at the national 
policy level of ICT initiatives (Hewitt de Alcántara 2001; Sachs 2000). 
 
The apparent narrowing of domestic digital divides 
As the digital divide closely follows disparities at the global level, so too do domestic 
divisions mirror existing socio-economic inequalities such as age, gender and 
disability.23 In the South, rich-poor / rural-urban divides are particularly great, and 
these tend to reflect a further fragmentation of the domestic divide along education 
                                                 
22 See Tanburn and Singh (2001: 1-2) for the argument that the traditional category of ‘developing 
country’ does not always fit poor ICT infrastructure, with examples of countries often perceived to be 
poor performing better than some wealthier countries. 
23 Many of the studies of the digital divide by race have focussed on America, where European and 
Asian Americans vastly outnumber their Hispanic and African American counterparts in their use of 
ICT. This ‘digital apartheid’, as Jesse Jackson has termed it (cited in Singleton and Mast (2000)), 
closely correlates with income, a key factor in PC and internet access and telephone ownership. 
Telephone ownership is confined to only some 12% of the richest quintile in sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia (Pigato 2001: 19). A considerable gap has also been shown to exist between black and 
white nationals in South Africa, where the majority black population is heavily outnumbered in terms 
of internet use by the minority of whites. 
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and geographical location lines.24 Yet domestic divisions appear to be narrowing 
because among the indigenous educated workers from privileged socio-political 
groups in the capital cities are workers for large and foreign companies who rapidly 
adopt the latest technologies (James 1999: 35) and distort the figures. The division 
also appears to be narrowing in the North because some domestic divisions between 
income, education and ethnic groups are decreasing for basic access to PCs and the 
internet, with most rich groups, especially the wealthy and educated, reaching near 
saturation in computer and internet take-up (Bridges 2001: 33). But in both North 
and South it is these privileged groups who acquire and use new technologies at such 
a quick rate that they become even more privileged. So while the ‘info-have-nots’ are 
gaining ground, the ‘info-haves’ are growing faster. In this light, ICT could be 
charged with exacerbating existing inequalities. 
 
1:9. Approaches to the problems of the digital divide 
Such inequalities are not always well recognised by studies and recommendations on 
the digital divide, which fall into the two categories of statistical studies and e-
readiness assessments. Statistical studies count numbers of users, teledensity, and 
sales figures, to know the uptake of ICT in a given area and sometimes by 
demographic groupings. The sources vary greatly from international organisations 
seeking global statistics by country (such as the ITU and the Internet Software 
Consortium), to private statistical compilers and very specific reports, so 
methodologies also vary greatly. These are used to inform e-readiness assessments 
which measure a country’s ability to integrate ICT into different sectors of society 
(i.e., schools, government and e-commerce). A weakness of these assessments is that 
they tend to neglect addressing the digital divide by socio-economic groups, so do 
not ask how technology is (or is not) being used in everyday life, nor the difficult 
area of how well technologies are being used (which is the value of case studies). 
One opinion is that enough of these assessments have been conducted now with 
frequent duplification (especially in e-readiness assessments), and it is time for 
                                                 
24 Caution should be taken in assuming that all minority groups are excluded from ICT access, 




implementation (Bridges 2001: 40). This is slowly happening, and e-readiness 
assessments across Africa are gradually translating into policy. 
 
1:10. Policy development 
Global responses to inform policy on the digital divide at the international level came 
with the World Bank’s (1998) Knowledge for Development, which heralded the 
arrival of ICT as a new development concern. This was followed by the launch of the 
UN ICT Task Force in 2001 as a forum on discussions on policy and particularly on 
how ICT can help achieve the Millennium Development Goals. A similar initiative is 
the G8’s Digital Opportunity Task Force, the largest and most comprehensively 
targeted at the digital divide and, according to one report, the most likely to make an 
impact on government policy.25 Both are significant in that they represent and 
encourage new forms of collaborative interaction among government, private sector, 
multilateral, and non-profit organisations, such as the public-private partnership of 
the Digital Opportunity Initiative (DOI) between Accenture, the Markle Foundation 
and UNDP.26 The latest milestone in the international dialogue around ICT and 
development is the World Summit on the Information Society which took place in 
Geneva in December 2003, and which aims again at the Millennium Development 
Goals by identifying strategies and actions that mainstream ICT into the work aimed 
at achieving them (WSIS 2003). The follow-up Tunis phase in 2005 will be an 
opportunity to test the international community’s commitment to goals, such as 
getting every village at least one point of access to the internet by 2015.27 A recent 
move towards this was made with the United Nations’ launch in March 2005 of a 
Digital Solidarity Fund to finance projects that address the uneven distribution and 
use of ICT and enable excluded people and countries to enter the new era of the 
information society. Nevertheless, while agreed at the international level there is a 
risk that policy principles are transplanted to countries across digital divides without 
                                                 
25 Bridges (2001). 
26 See DOI (2001). 
27 The WSIS met in Paris in May 2005 to discuss ‘ICT for Capacity-Building: critical success 
factors’. One of the foci of the meeting was satellite technologies, suggesting that this seems likely to 
be high on the agenda in reaching marginalised groups in remote areas. 
 
 19
being adapted to the local context. Countries are increasingly developing their own 
national ICT policies (chapter two), however, with an aim to addressing local needs 
and skills in the context of their particular political environment. Doing so should 
then more accurately be able to attend to access as a credible means of closing, or at 
least narrowing, the digital divide.28 
 
1:11. On-the-ground initiatives 
Increasingly operating in tune with national ICT policies, there are numerous on-the-
ground initiatives working to provide technology access and help to put technology 
to use in the South. Yet private sector, for-profit programmes, most frequently in the 
form of telecentres or phone shops, may also be charged with actually widening the 
digital divide within countries because they tend to replicate the pattern of inequality 
at internal-country level, providing access to the middle and upper classes who can 
afford to use them. Unlike explicitly non-profit social programmes, on-the-ground 
initiatives generally do not address wider issues of divide, such as local content. 
Those donor programmes that do attempt this typically become known to 
Northerners through articles in the media – especially the internet – and tend to 
report on projects that involve anything from infrastructure and physical access 
providers, training programmes and telecentres, to school computer programmes, 
agriculture and healthcare.29 These are usually portrayed as success stories or of 
holding potential, and it is rare that the project is revisited to assess its sustainability. 
They too often neglect related factors discussed above that address the access needs 
and active direction of the local society that would make a project self-sustaining, 
nor is mention made of failures. Little is also said about how and why ICT is being 
adopted and appropriated by individuals not attached to projects. Amid much talk of 
new models of social investment, Russell Southwood, CEO of Balancing Act and 
one of the foremost commentators on the use of ICT in African enterprise 
summarises the mismatch of agenda, noting that, 
                                                 
28 Bridges (2001: 73). 
29 See Digital Dividend (2004b) for a list of over 1,000 of these ‘ICT-enabled’ development projects, 




the actual practice has been a confused mix of traditional NGO funding with an overlay 
of upbeat venture capital rhetoric…. Doing good and doing business can overlap but 
they are not always the same thing. (Balancing Act 2003a) 
 
Only a small number of people are acknowledging any of these problems and few 
discuss the need for more entrepreneurial attitudes and the desperately lacking hard-
headed discussion about financial sustainability. 
 
1:12. Liberalisation of the Fourth World telecommunications industry 
While still holding true at the macro-level, Castells’ gloomy predictions for the 
impending Fourth World did not anticipate the privatisation of the 
telecommunications industry across much of the African continent. Nor did they 
anticipate the subsequent large-scale investment in the ICT infrastructure of the 
South by domestic entrepreneurs who are working with international companies to 
serve a massive untapped market that is hungry for the mobile phones and internet 
access that the liberalisation allowed (section 8:4). Africa’s mobile market, for 
example, has been the fastest growing of any region over the last five years, with 
over 13m new mobile subscribers added on the continent in 2003 alone, a figure 
equivalent to the total number of fixed and mobile phone subscribers in 1995. 
Internet users in sub-Saharan Africa are also set to rise, from just 4.5m in 2000 and 
13.8m in 2003, to 18.6m in 2005 (ITU 2004d). So only a few years after Castells’ 
influential ‘Information Age’ series (1996; 1997; 1998), broader sources of 
information are now increasingly becoming available in Africa as the internet 
expands within cities and communication by mobile phone is spreading rapidly into 
rural areas in a race to grab the market share. True, in the short term it is unlikely that 
these in-roads will pose any threat from Africa to the North and the continent will 
probably still remain largely irrelevant to the global economy for some time. But the 
recent boom of a reliable, and in some areas very high quality, ICT infrastructure in 
many African countries marks a massive improvement in information and 
communications technologies. As much of the donor literature on the ICT revolution 
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in the South is at pains to point out (UNDP 2001; World Bank 1998; 2000a), this 
does indeed provide the opportunity to access international markets. Perhaps more 
realistically at this early stage, however, at the domestic level it also allows for more 
reliable communication and access to broader sources of information. 
 
1:13. Post-Fordism, tacit knowledge and localised networks 
To those who have access to it, the massive growth in information highlights the 
importance of selection and use, and calls for caution over the challenge of accessing 
and understanding the codified knowledge of others (Stiglitz 1999). This is a central 
tenet of the post-Fordist discourse, which emphasises how for enterprises this rapid 
technological change highlights the importance of lifelong learning and the need for 
workers to regularly ‘retool’ their minds (Reich 1991). It also ties in with flexible 
specialisation theory that is characterised by an emphasis on networking (section 
1:20) and enterprise relationships (King & McGrath 2002: 24). Almost inevitably 
there are those who are unable to keep abreast with these rapid changes, and most at 
risk is the informal sector, which is in danger of becoming an unskilled, subordinate 
and dependent feature of capitalist development. The position of tacit forms of 
knowledge – ‘know-how’ and ‘know-who’ – the dominant forms of knowledge in 
Africa (Dahms 2001a: 1; Mansell & Wehn 1998: 257), and the localisation of 
external knowledge for the success of African MSEs, are therefore vital. 
 
1:14. Small Enterprise Development 
1:15. What exactly do we mean by ‘MSEs’ and ‘entrepreneurs’? 
There is no commonly accepted definition of micro and small enterprises, with some 
definitions using the number of employees to differentiate among categories, others 
using assets or annual turnover, but the specific definition often depends on the 
purpose and country context.30 Perhaps the most appropriate way of describing MSEs 
is to disaggregate them into categories by their general growth prospects.31  
                                                 
30 The term ‘very small and micro enterprises’ (VSMEs) has recently been introduced by McGrath 
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These can be positioned along an ‘enterprise continuum’ (Liedholm & Mead 1999; 
Mead 1999) of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ fields (Seierup 1994: 15-19) where ‘survivalists’ 
can be distinguished from enterprises with possible medium-scale prospects. So long 
as this potential for graduation to more profitable business is accepted – and studies 
suggest this relates to a convergence of factors that include education, experience and 
the broader enabling environment (Mead 1999) – this study finds two broad 
categories of micro- and small enterprise most helpful, breaking the universe of 
MSEs into two groups. One is majority ‘livelihood’ enterprises, which contribute to 
the total income of the family, enabling them to purchase essential goods and 
services. Within this would fall most family farms, which are now finally recognised 
as the most numerous of small enterprises (Commission for Africa 2005: 239).32 The 
other is minority ‘growth’ enterprises in which the owner seeks to expand activities 
to generate higher levels of return for consumption and/or investment and in which 
there is a higher degree of integration into market systems.33 
 
Irrespective of their place on the enterprise continuum – and the case study 
enterprises range from some exceptionally poor farmers and carvers to wealthy 
vinyago traders with even larger export potential than they exploit at present – we 
apply the term ‘entrepreneur’ to all the individuals operating the micro and small 
enterprises covered in this study. In the Schumpeterian tradition (1971), 
entrepreneurship is associated with actors who break with established patterns of 
behaviour and are particularly innovative in the economic sphere of society (Nijkamp 
2003). Trulsson, the author of one of the most detailed studies of entrepreneurship in 
Tanzania, sees that it is primarily about identifying and obtaining resources and 
combining them in novel and efficient ways (1997: 250). In both these senses – and 
                                                                                                                                          
(2005) in relation to enterprises with only one or two workers. 
31 Based on Duncombe and Heeks’ (2001b: 1.12) adaptation of Grindle et al (1989) and Mead (1994). 
32 The Report of the Commission for Africa is inconsistent on the status of family farms, at times 
referring to them as the most important of small businesses (e.g., 2005: 48), while at other times 
dividing the private sector into ‘micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and family farms’ (ibid.: 
229). See King (2005: 2-3) for a brief discussion of the farm/non-farm distinction over the past 30 
years. 
33 This dichotomy raises important policy questions over the balance between ensuring that the needs 
are met of the critical mass (of what are essentially poverty alleviating enterprises that make the poor a 
little less poor), and of programmes that may be weighted towards objectives of enhancing growth or 
even competitiveness (Rogerson 2001: 136). 
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certainly when compared with those individuals running the niche enterprises that 
Trulsson profiles – none of the enterprises covered in this study are operated by 
entrepreneurs. Proponents of the Schumpeterian position require that the 
entrepreneur demonstrates his or her ability through a change mechanism coined the 
‘entrepreneurial event’ (Shapero 1984), in which motivational and contextual 
determinants come together through what Seierup (1994) terms ‘a feel for the game’, 
and where entrepreneurship is defined by successful operation of business activities 
(ibid.: 19). In the context of the very challenging conditions where the rules are often 
different from the Northern system, however, success is relative for those engaged in 
business in many developing countries. While their entrepreneurial credentials in the 
Schumpeterian use of the term are usually limited, I do feel that the entrepreneurial 
quality of perseverance should be taken into consideration given the particularly 
harsh environment they operate under. Together with their unquestionable ‘feel for 
the game’, their ability to stick at it and make a living warrants the application of the 
term ‘entrepreneur’ to the individuals covered in this study. Nevertheless, it is vital 
that the enterprise continuum holds and the distinction is kept between upper and 
lower fields of entrepreneur. 
 
1:16. Why micro and small enterprises? 
The importance of the small enterprise economy to economic and social development 
in Africa is ‘almost undisputed’ (Rogerson 2001: 115), with wide-ranging benefits 
from their role in income generation for the poor, to their massive contribution to 
employment creation and growth (Biggs & Srivastava 1996; Commission for Africa 
2005: 239; World Bank 2004d: 39). Wider macro-economic benefits include their 
utilisation of local resources and little pressure on limited foreign currency reserves, 
their acting as a stimulus for the development of indigenous production of import-
substituting goods and services (Harper & Tanburn 2004) and their contribution to 
inputs into larger-scale industrial and commercial activity central to the poverty-
growth debate (URT 2002d: 4-5). This is particularly the case among ‘emergent’ or 
‘entrepreneurial’ informal and small enterprises where owner-operators have had 
significant exposure to both formal education, training and employment (McGrath & 
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King 1999). These advantages have been bolstered by powerful arguments in favour 
of the relative efficiency of smaller enterprises (Afenyadu et al 1999) that have 
helped ensure that small enterprises have been placed high on the policy agenda for 
African development (King 1996a; 1996b; McGrath & King 1999), with a shift from 
the policy periphery to an increasingly central role in African development planning. 
 
1:17. MSE constraints and non-financial services 
Even while it has been shown that African MSEs may not ‘grow like mushrooms but 
die like flies’ (Fluitman & Momo 2002: 26), and while operators have shown 
incredible resistance in hostile environments to earn the title ‘pioneers of 
development’ (Marsden 1992), the potential for graduation (Mead 1999) is often not 
realised and the reality for most MSEs is stagnation. This is because African MSEs 
face a host of challenges influenced by constraints more generally to national 
economies at the macro-level (Killick 1999) which, mounting evidence suggests, 
strongly influences the pattern of growth of employment in MSEs (Mead 1999).34 
Common constraints are the restrictions of an undeveloped infrastructure, 
unfavourable legal and regulatory frameworks, an ineffective and poorly coordinated 
institutional support framework and limited access to finance (Commission for 
Africa 2005; URT 2002d). 
 
For some time the solution to this last complaint (which can be argued to be 
symptomatic of other problems) was micro-credit, but it is increasingly being 
recognised that there had been a tendency to overstate the importance of credit as a 
core constraint on small enterprise development (Dawson 1997). Instead research 
studies have again begun to stress the importance of lack of demand or market 
access, lack of product diversification, inadequate infrastructure, and poor access to 
raw materials as equally significant points for small enterprise development 
intervention, moving non-financial support services back on the policy agenda 
(Rogerson 2001). These non-financial services are any of ‘the wide array of non-
                                                 
34 These are extensively described and assessed in the MSE literature. See for example, Rogerson 
(1999); Von Massow (1999); Tybout (2000). 
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financial services critical to the entry, survival, productivity, competitiveness, and 
growth of [a small enterprise]…that improve the performance of the enterprise, its 
access to market, and its ability to compete’ (CDASED 2001). Either provided by 
publicly supported programmes and organisations or the public commercial sector, 
these can include training, marketing assistance, research, business management, 
information and accounting, as well as higher-end strategic services such as technical 
assistance, product development and business linkage promotion. 
 
The focus of non-financial services has now shifted from service delivery and 
provider-centric models to a market development demand-driven model that 
emphasises commercial, business-like interventions with much greater emphasis 
being placed on the dynamics of the market and its environment (Dawson 1997; 
Knopp 2001). This has been heralded by the utilisation of a sub-sector approach to 
the analysis and diagnosis of the constraints and the design of appropriate 
interventions, taking an MSEs entire system vertically, through input supply and the 
production process to the marketing of the product or service. The advantage over 
conventional forms of analysis which relied on broad, non-specific interventions is 
that by seeing the small enterprise economy as more than an undifferentiated mass of 
enterprises it helps identify problems and solutions that are highly system-specific 
and focused (Buckley 1998). 
 
1:18. Up-to-date, system-specific demand-related information 
Of all system-specific information, market-related information is most highly valued 
by MSEs because it is not readily available to them (Duncombe & Heeks 2001b; 
Mungunasi 2000; Pigato 2001). In the classic textbook version of a market-based 
economy, the importance of market information is that it makes all markets work 
because both consumers and producers know how to react to demand and prices. In 
the South, and especially in rural areas where information is ‘poor, scarce, 
maldistributed, inefficiently communicated, and intensely valued’ (Geertz 1978: 29), 
market signals flow sluggishly and the result is inefficiency and inequality for 
farmers – the majority of producers in the South – who are unaware of demand and 
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prices (Eggleston et al 2002).35 But the point here is not so much that there is market 
demand, rather that there is a great need for relevant, up-to-date (over static) 
demand-related information that is specific to the MSEs’ particular market and, 
crucially, packaged in simple ready-to-use formats and available in the local 
language (written, speech, or multimedia). Here, it is argued, ICT located in one-stop 
shops or telecentres hold the potential for reducing information asymmetries faced by 
micro-entrepreneurs and can connect clients – commonly micro-entrepreneurs in the 
informal sector – to formal sector suppliers and markets (ITC 2001). Yet this does 
raise questions of the local relevance of content, the likely need for intermediation 
(Duncombe & Heeks 2001b: 4.63; Pigato 2001: 21) by ‘infomediaries’ (Schilderman 
2002), and trust in the value of the information. 
 
1:19. Enabling a business environment for the majority 
We turn to trust shortly, but in the meantime address the pressing issue of the 
government’s role in intermediation; first in facilitating the running of the MSE 
sector more generally, and then more specifically in relation to ICT. Where the 
enabling environment for the telecommunications sector is good (section 1:4), and 
often better than many other sectors of the economy, the government might do well 
to learn from its success in this area and better enable the environment for small 
enterprises to operate effectively.36 One move in this direction has been recognition 
of the informal sector in the latest Construction Industry Policy (URT 2003a), an 
industry we turn to in chapter five. This is the first government document to spell out 
their intention to ‘encourage, enable and improve the performance’ (URT 2003a: 19) 
of a part of the sector that provides a livelihood to so many Tanzanians. The 
document outlines its intention to ‘promote the useful existence of the informal 
construction sector as an integral part of the construction industry’ and, in an 
important concrete measure, the government offers to support credit facilities for the 
sector (URT 2003a: 19-20). This is an encouraging development for the informal 
                                                 
35 In terms of prices, the ineffectiveness with which information can be transmitted across markets is 
shown by Badiane and Shively (1998) who studied monthly maize prices in Ghana from 1980 to 1993 
and found that ‘the estimated time to fully transmit a price shock [from the central market to each of 
two outlying markets] is about four months’. 
36 See Daftari in Thomas (2005) for the government’s support of the ICT sector more generally. 
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operators, at least in the construction industry. Nevertheless, before the question of 
facilitating the use of ICT for small enterprises is raised there are many other familiar 
constraints to the progress of MSEs that still need to be overcome. Access to finance 
is still severely limited, the legal and regulatory frameworks are unfavourable, and 
institutional support is poorly coordinated and largely ineffective. 
 
Some moves towards creating a better enabling environment for MSEs are met in the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy (SMEDP), but it still remains to 
be seen whether the fine words of the policy document will be translated into action. 
This is especially true in the crucial transition between official policy as set by the 
central government feeding down to the ground, for local application of official 
policy is not always clear to operators, especially, as King (1996a: 203) found in 
Kenya, when there is little information on the ground that is circulating in Swahili. 
SMEDP also makes no mention of privileged access to local bureaucrats in the local 
application of official policy which, while perhaps coming across here as a minor 
point, is a hugely significant factor on the ground for explaining why some MSEs 
manage to flourish. This is particularly the case in the dissemination of new rules and 
regulations that slowly come through with SMEDP, and in their execution. At 
present certain MSEs – often the wealthier ‘information-elite’ entrepreneurs we 
discuss in chapter six – are still at an unfair advantage because of their access to the 
right people to ‘negotiate’ with (Commission for Africa 2005: 16), and as a 
consequence they become even more privileged and leave behind the majority of 
entrepreneurs who are less well connected.37 It is its focus on corruption and 
harassment that most sets the country’s nascent Informal Sector Roadmap (UNDP et 
al 2004) ahead from the main government policy documents (including SMEDP) that 
it aims to complement.38 
 
                                                 
37 UNDP et al (2004: para.14) found that survivalist MSE operators tended to want to remain small 
and invisible and to avoid compliance, while ‘entrepreneurs’ could be split into two types: those who 
tended to comply to avoid harassment and be free to pursue their growth, and those who, while 
pursuing their growth, refused to comply with the demands of corrupt officials. 
38 In further recognition that labourers are working in larger groups (fn 28) and of the intensification 
of labour over machinery, the roadmap favours developing markets for the employment-intensive 
sectors like construction and manufacturing (UNDP et al 2004: paras.206-207), effectively treating 
the informal sector as a labour sponge. 
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To be effective to as many informal sector operators as possible and not just the most 
privileged with favourable access to information sources, SMEDP will need to 
ensure that it takes care to treat the informal sector as far more heterogeneous than it 
currently does. One danger relating to ICT, for example, is in its plans to enhance 
service provision through e-commerce (URT 2002d: 19). Here the majority 
survivalist SMEs whose needs may be better served through developing their 
entrepreneurship skills through education and training (ibid.: 27) are at risk of being 
left further behind by the minority who are set to gain from such ventures. In this and 
many other aims such as the creation of a national website for SMEs and a directory 
of service providers, SMEDP needs to be clearer which SMEs the intervention is 
aimed at and what the likely effects of this will be on the future of the informal 
sector. At present it makes little of the continuum of SMEs in Tanzania, and 
apparently treats the informal sector as an homogeneous mass whose constraints it 
plans to tackle wholesale. Here it is perhaps worth taking on board Fafchamps’ 
observation that, 
 
perhaps the best measure of our lack of knowledge about how markets operate in 
practice is our propensity to call ‘informal’ everything that is not of Western 
inspiration…. African market arrangements and institutions take many forms, and it 
would be misleading to lump them together into a single ‘informal sector’. (Fafchamps 
2004: 4) 
 
This differentiation is well recognised in Duncombe and Heeks’ work on Botswana 
(2001a; 2001b), where they conclude that it is only flyers and potential flyers (all 
producing hardware and software in the ICT-sector) who should be the focus for ICT 
interventions because their enterprises require business interventions. For trundlers 
(those with a roughly static turnover and showing no great desire or capacity to 
expand) and survivalists, however, they argue that ICT is of limited value because 
they require welfare interventions. Yet for the enterprises covered in our three case 
studies and which would certainly be categorised as survivalists or trundlers by 
Duncombe and Heeks’ (2001b: 1.12) application of the term, this underestimates the 
small but significant change to business that a phone can have. What to outsiders 
 
 29
may seem a limited value of an information and communication technology may to 
the operators of the huge number of MSEs be a value that can make a considerable 
difference. As the Senior Statistician of Kariakoo Market Corporation (KMC) 
observes of farmers with better access to demand information from the wholesale 
market, for example, those with mobile phones now do not send their crops blindly 
but will know instead to divert their produce for minimum profit more locally instead 
of maximum loss in Dar es Salaam (section 3:11). 
 
SMEDP’s apparent treatment of the informal sector as an homogeneous mass also 
calls for the need to emphasise that when we talk of the majority of MSEs that have 
access to ICT, we are talking about mobile phones, not the internet. It becomes 
apparent in the case study chapters that no farmers or auctioneers (madalali) of 
perishable foodstuffs (chapter four) reported using the internet, and neither did 
construction gang-leaders (chapter five), carvers or collectors (chapter six). Only 
exporters of carvings reported using the internet, and this is mostly for e-mail and 
much less for accessing websites or promoting their own businesses on websites. 
SMEDP, which concentrates on entrepreneurs’ use of the internet, is therefore largely 
irrelevant to the majority of enterprises which – when they do use ICT – rely almost 
exclusively on mobile phones as a significant cost-saving device in day-to-day 
business communication. As it was recently put in The Economist (2005b), ‘[t]he 
digital divide that really matters, then, is between those with access to a mobile 
network and those without’. This raises the important question of whether energies 
should be directed towards what is being used by the majority at present – mobile 
phones – or towards what may hold potential in the internet if the obstacles to its 
effective use, especially in rural areas, were overcome. 
 
It is important to put this mobile phone uptake into perspective. In chapter five we 
note that although telephones are increasingly being used in the informal sector – 
Africa’s ordinary economy – this is only by a small minority at present, with few 
gang members other than the leader using a mobile phone for work purposes. By no 
means do all farmers use mobiles to contact the market and, for reasons that include 
lack of network coverage, inability to afford handsets and airtime credit, or simply 
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contentment with the status quo, very few carvers are using the technology either. 
Some carvers, for example, express contentment with dealing with their buyers face-
to-face, and we ask whether anybody other than the gang-leader in the ICW gangs 
need to use mobile phones for work purposes anyway. (We suggest out-of-hours 
work was a reason that they could). Whatever the motivation for phone use among 
present adopters, it does seem that as coverage spreads to new areas, the future 
access to the technology is still likely to exclude the chronic poor at the lower end of 
the informal sector spectrum. The simple reason for this is that if current 
interconnection rates remain the same (sections 8:2 and 8:3), mobile phones will 
continue to be too expensive for them to use for anything but the most infrequent of 
occasions. This leads us to observe that, in terms of personal possession of a phone at 
least, the stratified ownership of handsets may reflect what is now perhaps the 
biggest split in employment in Tanzania. The split is perhaps no longer the formal-
informal dichotomy, but increasingly that between a stratum of employers and 
middlemen, and a majority ‘informal proletariat’. In all but the most remote areas the 
employers and middlemen are using mobile phones where they can, while the 
majority informal proletariat are generally not using any ICT at all. 
 
1:20. Knowledge-sharing, trust and social capital  
As mentioned in section 1:13, the importance of linkages between MSEs and 
collaborating enterprises of different sizes is the opportunities that they present for 
sharing knowledge, much of which is tacit and difficult to codify (King & McGrath 
2002: chapter 6). King’s evidence from Nairobi, for example, suggests that 
continuing relationships with larger firms are an important source of skills and 
technological development (ibid.).39 Some evidence of the possibility for technology 
diffusion and learning or imitation effects among small enterprises (IDS 2004; Van 
                                                 
39 Counter to these claims, disagreement exists about the extent to which vertical relations promote 
skill transfer (Adam (1999); Jeans (1999), and see Meyer-Stamer (1995) for some doubt) and thus 
constitute an important source of learning for growth within SMEs. Nevertheless, such dialogic 
engagement between Africanists and others with an interest in international theory about skills 
development is to be encouraged (McGrath 2005), as can be seen in DFID’s increasing recognition of 
the importance of linkages in their establishment of a Business Linkages Challenge Fund (Department 
for International Development (2000: 62)). 
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Dijk & Rabellotti 1997) in Africa also comes from enterprise clusters – a group of 
producers who are engaged in making the same or similar things in close proximity 
to each other (Schmitz 1992) – so long as the clusters are ‘pro-active, consciously 
pursuing joint-action around problems and issues of common concern’ (McCormick 
1999b). Another associated thread are networks, which have long been seen as 
important to business success because they provide entrepreneurs with information 
about the wider world, in particular about technologies and emerging market 
opportunities (Barr 1999). 
 
Despite the increasing academic interest in networks, however, the evidence from 
Africa of their benefits is weak when compared with the great advantages that some 
enterprises have derived from networks in other parts of the world (Liedholm & 
Mead 1999). This has been attributed to a lack of trust between collaborating 
enterprises, a ‘neglected resource’ in enhancing the competitive advantage of clusters 
or networks (Humphrey & Schmitz 1998: 57). In contrast to other enterprises 
covered in the international literature, African MSEs are seen to be unable to 
concentrate on reaping the benefits of joint action because they are distracted by 
establishing and maintaining trust (Barr 1999; Fafchamps 2004; Ishihara 2003; 
McCormick 1999b; Parker 1994; Pedersen 1999).40 
 
Much of the lack of trust has been put down to the uncertainties created by an 
economic environment where the absence of a functioning legal and judicial 
apparatus regularly fails to sanction contracts (Murphy 2002). This can be because 
institutional practices are so complex that law cannot cover all contingencies, 
because there are no formal system of contracts anyway, or because people lack the 
contacts to access and take advantage of the law. Since ‘organisational networks’ 
(Karlsson & Westin 1994) are defined by contractual relationships (usually 
characterised by forward, backward and horizontal linkages) that require an 
accessible legal system, entrepreneurs therefore tend to shun the shifting alliances 
that weak ties demand and rely instead on what Granovetter (1985) calls ‘strong ties’ 
                                                 
40 Parker, J. 1994. ‘Patterns of Business Growth: micro and small enterprises in Kenya’. PhD 
dissertation. Michigan State University, East Lansing; cited in Liedholm (2001). 
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based on ascribed or earned trust developed over long periods of time. This type of 
trust is found in relationships based on more personalised sources embedded in 
‘entrepreneurial networks’ (McCormick 1996) that are often social (Lyon 2000: 664) 
and facilitate more than the informal enforcement of contracts. Crucially, they also 
allow for information sharing about prices, market conditions and referrals through 
social contacts leading to new business opportunities (Barr 1998; Duncombe & 
Heeks 2001b: section 4; Fafchamps 1999a; 2001; Fafchamps & Minten 1999; 
Murphy 2002). 
 
Taken together, it is argued (Barr 2000: 539) that trust and networks create social 
capital – the networks of relationships within an economy  or, crudely, ‘who you 
know’ (Duncombe & Heeks 2001b: 1.12). This acts as the glue of co-operative 
economic relationships and is the social interaction that underlies all such activity. 
Yet as Lyon’s (2000) study of networks in Ghanaian agriculture shows, there are also 
extra-economic aspects of trusting relationships that lie in the domain of cultural 
expectations, social pressure and ‘community’ conceptions of reciprocity and 
obligation. This requires recognition that social reality is far messier than social 
capital theorists tend to imply, with context-specific rules and established norms 
which bring rise to inequalities and hierarchical patron-client relations (Pedersen 
1999), generating contestations and struggles over access to social and economic  
resources.41 
 
Social capital has gained importance over the last two decades, principally in the 
fields of political science and sociology where the likes of Bourdieu (e.g., 1986, on 
exclusive membership of networks) and Putnam (1993b, on social capital in 
geographical regions) began to critique the narrow analytic perspective on economic 
activities of the neoclassical school of macroeconomic thinking. The mainstream 
perspective on economic investigation sees economic transactions as defined by 
rational calculations of individual gains (or, ‘rational choice theory’), and sidelines 
social and kinship obligations and with it the analysis of sociological conceptions of 
                                                 
41 Norms define what actions are considered acceptable or unacceptable, and can be seen as the basis 
of building and maintaining personalised trust. The term can be challenging because, as with social 
capital, norms are intangible and difficult to observe (Lyon 2000: 665). 
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economic activities (Huysman & Wulf 2004: 1). Social capital, in essence, allows us 
to study the social aspects of economic activities (Fine 2001: 198), although it has 
been regarded simultaneously as an economic, sociological and political concept 
(Szreter 1999), and also as a geographical concept (Mohan & Mohan 2002). 
 
With a spread of researchers from such disparate disciplines, however, it comes as 
little surprise that the term has no universally accepted definition, with some 
researchers considering it to be membership in groups and social networks (Belliveau 
et al 1996), others as a catch-all concept embracing social exchange and support 
(Adler & Kwon 2002). This lack of a rigorous definition has in itself led many 
economists (e.g., Durlauf 2002) to view the concept as woolly and based on 
inappropriate evidence, while others are wary of social capital because it is almost 
impossible to quantify, and question why the word capital is used since social 
networks lack a common currency and transferability (Robison et al 2002). 42 Some 
political economists and sociologists, on the other hand, are unhappy with the use of 
an economic metaphor to describe moral and social relationships, with those from the 
left preferring the terms socialism/capitalism because in policy social capital often 
leaves economic issues alone in favour of complementing economic with social 
engineering. It is here that the World Bank, in its uncritical acceptance of Robert 
Putnam’s work in particular, is seen by some (e.g., Fine 2001; Harriss 2002) as guilty 
of adopting the concept of social capital to support its bias against state intervention 
and trade unions.  
 
Aside from claims that Putnam and Coleman’s work is based on false empirical 
observations (Fine 2001: 191), it is fair to say that, in general, most researchers seem 
to agree with Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1995) that social capital should be 
regarded as any aspect of a group that facilitates the group’s interactions, both for 
that group and for its individual members. Yet one of the greatest difficulties of 
social capital is that whatever interaction is being measured – be it networks, norms, 
participation or reciprocity – there are problems in obtaining disaggregated data on 
                                                 
42 See Murphy (2002) on the difficulties of defining social capital, and Fukuyama (n.d.) for the 
difficulties of measuring it. 
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its dimensions. As Mohan and Mohan (2002: 199) observe, most indicators are 
derived from national studies that permit little disaggregating, and there are few 
international studies which attempt to ask comparable questions across a number of 
states. For those studies that do seek comparison nationally or internationally, the 
responses are often so context-specific that they are non-generalisable (Fine 2001: 
199), or are so vague as to be of little help. One recent study examining the effect of 
social capital on industrialisation, for example, can only offer the least incisive 
conclusion on its generalisability, that 
 
the high degree of state economic intervention, widespread corruption, and ethnic 
diversity in Indonesia are hardly unique among less developed countries, and this 
suggests that the findings of this paper [that initial social capital does not predict 
subsequent industrial development] could be relevant elsewhere. (Miguel et al 2005: 14) 
 
Indeed, some even posit that the rise of the social capitalist paradigm has actually 
turned social networks into a concept that conceals more than it reveals. In a new 
article that explores the role of social networks in businesses across Africa, Kate 
Meagher (2005) argues that the essentialism and cultural determinism of social 
capitalist perspectives have distorted our understanding of the continent’s informal 
economies by conceptualising networks as ‘social capital’, to the extent that they 
tend to portray them as ‘social liabilities’ if they fail to promote economic efficiency 
and accumulation. Meagher’s study is exciting because not only does it direct 
attention to what she persuasively argues are the more institutionally-sensitive 
network perspectives of ‘legacies, linkages and localities’;43 she also offers a 
welcome break from the ‘sack of analytical potatoes’ (Fine 2001: 191) that those 
interested in social capital are forced to peel through at length in order to make a 
meal of some of the more unappetising chips from the literature. To be fair, social 
capital is still in the early stages of serious empirical investigation and we are yet to 
have a clear sense of its boundaries (Field 2003: 137) – particularly as researchers 
from disparate disciplines add to and increase the confusion of what has been 
                                                 
43 These focus on how the economic performance of networks is shaped by their specific institutional 
content as well as by the nature of their linkages with the wider society and the state. 
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described as the ‘chaotic conception’ (Warde & Tampubolon 2002: 177). The risk, 
however, is that if researchers continue, as Ben Fine (2001: 192) puts it, ‘adding one 
more damned variable’ without acknowledging that as a result the other elements to 
which the contextual is added ought to be critically rejected, or reconstructed, we are 
left with much rich data that is useful for one particular locale but cannot be 
generalised and so is of little value elsewhere.  
 
Trust is a particularly troublesome variable that is often associated with social capital 
(e.g., Fukuyama 1995), again because (as mentioned above with networks, norms, 
participation and reciprocity) there are difficulties with its aggregation. As Harriss 
(2002: 114) notes, for example, there is no reason to believe that trust developed 
through interpersonal relations (as in local associations) is simply aggregated up into 
societal trust.44 A weakness of Narayan and Pritchett’s celebrated study of the role of 
social capital in influencing household outcomes in rural Tanzania is that – following 
Putnam’s lead in using data on levels of associational activity as proxies for social 
capital – they rely on this very assumption when positing (1997: 18) that greater 
levels of trust lead to higher village social capital.  
 
What appears to make informal networks personal is direct, face-to-face contact, a 
pervasive feature of African MSE economies (Dahms 2001b: 9-10; Egbert 2004; 
McCormick 1999a: 1532; Mungunasi 2000: 4.1; Trulsson 1997: 132-133). Indeed, 
personal interaction cultivated through extensive face-to-face contact is so highly 
valued as the most effective method of business communication (McCormick 1998; 
Pigato 2001) that poorer enterprise owners will only act upon, and trust, information 
delivered on a personal level (Duncombe & Heeks 2001b: section 4). Given the 
arguments in favour of the transformative potential of ICT for African MSEs (section 
1:23 below), the sudden interface between traditional, established social integration 
(produced and reproduced by face-to-face contact), and the suggested shift towards 
ICT that will bring system integration (produced and reproduced by individuals 
                                                 
44 Harriss notes that some empirical research even suggests that the relationship may well run in the 
opposite direction, with trust in governmental institutions breeding greater interpersonal trust and a 
trust in society.  
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distanced between space and time (Giddens 1990: 18)), can therefore be seen to have 
implications for the way that African MSEs work. 
 
Social capital – let alone trust – is largely missing from the ICT scholarship 
(Huysman & Wulf 2004: 7-8). Those contributions that have been made are heavily 
biased towards the internet and its use among development practitioners  (e.g., Rohde 
2004) and suggest that, whatever the relationship between online networks and social 
capital, the networks and the study of them are still too much in their infancy to reach 
any useful conclusions. Less research has been done on economic actors operating 
outside the aid industry in developing countries, although some work on the use of 
mobile phones in sub-Saharan Africa has been conducted by James Goodman 
(2005). His work that is available in the public domain was undertaken for Vodafone 
(giving an indication, perhaps, of why the work is so in favour of a positive link 
between mobile phone ownership and life satisfaction and a willingness to help 
others) and concludes that in South Africa and Tanzania mobile phones are used 
mostly in strong links (family and friends), but also in weak links (links with others 
outside the community, including businessmen) (Goodman 2005: 59, 63). The 
advantage of mobile phones in weak links is that they allow users to circumvent 
traditional social barriers which (he argues in an earlier study of mobile phones in 
Poland) ‘has implications particularly for developing world economies and groups 
that are reliant on strong support networks’ (Goodman 2003: 3). These findings seem 
to complement twelve World Bank-funded studies (2002) undertaken in developing 
countries that point to the importance of social networks in increasing the availability 
of information on such issues as crop prices, location of new markets, and sources of 










1:21. ICT for Development 
1:22. What do we mean by ‘information and communication 
technologies’? 
Information and communication technologies encompass a set of activities that 
facilitate, by electronic means, the capturing, storage, processing, transmission, and 
display of information.45 This includes both the information infrastructure (i.e., 
wires, transmitters, computers) and the information technology (i.e., the applications 
and content that travel through the infrastructures).46 While it is recognised that ‘[t]he 
terminology needs to be inclusive and should avoid the use of the acronym ICT if it 
is only to be equated with new technologies’ (Skuse 2001: 12), this study takes a 
‘narrow’ view of new ICT. We pay less attention to the older ICT of radio and 
television, and largely consider the internet and mobile phones because they are the 
most widely used new ICTs among Tanzanian entrepreneurs.47 Colle’s (2000: 423) 
‘electronic multimedia’ view of ICT is therefore discarded, for although it embraces 
telecommunications links, computers, network services, and databases, it also 
includes electronic media applications such as audio and video recordings, films, 
print duplicators – technologies that are irrelevant to the mainstream requirements of 
Tanzanian MSEs and to which, for the most part, entrepreneurs are a very long way 
from gaining access to. Of these two technologies it is worth noting that the mobile 
phone seems to evoke much less intellectual enthusiasm than the internet, around 
which ICT discussion tends to be centred and to which development assistance in 
terms of access is largely focussed (Hewitt de Alcántara 2001: vi). As Geser (2002: 
section 2) notes, in Castells’ theoretical perspective (1996; 1998) only the internet is 
given the status of a mega-innovation that counts, while mobile communication 
                                                 
45 OECD definition cited by Hewitt De Alcántara (2001: 3). 
46 See World Bank (2000b). 
47 On the topic of the popularity of mobile phones as new ICT it is worth pointing out at this stage that 
in many examples given in this study farmers and traders refer in Swahili to the generic word for 
‘telephone’ (simu) and not specifically to the ‘mobile telephone’ (simu ya mkononi). When asked if 
they meant the fixed line telephone (simu ya kawaida) or the mobile phone, the majority said the 
latter. As a couple of respondents explained, this is probably because although mobile phone coverage 
in many areas is still far from ideal, the accessibility, reliability and price (particularly when texting) 
of mobile phone use is so superior to the TTCL fixed line service that in both urban and rural areas 
fixed lines are increasingly ignored nowadays as a form of telecommunication. See also footnotes 16 
(section 8:5) and  35 (section 3:10). 
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facilities are almost totally neglected, despite them being used by a broader strata of 
the world’s population.  
 
1:23. What is the case for the transformative potential of ICT? 
Studies that have considered the indirect impact of ICT on development have drawn 
a distinction between ICT production, which has contributed significantly to the 
economic success of many of the ‘tiger’ economies (Mansell & Wehn 1998), and 
consumption, which is more likely to bring benefits to poorer countries (Kraemer & 
Dedrick 1998). The successful experience of East Asian countries has led support to 
an ‘ICT-led’ development thesis implying that poor countries can adopt 
‘leapfrogging’ strategies. This view sees ICT as a ‘window of opportunity’ for 
developing countries to progress from a situation of ‘zero’ or ‘limited’ technology to 
widespread adoption of ‘sophisticated’ technologies, without going through the 
stages of technological adaptation and learning experienced in Northern countries 
(Hobday 1994). Having leapfrogged to these new technologies, ICT can then be used 
in Southern countries to plug knowledge and information gaps, which are seen to be 
primary impediments to their growth and development. As the World Bank (1998) 
has put it,  
 
Information is the lifeblood of every economy. In more traditional economies, 
information may be less codified, more often conveyed in personal interaction, but it is 
vital nonetheless….Without reliable information, markets do not work well. (World 
Bank 1998: 72) 
 
In terms of markets, this confidence in ICT comes from the information-theoretic 
approach to understanding development which looks at the causes and consequences 
of transaction costs, uncertainty, incomplete markets and incomplete information, 
and attributes these constraints to information asymmetries (Akerlof 1970). Only 
with ICT, so goes the information-theoretic approach, can rural areas of developing 
countries then create integrated markets (Eggleston et al 2002). The evidence to 
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support this approach has until very recently relied on the impact of ICT on 
economic growth from the study of high-income countries.48 
 
A vast promotional literature also exists on the benefits and potentials of ICT as a 
tool for enhancing daily life by increasing access to information (DOI 2001; Gerster 
& Zimmermann 2003; UNDP 2001) for a whole host of areas from health, education, 
empowerment and participation, to protection of the environment. As the UNDP’s 
Human Development Report, Making Technologies Work for Human Development, 
puts it when asking what is new about information and communications technology 
as a means for eradicating poverty in the 21st century, ‘it is a pervasive input to 
almost all human activities: it has possibilities for use in an almost endless range of 
locations and purposes’ (UNDP 2001: 35). According to the Digital Opportunity 
Initiative (section 1:10), this is based on ‘ample evidence that a focused, micro-level 
application of ICT can contribute to individual development goals’ (DOI 2001: 
chapter 2). 
 
Again, the problem with such sweeping statements about what ICT can do for 
development is the very limited evidence that is used to support the case for how the 
diffusion and application of ICT can be a catalyst for economic competitiveness and 
growth in developing countries. Even when a case for the macro impact is made, 
such as the recent Vodafone-sponsored study by Waverman et al (2005), it tends to 
ignore that disentangling the development impact of ICT from those of other changes 
can be difficult, requiring good impartial data and careful attention to issues such as 
reverse causality (Eggleston et al 2002; Matambalya & Wolf 2001).49 In fact ITDG’s 
worldwide research (ITDG 2001) critiquing the Making Technologies Work Human 
Development Report (UNDP 2001) for DFID could identify no single proven 
sustainable model for poor to use ICT. To take the case of ICT and MSEs again, 
                                                 
48 Röller and Waveman’s (2001) analysis over 20 years, for example, finds a significant positive causal 
link between telecommunications infrastructure and economic growth in 21 OECD countries. 
Vodafone has very recently looked at the impact of telecommunications on macro economic growth in 
developing countries and documents the (only positive) social and economic role they play in South 
Africa and Tanzania (Waverman et al 2005). 
49 In other words, does a positive correlation between improved ICT and economic growth reveal that 
(1) ICTs bolster growth, or that (2) growth nourishes improved ICTs, or dies it suggest both? 
(Eggleston et al 2002: 70). 
 
 40
there are few documented instances showing the direct relation between the use of 
ICT and increases in income for small-scale enterprises or households (O'Farrell et al 
1999), and similar conclusions have been reached more recently by Russell 
Southwood (Balancing Act 2003b).50 Even where benefits have been found, a useful 
study by Duncombe and Heeks (2001b) shows that those enterprises making 
significant gains have been using ICT for some time. These meet two very 
challenging criteria that act as key determinants of whether or not ICT is used within 
an enterprise: threshold size, typically expressed in terms of a few tens of thousands 
of US dollars of annual turnover, and sub-sector, with ICT-use being concentrated 
among areas where ICT were commonly applied to the primary value chain and/or 
linkages with ICT-using suppliers (e.g. printers/publishers or those in engineering 
services who rely on drawings) or where customers are located outside the country 
(manufacturing exporters and the tourist industry) (Duncombe & Heeks 2001b). As 
discussed in section 1:15, this is clearly a very small amount of MSEs in Southern 
countries, the majority being survivalist and predominantly rural informal sector 
enterprises with little or no access to telecommunications. It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that one of the report’s authors concludes that,  
 
ICT…remain out of reach for the majority of small enterprises. This will remain true for 
the foreseeable future – most African small enterprises will neither own ICT nor access 
and use ICT-based data. (Duncombe & Heeks 2001b: 2) 
 
The result of all the optimism is that failure has largely been ignored, with estimates 
suggesting that the majority of ICT-based initiatives end in total failure of a system 
that never works; partial failure in which major goals are unattained or in which there 
are significant undesirable outcomes; sustainability failure or replication failure 
(Heeks & Davies 1999). The negative impacts such as job losses, increased stress, 
reduced flexibility, centralised control and surveillance and impoverished 
communications have also been downplayed (Heeks 1999), with too little emphasis 
                                                 
50 One new exception is a collaboration between Information for Development (i4d) and the 
International Institute for Communication and Development (IICD) that provides a series of articles on 




being placed on the importance of ICT for addressing the information needs of the 
poor. Taken together, the danger is that the policy debate becomes too strongly 
focused around the capabilities of ICT without enough evidence to substantiate the 
claims. 
 
1:24. The Adoption and Appropriation of ICT 
1:25. Adoption and appropriation of ‘neutral technology’ 
The emerging picture is one of a deficiency of evidence and analysis of everyday 
appropriation of ‘ICT for development’, especially for the African context where the 
social dimensions of technology in the field of ICT for income generating activities 
remain largely unexplored. Of the North it is argued that the lack of interest in the 
sociology of ICT can be attributed to a lack of contestation of the problematic 
aspects of technological determinism, which ‘leaves no space for human choice or 
intervention and, moreover, absolves people from responsibility for the technologies 
they make and use.’ (Henwood et al 2000: 9-10). This holds for the South too. The 
alternative to the dominant technological determinist approach, in its common forms, 
adopts what Henwood et al calls the ‘technology as neutral’ view, in which the usage 
of technology is emphasised. The advantage of this ‘technology as neutral’ model is 
that it gives ‘a prominent place to people, individually and in groups, making choices 
about how they want to use technological artefacts’ (ibid.: 10). 
 
These choices are part of the adoption and appropriation process in which individuals 
and communities encounter, engage with and adapt an innovation. This is concerned 
with how decisions are made about innovation, the process of actually obtaining the 
product and then its implementation and use (Stewart 2001: 45) (in the case of an 
ICT, to meet specific information and communication needs).51 In general, this is 
about creativity and power over the tools and content of communication. More 
specifically, adoption in this thesis refers to the factors that influence the decision-
                                                 
51 See Stewart (2001: chapter 2) for discussion on the key terminology (‘adoption’, ‘appropriation’, 
‘domestication’, ‘consumption’, ‘use’, etc.) associated with the sociology of ICT. 
 
 42
making involved in the take-up of a new product and its diffusion over time through 
society. As Stewart (2002) shows, the adoption of new products and classes of 
products may be an individual process, but it is also social; and the social situation, 
whether it be within a closed community, or through a broader personal network, is a 
source of ideas, products, support and values. These thoughts are influenced by the 
work of Rogers (1995), who by studying the diffusion of innovations within a 
community, highlights the social nature of adoption – how an individual adoption is 
only part of a broader community of adopting. The concept of appropriation in the 
Tanzanian context is also dealt with, in section 8:6. Appropriation in this thesis refers 
to the process of an ICT-user reworking and personalising a new product to make it 
their own. This has been extensively studied in consumer research and the study of 
diffusion of innovations in the North, which show that the way we appropriate is 
shaped by our local environment and relationships, and our everyday activities and 
interests, and personal life goals and themes. As cultural studies has it, the consumer 
is active, a ‘bricoleur’, a tinkerer, engaged in a ‘multidimensional process of 
negotiation involving humans and non-humans’ (Akrich 1992). Again, little is 
known about how adoption and appropriation of ICT works in the South, and how it 
is initiated and maintained (Michiels & Van Crowder 2001), but what is likely is that 
the rate of adoption and appropriation is largely determined by the same practical 
constraints of money, space, time and skills (Dholakia et al 1996: 380) as the North. 
 
1:26. The informal economy of ICT 
The arena in which much of the process of adoption and use of ICT products and 
skills occurs has been referred to as an informal economy (Stewart 2001: chapter 6) 
because of the informal nature of the exchange and sharing of artefacts, information 
and knowledge.52 More specifically, the economy is ‘a social network exchanging 
and sharing goods, passing information by word of mouth and by demonstration, a 
place where people learn from each other and together’ (ibid.: 324) and in which the 
individual is only part of a broader community of adopters (Rogers 1995). A key 
                                                 
52 For clarity the informal economy here should perhaps be more accurately referred to as the 




person in this economy is the opinion broker (Stewart 2001: 59)53 or ‘cosmopolite’ 
(Rogers 1995: 273-274), an early adopter who travels widely and is therefore more 
likely to have strong links to and be influenced by other social networks or other 
external information sources. Through interpersonal communication (Stewart 2001: 
chapter 7) the opinion broker acts as a key element to creating a critical mass of 
adopters (ibid.: chapter 8). 
 
As Stewart (2001) has shown, however, there are many products that do not need to 
be personally owned to be used, or for people to be affected by their presence. 
Nevertheless, the literature on ICT usage in the South – especially the digital divide 
literature with its exaggerated focus on access – is still dominated by misconceptions 
which fail to see that constraints to access that apply in high-income countries are 
sometimes much less important in the different socio-economic context of 
developing countries (Prahalad 2000). This can be seen both in the large-scale 
sharing of information resources such as newspapers, radios and televisions and, 
more recently access to the internet.54 It also ignores that products in Africa, rather 
than being discarded altogether, are often adapted throughout their lifecycle, being 
recycled, as Kopytoff (1986: 399) has shown, to suit various demands from the first 
elite owner to be shared among the masses. 
 
1:27. Research Questions 
The appropriation of products to suit their African environment can seem some 
distance from the new post-Fordist demands of the knowledge economy. In an 
increasingly globalised world, however, in which multinational corporations are 
intensifying their efforts to explore new markets and where ICT is now deeply 
embedded in the conception and practice of socio-economic development 
(Thompson 2004), these technologies are no longer exclusively an issue for the 
                                                 
53 Rogers (1995: chapter 2) uses the term opinion leader as somebody important in determining the 
rate of adoption of an innovation system. 
54 Each computer with an internet or e-mail connection in Africa supports an average of three users 
(UNECA; cited in Akst and Jensen (2001). 
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North, and are now approaching economically poorer regions apace.55 It is 
unfortunate, therefore, that the ferocious rate with which ICT is being adopted in 
Africa means that those interested in the effects of ICT – not least government policy 
makers – are being misled by what is now already outdated research. In the case of 
enterprise in Tanzania, for example, the working assumption which guided the 
national ICT policy document (URT 2003b) was that, ‘with the exception of a few 
large banks and other companies, there is minimal use of computers and 
telecommunications in the business sector’ (Miller Esselaar Associates 2001: 40). 
Inaccuracies like this point to the urgent call for research into how a large and 
seemingly absent segment of the economy operates outside the most visible confines 
of more formal business communication and knowledge retrieval systems. Such an 
insight would offer an inlet of crucial importance to our knowledge of the 
development of small enterprise throughout the South. 
 
This thesis seeks to reply to that call by taking three case studies covering very 
different contributions to the Tanzanian economy, and looking at how ICT is being 
used by various entrepreneurs in day-to-day business.56 For each case study key 
informants were identified as a starting point from which to locate and then follow 
their business linkages and those of their contacts throughout the networks of the 
sub-sector. This involved physically tracing the marketing of construction services 
and the entire domestic supply chains of perishable foodstuffs and African 
blackwood carvings. Interviews and discussions were then conducted with these 
various entrepreneurs to act as empirical evidence with which to assess how they 
communicate with each other in business, and the role that new ICT now play in 
these interactions. 
 
Since there is very little detailed evidence of the appropriation of these new ICT in 
business – with sparse detailed analysis from developing countries beyond the oft-
cited examples of farmers and artisans avoiding exploitative middlemen – efforts 
                                                 
55 Thompson (2004) analyses a recent speech on ICT by the president of the World Bank Group and 
shows that the discourse surrounding such technologies replicates and extends into the developmental 
sphere a markedly North American worldview. 
56 See section 2:2 for a detailed explanation of how and why the case studies were chosen. 
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were taken to reflect the reality of the majority, non-assisted African-run enterprises. 
This was achieved by ensuring that those entrepreneurs who were interviewed had 
not received assistance from donor projects, especially in their access to ICT.57 
 
The contribution of the research is therefore to inform policy-makers both in 
Tanzania and further afield with detail on how ICT is being used, and the changes 
this is bringing to the existing business culture. This interface between ICT and 
business culture in Tanzania has hitherto been neglected. We then ask how the 
technologies may be better applied for business use in Tanzania, although it is also 
felt that there is much here that is transferable and will also enrich – or question – our 
knowledge of the use of ICT in business in other countries in the South. Ultimately, 
however, the interest is on the developmental applicability of what we learn about 
Tanzanian entrepreneurs’ use of these new technologies. This is the concern of many 
of the entrepreneurs interviewed in the case studies, and the government’s awareness 
of this was recently articulated in a discussion with the Director of Information and 
Documentation at COSTECH (the body who oversee foreign academic research in 
Tanzania), in which he expressed his appreciation of the many studies being 
conducted in the country in all academic disciplines but questioned how many of 
these have any impact on the ground.58 To these ends, in addition to postdoctoral 
dissemination within the academic and donor community, the long-term objective of 
this research is to provide individual entrepreneurs who contributed so much to this 
research with oral feedback offering feasible interventions. Crucially, it is also for 
those policy-makers in Tanzania who have so much influence over the future course 




                                                 
57 One contribution is Nielinger (2003a) who, building on Matambalya and Wolf’s (2001) solely 
productivity-based approach to the influence of ICT on enterprise competitiveness, uses what is now 
somewhat dated data from 2000 to provide empirical data on the ICT utilisation of select SMEs in 
Tanzania. As the author admits, however, it needs to be recognised that the choice of the information-
intensive and internationally-oriented business segments (the tourist industry is one, see section 1:23) 
distorts this analysis. 
58 Discussion with Theophilus Mlaki, COSTECH, Dar es Salaam. 22 February 2005. 
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Research question 1 
In terms of micro and small enterprises it is argued that one of the greatest benefits 
ICT can offer is the opportunity they present for obtaining information that will help 
develop integrated markets (Eggleston et al 2002). For enterprises in Africa the 
empirical evidence to support this is not overwhelming, but it is clear that under the 
present information asymmetries faced by micro-entrepreneurs there is a great need 
for relevant, up-to-date demand-related information that is specific to the MSEs’ 
particular market. While it is probably true that, for the foreseeable future, ICT will 
remain out of reach for the majority of African MSEs and most will neither own ICT 
nor access and use ICT-based data (Duncombe & Heeks 2001b), the fieldwork for 
this study shows that in Tanzania entrepreneurs are well aware of the opportunities 
provided by ICT and are increasingly reacting to the situation by gaining access to 
the technologies. 
 
This evidence suggests that while ‘third way’ proponents such as Castells (1996; 
1998) look to have been correct in their prediction of Africa’s fate in the macro-
economic picture – a safe bet but six years ago – many fail to have anticipated the 
recent massive expansion in ICT infrastructure across most of the continent. ‘Third 
way’ proponents have also underestimated the response of many Africans to take 
advantage of the availability of ICT by using at times ingenious and (from the 
Northern view) unconventional methods. By seeking to reveal, using three case 
studies, how and why a growing and ‘missing’ group of ICT adopters are 
appropriating technology to suit the particularities of their socio-economic 
environment, the study therefore hopes to show that at least in terms of access the 
digital divide may now not be as immense as we in the North – and many policy 
makers in the South – are led to believe. The research question is: How is ICT being 
integrated into the existing business culture? 
 
Research question 2 
Castells also warns of a risk that at the national level the increase in access to ICT 
merely links up African elites to the global networks of wealth, power, information 
and communication (Castells 1998: 91-92), further marginalising the poor. The 
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research for this study again challenges these predictions by showing that while no 
threat to the dominant global economic system is likely to be created by African 
entrepreneurs in the near future, there is a growing group of non-elite entrepreneurs 
who are learning to use ICT and are not being left behind economically. Part of the 
reason for the growth of this group is that in Tanzania, as in the North, access prices 
to ICT is falling, driven by ordinary rules of labour and demand. Put simply, 
businesses want a mass market for their goods, and companies are beginning to 
appear who can supply to customers seeking an affordable version. In this light, 
markets for ICT in Tanzania are acting pretty much like markets for radios, 
refrigerators, cars and mobile phones in the North (Singleton & Mast 2000: 32), 
which all started out as luxury goods and spread downward, not instantaneously but 
inexorably. 
 
Perhaps a greater risk then is the effect that ICT is having on a business culture that 
relies heavily on, and trusts more, information delivered on a personal, face-to-face 
level. This calls to question how tacit knowledge – ‘know-how’ and ‘know-who’, the 
dominant forms of knowledge in Africa – is being dealt with when ICT is providing 
the opportunity to move beyond strong ties based on ascribed or earned trust 
developed over long periods of time. Here the study seeks to reveal whether 
information sharing about prices, market conditions and referrals through social 
contacts is leading to new business opportunities for Tanzanian MSEs. The research 
question is: What changes is ICT bringing about to the existing business culture? 
 
Research question 3 
Based on the replies to these questions, our final question considers, quite simply, 





1:28. Thesis outline 
In addressing these questions we begin with an introduction to Tanzania’s economy 
as background to the present government policy on ICT. This is presented in brief 
market commentaries of telecommunications systems and the internet in Tanzania, 
where we discuss why ICT is now popular, and with whom. Chapter three outlines 
the methodology, deals with some pertinent methodological considerations, and 
explains the rationale for using multiple case studies. These serve to answer 
Duncombe and Heeks’ (2001a) call for sector case studies of secondary ICT users, 
focussing on linkages. Chapters four, five and six present separate case studies which 
use the findings of semi-structured interviews and open discussions with 
entrepreneurs to reveal how ICT really are being accessed, adopted and appropriated 
in the non-donor assisted real world of Tanzanian micro and small enterprises. The 
first case study traces the supply chain of perishable foodstuffs from the rural 
shambas (farm plots) of Iringa and Mbeya to the wholesale market in Kariakoo, Dar 
es Salaam.59 We then take a study of Dar es Salaam’s construction industry in 
chapter five, which is followed by an analysis in chapter six of the use of ICT in the 
supply chain of Makonde carvings (vinyago), from the source of the wood of the 
African blackwood tree to their export as marketed products. The concluding chapter 
ties together themes arising in the three case studies with issues from this opening 
chapter. On the basis of evidence from the case studies we then assess how ICT is 
being integrated into the existing business culture, the changes this is bringing to the 
existing business culture and how ICT may be better applied for business use in 
Tanzania’s particular setting.  
                                                 
59 Kariakoo municipal market is the biggest and most important wholesale market in Tanzania, 
attracting produce from all over the country. It is estimated (Chijoriga 1992: 5) that the market handles 
about 60% of all staples, fruits and vegetables which are brought into Dar es Salaam for wholesale 
purposes. The Kariakoo Market Corporation (KMC), formed under the Act of Parliament 36 (1974) to 
implement the running of Kariakoo and other markets in Dar es Salaam, is a state company under the 
Ministry of Local Governments. 
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2 The Research Process: journalist, businessman, 
spy 
 
The myth of the chameleon fieldworker, perfectly tuned to his exotic surroundings, a 
walking miracle of empathy, tact, patience and cosmopolitanism, was demolished by 
[Malinowski,] the man who had perhaps done the most to create it. (Geertz 1983: 56) 
 
This study builds upon empirical data collected during two periods of fieldwork in 
Tanzania over a total of 15 months in 2002 and 2003.1 The first period ran from 
April to August 2002, and the second from October 2002 to September 2003. In this 
chapter I recapitulate my research journey by mapping and discussing how I have 
negotiated the research process from deciding to undertake doctoral research through 
to the writing-up of the thesis. I place particular emphasis on how I focussed in on 
three case studies and then how I was able to achieve some success in locating and 
gaining access to my sample businesses people. I then locate the study within the 
qualitative tradition and the interpretive research framework, and explain why I 
chose to take multiple case studies to aid the generalisability of my findings. The 
validity of the research is then considered by looking at the methods of data 
collection I adopted and how I dealt with the challenges posed during the course of 
gathering this. I then explain my approach to the description and interpretation of the 
data, all the time taking into account the important influences of the research 
environment of these processes. Because of the constant personal negotiation over 
method (that is, the actual techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data 
relating to my research questions) and methodological considerations (the analysis of 
how research should or does proceed), however, every issue that ever arose during 
the research process cannot be covered here. At the risk of losing detail, therefore, 
many issues that are covered have been condensed so that they could be included. 
                                                 
1 Many of my recollections here are based on a review of discussion papers written for supervision 
sessions, drafts of fieldwork strategy papers, field reports I submitted during the fieldwork, and a field 
diary I kept during both periods of fieldwork. 
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While a great deal was scrutinised at the time – and there was surely much I also 
unwittingly ignored – space does not permit the replication here of how I came to 
every decision I made. For this reason I sometimes have to present my actions as 
fact, without always rationalising them in depth and offering the pros and cons I had 
to consider.2 The issues I do include are those I regard as the most salient features 
from the entire process of how I have come to my conclusions. In tune with the entire 
research process, therefore, the aim of this account has been to make it reflective, not 
merely autobiographical. 
 
2:1. The emergence of the basic ideas: Tanzania, enterprise 
and ICT 
My research proposal for the funding for this present work sought to examine a range 
of emerging areas of enterprise that I had identified in the earlier study of north-east 
Tanzania, urban and peri-urban entrepreneurs at the other end of the ‘enterprise 
continuum’ (section 1:15) and how they are able to exploit niche markets. Along 
with entrepreneurs operating fashion and design, food processing and furniture 
enterprises that I was to look at, my greatest interest was in the entrepreneurs in 
small towns such as Same who had begun to rent on-location the use of office 
computers for internet access. While it rapidly became clear when I later began my 
research in Dar es Salaam that such multiple application of products is commonplace 
in the informal economy, at the time in 2000 any form of access to the internet 
seemed to me very ‘Western’ and alien to the rural business landscape I was then 
familiar with where housewives sell their farm produce at the local market and 
mafundi repair seemingly irreparable Land Rovers with lump hammers. This exciting 
new area of computers-to-rent in Africa which I had never before witnessed led me 
to broadly state in the research proposal that one of the areas I wanted to look at was 
                                                 
2 It is not the task here to regurgitate from the huge literature that exists on doing a research project, 
where much similar discussion is given to quantitative research methods and methodology, all with 
predictable table of contents covering almost every subject down to how to write field notes (Bryman 
2001: 306-309). The greatest weakness of this voluminous literature is that it is often not aimed at 
research in foreign settings. There is some debate over the conduct and context of fieldwork in the 
South, placing a greater emphasis on the subjectivity of ethnographic work. See the list presented in 
Batterbury (1994: 64) and the recommended reading at the end of the same volume. 
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‘ICT’, then a niche market in as much as it was specialised and very new to 
Tanzania, and uncharted territory in the study of African MSEs.3 In this area I 
proposed firstly to find out whether these modest ‘cyber cafés’ are a new emerging 
niche market with growth potential (which I quickly found was true) and then, 
quoting from DFID’s White Paper on International Development which had recently 
been released amid much talk about the digital divide, I questioned whether access to 
such new technology has ‘the potential to help poor people leapfrog some of the 
traditional barriers to development, by linking them into the new global economy 
[and] improving their access to knowledge’ (DFID 2000). Aware that the potential 
for MSEs in Africa to exploit the ICT niche had not been studied, my emphasis was 
on the ways in which entrepreneurs use their access to the internet as a source of 
developing their businesses. 
 
2:2. Evolution of the research project 
2:3. Edinburgh: September 2001 – April 2002 
My research journey formally began upon receiving funding in September 2001 
when I embarked on a series of fortnightly sessions with my supervisors. In October 
I produced a brief review document covering the main secondary sources pertaining 
to MSE development and ICT in sub-Saharan Africa, and then in November set 
about consulting academics and private sector and donor agency practitioners with 
knowledge and insight grounded in years of experience in enterprise development to 
get some judgement of their feelings about my field of research.4 To these 24 
individuals I posed a couple of broad questions, asking: if they believed my interest 
in the use of ICT in MSEs was worthwhile pursuing; what their experience of ICT in 
African MSEs was; what they or their organisation were doing in this field and 
whether they knew of others who may be worth contacting on this. The response was 
                                                 
3 Kenneth King and Simon McGrath first encouraged me to pursue this ICT lead, while I was more 
sceptical of the scope of such a study – in retrospect, probably because I was so used to witnessing a 
high failure rate among rural MSEs and took some persuading that such enterprises could survive. 
4 In a later article, King (2004) – who urged me to conduct this hugely important exercise – argues why 
consulting practitioners’ views is so crucial at this stage. 
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encouraging and, through bringing me up to speed with what was happening on the 
ground, began to open my thoughts to possible avenues I could follow.5 
 
Questions of access to ICT arose and I started to think that I could pursue an analysis 
of the ways in which entrepreneurs use their access to ICT to develop business 
networks as a possible determinant of MSE ‘success’. In determining how I might 
assess this in the field I discussed with my supervisors the possibility of looking at 
how entrepreneurs’ differing points of access affect how they use ICT and (on the 
basis of my internet research) speculated on possible points of access: telecentres, 
and where ICT is supplied by an NGO and personal purchase. This was still all 
speculation, however, based on others’ accounts of ICT in different parts of Africa, 
while in my mind ICT in Tanzania was still a frustratingly unreliable internet 
connection accessed through a dusty office in Same town. I was growing 
increasingly discouraged with having to rely on second-hand evidence and out-dated 
memories and did not relish the thought of having to wait until the beginning of my 
second year to finally get to see for myself what was happening on the ground. 
 
By February this frustration intensified when in a further progress report I had to 
address the question of how my findings had altered the balance of my thesis. I 
realised that I still had more questions that answers. It therefore came as a massive 
relief when my supervisors suggested that I write a fieldwork strategy paper with a 
view to conducting a preliminary research safari exploring the state of ICT in MSEs 
in Tanzania. This report was submitted in March 2002 and, after discussion with a 
new co-supervisor and several drafts later, I then presented these thoughts to the 
                                                 
5 I benefited especially from the kindness of Donald Mead (Agricultural Economics, Michigan State 
University) who spent much time on a series of comments addressing my questions, and particularly 
urged me from his experience to try to see ICT only as enabling factors facilitated by institutional 
arrangement, a way of making relationships work once markets have been identified. Thoughtful 
comments that still stand out as having salience in my personal development of how ICT were then 
(and still are) being used in African MSEs were also offered by Abigail Barr (CSAE, University of 
Oxford) and Christian Rogerson (University of Witwatersrand), who brought to my attention a number 
of key texts by Susanna Wolf. Andy Jeans (Programme Manager, APT Enterprise Development) was 
crucial in first raising the issue of trust in relationships among those who will not always know each 
other, especially when ICT is being used. 
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doctoral peer-group at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.6 From 
this meeting I was excited to learn that as well as the internet, cell phone phones 
were now becoming increasingly widespread in Tanzania where formerly only the 
elite had access to mobile telephony, so I re-wrote my strategy paper to also include 
a whole new form of ICT I never knew had already been introduced in Tanzania. The 
aim now was to undertake a first phase of fieldwork to provide background on the 
role of ICT – the internet and mobile phones – in Tanzanian MSEs, to gain an insight 
into who are using these technologies and why, and how they are being used to aid 
small enterprise competitiveness. With this background knowledge, it was hoped, I 
would then be better informed about what my research questions might be, and to be 
in a stronger position to know which entrepreneurs I could work with later. 
 
2:4. Tanzania, Phase one of fieldwork: April – August 2002 
After submitting my research application to the Commission for Science and 
Technology (COSTECH, who conduct ICT research for the government) and quickly 
receiving the clearance forms (thanks to my ability as a their neighbour to check on 
progress every day), I gradually became reaccustomed to life in Tanzania. I 
undertook a period of formal Swahili tuition, and all the time kept my eyes open to 
the various uses of ICT in Dar es Salaam, my city of residence. I rented a room in 
Kijitonyama, a middle-class African residential area, and got to know workers 
throughout the city, chatting with them as they conducted their day-to-day business, 
especially those working locally in the now ever-present huduma ya simu phone 
kiosks and internet cafés. During this bedding-in stage, away from the academic 
setting, the learning curve was steep as I followed an array of different leads that I 
had never previously explored. Largely at random I used a combination of 
questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and chatting to survey staff and users in 
the internet cafés; computer and mobile phone technicians at their workbenches; 
government officials at COSTECH , an I.T. Officer at Tanzania Association of 
                                                 
6 Under the guidance of Simon McGrath, these short sessions provided a necessary forum for sharing 
early thoughts with other Africanists on possible research areas. I benefited in particular from the 
fresh-from-Tanzania views of Dave Edwards and Steve Kerr, who both acted as sympathetic sounding 
boards for my undeveloped interests. 
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NGOs and internet service provider (ISP) executives in their offices and when the 
occasion arose, youths on the street operating at the ‘acquisition’ end of the informal 
economy. I also talked with any entrepreneurs willing to entertain my questions 
about what they did and how they used their mobile phones and obtained access to 
the internet for their income generating activities. In a sampling method that I only 
deemed satisfactory because of the short period of time available to cover this first 
phase of broad exploratory research, the locating of these individuals relied for the 
most part on those people I came across on transient walks across the city, and 
whether they were prepared to talk with me. In finding internet cafés, for example, 
while the intention was to approach all 22 ISPs and then take a sample of their 
internet café customers by municipality, some ISPs were reluctant to give the 
necessary details. The cafés were therefore located instead by walking around the 
city’s three municipalities of Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke and choosing whoever 
was prepared to talk.7 
 
Perhaps of even more importance, this period back in Tanzania also reminded me of 
the need for flexibility in planning and how to utilise my time realistically.8 It was 
during this stage that I began to discard two areas I had considered in Edinburgh: an 
analysis of the influence of ICT on existing Asian trade networks, and the use of ICT 
supplied to small enterprises by NGOs. 
 
NGOs 
Previous research provided links with a large NGO in Tanzania (The Gatsby Trust) 
which supports MSEs and had recently provided computers to four associations to 
enable them to network with their members and others in marketing and business 
                                                 
7 Enoch Yonazi and his COSTECH colleagues researching for the elusive e-readiness paper adopted a 
more representative method for their field survey of Tanzania’s internet cafés by assigning three 
research assistants to cover the main artery roads of the city and then the feeder roads, starting with the 
City Centre, then Temeke, the Port Access Road, Ubungo and the airport route (Discussion with 
Mathias Masawe, Senior Librarian, COSTECH, 17/07/02). 
8 This first phase is reminiscent of Barley’s (undoubtedly exaggerated) account of his fieldwork in the 
Cameroons when he reports that one per cent of his time was spent doing research, while the rest was 
‘on logistics, being ill, being sociable, arranging things, getting from place to place, and above all, 
waiting’ (Barley 1983: 98). 
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development. I steered away from donor-assisted projects, however, because I felt 
that – for all their attempts to create sustainability – in the area of small enterprise 
development NGO assistance projects are often artificially produced constructs that 
tend to represent the extra-ordinary and do not well reflect the reality of the majority, 
non-assisted African-run enterprises.9 
 
Asians 
While my intention had always been to focus my study on ventures initiated and 
owned by indigenous Tanzanians (with the hope that the work will contribute 
towards developing African entrepreneurship), I was, however, open to the study of 
Asian-run enterprises.10 Though a relatively small minority group in East Africa, 
Asians are already well positioned and hold substantial economic influence and as a 
consequence their role as efficient capitalists has often been hindered by government 
policy on the mistaken notion that they constitute ‘Asian capital’ (Himbara 1997) .11 
The present government, for example, though not explicitly stating Asians in its 
policy, is still seeking to redress this racial imbalance. It outlines this in its vision for 
2025, by which time ‘racial and gender imbalances will have been redressed such 
that economic activities will not be identifiable by gender or race’ (URT 2001: 3).12 
It is the influential position of Asian capitalists in the Tanzanian economy that drew 
                                                 
9 King (2004) also makes this point. See Batterbury (1994) for a discussion on the pros and cons of 
affiliations to development projects. 
10 The majority black Tanzanians descend from one of the country’s 120 indigenous ethnic groups 
(such as the Makonde and Zaramo we introduce in chapter six). Though now passé among many 
northern-based Africanists, the term ‘tribe’ is used here to refer to these ethnic groups, to which every 
Tanzanian will usually regard themselves as being a member of. Tanzanian English-speakers use the 
term tribe, which is also the translation every Tanzanian I have ever asked uses for the Swahili word 
kabila. The term was also applied by Lyn Schumaker when presenting at the Centre of African Studies, 
University of Edinburgh, 04/11/04. 
11 In contrast to King (1996a: 47n) who uses the term ‘Indian’, the term ‘Asian’ is used here to refer to 
those who Swahili-speakers call wahindi, South Asians of Indian and Pakistani origin (Heilman 1998: 
385). Wahindi began migrating in large numbers to East Africa during the colonial era and many have 
now become Tanzanian citizens, while others remain residents. Among other religious communities of 
Jains, Sikhs, Parsees and Catholics, the two main Asian communities in Dar es Salaam are Hindus and 
Muslims (mostly Ismai΄li but also Ithnasheri and Bohora). Along with Mideasterners and Europeans, 
these non-indigenous Tanzanians still form under 1% of the population. See Gregory (1993). 
12 See Heilman (1998) on a history of animosity towards Asians, who have long been regarded by 
many urban indigenous Tanzanians as unpatriotic opportunists. Despite their formal legal rights, he 
notes, ‘Asians are still a special group whose status is somewhat like that of guest; their ability to live 
and prosper in Tanzania depends upon the goodwill of their African hosts’ (Heilman 1998: 382). 
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me towards hoping to investigate how they have managed to be so successful in 
business and, I hoped, might provide some clues for the development of indigenous 
African entrepreneurship.13 I planned for such an analysis to obtain some awareness 
of how ICT have altered existing traditional trade networks, particularly in the light 
of a new generation of more technically-educated Asians who are beginning to take 
over business from elders who have long had a tradition of what Seierup (1994: 11) 
calls a ‘feel for the game’ of entrepreneurship.14 Such an examination may also have 
revealed an internal digital divide – ‘a part of the North in the South’, both in terms 
of ICT assets and knowledge – that favours the minority of prosperous Asians over 
the majority African population, and would have provided much detail with which to 
then consider the influence of ICT on the ethno-economic balance of power in 
Tanzania. 
 
In the event, however, I was unable to penetrate Dar es Salaam’s Asian business 
community. This was despite having a couple of long time friends who are respected 
members of Indian communities and who may have been able to provide access to 
networks within these communities, but I did not wish to abuse the generosity they 
offered in other areas. Furthermore, I have always suspected that – perhaps 
inaccurately, since I must admit to having never tested this belief – penetrating these 
communities would be difficult and that Indians would be reluctant to share with an 
outsider much of their business practices in any detail, under the basic business 
                                                 
13 More work has been done on Kenya’s Indian business community. See Himbara (1994), for 
example, for discussion of the role of Kenyan-Indians as leaders of a dynamic entrepreneurial sector. 
Supporting Barr’s (2000: 557) contention that the apparent superiority of some ethnic groups in 
business might relate to their tendency to build up and maintain more effective networks, see 
Fafchamps (1999b) on the circulation of information within Asian communities, and his later work 
(2004) where – while he does not rule out the existence of strong ethnic bias in other African countries 
– he concludes that network effects have a stronger effect on trust and information sharing than 
religion and ethnicity. For a study of the utilisation of ethnic ties and kinship relations within an 
African community (where cross-ethnic co-operation is rare) in Nairobi, see Ishihara (2003: chapters 
5-6). 
14 Ned Bertz agrees with my belief that younger East African-born Asians are increasingly benefiting 
from community networks that stretch globally to Northern countries such as Canada where they 
studying subjects such as I.T., to then return home and set up I.T. businesses as the demand for these 
services increases. I would also agree with his contention that Asian success in their traditional 
domains of petty trading and import-export lies in their access to opaque credit networks (Discussion 
following Bertz, N. 2004. ‘Educating the Nation: Race, Nationalism and the Indian Diaspora in the 
History of Tanzanian Schools’. Paper presented at States, Borders and Nations: Negotiating 
Citizenship in Africa, 20 May 2004, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh). 
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principle that knowledge is power which those who hold it will not necessarily want 
to share it with others. Nevertheless, I did pursue my interest in ethnicity, especially 
between Tanzanian tribes and in inter-ethnic economic relations, by asking many of 
the Africans I interviewed or chatted with their experiences of dealing with Asians 
and their views on the group’s dominance in the economy. These discussions would 
often offer anecdotes that reveal a fairly uniform picture of Africans’ deep-seated 
views about Indians (and also Tanzanian tribes and, at times, white Africans), and 
these views reveal two camps of African-Tanzanians, broadly similar to those 
Heilman (1998: 377-380) identifies: those who concede that hard work, thrift, and 
skill contributed to Asian business success and that Asians should not be blamed for 
their prosperity, versus those who counter, for example, that Asians are corrupt, 
disinterested in national development and divert wealth abroad (Egbert 1998). 
 
This on-the-ground research culminated in a 66 page report in which I described the 
eclectic findings arising from this first exploratory phase in Dar es Salaam, with a 
particular emphasis on internet cafés, mobile phones and call shops, and 
entrepreneurs’ use of them in personal income-generating activities. The informal 
economy of mobile phone acquisition and sale was also covered in some detail, as 
was the role of the electronic engineer fundi as businessman and expert. With this I 
was able to reflect on those hypotheses I might pursue during the second focused 
phase of fieldwork, and what methods I would employ. To use a fishing analogy, the 
process can be seen to be akin to starting with a broad trawl net to catch everything, 
discarding that which I was not interested in (in the belief that one must be interested 
in what I was about to study for many years) to only then know what specific species 
were in the waters that I would want to be angling for later, and where I would find 
them. 
 
Indeed it was during this first phase that I became acquainted with some individuals 
who were to prove crucial to the later research, and from where some of my early 
thoughts on some key themes emerged: Hamisi Geddy and Dickson Wiva, key 
informants in the vinyago case study were met through a helpful member of staff in 
an internet café in Mwenge (footnote 56, Appendix II) and who volunteered to 
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approach them; a middleman using his mobile phone for trading fertiliser was met 
during a random street interview in the city centre, prompting an interest in the use of 
ICT in agriculture (chapter four) and entrepreneurs’ use of call shops for their 
personal income-generating activities prompting initial investigation into what turned 
out to be what I regard as a triumvirate of ICT as the informal ‘office’ (chapter six). 
 
2:5. Edinburgh: September – October 2002 
Narrowing down on what to study, and which sectors to use as case studies 
Having looked at as many opportunities as possible, upon my return to Edinburgh the 
field report served to generate discussion on the direction of my more substantial 
period of fieldwork, which I was keen start as soon as possible. By this time I knew 
that I wanted to conduct a longitudinal study (as best I could in the relatively short 
period available) maintaining regular contact with the same entrepreneurs or 
organisations over a period of time and following a sequence of events within their 
real-life context in order to connect directly with social reality, over an extended 
period, using multiple sources of evidence. This, I was sure, would involve a number 
of different enterprises, ideally in different locations, which I would take as case 
studies – a decision that was influenced by my reading of the structural adjustment 
literature where Ponte (2002: 4), commenting on agricultural change in the post-
adjustment era, argues that by focussing on the macro-level, the richness of local-
level experiences and divergent reactions to policy change is lost.15 As Knorr-Cetina 
puts it: 
 
…it is through micro-social approaches that we will learn most about the macro order, 
for it is there approaches which through their unashamed empiricism afford us a 
glimpse of the reality about which we speak. Certainly, we will not get a grasp of 
whatever is the whole of the matter by a microscopic recording of the face-to-face 
                                                 
15 Bryceson and Bank warn, however, that while richly detailed local case studies are being generated 
in this field, these can lack a sense of interconnection and an appreciation of overall social patterns, so 
local case studies must have must have larger relevance (Bryceson & Bank 2001: 18). This 
understanding of macro level development and the development of general models can only be 
achieved, argues Trulsson (1997: 318), when enough case studies allowing for comparisons across 
time and space have been undertaken and compared. 
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interaction. However, it may be enough to begin with if we – for the first time – hear the 
macro order tick.16  
 
In Edinburgh I then wrote two drafts of a pre-phase two chapter outline, with a view 
to return to Tanzania in late October where I would then decide which networks I 
would physically follow from three of five possible case studies I had identified 
during the first phase of fieldwork: agriculture, construction, traditional craft, the 
motor vehicle industry, and ICT as businesses. To help me make this decision I 
planned to delve into all five possible case studies and see what emerged from this 
early analysis. In the pre-phase two chapter outline I sketched out the broad research 
questions I was interested in, along with more specific questions relating to all five of 
the prospective case studies, and methodological considerations I had to bear in mind 
(and which later provided a useful focus at times when I decided to take stock on 
whether I was conducting my fieldwork as considerately as possible). The research 
questions for each case study related primarily to how ICT is being used in 
Tanzanian MSEs; how they have been adopted and to what benefit when compared 
with previous and existing means of information and communication exchange and 
how they look set to change the way business is done in future. Among these 
questions (and certainly not exclusively) I sought to find out more specifically in 
what ways ICT have enhanced enterprise development and competitiveness in terms 
of an entrepreneurs’ ability to adjust to new market conditions; to identify new 
opportunities and innovations within the enterprise and to minimise marketing and 
technology development costs through networking and forging ties with other actors. 
This was to be based on a prior investigation of the extent to which suppliers in 
traditional networks have adopted ICT and the shape that traditional, pre-ICT 
business networks took, who were involved in them, and how they were formed. 
Having established this I was then interested in finding out where the establishment 
and maintenance of trust fits into these relationships, at what stage ICT is then 
employed, and who act as the ICT intermediaries. 
                                                 
16 Knorr-Cetina, K. 1981. ‘The Micro-Sociological Challenge of Macro-Sociology: Towards a 
Reconstruction of Social Theory and Methodology’, in K. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel (eds.). 
Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-







2:6. Tanzania, Phase two of fieldwork: October 2002 – September 
2003 
Deciding on case studies 
On my return to Tanzania I was again based in a rented house in Kijitonyama, Dar es 
Salaam, where I spent the first two months in the University’s East Africana section 
conducting a broad review of the published books, articles and unpublished theses 
covering enterprise development and my sectors of interest. I also tried to keep 
abreast of developments in the ICT field through accessing online articles in internet 
cafés, but found this very difficult with many unreliable and frustratingly slow dial-
up internet connections.17 At the same time I made it my business to engage in 
informal chats with people operating at all levels in my five sectors of interest, and 
from this I slowly gained an idea of the actors, places and issues concerning these 
areas. On the basis of these conversations I then set about creating questions for my 
forthcoming interviews, drawing in as much as possible on the research questions I 
had formulated in Edinburgh.  
 
The process of engaging during the second phase of fieldwork with Dar es Salaam-
based actors and academics operating within the five case studies helped in my desire 
to reduce this number to three studies, which I considered a manageable number of 
sectors. This said, and given the argument above in favour of multiple case studies, I 
sometimes think that it may have been beneficial to have confined myself to a 
smaller number of case studies – perhaps just one – and studied it for a longer period, 
which would have allowed for the detail in the writing-up stage, detail that is 
sometimes lost presenting three case studies under the constraint of a word limit. My 
                                                 
17 After a number of months I established friendships with many of the staff at COSTECH who 
kindly allowed me as a researcher, friend and neighbour to use their offices and their much more 
reliable internet access. 
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decision to not go below three case studies, however, was taken in order to obtain a 
spread of examples from different sectors and geographical areas and to achieve a 
better representation of the national, macro picture of the use of ICT in Tanzanian 
MSEs, while an upper limit of this number was taken so as not to dilute the 
research.18 
 
The second-hand motor vehicle industry 
One possible case study identified during the preliminary phase of fieldwork was the 
second-hand motor vehicle industry, where I considered comparing the use of ICT by 
vehicle importers with established business links in the Arab States and other African 
countries with the use of ICT by vehicle dealers in Tanzania using foreign custom-
made websites (e.g., www.japanesevehicles.com) to obtain cars for sale. These 
operators are part of a larger penumbra of entrepreneurs such as the mechanics in 
Dar es Salaam who recondition and repair these and other vehicles, and I considered 
comparing the many operators who have been able to survive for decades by using 
the same methods (in the recycling of vehicles) with the more adaptive mechanics 
who are rising to the challenge of a radical change in techniques brought about by 
computerisation – raising questions of education, innovation and susceptibility to 
new form of information and communication. Despite these interesting issues, 
however, I abandoned the motor vehicle industry primarily because of the difficulty I 
had in getting hold of informants (admittedly, mostly importers, not mechanics) who 
were willing to speak to me in much detail, and also because I found from cross-
checking that some of those who had spoken to me had given misleading data which 
I considered unreliable. As I found during the first phase of research from those few 
importers who I did manage to speak with and gain information, these importers rely 
heavily for import and selling on mobile phones, e-mail and websites. Yet I also 
learnt from other sources that a number of second-hand vehicle importers do so in 
defiance of certain laws and at times are also apparently involved in illegal 
                                                 
18 I thank Ramadhan Mlinga, Head of the Department of Construction Technology and Management, 
University of Dar es Salaam, for this advice. 
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businesses for which vehicles can sometimes be a cover or means of transportation.19 
I did consider this a tempting challenge but, on balance, saw it as an unnecessary risk 
given that my training had not prepared me for researching what (from some 
accounts) may have been individuals with criminal motives or links. 
 
ICT as businesses 
I had planned to study not just the use of ICT in business but also the use of ICT as 
businesses in their own right by profiling a number of internet cafés, call shops and 
mobile phone retailers, considering determinants of sustainability with particular 
attention to government attitudes and customer demand. Aspects of ICT as 
businesses are dealt with in chapter two (and in the case study chapters where they 
are accessed for use in business), but more depth could have been achieved in a case 
study itself that delved deeper still, for example, into the networks that are involved 
in the acquisition and sale of the mobile phones that so many business and non-
business users rely on to purchase their handsets. The option here was to start with 
some contacts made in the preliminary phase, such as Mwita, a Dar es Salaam es 
Salaam-based businessman who imports counterfeit mobile phones from the Far 
East, and also to continue to pursue mafundi involved in the ‘not-new’ and ‘not-
original’ market in a bid to assess how people acquire and can afford to pay for the 
mobile phones that are now so popular, particularly in urban areas (section 8:6). In 
the event, enough leads were revealed with the remaining three sectors to place ICT 
as businesses not alone as a case study but as a common thread throughout the thesis, 
where examples are given of their use by entrepreneurs in areas such as the trading of 
food between rural areas of the country and Dar es Salaam. 
 
Agriculture: the perishable foodstuffs domestic marketing chain 
The preliminary phase of fieldwork revealed a small number of peripatetic traders 
involved at different points in the buying, transportation and selling of agricultural 
                                                 
19 For example, MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000: 26) report the connection between 
importation of second-hand cars and drug smuggling. 
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inputs and foodstuffs who were using mobile phones and huduma ya simu for 
contacting small- and large-scale farmers and buyers. Meeting these individuals by 
chance in the random sampling of the preliminary phase brought to attention the use 
of mobile phones among these crucial players in the country’s vastly important 
agricultural system providing a living for much of the population, and it was 
proposed to trace the networks of such actors from buying point to selling point to 
get some sense of whether ICT were used throughout the marketing chain, and to 
what affect for all involved.20 The country’s agricultural sector is clearly too large to 
take as one, not least because of the plethora of different foodstuffs traded 
domestically, so I decided to narrow down to a particular subsector and follow the 
ICT networks of the highly mobile middleman who are relied upon to carry the food 
from Tanzania’s farmers to the local and city markets. The influence of ICT on 
middlemen, it was judged, would provide information not only on how they 
themselves make profit by succeeding to deliver fresh food to the market on time, but 
also on farmers’ abilities to obtain over distance the price signals that are required to 
make the markets work efficiently. 
 
I initially considered following agricultural export businesses to see how the use of 
ICT within the networks surrounding traditional and non-traditional export crops 
contrast to those of the food crops cultivated for domestic consumption, but again 
was forced to focus on one area so as not to lose detail.21 During the early review of 
literature at the beginning of the second phase of fieldwork I then came across an 
excellent thesis by Eliab Chijoriga (1992) (chapter four) on the role of middlemen in 
the marketing of staples at his previous employer, Kariakoo Market Corporation, and 
a study which turned out to be crucial to this case study by offering essential 
background to the players and processes of much domestic agricultural trading. I 
                                                 
20 In 1995 agriculture contributed to 55.2% of GDP and employed 84% of Tanzania’s labour force 
(Ponte 2002: 38). See Crawford (1997: ch1) on the importance of agricultural and food marketing in 
developing countries. 
21 As Ponte (2002: 174) notes, along with the Ministry of Agriculture, crop boards, co-operatives, trade 
associations and larger farmer groups, large-scale farmers and traders are more likely to benefit from 
internet access to gain market information on international prices, commodity stock levels, futures and 
insurance markets, and can more easily network with potential clients in the North. Such a study may 
have provided some insights into the relevance and potential of ICT for small-scale farmers and traders 
at the domestic level. 
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contacted the author, who was now Director of Administration and Finance at 
COSTECH, and had a series of discussions on the possible course of my research, 
from which I benefited tremendously thanks to his wealth of experience from 
working at Kariakoo.22 In the first place, while his own study was on staple 
foodstuffs, his suggestion that I study perishable foodstuffs over grains such as rice 
and maize would ensure that I researched crops which are transported huge distances 
and are susceptible to quick deterioration. The delivery process therefore relies on 
fast decision making, which in turn necessitates prompt communication lest they rot. 
Chijoriga then recommended various locations where perishables are mainly grown, 
from which I favoured Iringa (for tomatoes) and Mbeya (for potatoes) over Arusha, 
Kilimanjaro and Morogoro regions because the latter areas principally supply to 
other markets within the country, while Iringa and Mbeya concentrate on Dar es 
Salaam (which was chosen because it is home to the largest municipal market and 
would be logistically easier to research because it was my base in Tanzania). Having 
made this decision, Chijoriga then personally approached some influential Dar es 
Salaam-based madalali traders – men who he says gained their prominence by being 
trustworthy (Eliab Chijoriga, 06/01/03) – and encouraged them to assist me. After 
introductory meetings, three of these men (Festo, Kamwene and Sanga B.) then 
supplied me with the names of some farmers and key suppliers upcountry, and 
permission to observe their own operations during the collection and transportation 
of perishable staples. Having obtained these contacts I then set about designing a set 
of questions to help me to discover in what ways, if at all, ICT is used by suppliers 
throughout the marketing chain to obtain information on relative prices which allows 





                                                 
22 Along with academics such as Ramadhan Mlinga at the University of Dar es Salaam whose own 
research had some connection to my interests, Chijoriga proved far more willing to discuss my work 
than my academic contact who the government (COSTECH, ironically) assigned me to. Meetings with 
this individual, a member of a completely unrelated department at UDSM, never materialised. 
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Construction: the informal construction sector 
Another chance encounter during the preliminary fieldwork stage was with Jill 
Wells, whose work on the construction industry in developing countries (Wells 
1986) I happened to have read before arriving in Dar es Salaam. In tune with my 
previous research on the informal economy (Molony 2000c), I had been interested in 
a case study which drew some comparison between the formal and informal sectors 
and, especially since the motor vehicle industry research was not proving fruitful, I 
became increasingly interested in the work that a dedicated group of Wells’ 
associates at the University of Dar es Salaam were conducting on a mass of small, 
unregistered construction enterprises which in recent years have grown in size and 
importance (Mlinga & Lema 2000; Mlinga & Wells 2002; Wells 2001). Wells 
introduced me to Ramadhan Mlinga (Head of the Department of Construction 
Technology and Management, University of Dar es Salaam [UDSM]) who had 
recently completed a study (Mlinga 2000) in which he uncovered strong linkages 
between formal and informal contractors within the industry, and which for me 
raised the question of whether ICT were being used in maintaining these and other 
linkages. As a starting point I drew up a set of questions which added the ICT angle 
to the linkages Mlinga had revealed, with a view to exposing possible differences in 
ICT usage between formal and informal operators and the real opportunities that 
these technologies offer to the increasingly important and growing mass of  
unregistered construction enterprises.  
 
In doing so, my intention had been to use as an in-road my long-established Asian 
and indigenous African contacts in formal construction industry management (which 
I hoped would also help uncover the ethnic dimension I may have explored), until 
Wells then brought to my attention an ongoing ‘Support for Informal Construction 
Workers in Dar es Salaam’ (‘STICW-Dar’) project involving the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
United Nations Volunteers (UNV) and the University of Dar es Salaam’s Bureau of 
Industrial Cooperation (BICO). This project aimed to facilitate dialogue between 
stakeholders and informal construction workers (ICWs) and had very recently 
conducted a comprehensive survey covering over 26,000 ICWs operating in Dar es 
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Salaam region, which I was very keen to obtain since I could never have hoped to 
achieve such a huge sample myself. I grew aspirations to draw from this sample my 
own representative group of ICWs who I could then interview on their experience of 
ICT in their various construction enterprises, yet while the academics supported my 
access to these documents, my polite requests to obtain the data received a cold 
response from the expatriate United Nations project leader who appeared to feel 
threatened by my interest in his work.23 In an attempt to gain more background on 
the project and perhaps become better received by the leader I then attended two 
workshops in late February 2003, at which time I bonded with a number of ‘leading 
beneficiaries’ ICWs and exchanged contacts with a promise from them that I would 
be welcome to interview them at a later date for my research.24 Despite this 
permission I felt that, since I had been led to the ICWs through the STICW-Dar 
project, I still had to obtain the consent of the project leader, but to no avail until a 
couple of short months before I was due to return to Edinburgh when he finally 
presented me with his list of the mobile phone numbers of the ICWs and allowed me 
to use these to contact them.25 
 
Traditional craft: the vinyago trade 
While my frustrations with the STICW-Dar project leader simmered, I worked on 
developing contacts with individuals operating at the urban retail end of the vinyago 
trade. This involved following up on links obtained through a particularly useful 
interview during the preliminary phase with Hamisi Geddy and Dickson Wiva, two 
Makonde carving exporters who later introduced me to Mary Shirima, an exporter 
                                                 
23 Ever since my first contact with the project I was warned by a number of associates who were 
sympathetic to my research (because, I believe, they could see its potential implications for the 
informal construction sector) that this individual would not take warmly to any form of interest from 
outsiders, not least academics. As King (2004: 5) remarks, ‘the difference between – say – researching 
a UNIDO project on technological development of the informal sector and trying to understand 
technological change in the informal sector is as different as chalk is from cheese’. 
24 As a further reflection on what from previous personal experience I see as aloofness on behalf of 
UN staff towards the Africans they are paid handsomely to serve, I was sad to observe at the workshop 
that not one of the UN staff – nor for that matter, graduate Tanzanian UN ‘Volunteers’ – sat with the 
ICWs over lunch and chatted with them. 
25 These long delays led me to believe I might never access the data, so I spent a period in Mbeya 




with a shop in the Mwenge crafts village area of Dar es Salaam who in turn gave me 
much detail on the supply side of the industry. As with the perishable staples 
subsectors, speaking with such Dar es Salaam-based operators allowed me to start to 
create early subsector diagrams that I used as a basis for mapping the chain of supply 
from source to sale, and speculating on the ICT flows within this. 
 
Together it is felt that the three case studies offer a sufficient cross-section with 
which to judge the use of ICT by stakeholders who contribute in very different ways 
to the Tanzanian economy. Doing so covers a wide geographical range and both 
genders, entrepreneurs within the case studies provide different degrees of formality, 
along with elements of the itinerant and the sedentary, across the urban and the rural; 
representation of ‘flyers’ and the subsistent (the rich ‘wabenzi’ and the poor 
‘walalahoi’), selling niche products and the market-saturated, and the perishable and 
the durable; those with mobile phone coverage and those without, the internet-
connected and the unconnected and all the while covering the various different 
methods of ICT accessibility. 
 
 
Sampling, locating and gaining access (Tanzania, Phase two of fieldwork, 
Interview round one: January 2003 – July 2003) 
From previous research I had in mind that studying the MSE sector is often a matter 
of researching the hidden because those being researched are often reluctant to be 
opened up to the gaze of outsiders (Charmes 1999), and for this reason I wanted to 
seize the opportunities that were available from informants I had already identified. I 
soon found that these individuals – Eliab Chijoriga (and his madalali contacts), 
Ramadhan Mlinga (and his connections with many ICWs), and Hamisi and Dickson 
(who had already introduced me to Mary Shirima and some of her vinyago contacts) 
– offered to share with me their lifetimes of experience in their respective trades and 
were more than willing for me to access their own networks, so I saw it as logical to 
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follow these connections that were presented to me.26 I was aware that by following 
leads that were, in a sense, being offered, I would be open to the criticism that these 
might be limiting me only to those individuals who were chosen by these key 
gatekeepers. Yet I was also conscious that because of their low degree of 
formalisation networks are often hard to trace by outsiders (Tostensen et al 2001a: 
27), so I decided to follow those I had the chance to enter (particularly with the 
difficulties fresh in my mind of entering Asian business networks).27 Since I was 
looking at linkages and how individuals communicate with each other in business, I 
saw no problem in starting with approaching those individuals whom these primary 
informants identified as their own key sources in their operations and then to 
physically trace their contacts throughout the networks, interviewing as I went along. 
There was no pretence of ‘random’ sampling, therefore for – although my sample 
was open to whichever contacts the person I was led to talk with then suggested I 
might approach, at whatever location he / she suggested – by the very nature of these 
individuals being in the network they knew the next person(s) I was to meet. The 
decision about who these next informants might be were taken by the previous 
informant partly on the basis of their view of the importance of these suppliers / 
buyers, and whether they thought that these recommended individuals would be 
willing to speak with me.28 In this respect my sample (Appendix I) was essentially 
developed through ‘snowballing’ because it relied on some regular contact (through 
repeat interviews) in informal settings (Irwin 1972), and built up bonds of trust and 
friendship to make possible access to new contacts – although with far lower risks to 
the informants and myself than where this method has been chosen for researching 
activity outside the law.29 These contacts who were selected by the last informant 
were not always individuals who use ICT (even where coverage is available), which 
                                                 
26 The following applies more for the perishable foodstuffs and vinyago case studies than the informal 
construction sector case studies, where my sample was based more heavily on interviews with one 
group (ICWs) and rarely followed their contacts (usually materials suppliers and clients). 
27 ‘Gatekeeper’ is used to describe a range of actors who control access, channel activities, and so on 
(Ellen 1984), although Kaufmann (2002) prefers the term ‘overseer’ to convey a stronger sense of 
informant involvement in ethnographic research. 
28 They sometimes cross-checked with friends in the same network on the whereabouts of potential 
interviewees, and in turn these friends might offer advice on the suitability of the proposed contact(s). 
29 Examples of research where the risks to both parties have been higher are Leonard (1994), Tripp 
(1997) and MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000). 
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made contacting them more difficult but ensured that my sample was more 
representative of those who for whatever reason have not adopted these technologies 
and, in some cases, do not use landline telephones when they are available for 
communicating with their business contacts. Furthermore, when I had been 
recommended to travel to a particular location because of the dominance of a 
particular trade there, I would not stick rigidly to all the contacts I was to meet, and 
would often diverge from the networks for a while and talk with those I met in 
various situations, and later try to pick up on those I was to meet – which was not 
always possible. After a while, therefore, the recommended contacts spread (almost 
inevitably) beyond the initial networks of my primary informants in Dar es Salaam, 
thus countering any risk of only meeting those individuals my primary informants at 
the point of entry wanted me to meet. 
 
To research these networks I had to move from an intensively focused, single-site 
ethnography (hitherto only Dar es Salaam), to a multi-sited ethnography researching 
individuals I had never met before in various far-off settlements I had never visited. I 
set off to Mtwara in mid-February 2003 to carry out two weeks of introductory 
interviews with those involved in the early stages of vinyago production and, after a 
short period in Dar es Salaam, I then did the same in Iringa and Mbeya for almost a 
month from mid-March. On the basis of recommendations from my key informants 
in Dar es Salaam on who to first see and where to find them, I was able to select 
what Sanjek (1978: 257) describes as ‘certain actors, activities, or locations as the 
anchor points for fieldwork’. As Bryceson (1993: 102), for research in the rural areas 
I started with the traders and radiated outwards along the marketing chain and, while 
contacts had often been established before arriving at a particular location, actually 
finding individuals required ingenuity, patience and a lot of time. Once located, these 
first interviews with the informants were of an introductory nature – both for myself 
and the interviewees – during which time I was at pains to take an informal stance by 
chatting with the farmers, carvers and traders and observing their businesses to get a 
feel of the environment within which they operate, and an overview of what methods 
of communication were being applied at their end of the marketing process. In the 
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eyes of my taxi driver in Dar es Salaam, this kind of research (utafiti) that he 
sometimes observed me undertake in the city was very useful: 
 
I see that you ask all the things that Dar es Salaam residents already know! These are 
easy questions! But this is important because then they [the traders] grow to like you 
and trust you and you can ask them anything! It’s a good way of getting information. I 
use utafiti when I want to find things out about girls! (Field diary notes after 
conversation with ‘Chinga’, my taxi driver, 09/07/03).30 
 
With this background I could then build on the ‘obvious questions’ and the trust that 
these sessions created, to then return once I had created a lengthier, more detailed 
series of questions to form the basis of a more comprehensive interview. This 
process was aided by creating subsector diagrams to help visualise the networks I 
was tracing, to which I added communication channels and methods to map the 
flows of ICT usage. 
 
Gaining access to these individuals for the first time in new locations such as the 
villages of Iringa, Mbeya and Mtwara was made simple by my key informants in Dar 
es Salaam providing me with the names of people who would introduce me to the 
area, and in some cases (unbeknownst to me) phoning ahead to ensure that I was 
going to be given their co-operation. Only later did I discover, for example, that the 
business networks I was to trace for the perishable foodstuffs case study had been in 
full swing shortly after Chijoriga agreed to allowing me into his networks.31 It 
emerged that Chijoriga had phoned his contacts in the Kariakoo management, who 
met face-to-face with some key madalali in the municipal market, who contacted by 
mobile phone their suppliers in the collecting towns of Iringa and Mbeya regions, 
who in turn contacted their suppliers in the villages and on the shambas through and 
face-to-face communication and letter delivered by messenger, all passing along the 
word that they were to welcome me and give me their full co-operation – because the 
                                                 
30 For access to field diary text that is referred to in this thesis please contact the author at the Centre 
of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. 
31 Harriss (1992: 138) cites many authors who have not had the advantage of such gatekeepers and 
encountered problems with getting traders to talk. 
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(clearly influential) Chijoriga in his Dar es Salaam office thought the research was 
worthwhile. In the typical Tanzanian hospitality I became familiar with, similar 
introductions were also obtained in Mtwara from individuals I met in the town on the 
recommendation of Dar es Salaam traders, and who – in the case of Philipo Luvale 
(section 8:14) – then made great efforts to ensure my travels within the remote 
villages were successful. This co-operation was perhaps most obvious to me, 
however, with the majority of ICWs who I had first met over lunch and breaks at the 
STICW-Dar project workshop and who always welcomed me with warmth to the 
interviews at their location (usually a bar) of choice. With these men I felt a special 
bond because I could relate well to many of their trades having done similar jobs 
myself in the industry in London, and felt that I had a reasonably good knowledge of 
the areas Dar es Salaam city where they lived, worked and socialised, and of the 
‘looser’ form of Swahili that some of them talk in. Once the STICW sample had 
been obtained and I had received ‘permission’ to gain access to the ICWs, none had a 
problem with themselves giving me access to interviews because of the bonds I had 
already formed, and this opened the way to some rich and lively discussion.32 
 
2:7. The qualitative research tradition and the interpretive 
framework 
Of all sources offering possible data collection methods to adopt for this study and in 
generating my thoughts on methodological considerations within which these 
methods are situated, the authors Aili Mari Tripp (1997) and, especially, Per 
Trulsson (1997) have held the most sway.33 While part of their influence on me 
                                                 
32 These experiences with entrepreneurs during the second phase of fieldwork contrasted with the 
response of ISPs I approached in the preliminary phase, who tended to be guarded with their replies to 
my basic questions and in some cases seemed at times to be trying to impede my progress by 
demanding a plethora of introductory letters and e-mails to many levels of management before they 
would consider an interview. The ISPs would usually not disclose the amount of internet cafés they 
supply to, perhaps because they fear that I may be investigating their business for tax purposes, or 
because they believe that I will pass their information on to a competitor. I thank Mathias Masawe, 
Senior Librarian, COSTECH for this suggestion (17 July 2002). 
33 Another key influence that has drawn to my attention the need to problematise methodological 
issues when undertaking research was the ‘Africa: Methodological and Practical Issues’ course run by 
Simon McGrath and Steve Kerr at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. I have 
benefited much from the course and subsequent discussions with the convenors, as well as Tom 
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undoubtedly lies in the fact that their studies cover entrepreneurship in Tanzania, it is 
their careful consideration of the methodological issues which surround those 
methods they adopted that I found most persuasive before the first phase of research 
in Tanzania. Both managed to persuade me that their conclusions are sound because 
they undertook the same exercise that is attempted here, one that Seale refers to as 
‘accounting’: 
 
Telling the story of how a research project was done can serve many purposes, not all of 
which assist judgements about the credibility of findings or the quality of a 
study….Relevant methodological accounting, however, can assist readers in evaluating 
the quality of conclusions. (Seale 1999: 177) 
 
The preliminary fieldwork confirmed to me that my personal strengths and interests 
lie in qualitative work, and I dismissed quantitative methods unless crucial on the 
grounds that, while they are often fruitful in generating interesting research 
questions, they are rarely capable of providing the more in-depth understanding the 
qualitative research techniques offer to explain social phenomena.34 Conducting 
fieldwork also provided the opportunity to focus on developing the craft skills of my 
research so that my conclusions could be regarded as reliable as possible. Being 
away from the academic setting also brought with it a sense of relief that I now had 
some personal autonomy from the requirement some people seem to want to impose 
that research should reflect some thoroughly consistent relationship with a 
philosophical or methodological position. Nonetheless, before, during and after both 
periods of fieldwork the empirical data and theoretical perspectives did shape each 
other in a dialectical process. Empirical material generated research questions, and 
research questions guided the way the empirical material has been approached. 
Together with the pre-fieldwork phase and the writing-up, the entire process can be 
                                                                                                                                          
Cadogan who helpfully offered his reflections on methodological issues during the time we were both 
conducting fieldwork in Tanzania, and Barbara Trudell, whose methodological section of her thesis 
(2004) was influential in brining together some of the key headings of this chapter. 
34 Also, as MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000: 19) note, quantitative methods and surveys 
cannot research activities marginal to the law, which in some cases I was to investigate. 
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seen as one of a constant series of (at times subconscious) personal negotiation over 
methodological issues. 
 
For a research methods course that I undertook before embarking on fieldwork I had 
to label my ‘research strategy’, and decided that my approach was closest to the 
abductive research strategy. Here the researcher is prepared to use exploration and 
descriptions of everyday activities as a starting point towards gaining an 
understanding of the processes that are uncovered during that research. I was drawn 
to the wording in the key recommended course literature that stated that with the 
abductive strategy an adequate understanding of one’s exploration can only be 
achieved through a period of immersion in a social world, during which time some 
knowledge of people’s ‘reality’ is gained, based on thick descriptions derived from 
everyday accounts (Blaikie 2000) – in essence, ethnography.35 This description 
seemed to suit an approach that I felt most at ease with, and I did submerge myself in 
this way – as best a white foreigner from a privileged background could hope to – 
into the social world of African business. In particular I was drawn to the abductive 
description of the study of activities in which social actors engage in their social 
lives, which then I roughly equated with empiricism, but at the time abduction 
seemed to offer something a bit deeper that required me to  
 
discover and describe this insider view, not to impose an outsider view on it. It is the 
everyday beliefs and practices, the mundane, tacit and taken for granted that have to be 
grasped and articulated in order to provide an understanding of these actions. (Sanghera 
2004) 
 
In retrospect, however, I do not think that I achieved this detail, and now feel that I 
had misunderstood quite what abduction required (at least by Sanghera’s account). In 
particular, I had underestimated how difficult it would be to achieve such a close – 
                                                 
35 I also confess that I was far more inspired by actually reading studies where they described their 
ethnographic approaches and that when conducting fieldwork I had in my mind some methods that 
they had adopted and which I felt most comfortable with. Texts that particularly influenced me this 
way are Trulsson (1997), MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) and, much later, Sommers (2001), 
especially where they discuss their methodologies. 
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almost scientific – analysis of the many individuals I interacted with in at least four 
huge geographical locales. On reflection I feel that the essence of the research 
strategy that I in fact adopted was one based more on the interpretivist approach. 
This contends that researchers have to interact with the subjects of the research, 
attempting to see the world from their standpoint (Vulliamy 1990) so to allow facts 
to speak for themselves to generate theoretical propositions (Winch 1994). 
 
2:8. Subsector case studies and generalisability 
After meeting both poorer and the more affluent entrepreneurs during the preliminary 
fieldwork I was also keen on looking at both survivalists and those who had shown 
some graduation in their ventures, and realised that by taking an entire subsector I 
was more likely to come across those at both sides of the wealth spectrum. To these 
ends I looked further into subsector analysis, which I hoped would also expose me to 
the links through this chain and provide the opportunity to examine these actors’ 
communication channels and their use (or not) of ICT.36 A subsector is defined as a 
final product or a key raw material or commodity, and consists of all the enterprises 
linked to the product or raw material of interest, from supply to production to 
distribution (Kantor 2000). The analysis of the subsector was developed by 
practitioners concerned specifically with enterprise development and who were 
seeking to avoid the tendency of viewing the MSE sector as though it were an 
undifferentiated mass of small-scale enterprises. It therefore allows for the 
development of specialised knowledge of the constraints and opportunities 
influencing a subsector and suggests a framework for appropriate policy 
interventions. The subsector approach focuses not on the individual enterprise per se 
but the system or subsector in which the enterprise operates (Buckley 1998), and 
involves a study of the vertical structure of a particular economic activity from input 
supply, through the production and marketing process, to the finished product. What 
is most appealing about this approach, however, is not its diagnostic and prescriptive 
                                                 
36 I thank the late John Grierson (at that time at the Swiss Centre for Development Cooperation in 
Technology and Management) for taking the time, in Edinburgh and by e-mail, to introduce me to 
subsector analysis, and Steven Haggblade (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, 
D.C.) for kindly answering my request to provide me with two of his studies. 
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nature, but its focus on the movement of the product or service through its various 
stages, in particular the attention it pays to (vertical) linkages between buyers and 
sellers (and to horizontal interactions, whether competitive or complementary, 
between enterprises performing similar functions) (Buckley 1998; Mead 1996). 
Furthermore, I understood from the subsector analysis literature that it should 
complement the ethnographic approach I am most comfortable with. It is concerned 
with following networks and so suited my emerging desire to locate business 
linkages (as ‘ongoing commercial dealings between separate profit-oriented 
enterprises’ (Grierson & Mead 1999)), and allow for an assessment of the extent to 
which ICT is used in these interactions.37 
I worked on the logic that the more variation of subsectors I could include, the more 
likely it was that my findings would be representative of the situation throughout 
Tanzania. I therefore decided to approach various subsectors in order to cover 
multiple networks across different enterprises, taking a number of subsectors, each as 
a case study. I saw the case study as perfectly suited to my needs because it is an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context (Yin 1989: 13), but I was also aware that the generalisability of findings from 
a single case to an entire population is difficult to show given that ‘the real business 
of case study is particularisation, not generalisation’ (Stake 1995: 8).38 Yet as Seale 
(1999: 106-118) argues, because it offers thick, detailed description which provides a 
vicarious experience of ‘being there’ with the researcher, generalisation is a desirable 
goal because the reader can then use his own human judgement to assess the 
likelihood of the same process applying to other settings which he knows. On this 
principle I was convinced that multiple case studies could only serve to further the 
generalisability of my findings in order to provide a clearer picture of the use of ICT 
across different sections of the economy. An appropriate label to give the approach I 
                                                 
37 Much of the mainstream literature on subsector analysis either speaks of its strengths or offers dense 
results. The best publications addressing the methods of subsector analysis are available only for 
purchase from USAID/GEMINI in Washington D.C.. As it turned out, I did not follow the subsector 
approach exactly as prescribed in the literature, but I did benefit from its approach towards a thorough 
consideration for all actors throughout the entire chain.  
38 Robson (2002: 93) defines generalisability as ‘the extent to which the findings of the enquiry are 
more generally applicable outside the specifics of the situation studied’. Maxwell (1996) makes a 
useful distinction between internal and external generalisability, with the former referring to the 




adopted may instead be one of a ‘flexible design research’ strategy, which Robson 
(2002: 164) argues is the most apt description for the combination of ethnographic 
and case study research. 
 
2:9. Validity 
What is more important than the name of the research strategy I brand to my study is 
the validity of the study itself. That is to say, whether the research method really 
assesses what it is intended to assess (Kvale 1996: 302). I do feel that collectively the 
iterative nature of the research process, the multiple methods I applied, and the 
length of time given to data collection help ensure that the research methods do 
indeed assess what they were meant to assess (i.e., how ICT is being integrated into 
the existing business culture, the changes this is bringing to the existing business 
culture and how ICT may be better applied for business use in Tanzania’s particular 
setting). Nonetheless, in an effort to show the validity of the present study I also feel 
that it is necessary to consider here two threats that Robson (2002: 171) identifies as 
holding the potential to challenge the trustworthiness of the flexible design research 
strategy; namely, description (that is the risks surrounding how the data is recorded) 
and the interpretation of that data. On this last important matter it is crucial for the 
validity of interpretation that this is contingent not only upon the ‘end product’, but 
also a demonstration of how that interpretation was reached (Mason 1996). We 
therefore briefly turn to the methods that were applied and the methodological issues 
which arose from these actions. 
 
2:10. Data collection  
2:11. Participant observation 
As stated, the research methods I employed were principally qualitative, but eclectic, 
with no rigid adherence to any procedure. This was working on the premise that all 
social research techniques are subject to error and bias and that only through the use 
of a combination of contrasting techniques focussed on the same topic can such 
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problems be minimised.39 In order to capture more than the semi-structured 
interviews offered I therefore used multiple sources to enhance the rigour of the 
research and applied some standard participant observation techniques. Such 
‘triangulation’ of techniques (Denzin 1988) included monitoring during transient 
walks (usually when searching for a farmer, carver, trader or fundi before an 
interview) when I would observe as much as possible relating to the actors and 
location of the case studies. This involved asking discrete questions where possible 
later on, and writing-up the relevant observations in my field diary at night in a bid to 
achieve Bernhard’s (1988) recommendation that the participant observer must 
remove himself everyday from cultural immersion so as to intellectualise, put this 
into perspective, and write about it convincingly.40 Or to use Mills’ concept of the 
sociological imagination, I was trying to achieve the ‘capacity to range from the most 
interpersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the self – 
and to see the relations between the two.’ (Mills 1959: 7). 
 
Despite my efforts to engage reflexively with myself and the ideas raised by 
interacting with my informants, however, I do not claim to have succeeded in 
establishing a rapport with the community (other than in the neighbourhood of my 
Dar es Salaam residence, and perhaps in the trading basement of Kariakoo market) to 
the extent that people ignored me (Bernhard 1988). I was never in one location long 
enough to do so. For this reason, and because as a white man I was very conspicuous, 
I was never a very successful ‘lurker’ (somewhere between eavesdropping and 
                                                 
39 As Rusque-Alcaino & Bromley (1979: 185) observe, ‘[p]ure autobiographies can be as misleading 
as pure questionnaire surveys, pure reliance on government statistics, or pure observation and 
informal interviewing, but in combination these alternative techniques are much more powerful than 
any one technique used in isolation’. 
40 While my thoughts on possible avenues to explore occurred at points when an issue arose during the 
interviews and observation, some new slants on my thinking are very difficult to put a timeframe on 
since they slowly developed over a longer period when I would mull them over, often with no intent, at 
quiet times at home or travelling between case study locales. I had a chance to gather these thoughts in 
writing when I prepared field reports for my supervisors in Edinburgh (in the air-conditioned Tanzania 
National Archives which is blessed with a good electricity supply). These reports proved to be a good 
morale boost since, by being able to see the progress that I had made both in terms of my thought 
processes and covering my interviewing goals, it assuaged my occasional doubts that my fieldwork 
was not progressing at a pace I had planned when in Edinburgh. 
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participation (Strickland & Schlesinger 1969)).41 When sitting alone I usually 
attracted attention, especially in rural areas, and I rarely succeeded in observing any 
more than the most banal incidents that an observant tourist may also have captured. 
Yet when I was approached by individuals who were curious about what I was doing, 
I was usually easily able to guide conversation into an information gathering 
exercise, the key points of which I would jot down afterwards. These impromptu 
discussions served any of three roles, by acting at times as a test for the interview 
questions, by bringing to mind methodological issues which had been overlooked, 
and by providing a further opportunity to gain differing perspectives on the case 
study in question and my research more generally. I would agree with Tripp, 
therefore, that it is in these discussions, rather than in formal interviews, when the 
most revealing comments are often made (Tripp 1997: 204); especially when alcohol 
was involved.42 
 
The research methods built on my ability to connect socially with most Tanzanians, 
something I have found easy ever since I first visited the country in my early teens. 
In no small part my success here should be put down to the convivial and often very 
gregarious character of many of the individuals I have come across over the years. 
Throughout the research process I again met many new Tanzanians who, by being so 
welcoming, aided my entry into long-term fieldwork and made me feel more at ease 
with what I first thought of as a daunting process. It is largely because of this that 
after interview round one when I returned to Mtwara Region in mid-July 2003 and 
when I revisited Iringa and Mbeya regions in early September for the second round 
of interviews and ethnography, carrying out the various research methods seemed to 
come as second nature. 
                                                 
41 The key difference between lurking and casual observation is that the lurker very self-consciously 
locates himself at the periphery of a social setting and pays strict attention to his degree of 
unobtrusiveness in the situation, adopting a distracted, preoccupied, disinterested, or engrossed 
demeanour (Strickland & Schlesinger 1969: 248-249). 
42 The schedules of the Kariakoo madalali, for example, demands that they arrive at work very early to 
receive the perishable consignments fresh for sale that morning, and so their ‘after-work’ beers were to 
me ‘breakfast beers’. On a number of occasions they insisted that I joined them since this was the best 
time for them to chat and, while this made information gathering a challenge, it brought out opinions 
on suppliers and other madalali which they were never so forthcoming with during their more sober 
appearances. I began by scribbling down notes on visits to the lavatory but, when it became clear that 




2:12. Semi-structured interviews 
The fieldwork of engaging with people came easily because I strove to keep my 
communication as unceremonious as I could, a method which appeared to sometimes 
have the desired effect of ensuring that my informants were as unaware as possible 
that I was gleaning information. Of course, this did not always happen, and some 
informants would sometimes appear a little agitated even though they had indicated 
that they were willing to take part in the semi-structured interviews. To ensure that 
my informants were comfortable I tried as much as possible to conduct the 
interviews – when it was practical – ‘on site’ in their work surroundings, which had 
the added effect on me of prompting more intellectual questions. I left the informant 
with the decision on where to meet, however, and this was often a public bar where 
they normally suggested that we then carried on with the discussion. While this 
meant that I was unable to see for myself some of the details that I would have been 
able to observe at their workplace (we would often then visit the workplace after the 
interview), a bar proved a good location for interviewing since curious listeners 
wishing to eavesdrop could only approach as close as the next table, whereas they 
could less easily be prevented from snooping in on our conversation if it were held, 
for example, in the marketplace. Other informants, worried perhaps of other people 
listening, decided on conducting the interview in a private place, which was usually 
their home.  
 
Before any questions were asked, and sometimes at the point when I first approached 
a potential informant, I always gave background to myself and my research, covering 
such issues as what my research was about, who it is for and the name of my 
sponsoring institution. I also raised the matter of confidentiality and gave assurances 
about not having to answer any questions. I then offered the opportunity to ask 
questions on this. I presented a brief written outline of the research objectives 
(stating my aim was to write-up my research in such a way that it will not harm 
people or threaten their future use of resources), a laminated copy of my research 
clearance certificate, and a business card from my university with my contact 
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details.43 I was very careful at this point to be realistic about the likely negligible 
impact of my research on the informant(s).44 
 
Except where the interviewee clearly spoke good English, interviews were conducted 
on a person-to-person basis in Swahili. For the first few months my knowledge of 
Swahili – though sufficient to ask the questions – prohibited me from understanding 
much of the replies, and my research assistant Chris (section 2:15 below) helped with 
the discussion. My linguistic skills improved with time, however, and I was later able 
to conduct interviews without an assistant, even during the few group discussions 
that took place with carving co-operatives. During these meetings care was taken to 
ensure that one person did not dominate the proceedings and that the emerging group 
culture did not swallow individual expression. Nevertheless, I did notice that,  
 
interviewing two people who are friends can be a good number because they 
compliment [sic] each other with their answers, prompting detail and sometimes 
clarification. Chris agreed, saying that he noticed that Frida would say something and 
then Audax would say something related and that he doubted if Audax would’ve 
thought of it otherwise!....I favour this over larger groups such as those interviewed 
during C&O [my MSc fieldwork] where a couple of women would dominate, while 
others (often the younger members of the group) would be largely silent and reluctant to 
speak in the presence of elders. (Comments in field diary following interview with 
Audax and Frida, 14/01/03) 
 
The interviews were semi-structured with a view to creating a balance between 
certain predetermined questions and ‘ad libbing’. They were framed in such a way 
that they could enable an understanding of the informant’s views on the issues I 
raised, at the same time as providing an opportunity to offer their other thoughts on 
matters I may not have mentioned. This method allowed for flexibility away from a 
pre-set agenda in order to follow a logical line of inquiry to an interesting reply. It 
                                                 
43 I felt that the smart business card helped assuage any doubts, if they existed, about my identity, and 
also allowed for future contact should the informant require to get in touch about the research. 
44 One of the main objectives of my postgraduate fellowship at the University of Edinburgh is to offer 
my research findings and attempt to engage in dialogue with stakeholders in Tanzania so that the 
research may eventually benefit business operators at some level.  
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also provided more opportunity for me to try as best I could to make the interview 
more of a meeting between ‘conversational partners’ (Rubin & Rubin 1995: 10-12), 
to create a blend between an interview and a casual chat (Burgess 1984).45 Here I 
feel that I gained much from the richness of tacit knowledge and from the more 
natural and interactive setting of the semi-structured interview. This gave informants 
an opportunity to question my fallible ideas and to set and challenge further lines of 
enquiry. 
 
A small number of pilot interviews were performed, first with friends and then with 
key informants, and these proved useful in calling to mind new questions and in 
getting an idea of which questions were unclear and required re-wording. They also 
gave a good indication of how long future interviews would take, and provided a 
good setting to work on Chambers’ (1998: 202) advice that sitting, asking, and 
listening are as much an attitude as a method.46 Furthermore, the pilot interviews 
allowed me to try to learn my questions by heart and to practice what Trulsson 
(1997: 51) has described as a ‘funnel technique’, which begins with wider issues and 
then hones in on more detail. I had learnt from conducting previous research on 
income generating activities (Molony 2000c) that pointed questions about earnings 
and profit margins can invite some unhelpful replies, so this detail was avoided.47 
Instead I strove for open-ended questions using clear language, made corrections as I 




                                                 
45 MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000: 20) discuss the ‘conversation’ as a research method.  
46 I thank Rehema Mputa for assisting me with translating many of my questions into better Swahili.   
Mock interviews carried out with internet café staff in the preliminary phase of fieldwork, for 
example, turned out to be particularly valuable in revealing that interviews with internet café 
managers are often much longer than expected because they frequently have to leave to assist 
customers. Comparing my questionnaires with those used in a study carried out by COSTECH was 
also useful in bringing to mind issues that had been overlooked. 
47 Bryceson (1993: 103, 157) also makes this point. My personal experience from previous fieldwork 
(Molony 2000c) was that people would either be reluctant and vague with their replies or tend to 
exaggerate their earnings. I therefore avoided such questions since probing risked breaching trust and 
could also misinform my conclusions.  
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2:13. Reliability and recording of the data 
In quantitative research great store is placed in the extent to which a research 
procedure produces the same results each time it is employed. This is known as the 
‘reliability’ or ‘replicability’ of the study (e.g., Black 1999). Yet I would argue that 
this should be no different in qualitative research. Although the attempt to use 
language to refer to, describe and explain aspects of the social world must ultimately 
depend on some modified form of realism, the qualitative researcher must still also 
be accountable for its accuracy, however subtle the language gets. Reliability and 
replicability are therefore very relevant, particularly since, as stated above, one of the 
challenges to the trustworthiness of the flexible design research is the way in which 
the data is recorded. Here the use of low inference descriptors in field notes and 
transcriptions are desirable ways of enhancing reliability (Seale 1999: 140-158) and 
are methods of recording the data that were employed in this study. Where 
impromptu discussions took place I would write-up the key points afterwards and 
transfer it to my field diary the same evening. With the semi-structured interviews I 
recorded the data in note form at the time, wrote it up immediately afterwards when 
possible and later entered it into my field diary. I also used a cassette recorder in a 
number of interviews where the informant was happy to be recorded and I later 
transcribed those parts of the conversations that I thought at the time exposed 
emerging themes (i.e., excluding points, usually relating to my prescribed questions, 
which I could write accurately at the time in note form and including those points 
when the conversation flowed faster or away from pre-set agenda so as to follow the 
logical line of inquiry).48 On many occasions, however, I did not use the cassette 
recorder, never because my request to use it was denied but because I was often 
opportunistic in my interviewing and had not anticipated that the interview would 
take place when it did and had not brought the device. These decisions were taken 
mindful that some of the best research begins opportunistically through curiosity and 
a desire to discover (Buttimer 1993), and because experience had taught me that very 
little of the research arrangements go to plan in the field so much reliance must be 
                                                 
48 Field notes entered later into my field diary are referenced as ‘field diary’ (e.g., field diary, 
09/07/03), while verbatim text – also stored in my field diary – is referenced by the name of the 
informant (e.g., Bahati, 19/07/03).  
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placed on happenstance. When I managed to obtain a camera about half way through 
the fieldwork I then asked informants at the end of the interview for permission to 
take a photograph, to which they always obliged. This served both during and after 
the fieldwork as a powerful memory jog of the many individuals I had interviewed 
(Appendix I) and the circumstances and emotions that surrounded the different 
meetings.49  
 
2:14. Important influences of the research environment 
2:15. Research assistance 
I benefited greatly from these meetings thanks to the help of a friend, Chris 
Mazengo, who I paid as a research assistant. The term research assistant almost 
seems inappropriate since he is so far from the image I had of a University-educated 
urban youth tutored in the various research methods to be applied to the fieldwork 
setting.50 I met Chris when he was working in what he regarded as the mundane, 
unchallenging surroundings of a video rental shop by my house in Kijitonyama, and 
every day when I returned from my Swahili classes I dropped by his workplace and 
we spoke at length about life in Tanzania. I learnt of his childhood, his Catholic 
missionary education and stories of stealing sugar from his mother’s pantry in the 
poor, dusty village of Bahi outside Dodoma on the central lorry route to Tabora, 
Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. I learnt of his reluctance to 
be a shepherd as his grandfather demanded and of how as a youth he came to Dar es 
Salaam in search of work. I learnt about his different – at times outrageously 
dangerous – employment as a youth in the city, his scrapes with the law, his adoption 
of Muslim attire to blend into areas of the coastal city, and his physical and mental 
hardening as he adapted to cope with an urban setting where jobs were scarce and as 
the breadwinner he was expected to send remittances back to his family in the 
                                                 
49 I plan to adopt a method of thanking interviewees used by Tom Cadogan who made a point of 
returning to his informants with a print of the photograph. To the interviewee this photograph can 
speak a thousand words written in a PhD thesis that may never have any tangible benefit to the 
informant. 
50 Kakuu Maghembe provided help with questionnaires during the preliminary stage. 
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village.51 And as I listened to the tales this man in his early thirties quietly told me 
over a coffee and with a hint of nostalgia, I soon respected his resilience and pride 
and realised – as he had realised long before – that his ambitions to make a new life 
with a family in the city were not going to be met in his present job. All his weekly 
earnings save TSh500 (about 50 cents) were spent on food and his daladala fare to 
work from his home in Mtongani, or ‘the ghetto’ as he called it. So it was with a 
feeling of immense satisfaction that when Chris was considering leaving his job I 
suggested that he might accompany me as interpreter on my research travels, first in 
the city he has such an intimate acquaintance of, then further afield. I judged that his 
intelligence, resourcefulness and ability to create a bond with all Tanzanians (except, 
he admitted, ‘the bossmen in their expensive clothes’), set him apart from the other 
assistants I might have chosen instead to help me with translating during the early 
stages of my fieldwork.52 With no formal, academic background in social research I 
thought that he was also less likely to act as a ‘filter’ to what was being said during 
the interviews.  
 
Chris first started working with me in January 2003, and I quickly began to 
appreciate his many qualities and soon realised that while researchers can go great 
lengths to ensure that the voices of the people they interview are heard, those 
individuals who help to make the interviews possible do not usually receive anything 
of the credit they deserve.53 As Lyn Schumaker (2001: 12) has observed, ‘[r]esearch 
assistants generally are invisible in the finished texts of anthropologists both today 
and in the past and, like wives, often only receive a token measure of gratitude in the 
preface’, and I would argue that part of the reason for this tendency to hide assistants 
is that researchers are reluctant to admit that they need the help of others. Perhaps 
                                                 
51 These conversations tended to take place in English since Chris’ abilities in my language were 
stronger than mine in Swahili. Unfortunately for the development of my Swahili, this period seemed to 
set English as our language of communication which, while helping Chris to become far more fluent, is 
something I would have changed given the opportunity again.  
52 I have in mind some research University-educated assistants working with the STICW-Dar project 
who seemed to distance themselves from, and bring an air of superiority to, the less educated informal 
sector workers they were supposed to interact with. 
53 Robson (1994: 56-58) also makes this observation. A notable exception is Willis (1999: 11-20), who 
helpfully notes that ‘one reason for our difficulty in putting a category name to our primary indigenous 
sources of knowledge is that the relationship has no exact parallel in the social experience of either 
Western or non-Western cultures’ (Willis 1999: 19).  
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this is because the use of a research assistant might somehow detract from our own 
ability to draw conclusions, or adversely influence these conclusions through acting 
as a filter? I also believe that some researchers hide their research assistants from 
view in the text because they are embarrassed of the inevitable existence of power 
asymmetries in such a relationship, particularly the financial asymmetries that I think 
ultimately led to the souring of my relationship with Chris, a topic which I have 
discussed elsewhere.54 Here I learnt that although there is a case for arguing that 
informants are part of the making of a participant-observer, both in terms of 
participation and observation which are subject to being controlled by overseers 
(Kaufmann 2002: 251), there is also a case for arguing that the relationship is not 
always one-way. The research assistant is often aware that he or she can likewise use 
the researcher a resource and a tool to help them make their way in life (Carrier 
2004). 
 
I had initially intended to use an interpreter only for the first few months, but Chris 
worked with me for longer as a constant ‘tour guide’ informing my developing 
cultural frame of context, and as a companion during the long and sometimes lonely 
periods away from Dar es Salaam. I tested ideas on him as a Tanzanian ‘insider’, and 
he helped to bridge my position as an ‘outsider’ with people involved in businesses 
that he too was often unfamiliar with, raising questions himself and offering 
observations out of his own curiosity. I soon realised that he was invaluable in gently 
applying, with respect, his powers of persuasion and skills as a listener gained not in 
the University but by speaking with his fellow countrymen over coffee on the street. 
This helped ensure that informants would be willing to talk, and I am convinced that 
Chris then played a crucial role in creating a personal chemistry with these actors and 
in allowing for the development of deeper relationships than would never have been 
possible without his help. 
 
 
                                                 
54 I have discussed these power asymmetries in my relationship with Chris in Molony (2004). Some of 




2:16. Perceptions of the researcher 
While the vast majority of informants who were approached were happy to talk when 
asked to be interviewed, there were a few cases where we ran into difficulties. This, I 
believe, had much to do with the way different people perceived of me as an mzungu 
(white person) conducting research.55 I was never able to interview staff at Mikono, a 
Dar es Salaam-based vinyago exporter with a bad reputation for not paying carvers, 
for example, and was later informed this was because they probably thought that I 
was an investigative journalist seeking to reveal their unfair treatment of carvers. In 
another incident of misperception, when walking the tracks between large potato 
fields to the house of the late Geoffrey Sanga, a field agent (‘kiunganishi’) 
connecting middleman in Mbeya region, suspicious villagers sought to misinform us 
of his whereabouts in the belief, he later told us, that we were disgruntled business 
associates seeking to settle a score. We were also accused in Mtwara town of 
working for a mobile phone company, and risked being assaulted by the very large 
and very drunk husband of a middle-distance vinyago collector, Bahati Mohamedi, 
who had invited us into her living room without his permission. Despite my careful 
explanation of the research, he insisted that my questions would be fed back to a 
mobile phone company who would be making profit from his wife’s replies, at no 
profit to him, and I cut the interview short as he grew more threatening.56 A more 
serious risk towards my own safety arose in Ilula Mtua, Iringa Region when – shortly 
after the beginning of the American-led invasion of Iraq – I was alone photographing 
with permission tomato packing by a mosque on the roadside (Figure 9) when a 
young man started the rumour that because of my interest in communications and my 
wish to take photographs I must have been working for the American Central 
Intelligence Agency. This potentially volatile situation was defused with humour. It 
                                                 
55 Murison (2004: 208-211) devotes much consideration to the complications – and advantages – 
associated with ‘being mzungu’. On this subject I would agree with Bryce Gormley (1994: 105) who 
observes that in many cases one gains the inherited reputation of being an mzungu – I too was judged 
on the attitudes and behaviour of other wazungu until I was given the opportunity to establish my own 
character at a personal level.  
56 His drunken state made it unclear if his anger was because we were in his house, interviewing his 
wife without his permission. Bahati had invited us in and I had not thought to ask if this was fine with 
her absent husband. This oversight on my behalf may have been because the women I had interviewed 
until this point were largely Christian women in the more culturally diverse city of Dar es Salaam, 




followed an evening in another area of Iringa Region earlier in the year when the 
Executive Officer of Ukumbi ward, a veteran sergeant of Nyerere’s war with Uganda 
and local trainer of Zimbabwean troops in their war of liberation, Frank Mkini, gave 
us food (as he put it, ‘our basic human right while under detention’) and then tried to 
place us under house arrest for being in his village without his permission.57 We were 
taken before the less militant village committee and secured our release with charm 
and after buying them drinks through most of the night. On my next visit to Ukumbi 
I was informed that Frank – who, I was told, had mental problems as a result of 
combat stress – was convinced my research story was a cover and that, again because 
of my interest in telecommunications, I was conducting intelligence; this time for the 
British intelligence service. 
 
More plausibly perhaps, I was also suspected by members of Umoja Workshop, an 
informal construction worker (ICW) group on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, of 
conducting a feasibility study for a United Nations agency. Two group members 
aggressively demanded to know how my organisation was going to finance them, 
and this is after I made it very clear that I was not working with the United Nations 
and had only got their details from the United Nations ‘Support for Informal 
Construction Workers in Dar es Salaam’ (‘STICW-Dar es Salaam’) project (section 
4:5). This situation was perhaps the most difficult to negotiate during the 18 months 
of fieldwork since it was most obvious to me then that I had failed in my efforts to 
express that my research was my own. It was also then that it most struck home that, 
as with most academic studies, it is the researcher who benefits from the research, 
however well-meaning otherwise (Howard 1994: 21). On this occasion Chris was 
also vocal to me in his observation that this is the case. I realised then that my 
research is unlikely to have any benefit to anyone other than myself in the near future 
unless my efforts to ‘make something’ of the research (Madge 1994: 99) are 
successful in feeding into action and help change the unequal power relations which 
enable the largely one-way flow of information from South to North. The guilt of the 
feeling that I was benefiting far more than those who were informing me was 
                                                 
57 It was my error for having not paid a courtesy call to the settlement administration on this occasion, 
as recommended by Hershfield et al (1983: 241-245). 
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probably the most intense reflexivity I engaged in, but I do not wish to privilege the 
issue here over other ethical decisions for, as Madge (1994: 93) is right to point out, 
‘ethical’ means different things to different people, and its meaning alters with time 
and place. What is perhaps more important is that I was engaging in reflexivity at all, 
which at its most basic ‘makes a problem out of what was once unproblematic: the 
figure of the fieldworker’ (Strathern 1991: 8). And this was possible because through 
courses in Edinburgh I had the opportunity to gain exposure to many well thought-
out methodological discussions. As Seale (1999: 49) emphasises, regardless of the 
methodological tradition, such exposure is only likely to increase a desirable aspect 
of research practice: methodological awareness.  
 
As described above, the Umoja Workshop situation was but one of the difficulties 
faced at points during the fieldwork. Though they could not easily have been 
predicted at those times, they were undoubtedly caused by perceptions of me as a 
foreigner, an mzungu with my own motives for gaining information. On the other 
hand, being an ‘outsider’ had its advantages since I was less likely to be associated 
with the Tanzanian state and, as a visitor making the effort to speak their language, I 
was somebody to be welcomed and cared for. As mentioned above, this reception 
was then further aided by introductions of recommendation from friends or business 
associates which probably served to legitimise me more in the eyes of informants. 
Yet one could argue, as Leonard (1994: 179) does, that the fact that all my 
informants were willing volunteers means that their accounts will not represent the 
full range of experiences. In this respect the truth status of what I have been told is 
uncertain since it can never be verified against the voices of those who have not been 
heard. And even for those who were interviewed, the power relationships of such an 
interaction – however much I might have attempted to avoid leading questions and 
tried to engage as much as possible in a casual conversation – are such that true 
disagreements may never come out.58 
                                                 
58 I raised this point during a seminar on ‘Qualitative Research Relationships in Practice: self and 
others in fieldwork interaction’ (27 April 2004, Graduate School of Social and Political Studies, 
University of Edinburgh), but with unsatisfactory discussion from the majority of researchers 
conducting their work in Britain whose general experience is that their informants do use the interview 
to air their opinions. As discussed above (and rather unsurprisingly), my experience from this research 
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2:17. Data analysis: objectivity and the (re)presentation of 
informants  
It is no solution to defuse these problems of power and privilege simply by inserting 
the self into the account and proclaiming that dialogue has occurred (Kulick 1995: 
15-16). This is part of the larger problem of what we identified in section 2:9 as the 
third challenge to the trustworthiness of the flexible design research strategy: that of 
the researcher’s interpretation of the data and the environment which informs it, and 
the risk of imposing a framework or meaning on what is happening rather than 
occurring or emerging from what is learnt. Given that the idea of research free from 
values is problematic (since no act of observation can ever be truly free from the 
underlying assumptions that guide it), a further attraction of qualitative research is 
that objectivity is considered a fundamental characteristic and does allow for a focus 
on the meanings which people give to their surroundings, rather than on the 
surroundings themselves (May 2001: 9-13).59  
 
In tune with other recent research (e.g., Trudell 2004), the present study is based on 
the notion that an understanding of the truth of a situation can be attained, or at least 
approximated, by weaving together the threads of many perspectives and discourses. 
We have noted that this research involved collecting data from different sources and 
used different research techniques, and this generated an immense volume of data 
and made data analysis a complex task. This was eased by the fact that analysis is not 
a distinct phase in qualitative research (Bryman & Burgess 1994: 217) for, alongside 
the constant personal negotiation over method and methodological considerations, 
there is also a constant interplay of data gathering and analysis (Wiseman 1974: 
317). Whenever this occurs there is no ‘right’ procedure in analysing and organising 
the data, but still the techniques employed do involve careful consideration at each 
stage of analysis. Yet as McCracken (1988) and Sayer (1992) note, the failure to 
                                                                                                                                          
is that most informants were more likely to express themselves in more depth when they know who 
they are talking to for longer than a one-off interview.  
59 One critique of the interpretivist approach in this respect is that it fails to acknowledge the theory-
laden aspects of observations. We do not neutrally observe the social world, so collecting data is 
already fraught with assumptions, abstractions, ideas and concepts. 
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identify the ‘right’ way should not be an excuse for an amateurish analytical 
approach. While the analysis of qualitative data should allow room for it to be a 
creative process, it is nonetheless a process demanding intellectual discipline, 
analytical rigour and a great deal of hard work. But because different people manage 
their creativity, intellectual endeavours and hard work in different ways, Patton 
(1990: 381) suggests, there is still no ‘right way’ to go about organising, analysing 
and interpreting qualitative data.60 Following Becker & Geer (1982: 241), I 
approached the analysis of the field data by dividing the process into three stages: 
‘(1) the selection and definition of problems, concepts and indices; (2) the check on 
the frequency and distribution of data; and (3) the incorporation of individual 
feelings.’ In looking for emerging patterns I created a hand-drawn spreadsheet by 
case study with ‘discussion areas’ from the interviews in the rows and the names of 
informants in the columns, to which I added the interview data. The emerging 
recurring themes that I ‘heard’ (Rubin & Rubin 1995: 234-238) then served as a 
guide to my discussion in the three case study chapters.61  
 
I include as accurately as possible what was actually said in our conversations in 
order to preserve the voices of informants while still maintaining a flow through the 
text where I incorporate my own feelings. This takes the form of referenced 
quotations from the individuals themselves.62 It is inevitable in such a study, 
however, that the author is faced with editorial decisions that move the analysis of 
what is said into another domain and raises the question of whose voices we are left 
with when they are presented in the text. Here I would agree with Seale (1999: 178) 
that attempts to delete the author from the text, although required by the logical 
                                                 
60 These thoughts are influenced by Sanghera (1997). 
61 I used Trulsson (1997: 53-54) as a guide here, whose own approach seems to adopt the essence of 
Boyatzis’ (1998) work on thematic analysis. Miles & Huberman (1994) offer a series of 13 tactics to 
be taken together for drawing initial meaning from a display that involve forming patterns, looking at 
contrasts, clarifying relationships, and building coherent understanding. These were not adopted since 
their tactics seem to take data analysis as a distinct phase later in the research than when I had already 
begun to engage in the constant interplay of data gathering and analysis. 
62 The alternative would have been to include whole interview transcriptions, which I decided against 
because I feel it would make the presentation of data unnecessarily difficult to read. 
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demands of post-modern theory, seem an impossible task.63 I have therefore 
attempted to deal with this hermeneutical challenge through the only means I see as 
satisfactory, which is the fairly conventional method of presenting these voices 
verbatim at the relevant point, followed by a bracketed reference indicating whose 
voice is being represented, and the date on which the conversation took place.64 I do 
recognise, however, that while this aids the flow of the piece, this method still fails to 
relinquish that by choosing to use certain excerpts I bring my own interpretation on 
what I decide to use.65
                                                 
63 Seale (1999: 159-177) then goes on to argue that experimental textual forms reflecting post-modern 
anxiety about this authorial presence can in fact mask a strong authorial presence. 
64 Quotes under three lines are presented in inverted commas in the main text body, and quotes over 
this length are indented and in a smaller font. In some cases my voice is also presented where the 
subsequent point may not seem clear without the question or comment I made during the interview. 
Ellipses are used at all other points where the presentation of my voice in the dialogue is not relevant, 
or where part of the informant’s comment is not crucial to the point being made.   More detail on the 
interviews are found in Appendix I, where they are listed by informant and indicated the informants’ 
occupation / position and the date and exact location of the meeting. In the case of some carving co-
operatives where I spoke with many carvers as a group while they worked, the quote is sometimes 
attributed to the group because the comments were offered without the time to record who made which 
remarks.  
65 Further methodological considerations and limitations to my methods have been presented in the 
text because I feel that they benefit more from the surrounding context. 
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3 Perishable Foodstuffs: from shamba to plate 
 
Telephones are another burning issue. Empirical work indicates that agricultural traders 
have access to phones for personal use but make virtually no use of them for business 
purposes. This is in part a reflection on the lack of trust between traders, but also on the 
absence of land line telephone services in agricultural markets. Consequently traders 
constantly have to travel to supply markets, raising transport and search costs. It would 
be much cheaper if traders could operate over the phone from their offices. The spread 
of mobile phones may ease this constraint. Time will tell. (Fafchamps 2004: 481) 
 
In this case study we closely trace the supply chain of tomatoes and potatoes from 
the rural shambas of Iringa and Mbeya to the wholesale market in Kariakoo, Dar es 
Salaam. We seek to find how ICT really are being accessed, adopted and 
appropriated by those many farmers and traders who are not directly influenced by 
donors. The evidence is based on semi-structured interviews and open discussions 
with 15 tomato and potato farmers, 4 intermediary traders (wafanyabiashara), 5 Dar 
es Salaam-based auctioneers (madalali) and various other key informants involved in 
the trade between the Southern Highlands and the commercial capital.1 In doing so, 
we first lay out the case for food marketing as a case study, then show that for many 
farmers an auctioneer (dalali) who they sell to plays an important role in supplying 
credit when they have cashflow problems. Because of this central role that a dalali 
plays we spend some time analysing the interactions in the business relationship 
between the two and follow the stages of what is often personal, face-to-face 
interaction in the building of their partnership. This is a welcome addition to the little 
empirical work on the social relations of markets and how actors build up trust that 
enables more complex exchange that spot transactions to take place (Lyon 2000). For 
this reason the ‘mobile moments’ in this section of the chapter are few. A closer 
analysis of the relationship helps to emphasise how – while a dalali can play a key 
role as a creditor – the dalali can also use this position of power to persuade a farmer 
                                                 
1 Interview details are given in Appendix I. A more detailed account of the methods is supplied in 
sections 2:10 of chapter two. 
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to supply only to him and to trust him on the price he says that he sells the farmer’s 
crop for. In such a situation the farmer’s exposure to prices being offered by other 
buyers can effectively be blinkered, which is the kind of sticky aspect of a real-world 
business relationship that those promoting ICT to link the farmer and market buyer 
directly (e.g., England 24 November 2004) would do well to observe. 
 
Interviews for the case study mostly took place in March, April and September 2003. 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, I was able to penetrate the network of a small 
number of madalali with the help of Eliab Chijoriga, a foodstuffs marketing expert 
and Director at COSTECH who introduced me to Bartholomeo Sanga, Festo 
Mkilama and Kamwene Sanga. Chijoriga urged these madalali to give me the 
contacts of the farmers who supply to them, and they did so once I had gained their 
friendship and trust during our preliminary meetings. I then visited these farmers for 
initial meetings, thereby achieving a complete marketing chain of suppliers and 
traders whose business dealings I could physically follow in order to track their use 
of ICT. Despite the advantages of this method of sampling (section 2:2), my 
informants were restricted to those working within this chain and, much like other 
studies of traders in Tanzania (Bryceson 1993: 120; Sebastiani-Kuoko 1998: 58), all 
the farmers and traders covered in this sample turned out to be male. While all are 
African, the wafanyabiashara do not necessarily come from the region where the 
interview took place.2 
 
3:1. Why food marketing as a case study? 
Agriculture is Tanzania’s most widespread economic activity, acting as the largest 
employer of the labour force. It provides a livelihood for some 80% of the 
                                                 
2 As with other areas of Africa, the female involvement in farming in this area of Tanzania is mostly 
restricted to labour. Women produce fruits and vegetables on a small scale and tend to only sell to 
traders who come to their farms or at local retail and at periodic markets on a very small scale. As 
Poole et al (2000b) note, such incomes from crop marketing can be the source of much suspicion 
between the genders. Men often expect to be able to keep both their own profits and those women in 
the household earn to feed, clothe and educate the family. For this reason women often try to avoid full 
disclosure of incomes, a situation which hinders market information exchange within the household. 
For further discussion on women’s efforts in petty trading to make ends meet in the rural household, 
see Molony (2000). 
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economically active population and also makes the largest contribution to GDP, 45% 
in 2003 (World Bank 2005). The country’s economy is thus predominantly based in 
the rural areas where about 70% of the Tanzanian population reside (World Bank 
2004a) and where the extent and severity of poverty is greatest. The 1.33% average 
rate of growth of Tanzania’s rural population, however, is much lower than the 
5.06% rate of the urban population (UN-Habitat 2002) who in domestic urban food 
markets (where the urban poor spend well over two-thirds of their income (World 
Bank 1999)) receive almost all the remaining half of total agricultural output that is 
not consumed by subsistence farming. Added to this growth is the massive influx of 
migrants to cities such as Dar es Salaam (growing at a rate of 5.4%) (UN-Habitat 
2004) which together are placing immediate pressures on food supply. This further 
calls for a greater understanding of the role of new ICT in the marketing systems that 
direct the production and distribute the output to the main points of consumption and 
ensure that the burgeoning urban population can buy affordable food. An 
understanding of domestic food marketing systems is also important because of 
agriculture’s role in feeding into the industrial and commercial sectors that rely upon 
agriculture as a source of raw materials and as a market for manufactured goods 
(Crawford 1997: ch.1). The functioning of food marketing systems therefore has 
considerable impacts on both the livelihoods of rural producers and, at a time of 
rapid urbanisation and increasing levels of urban poverty, is also a serious issue in 
urban development. Despite this, research on agro-food systems has mainly 
concentrated on the export of produce (Lyon 2003: 12), a situation that runs the risk 
of ignoring the politically strategic importance of basic food entitlements at the 
domestic level as ‘part and parcel of every Tanzania’s birthright’ (Bryceson 1993: 4). 
At a time when new ICT is hailed to revolutionise the way business is conducted 
(section 1:23), a study of the marketing channels through which much of the 
population makes a living selling the smallholder produce so essential in stimulating 
broader economic growth and contributing to rural (and national) poverty reduction 






3:2. Historical background to food marketing in Tanzania 
Before liberalisation, development in Tanzania was state-led, guided by Nyerere’s 
philosophy that active intervention could direct the economy to achieve both 
productive and welfare objectives. This was enshrined in the 1967 Arusha 
Declaration (Nyerere 1968), which introduced the nationalisation of the main means 
of production, distribution and exchange, along with a series of public policies which 
put in place regulations and controls. Together these had the effect of inhibiting most 
private entrepreneurship (Rugumamu & Mutagwaba 1999). The suppression of 
individual economic creativity was at its most intense during the 1970s and early 
1980s in the important area of agricultural marketing. Here the state used a series of 
measures to take control of maize and rice markets. The clearest example of this is in 
food crop marketing, which was single channel and placed under the direction of co-
operatives. This move designed in part to eliminate private traders (Maliyamkono & 
Bagachwa 1990: 67) who government and party politicians at national and local level 
viewed as illegal profiteers who had to be eradicated (Bryceson 1993: 95). It was 
only in the early 1980s when the authorities realised the futility of the crackdown on 
‘economic saboteurs’ that they fully grasped the magnitude of second economy 
(Maliyamkono & Bagachwa 1990: 83) and, under great pressure from the IMF 
(Bryceson 1993: 99-102; Ponte 1998: 319), made the first moves towards the reform 
of agricultural pricing and marketing.3 Yet the picture that emerges is that regardless 
of the relaxation on controls from about 1984, private trading was always a pervasive 
aspect of nearly every Tanzanian’s existence throughout the socialist era anyway, 
particularly when it came to the food crop sub-sector. That private traders in staples 
had been operating long before they were officially sanctioned is covered in 
considerable detail by Bryceson (1993: ch.5) and need not be repeated here. Others 
(e.g., Maliyamkono & Bagachwa 1993: ch.5) have also shown how in its attempt to 
control the market the socialist government set a series of disincentives for farmers to 
participate in the formal economy and these effectively led to the further 
                                                 
3 The precise timing of the first step towards market liberalisation is debated, with some authors 
pointing to the 1984 budget, others to the 1986 IMF agreement. Ponte (1998) shows the most 
important marketing changes took place in 1987 when the government permitted the commercial sale 
of food crops (grains, pulses and oilseeds) and inputs. For detailed commentary on the transformation 
of agricultural marketing through the adjustment period see Bryceson (1993) and Ponte (2002). 
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development of parallel food markets, particularly for the predominant staples of 
maize, rice and to some extent wheat. Less attention, however, is given to trading 
carried out in the period from the socialist era to the present by farmers of the less 
heavily controlled perishable foodstuffs in these main potato and tomato growing 
areas. This is probably because of the relative unimportance of these crops politically 
against the predominant staples of maize, rice and wheat.4 
 
Tomato and potato farming in Iringa and Mbeya regions 
Iringa Region in the Southern Highlands is home to the Hehe, Bena, Kinga and 
Pangwa ethnic groups and covers 59,000 square kilometres. 73% of this is farmed 
arable land, the produce of which provides over 85% of regional GDP from the 
efforts of more than 90% of the regional population (URT 1997a: 31). The land 
produces maize as the staple food crop and large cash crops of sunflower, tea, 
tobacco and pyrethrum. These are fed by a single rainy season from November to 
May, leaving dry conditions for the rest of the year. Tomatoes are mostly cultivated 
in the midlands and highlands agriculture-economic zones where altitude reaches 
well over 2000 metres above sea level and rainfall ranges between 1000 and 1600 
millimetres per year. Also in the Southern Highlands is Mbeya Region, home to 
various ethnic groups including the Nyakyusa, covering an area of 63,400 square 
kilometres and bordering Zambia and Malawi. 90% of the land is arable, farmed by 
80% of the region’s population. As in Iringa Region these farmers nearly all use the 
hoe for land preparation (Mussei et al 2000: 17) on an average of 2.5 acres of 
intercropping and/or monocropping land. The land is fed by reliable rainfall from 
October through to May. Cash crops of coffee, tea and cocoa are then cultivated from 
November to May, along with maize, rice and bananas to produce food harvests that 
tend to be less erratic than other parts of the country. Exportable surpluses of these 
staple crops are therefore a regular feature, and the long-distance trade in these 
                                                 
4 With the exception of Ponte’s (2002) major work on fast crops, staples are the most closely 
documented food crop in terms of government and academic studies, largely because they dominate 
production and consumption. Maize in particular is grown by more than 50% of Tanzanian peasants 
for subsistence and commercial use and, often in the form of ugali stiff porridge, acts as the principal 




accounts for much of the region’s prosperity (Bryceson 1993: 113-114). 90% of the 
potato crop in Tanzania is produced by smallholder farmers from the Southern 
Highlands (Manyona 1991), mostly in districts where the conditions are best suited 
for tuber production (Rolot 2001: 191). While peaks do occur, in both regions 
conditions and farming practices allow for year-round supply of these perishables to 
Dar es Salaam’s Kariakoo wholesale market. 
  
3:3. Marketing chain, players and processes 
3:4. Farmers 
Based on personal observation and the categorisation of traders and the farmers 
themselves, the broad categories of farmer seem to reflect their access to capital. 
Small-scale farmers (wakulima wadogo, e.g., Lukelo Mahenge, Petro Lyelu) are 
often barely above subsistence level, risk averse (Thomson & Terpend 1993: 4) and, 
with the help of labour from members of the immediate family, rely on farming as 
their main source of income to cover basic needs.5 Small farmers’ outputs are low 
because they farm small areas of land (93% of farm families cultivate less than two 
hectares (URT 1988)) that they either own outright or rent from larger farmers, and 
they are now increasingly renting or selling out to their larger-scale counterparts in 
favour of wage labour or non-farm activities (Bryceson 2002b: 734; Ponte 1998: 
334). Since they are producing less than other groups of farmers and their earnings 
are smaller, an individual small farmers’ decision to supply distant markets such as 
Kariakoo is affected by his more immediate need for cash and the transport costs of 
sending small amounts over long distances. This group of farmers are numerically 
the most represented group in the country and make the largest contribution to the 
country’s total crop output. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are a smaller group of large-scale farmers 
(wakulima wakubwa, e.g., Berod Pilla, Samwel Kiando) who, because their assets 
                                                 
5 As mentioned in section 3:4, however, very few farmers nowadays produce purely for subsistence 
consumption. See Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990: 3.1.2-3.1.4) for additional reasons that 
influence whether farmers participate in the market. 
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and annual turnover are greater than most MSEs (section 1:15), might rightly be 
categorised as medium-scale entrepreneurs. Large-scale farmers oversee the farming 
of larger areas of land than small- and medium-scale farmers (the group who lie 
between small- and large-scale farmers). Large farmers usually own this land 
themselves and in addition farm land that they rent locally from smaller farmers in 
different geographical across the country.6 By having access to land throughout the 
year they can take advantage of optimal seasonal variations and can constantly have 
some piece of land under cultivation and supply the market with crops without a 
break. Berod Pilla, a tomato farmer based in Ilula (Iringa Region), for example, 
harvests and plants at different times in different five acre plots at different locations 
every year. In any of these locations large farmers do not usually undertake much or 
any of the actual physical labour of farming but instead use locally hired labour to 
aid the work of members of the immediate and extended family, some of whom may 
travel to help at busy times on their more distant rented plots. With higher yields 
resulting from their access to productive land throughout the year, their frequency of 
output reaching Dar es Salaam is higher than that of their smaller counterparts, with 
some of the largest farmers managing to supply Kariakoo almost daily. 
 
Graduation from small to large farmer: poor culture of savings or simply a 
run-down of working capital? 
In the graduation from a small-scale farmer to a larger-scale farmer it appears that a 
successful risk-spreading strategy (Ellis 2000; Tiffen 2003: 1359) combining ‘fast’ 
cash crops (i.e., those such as tomatoes with a rapid turnover from land preparation 
to harvest) and income diversification can be more than a forced survivalist venture 
since it provides the opportunity for expansion through cross-subsidisation between 
agricultural and non-agricultural trading activities.7 When this is carried out 
                                                 
6 See Van Donge (1992a), however, for the argument that housing rather than the size of holdings can 
be a better indicator of wealth. 
7 Diversification is also not particular to agriculture, with large entrepreneurs in north-western 
Tanzania adopting diversification as a strategy aimed at avoiding putting all their eggs in one basket 
and to maintain a constant cash flow in a risky economic environment (Trulsson 1997: ch.8). See also 
Seierup (1994) for diversification as an investment strategy in the ‘upper field’ of entrepreneurship 
among Asians as well as black Africans. 
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successfully it then heightens one of the most salient features of de-agrarianisation, 
that of the massive difference between high and low income earners.8 The farmers 
and traders whose livelihoods are invested in these perishable foodstuffs markets 
were consulted for their views on what makes the difference, and in general the 
consensus was that cross-subsidisation of funds from income diversification 
activities can only be a profitable undertaking so long as enough capital is available 
to be transferred, a point Bryceson underlines as one of the prominent paradoxes of 
rural dwellers’ income generation sources. Non-agricultural involvement, she argues, 
tends to be triggered in part by capital constraints in commercial agriculture, while 
success in non-agricultural activities is largely determined by access to capital 
(Bryceson 2002a: 11) and the associated ability to bear risk (Wiggins 2000: 638). 
Indeed, the majority of madalali and farmers of all sizes suggested that capital 
reinvested in farming and other non-agricultural sources of income largely explains 
the huge disparity between farmers’ total incomes. 
 
During subsequent discussions three large farmers put their success in generating 
more capital than other farmers down to their ability to save and reinvest money into 
business rather than ‘squandering it on beer and women’ (Samwel Kiando, 
22/03/03), as one very successful large farmer observes of some of his counterparts 
whenever they have money.9 This was also picked up on by a financial adviser to a 
large coffee marketing trust fund who believes that there is a poor culture of savings 
among many farmers (of any crop, not just coffee) because not all have managed to 
adapt to a situation in which seasonal credit is not supplied as readily as it was under 
                                                 
8 Personal communication with Deborah Bryceson at seminar on ‘Poverty Policies or Policy Poverty: 
Paradoxes of Economic Reform and Occupational Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa’. 14 January 
2004. Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. Bryceson (2002b: 734) gives the example 
that higher-income earners redirect portions of their agricultural capital to more lucrative non-
agricultural activities, and in (2002a: 24) also cites Jambiya’s (1998) study on the Usambaras where 
75% invested agricultural earnings are directed into enterprises, and 84% of agricultural capital is 
sourced from non-agricultural sources.  
9 It has been suggested that Tanzania’s education system improve numeracy and organisational skills 
in order to tackle poorly managed supply of credit and poor personal budgeting skills (Wedgewood 
2005).   In the same style as written references, where comments made during interviews are used in 
the main text the name of the informant and date of the meeting is given in brackets after the comment. 
The location of interviews and discussions are listed in Appendix I. 
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pre-liberalisation marketing arrangements (Gama Jordan, 26/05/03).10 Under the 
present circumstances the challenge the majority of farmers are therefore faced with 
is that of avoiding the ever present danger of running down one’s working capital by 
using it for necessary consumption rather than business operations (Bryceson 2002a: 
11). It is in these areas of southern Tanzania where exactly this dilemma of  
exhausted working capital accounts for the high rate of turnover of non-agricultural 
income generating activities (Mwamfupe 1998). 
 
From the perspective of a small farmer, notes Edward Sanga (16/05/03), large 
farmers are successful in accessing capital in the form of loans or credit not only 
because they have collateral but also because they have access to the right people to 
ask – a factor that has also been observed of entrepreneurs’ privileged position in 
obtaining credit in north-west Tanzania (Trulsson 2000: 165) and among those who 
get to know the ‘gatekeepers of the local money reservoirs’ (Seierup 1994: 18) in 
small towns in central and western Kenya.11 This follows the argument (Kydd & 
Poulton 2000) that different players have differential access to market information 
through relevant networks and that, in general, better capitalised producers may well 
be better placed to access market information early. Whether this is the case in terms 
of farmers’ access to credit channelled into non-agricultural activities is unknown 
since this fieldwork concentrated on incomes gained through perishable foodstuffs, 
but it is no less likely that if credit is obtained for agricultural activities it is then 
cross-subsidised as freely as profits are. What is clear, however, is that in the absence 
of insurance markets to protect investments in highly perishable crops grown in a 
risky environment open to price fluctuations and transaction failure (section 3:8), the 
vast majority of tomato and potato farmers covered here turn to networks where they 
can access informal financial systems for credit cover against subsequent fluctuations 
in their income streams. 
                                                 
10 This comment echoes a study by Dorward et al (1998), who show that seasonal credit provision has 
been undermined by the liberalisation process and, while some success has been achieved within some 
export cash cropping systems, private market participants in domestic food systems are apparently still 
struggling to develop alternative mechanisms. As mentioned in section 2:3 (footnote 25), coffee 
marketing was researched for a short period as a back-up case study when problems were encountered 
in researching the informal construction industry. 





Perishable foodstuffs can either be sold by a farmer at a nearby market, or to one of 
two types of middleman: he can either sell them locally to a mobile intermediary 
trader (mfanyabiashara; pl. wafanyabiashara), or send them to an auctioneer (dalali; 
pl. madalali) in a larger city market such as the Kariakoo wholesale market within 
the Kariakoo market complex in Dar es Salaam. The role of the mfanyabiashara 
(e.g., Emmanuel Wilson) is usually one of travelling straight to villages to source and 
purchase potatoes or tomatoes that are then sold to markets throughout the country. 
For those farmers without somebody to sell to in Kariakoo, the mfanyabiashara can 
save the hassle of finding somebody and dealing with communications (Angelo 
Kilave, 07/05/03). He can even be a buyer of last resort for those farmers with an 
established buyer in Dar es Salaam who informs them to sell locally when the price 
in the city is so poor that neither of them will make a profit if they are sent to Dar es 
Salaam. Sometimes buying between the farmer and mfanyabiashara are primary and 
secondary stockists who store the tomatoes / potatoes for a small fee. A sub-category 
of this type of trader is the kiunganishi (e.g., Geoffrey Sanga; literally ‘connector’, 
connecting farmer and dalali), who differs from the mfanyabiashara in that he is 
usually a farmer himself in the area where he lives and acts as a field agent 
representing one particular dalali only. He organises the collection of crops from the 
same pool of local farmers every season and sends them to his dalali. 
 
The dalali (e.g., Kamwene Sanga) is an auctioneer usually stationed at Kariakoo 
where he receives farmers’ produce (through a kiunganishi if he has one) and, acting 
as a farmer’s agent, handles and sells it on to buyers who can be owners of, or 
distributors to, smaller sub-markets throughout the city as well as hotels and traders 
delivering to Zanzibar and even the Comoros. As we discuss in section 3:8 in relation 
to their role as credit suppliers, the most competitive madalali are supplied by a large 
pool of farmers and have multiple selling channels that enable them to oversee the 
efficient receipt and sale of consignments at even the busiest times.12 As has been 
noted, traders tend to farm as their secondary occupation (Bryceson 1993: 121) or 
                                                 
12 Bartholomeo Sanga, for example, is a dalali with over 20 farmers supplying to him at one time. 
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own land that is farmed on their behalf, and this is their main source of finance 
(Thomson & Terpend 1993: 11). Some of the most successful dalali also gain 
income from daladala commuter buses and taxis in Dar es Salaam and guesthouses 
or bars in their hometown or in Dar es Salaam.13 
 
3:6. The trader hierarchy: risk-taking, experience and character 
While it is uncertain why some successful farmers move on to trading instead of 
further progressing as cultivators, we have seen from the testimony of madalali that 
the decision to enter their trade was apparently not financially motivated.14 What is 
also clear from the biography of madalali such as Festo Mkilama (Figure 10) is the 
necessity of being an mfanyabiashara as an essential prerequisite to becoming a 
dalali. In doing so, those wafanyabiashara who have the confidence to break away 
from only collecting produce from their original home locality take a series of high 
risks, not least the uncertainty of transport arrangements in rural areas and the 
availability of supplies and destination markets. This requires having to cultivate 
good relations in multiple new locales with suppliers and other traders for the 
purpose of gathering market and transport information which, as Bryceson (1993: 
141) notes, demands a character that is resilient and gregarious. ‘Resilient’ and 
‘gregarious’ are among the most appropriate words to describe the successful traders 
such as Bartholomeo Sanga and Kamwene Sanga in this sample who, many other 
traders point out, tend also to be socially popular at the same time as being respected 
by fellow traders and farmers as resourceful businessmen.15 Although referring 
                                                 
13 Daladala are favoured for quick returns, while guesthouses are favoured as ‘retirement businesses’ 
(Eliab Chijoriga, 15/04/03). Real estate is often regarded as a good hedge against inflation (Van Donge 
1992b: 197). 
14 According to Bryceson (1993: 130), access to large amounts of capital is not vital either to 
becoming a dalali. This is disputed by Van Donge (1992b: 183, 198) who sees that capital 
requirements increase as a trader ascends in the hierarchy, and notes the trader’s option of continuing 
to operate in a lower stage when his capital increases can make him richer than someone else at a 
higher stage. 
15 Unfortunately, the mfanyabiashara’s peripatetic existence also demands a sociable lifestyle in order 
to form and renew ties with potential suppliers and sources of market and transport relations (similar to 
that described of the face-to-face meetings in section 3:8), which in trading towns such as Uyole 
(Mbeya Region) frequently involves drinking in the roadside bars frequented by long-distance lorry 
drivers, staying in guesthouses and the ubiquitous presence of available women in both locations. This 
has been shown to be a significant factor in the spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly since trading is a 
 
 103
specifically to madalali, Bryceson judges well the qualifications needed to progress 
in trading: 
 
the main prerequisite is “being known”. Several traders confirmed the importance of 
being popular. A wholesaler has to have ‘nous’ (akili) and a reputation for having many 
clients, being well-liked, respected and trustworthy. An outgoing personality, 
shrewdness and an aura of invincibility as ‘Mr Fix-it’ combine to form the mystique of 
the successful wholesaler. (Bryceson 1993: 130) 
 
As we shall see, the successful trader applies these traits when operating in the 
markets where he gains the experience, contacts and reputation that attracts to his 
pool new suppliers who can then learn from his trading experience and, later on in 
their relationship, gain access to credit. To have the chance of reaping these benefits 
an emerging farmer new to the market must first position himself with a dalali 
because, as one informant puts it, ‘farmers fail when they are unable to penetrate the 
network of madalali’ (Gerald Mgaya, 21/05/03). 
 
Harvesting and transportation from the Southern Highlands to Dar es Salaam 
The decision on when to harvest takes into consideration the use to which the fruits 
will be put (De Lannoy 2001: 470): how long the tomato can stay on the plant before 
it must be picked; how long it can be stored before it must arrive at the market in 
order to be fresh enough to sell and when the dalali’s other expected consignments 
are due to arrive so that there is no glut / shortage. The potato farmer has more time 
to make this decision than the tomato farmer because when ready his crops can stay 
longer before harvesting and can also be stored before transportation to Dar es 
Salaam. Once the crops are harvested and ready to be sent to Dar es Salaam they are 
graded and packed into locally-made wicker baskets (Figure 9) or gunny bags. The 
crop is then transported to the Dar es Salaam-Zambia TANZAM highway using a 
variety of means from bicycle or oxen cart to Land Rover or pick-up. The size of his 
                                                                                                                                          
youthful passion (Bryceson 1999: 179) and it is this group who are among the population’s most 
sexually active. On the social culture of these towns, for example, see Gysels et al (2002). 
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crop and his ability to hire (or have his own) transport to send to Dar es Salaam then 
determines whether a farmer sends his crop alone or with other farmers’ crops in a 
larger lorry. By going to lorry parks personally or phoning lorry owners or drivers he 
knows the farmer then finds a lorry that will deliver to Kariakoo and either pays the 
driver or owner himself if he has the cash, or asks the dalali to pay him in advance 
from the money the farmer will make from the sale of his crop. Any such logistical 
communication between farmer and dalali are usually conducted now by mobile 
phone where previously letters would be used or the farmer would have to be present 
with the consignment all the time.16 
 
A small sample of 11 lorry drivers at the Dar es Salaam end of the Iringa / Mbeya 
run revealed about half have mobile phones they use for their work, having either 
purchased them themselves or had them issued by the lorry owner. One large farmer 
(Samwel Kiando, 24/05/03) now issues all his lorry drivers with mobile phones in 
case of breakdown. Despite this, however, and depending on his relationship with the 
lorry owner, a farmer may still wish to travel with the lorry. This may simply be 
because he may need to go to Dar es Salaam anyway to see his dalali or for other 
business, but it may also be because the farmer is wary that the crops he depends on 
for his livelihood may not reach Dar es Salaam without problems. Yet while lorry 
drivers may increasingly be equipped with mobile phones, a driver will usually first 
call his boss (i.e., not the owner of the perishable foodstuffs) in the event of a 
breakdown, at which point both drivers and farmers report that the owner tends to 
care more about fixing his lorry than the state of somebody else’s perishable cargo. 
Although a driver with close ties to a large farmer will apparently act with more 
urgency in sorting the problem (by calling a nearby town with spare parts if the 
problem can be repaired, or informing the waiting dalali to send new transport from 
Dar es Salaam if it cannot) (Lorry drivers, 14/04/03), some farmers (e.g., Angelo 
Kilave, 07/05/03) still prefer to be with their crops and to make decisions themselves 
rather than rely on others’ ability to communicate with new sources of transport. 
Farmers without a prearranged agreement to sell to a particular dalali in Kariakoo 
                                                 
16 This case study looks only at mobile phone coverage since no farmers covered in the sample use the 
internet, public access to which is only available in a few urban areas (principally the cities of Iringa 
and Mbeya) of the Southern Highlands. 
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but who would rather sell in Dar es Salaam than locally to an mfanyabiashara can 
also send to markets outside Kariakoo during times of overabundance. Lorries are 
now increasingly by-passing the municipal market to go straight to these markets in 
avoidance of a law passed to ensure that all deliveries go via Kariakoo to be 
registered and taxed (Nicanor Omolo, 27/08/03).17 
 
3:7. Interactions within the farmer-dalali business 
relationship 
The relationship between supplier and dalali is set in a risky operating environment 
where farmers, particularly those marketing highly perishable fast crops such as 
tomatoes, invest much in the face of weather and price fluctuations and considerable 
threat of transaction failure. We have noted that farmers who are able to bear more of 
these risks are those with access to capital, which can be made available either 
through successful income diversification (which may at some time require a 
creditor) or, as we also discuss, through a dalali who absorbs the risk of not 
recovering the investment should the harvest fail. In an attempt to expose what can 
be a farmer’s financial reliance on a dalali, we now follow the subsequent stages of 
interaction that strengthen the partnership until it reaches a mature, ‘permanently 
connected’ level. With this we can then assess the effects that ICT have on the 
interactions of these business relationships. 
 
3:8. Stages of relationship between farmer and dalali 
Stage one: Recommendations within the madalali network 
In order to get into the network a farmer seeking a dalali will assume the dalali his 
family normally uses and who he will probably have already had dealings with on 
                                                 
17 In high season, for example, there are around two thousand baskets being delivered to Kariakoo 
daily, and around three thousand to smaller markets that take the rest. This is apparently also the case 
for potatoes and many other vegetables (Shaibu Mlilapi, 14/08/03). See Lynch (1994) on the 




another family member’s behalf. Where this is not possible he will usually ask 
another farmer from his village with established links to a dalali the name of the 
dalali who he uses. If this established farmer agrees to act as ‘relationship broker’ he 
can say to the emerging farmer that a dalali such as Festo, for example, is a good 
dalali to work with because he can give cash advances, and in effect recommends the 
emerging farmer to Festo as somebody who can supply potatoes or tomatoes as he 
does. By using local social networks to provide him with information with which he 
can then assess the risk of going into business with a stranger the emerging farmer is 
reducing his own transaction costs (i.e., the search, screening, negotiation, 
monitoring and enforcement cost of transacting activities undertaken to mitigate 
uncertainty and reduce the risks of transaction failure (Poole & Del Campo Gomis 
1998: 201)). The dalali is also reducing his transaction costs when the established 
farmer with whom he already has a business relationship is saying to the dalali that 
his friend from the village can reliably supply crops in the same way as he does. 
Lacking physical assets to offer as surety, the participants in effect pledge as 
collateral their social connections and reputation, in much the same way as Putnam 
(1993: 169) describes of rotating credit associations, allowing trust to become 
transitive and spread. According to a Kariakoo statistician who has worked for many 
years with madalali, in these situations farmers are most partial to trusting an 
unknown person when introduced or recommended by somebody they know, which 
in Kariakoo is usually an established farmer who has been in the business long 
enough to have identified a dalali with a good reputation (Nicanor Omolo, 27/08/03). 
Should business then start between the emerging farmer and dalali it will then be 
recognised by both parties that the established farmer who introduced them should be 
regarded as a friend and somebody to continue doing business with. Should business 
then cease between the two new business partners, perhaps because one accuses the 
other of cheating him through some means, the emerging farmer is by this time more 
familiar with the marketing process and Kariakoo market itself and will know of 
other madalali he can approach. Alternatively, established farmers can advise 
emerging farmers to approach a local kiunganishi who, with strong links to one 
particular dalali and living locally, is willing to take on a new farmer because he can 
keep a close eye on his progress and make extra money from his dalali by helping 
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coordinate his supply. The emerging farmer is therefore only dealing with a dalali by 
proxy and, if he fails to meet him face-to-face, is less entitled to the benefits of a 
more personal relationship with him, though may receive them indirectly through the 
kiunganishi. All these negotiations, because they involve actors often in the same or 
nearby villages, are conducted face-to-face. 
 
Wafanyabiashara as ‘phone book gatekeepers’ 
If an emerging farmer does not manage to get good recommendations from other 
more established farmers in his local social network (perhaps because others are not 
willing to stake their own reputations on him), he may approach an mfanyabiashara 
to put him in touch with a dalali. This is a lesser risk for the farmer’s reputation 
locally and future transactions if he fails to produce the goods to the dalali because 
the more transitory existence of the mfanyabiashara means that the ties between 
them are weaker. Furthermore, if the dalali is urgently seeking more farmers to 
supply him and has asked his current suppliers (farmers or wafanyabiashara) if they 
can put in touch any other farmers they know, he may also expect less reliable 
suppliers because his established suppliers are not first offering their reputations but 
rather are being asked to produce trustworthy people at short notice. This is a 
demand that the dalali recognises will not always work. Yet where ties are weaker 
because interaction is not so local and where recommendation is paid for on 
commission, not reputation, there is more opportunity for deviance. Cases are 
reported, for example, of wafanyabiashara taking crops from farmers, promising to 
reimburse them when they are paid by a dalali, and the crops then ‘going missing’ 
with little easy recourse to justice for the farmer. Wafanyabiashara can also use more 
subtle means of taking advantage of the situation where a farmer is not in the 
madalali network and has no access to a mobile phone, as in the case of Galuce and 
Msemwa (26/03/03), partners in a large potato trading town who supply the selective 
phone numbers of madalali in Kariakoo, to whom the farmer will ask the market 
price. Through having access to the phone and knowing madalali, these 
wafanyabiashara are in a win-win situation since they either get commission from 
the dalali whose number they recommend or, if the dalali’s price does not suit the 
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farmer, they get a profit by buying from the farmer and organising the transport 
themselves.18 In the meantime the farmer not only gets a poor price because the 
buyers recognise him as a small-scale farmer outside the madalali network and 
desperate to sell, but by supplying to wafanyabiashara he lacks the benefits that 
come with an established business relationship with a regular dalali.19 A third, less 
frequent way an emerging farmer can get into business with a dalali occurs if he goes 
direct to the KMC offices himself where staff will introduce him to a dalali (Kuboja 
Ng’ungu, 27/08/03). 
 
Stage two: Building relationships based on trust through a period of repeated 
fair exchange of crops for cash and information about demand 
Transaction risks and the (un)ethical environment of trading 
Those who make it into the madalali network and who have access to a mobile 
phone find that the amount of good information that is offered depends on the 
farmer’s relationship with the dalali. The opportunities for trust to be breached arise 
all the way through the marketing chain, with farmers frequently complaining of 
problems further away from the village. Farmers give examples of lorry drivers being 
untruthful about the quantity of the consignment that they deliver, theft in the 
marketplace and unscrupulous madalali who, in Bryceson’s account of staple food 
markets in Dar es Salaam, operate in an unsavoury ethical environment of trade 
(1993: 138). These ‘risks of opportunism’ that a farmer takes when entering the 
market are often taken alongside ‘coordination risks’ (the risk of failure of an 
investment because of the absence of complementary investments by other suppliers 
in the chain), another common transaction risk in the absence of a functioning legal 
                                                 
18 Though at no point was it revealed that the wafanyabiashara and dalali worked in tandem by 
reporting an inflated price, some informants (e.g., Kamwene Sanga, 17/04/03) suspect other tribes of 
creating a cartel that protects the interests of members of its own. In Sebastiani-Kuoko’s sample (1998: 
57) middlemen were either of the same tribe or very close friends. 
19 These two men, who as farmers, wafanyabiashara and owners of a central huduma ya simu (phone 
kiosk) could safely be termed ‘entrepreneurial farmers’, estimate that in the town of 77,000 inhabitants 
(URT 2004a) less that one quarter of farmers have mobile phones and fewer than one quarter use 
huduma ya simu to call a dalali in Dar es Salaam, meaning more than three quarters of farmers use the 
town’s 18 or so wafanyabiashara (Galuce & Msemwa, 26/04/03). 
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and judicial apparatus that regularly fails to sanction contracts.20 To counter any 
attempts to meddle with his crops on their way to, or at, the market, or if he suspects 
any dishonesty from his dalali, a farmer may go to Kariakoo personally to try avoid 
being cheated. As emphasised in section 3:8, however, one of the main disadvantages 
of the farmer being in Kariakoo is that it negates one of the main benefits of the 
mobile phone, that of obtaining up-to-date market information without having to be 
present at the market. Nevertheless, the farmer will usually travel with his crops to 
Kariakoo at least for the first time he supplies to a new dalali so that he can see how 
the market works if he is a newcomer, and to meet his new dalali if it is the first time 
they are doing business together. 
 
Testing reputations by fair exchange 
For the farmer to obtain this up-to-date market information while away from 
Kariakoo he must trust his dalali, and the dalali must trust his farmer. Because of the 
great transaction risks of the market, however, trust it at very low levels in Tanzanian 
food crop trading, with one analysis of horticultural markets (Poole et al 2000) 
showing the high risk – a one-in-three chance – of encountering payment problems. 
This may explain why in the horticultural study only 14% of these farmers sold to the 
same traders last time as the time previously, and why nearly all farmers in this 
sample have had dealings with other madalali who they left the first because of some 
breach of trust.  
 
Testing a long-distance relationship through transfer of responsibility 
Once the dalali can prove to the farmer that he can sell his goods quickly, at a good 
price, and report the profit honestly and pay him promptly, and once the farmer can 
                                                 
20 Risks of opportunism are most often observed as the delivery of sub-standard goods or services 
whose quality cannot easily be assessed when entering a contract, and include loans default by farmers; 
low prices offered by traders at harvest time (when farmers are desperate for cash) or in remote areas 
(where farmers have no other sales outlets) and use of inaccurate / loaded weights and measures. The 
cumulative effects of these risks can be to discourage more advanced, innovative risk-taking associated 
with entrepreneurship, undermining the very processes of exchange necessary for economic growth 
(Kydd & Dorward 2003). For more on the frequent cases of business failure among vegetable traders, 
see Van Donge (1992b).  
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prove that he is able to regularly supply crops to the market, an agreement is usually 
made that the dalali is now responsible for future consignments as soon as they reach 
the market. This agreement is often made between the two face-to-face at the 
marketplace, but is usually unwritten (Mlyavidoga 1998: 125) and unsigned and 
therefore not legally binding, with the emphasis being on trust. Now the farmer need 
not be physically present at Kariakoo because he can use a mobile phone to 
communicate with his dalali from a distance and in his absence has to trust his dalali 
to ensure that he is not cheated through theft or swaps. The dalali must check to see 
that he receives the right amount of consignments that the farmer reported when he 
phoned him, and that they all have the farmer’s name on the label. It is also the 
dalali’s job now to be faithful in reporting to the farmer how much he sold the 
different gunny bags for, and to pay the farmer his money with as little fuss as 
possible. 
 
Desire to retain reputation as trustworthy 
When asked how they know at this stage that they have found the right dalali to 
work with, over half of the farmers offer that they know they are with the right 
because they can trust him. When pressed about why this is, they say that a good 
dalali will pay them a fair price without delay, which is conduct they equate with a 
good character. Lyon (2000: 672) received the same response from tomato farmers 
and traders in Ghana. And when asked how they know that their dalali has a good 
character, the Tanzanian farmers often say that they have been friends for a long time 
so know their business partners’ honest character from experience. Again these 
sentiments are similar to those identified in Ghana’s Brong Ahafo Region, where 
Lyon reports what he terms as ‘networks of working relationships’ as the most 
common reason for trusting someone. These are based on a long-standing trusting 
relationship of continued interaction where each party collects information on the 
capability of the other to build up confidence (Lyon 2000: 671). One successful large 
farmer, Samwel Kiando (22/03/03), then went on to explain that from his own 
experience the people who succeed in tomato farming tend to be those who realise 
the implications of being shamed locally if exposed as untrustworthy after reneging 
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on a deal, and he and his long-term dalali know this and have formed a good 
relationship through repeated exchange.21 In Putnam’s words, this ‘tends to 
encourage the development of a norm of generalized reciprocity’ (1993a: 172), a 
highly productive component of social capital that – as we shall see by stage four – 
serves to reconcile short-term altruism and long-term self-interest. 
 
Stage three: An established relationship and the importance of face-to-face 
meetings 
Yet in order for trust to develop from repeated exchange something more than 
market information and crops need to be traded over time. As Festo (15/04/03) in 
Kariakoo hints at, he first got to know two of his main suppliers when they were 
small farmers and were often bankrupt. Despite his difficulties the farmer would 
always supply whatever he could solely to his dalali, who recognised this loyalty and 
so they met up (first when he used to travel to the village, then later when the farmer 
could afford to come to Kariakoo) and he helped him with his problems. What is 
most significant about this account is that only after the farmer and dalali met again 
face-to-face did the dalali consider helping his struggling farmer. Such meetings 
usually occur in Dar es Salaam and were apparently more frequent before mobile 
phones emerged to facilitate the exchange of supply and demand information and 
when farmers therefore had more reason to visit the market. However, they appear to 
be too important to business for them to fade away altogether, so the meeting can be 
planned by the farmer about once per season to coincide with another reason to visit 
the city and renew other relationships in addition to that with his dalali. Starting at 
Kariakoo market around mid-morning when the early, most frantic period of trading 
is over they can swiftly move onto the municipal market bar, which can take many 
hours. Depending on time and the strength of their friendship, what could most 
accurately be seen as fairly casual, alcohol-fuelled business meeting can then shift on 
                                                 
21 Putnam (1993: 168) gives the example of an Ibo village in Nigeria as a small, highly personalized 
community where the threat of ostracism from the socio-economic system is sufficient to act as a 
credible sanction to the risk of default in rotating credit schemes. 
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to other bars or to the dalali’s home for a meal.22 The gains made from the meeting 
suggest that it is more than a courteous get-together, for the marketplace meeting 
appears to be of mutual benefit to both parties and is crucial in the business 
relationship between farmer and dalali because it allows for the flow of information 
both ways in a manner of communication that is more fluent than a time / cost- 
restricted phone call. 
 
Sources of information and information exchange 
The content of the marketplace meeting is not necessarily business that cannot be 
conducted over the phone. Nor is the meeting a cost-saving measure to avoid paying 
for lengthy calls, since the cost of getting to Kariakoo and being away from the farm 
can be high. Rather, for the farmer a personal visit to the dalali seems to be a move 
to ensure that there are no problems with the operation and a chance to catch up on 
the latest trends of the market and what may improve business. As one farmer put it,  
 
…the information is better because it is live and I am free to ask questions when they 
come to mind. I don’t feel under the pressure like in a phone call when I can only 
exchange greetings with the dalali and find out about market demand. When we are 
meeting face-to-face I have more time to find out information that the dalali may know 
about sourcing cheaper inputs that I can then arrange while in Dar es Salaam, and what 
varieties are in demand and about new farming methods. (Angelo Kilave, 07/05/03) 
 
Apart from his personal experience of farming, to the farmer the dalali’s ‘surgery’ 
apparently outweighs other sources of information. On crop production methods, for 
example, nearly all farmers say that they learnt methods when they started farming 
and are in a better position to know what is best for the particular soils and climate of 
                                                 
22 These meetings seem similar to the market meetings among Chagga women described by Pietila 
(2002: 203) where women traders use market as a place to mix and get information. I was invited to 
one of these seemingly-spontaneous meetings which occurred after an interview with a dalali when a 
visiting farmer and some other madalali decided to relax and chat. A few snippets of information 
concerning weather and demand flashed by, but it seemed my presence turned events so I was unable 
to get a picture beyond the setting and atmosphere. I was keen to see who would be buying the beers 
since it would give some indication of the power relations, but it seemed that my presence again 
altered the flow since I ended up paying for most of the drinks. 
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their area than anybody else since they usually have years of experience. The only 
person they will take advice from is their dalali, whose advice on the application of 
pesticides and fertilisers has been shown to have improved the quality of farmers’ 
tomatoes in Dar es Salaam’s Temeke municipality (Nicanor Omolo, 27/08/03). On 
price information the word of traders when used in combination with meeting 
neighbours and other farmers at markets have been identified elsewhere as the most 
significant price information sources for farmers (Muturi 2001: 27). While 
information on prices in rural areas can amount to gossip (Lyon 2003: 15), when 
local farmers and wafanyabiashara who have recently been to Kariakoo are also 
consulted it is apparently used as an attempt to triangulate sources when speaking to 
a dalali is not possible. However, a dalali is seen by many farmers as the most highly 
regarded source of demand information, and certainly more reliable than the word of 
others in terms of the current price at the time a farmer has to make decisions about 
when to harvest and where to send his crops, because it is up-to-date and first-hand. 
Asking others about market prices is only useful when a farmer is trying to cross-
check on a dalali’s price that he feels the need to question. 
 
Other than the word of a dalali with whom a farmer feels he is in a trusted 
relationship, he tends to have a good deal of faith in his own judgement. For 
information on agro-inputs such as manure, for example, farmers are most 
comfortable with relying on their own personal experience, based on tests they have 
conducted themselves.23 The ‘Bwana Shamba’ local, government-employed 
agricultural extension officer is a better respected source because he knows the 
specificities of the local farming environment. He is certainly more highly regarded 
by farmers than cultivation advice articles written for national newspapers and which 
they criticise as not being appropriate to their particular climate and soils. The same 
is said for an education section to a now defunct weekly broadcast produced by 
                                                 
23 There is always the possibility that farmers are unintentionally exaggerating their own role in these 
tests because it is on their own land and they feel very personally involved in the analysis of their 
lands’ response to the new method / input, while under-reporting the significance of somebody else, 
possibly a local agricultural extension officer, in bringing new inputs or methods to their attention in 
the first place. 
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KMC and aired on Radio Tanzania.24 The show also broadcast information on retail 
and wholesale prices for those crops most in demand (Kuboja Ng’ungu, 27/08/03), 
but farmers criticised the figures as representing only an average price for the 
previous week, which is not accurate enough for farmers seeking to know present or 
forthcoming demand.25 As one farmer put it, ‘[t]he radio lies. The dalali can know 
the exact price at any time, morning and afternoon’ (Edward Sanga, 16/05/03). 
Similarly, a few farmers expressed that they have little confidence in the radio as a 
source of applicable information on credit sources, since they know that although it 
may be available it will be a long and difficult application process which they feel is 
unlikely to bear fruit.26 Those farmers who have obtained credit have done so from 
local small-scale credit banks, ‘personal contacts’ or, in the majority of cases, from 
their dalali. The internet is a source of information most (9/14) farmers in the sample 
have heard of, but none know what it does or how it could help their business. 
 
In contrast to these other sources, the information exchanged at the impromptu 
marketplace meetings comes from the dalali’s own experience as a successful farmer 
(often with knowledge of the farmer’s specific local farming environment) and his 
experience as a trader. It is also gathered when speaking with many other farmer-
suppliers in similar meetings in the course of the year when he uses this chance to 
catch up on developments in the villages, in particular the growing conditions, and to 
hear the farmer’s version of gossip on the farming progress of other farmers who 
may (or should) be supplying him. So while the farmer has the opportunity to learn 
from his dalali more about methods and the market, the dalali slowly updates from 
these meetings his database of shared practical experiences that are respected by the 
farmer more than any of the other sources of information available to them. 
                                                 
24 ‘Lijue Soko La Kariakoo’ was produced by KMC and ran from the establishment of KMC until 
September 2002, when it was suspended for non-payment of fees. The programme has not been aired 
since. 
25 A separate study mentioned (though not referenced) in Thomson and Terpend (1993: 19-20) found 
that grain traders expressed annoyance that consignments they had transported to the capital achieved 
lower prices than those broadcast on the thrice-weekly broadcasts, presumably because the opportunity 
for profit had been recognised by a number of traders and the resulting inflow of grain had reduced 
prices. 
26 This contrasts with Zambian small scale farmers and traders for whom the radio is a very efficient 
way of disseminating information (Porter et al 2004). 
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An opportunity for the farmer to ask for credit 
These marketplace meetings are of equal importance to the farmer because through 
being present and renewing ties the farmer is reminding his dalali that he is a reliable 
supplier of the crops that make him a dalali and earn him a living, and for this the 
farmer should be rewarded since the dalali cannot do business without him.27 The 
meeting therefore also provides the farmer with an opportunity to ask for something 
more from the dalali that will strengthen their business relationship. It is at the 
marketplace meeting that the farmer may mention to his dalali that he has financial 
difficulties, particularly if he has spent the last of the profits from his last crop on the 
transportation of his goods to the market and so may require credit for farm inputs if 
his new crop has not sold at a good price. The dalali’s attitude to such requests is 
explained by a large farmer who is approached in a similar way by those he does 
business with: 
 
There’s a time when customers get family problems and they come to you and because 
you know their importance in your business it’s good to start helping them. So they 
won’t run away from you. There are many ways to care for the customers, for example, 
helping them with their problems as long as they will do business with you. (Kuboja 
Ng’ungu, 27/08/03) 
 
Apparently the question of financial assistance is not raised by the farmer directly but 
through hints, to which the dalali – if he wishes to help – responds with questions 
about the farmer’s needs (Nicanor Omolo, 27/08/03). This interaction reveals 
madalali not only as a source of credit for a future crop (Bryceson 1993: 34), but also 
emerging as providers of credit for other requirements from school fees to large sums 
of business capital, this extending from an expansion of income diversification and 
commensurate cash flow complications discussed earlier.28 The dalali, as farmer 
                                                 
27 I leave the reader to judge between Van Donge’s (1992b) pessimistic/realistic account of the weak 
bonds of solidarity successful traders feel towards others because of the high incidence of transaction 
failure, and the next three quotes from farmers / traders whose altruism may have been voiced for my 
benefit. 
28 For reasons that were not given by one authoritative Kariakoo source (Nicanor Omolo, 27/08/03), 
input credit is more often provided to tomato and onion farmers, and much less frequently to potato 
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himself and often a businessman, understands these difficulties and when in a good 
relationship with a farmer and doing well himself can be very reasonable about the 
terms of repayment. Exoni, formerly a large tomato farmer, for example, lost almost 
his entire fortune when a lorry full of his rice turned over and petrol contaminated the 
entire (uninsured) load, making it unsaleable. This occurred in 1996 and his tomato 
dalali has still not pressurised him to repay the (re)start-up capital he loaned him 
since he knows that the farmer will have difficulty for some time, particular since his 
crops have been hampered by poor rains (Exoni Manitu, 15/05/03). As we shall see 
in section 3:12, if the farmer wishes for this earnings to be deposited in a bank 
account the dalali can be trusted to handle this on his behalf, so the dalali will 
therefore have knowledge of at least one source of a farmer’s income and will have 
some idea when some farmers are able to repay a loan. This repayment or balancing 
of the books is another function of the marketplace meeting, since the large sums that 
can be involved in the rough environment of Kariakoo require the farmer to be at the 
market to handle the cash himself if his dalali does not. Again though, a dalali will 
not push too hard for repayment unless he has a good reason, for fear of the farmer – 
who he relies as a regular supplier of quality crops – calling into question his trust 
and supplying another dalali in return for credit. So the dalali must show the farmer 
that he can trust him and that he values this, even if this means that he will share a 
loss. As one dalali put it, 
 
even if he [the farmer] does not come back I will still give him money again if he asks 
next season because he helps me if he has a good season, and then I get to drink beer. 
(Festo Mkilama, 15/04/03)29 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
farmers. Sums of money owed can apparently exceed TSh1,000,000,000 (Emmanuel Wilson, 
22/05/03), which was worth $97,600 on the day of the interview. 
29 In the light of some large farmers’ comments that smaller farmers do not progress because they 
squander their money on beer (and womanising) (section 3:4), this reference to only being able to 
drink beer when wealthy is telling of some larger farmers attitudes towards budgeting – they only 
spend on luxuries when they can afford to. See Van Donge (1992b) for the common failure of business 
partnerships owing to one partner engaging in what is diplomatically termed starehe – most often 
drinking and women. 
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Stage four: Mature, ‘permanently connected’ relationship 
It is such gestures that create further trust between the two and cements the 
relationship into something more lasting. Now that the farmer has a reasonable 
creditor and the dalali a trusted supplier, neither seems inclined to jeopardise the 
relationship by doing anything that the other may deem dishonest. The farmers who 
have reached this stage of relationship with a dalali are a very small minority, 
usually medium- or large-scale farmers who we can call ‘permanently connected’ 
farmers – a term used by one dalali who sees two types of farmers that he deals with, 
‘those who just come to Kariakoo with tomatoes and those others that are 
permanently connected to me’. The latter are a group of five or six farmers with 
whom he has ‘close communications’, to use his phrase (Shaibu Mlilapi, 14/08/03).30 
Among the sample of farmers these ‘permanent’ relationships have on average 
already lasted over five years, during which time the farmer has repeatedly proved 
his ability to regularly supply his dalali, who in turn has supplied credit when it is 
needed and a fair price that is paid swiftly. The relationship can now be described as 
having progressed to a further ‘mature’ stage in which the dalali gradually evolves 
further from being the farmer’s patron to a friend. As the farmer becomes more 
successful the dalali can then even approach the farmer for help with money when he 
has cash flow problems himself, a reverse of the situation in the early stages of their 
relationship. Indeed the large farmer’s income at times of good harvest can be such 
that he is able to show his thanks for his dalali’s co-operation by giving him a cash 
gift, maybe because the dalali has learnt from chatting in Kariakoo that there is great 
demand for a particular crop at a market somewhere else in the country and they 
have both made a good earning from working together to get hold of the required 
crop and send it to the market. As one large farmer who makes a point of ‘tipping’ 
one dalali whose knowledge of demand has often made him a good profit explains, ‘I 
can say, “Just take some of my profit because you helped me”. It keeps a good 
business relationship when you give as a thank-you’ (Samwel Kiando, 24/05/03). 
                                                 
30 I use the present tense here although the dalali, Shaibu Mlilapi, passed away when I was in Iringa 
speaking with some of his suppliers. This is a great shame because Shaibu had many friends in 
Kariakoo. His knowledge of farmers and markets in Tanzania is also a loss to this research, and it is 
unfortunate that I was unable to interview him in depth before his sudden death. Geoffrey Sanga also 
passed away, shortly after the second period of fieldwork.  
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This kind of gesture, which can be up to TSh200,000 (almost $200) maybe three 
times a year for some large farmers (joint interview with Bartholomeo Sanga and 
Festo Mkilama, 17/09/03), can also extend to public holidays among the most 
successful farmers who have the means to tip their dalali in what should be regarded 
as a calculated strategy aimed at maintaining goodwill and trust between the two 
businessmen. 
 
3:9. The adoption and appropriation of ICT in the trading of 
perishable foodstuffs 
While these interactions are important in establishing a long-term relationship based 
on trust that ensures the market regularly receives perishable vegetables and both 
farmer and dalali make a regular profit from it, farmers and traders alike report that 
most of the communication between the two is conducted at a distance. This 
communication occurs at a distance because it is impractical and unnecessary for 
either partner to travel to communicate with the other face-to-face, and concerns 
supply and demand information directly related to the buying and selling of a 
farmer’s crops. As we shall discuss in section 3:11, however, before the introduction 
of more efficient communication technologies this information on supply and 
demand would often be exchanged through intermediaries and was often too late to 
be effective. It is here in exchanges of supply and demand information – the most 
frequent communication between the rural farmer and town-based dalali – that ICT 
hold the most benefit for both of them because they allow for the first-hand exchange 
of such information while it is still up-to-date and can be acted on. Despite the 
opportunities ICT offer, however, distance and the marginality of many farmers still 
makes it difficult for traders to do business with those residing in rural areas. In 
terms of the road infrastructure, other than the well-maintained TANZAM highway 
the remaining roads in the Southern Highlands are still in very poor shape. Those 
farmers far from the main road are not only marginalised because they have 
difficulty in reaching the market, but they become even more marginalised because 
private traders avoid those farmers in areas off the main road where transport costs 
are too high in favour of areas with a good transport infrastructure (Bryceson 2002b: 
 
 119
728) and shun those locations where information is more uncertain (Thomson & 
Terpend 1993: 8).31 With an ageing and limited fixed line infrastructure and despite 
recent efforts by mobile phone operators to spread their networks, the problem of 
marginality that comes with distance from the main road largely transfers to the 
availability of telecommunications. Faced with the difficulty of even contacting 
traders in local towns, however, farmers and others have started to apply a series of 
innovative methods to take maximum advantage of what coverage is on offer and 
ways of paying for it when they cannot afford to purchase the equipment themselves. 
 
3:10. Reactions to infrastructural marginality and market access 
constraints 
Local network coverage and ‘network reception spots’ 
When network coverage does not immediately serve a location where a farmer 
requires reception, farmers and others needing to contact towns and cities have 
managed to locate the nearest point of reception emitted from transmission towers 
(‘base stations’) adjacent to, and designed to serve, the Dar es Salaam-Zambia 
TANZAM highway.32 This practice was witnessed in every settlement visited where 
potatoes and tomatoes are grown and which is within range of the signal given by the 
roadside base stations (about 30 kilometres diameter from the station) and where no 
natural features disturb the straight line of transmission. These we shall call ‘network 
reception spots’ (hereafter, ‘NRS’), a term which suitably emphasises that it is a 
location where mobile phone reception can be obtained only in certain areas as a 
consequence of more blanket coverage intended primarily to serve other areas (in 




                                                 
31 A recent study of roads in the same area by Daemen (2002) reveals producer prices and sales 
production to be significantly higher on maintained roads, of which there are few in both Iringa and 
Mbeya. A strong relationship was revealed between producer prices and distance to trunk road, and 
producer prices were found to decline 50% faster on unmaintained roads than on maintained roads. 
32 The highway is marked in grey in the map of Tanzania on page xv.  
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The location of the spots were first identified by villagers and wafanyabiashara who 
were travelling with mobile phones from the country’s main towns (where coverage 
was first made available by mobile phone operators) and trying out reception areas 
by roaming around the countryside, starting with the areas nearest to their settlements 
and then branching out to areas of higher altitude and those locations with greater 
obvious chance of a clean line of transmission. Ntokela (Rungwe district) at an 
elevation of around 8,500 feet and five kilometres from the main road to Malawi is 
an example of an area where potato farmers have found a location on a rise on a track 
where both Vodacom and Celtel can be picked up near to their shambas. Ukumbi 
(Kilolo district, Iringa Region) is another area where reception is intermittently 
picked up through what we could term an ‘opportunistic physical NRS’ at around 
6,000 feet above sea level in a few square metres of a maize shamba (there is a clear 
path among the crops leading to the best area) and also where more reliable coverage 
is received on parts of a bare hill some half an hour away by foot (Figure 5). 
 
A second type of NRS can been found in areas where there is no obvious line of 
transmission but where this time human (as opposed to natural) physical objects are 
exploited to receive reception. One of these ‘opportunistic human NRS’ was found in 
Mtitu (also Kilolo district, Iringa Region) 30 kilometres from the nearest known base 
                                                 
33 Adapted merged version of GSM coverage maps, starting on page 276. 
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station at Ihemi on the TANZAM highway, where Angelo Kilave led the author to a 
swamp in a valley with no obvious line of transmission. Here he uses a line of 
electricity cables two kilometres from his house to serve as a spot from where he can 
contact his dalali in Kariakoo (Figure 6). Using a similar principle, farmers in 
Kidamali (Iringa district) have now taken the further step of creating what we can 
term ‘manufactured human NRS’, phone kiosks (huduma ya simu) set on stilts to 
obtain reception (Figure 7). 
 
Oftentimes for especially marginal farmers in Iringa and Mbeya the NRS is anything 
up to two hours away by foot, so it is not unknown for a busy farmer wishing to 
contact Dar es Salaam to send others (usually a male youth, though sometimes 
women) with a mobile phone to the nearest known NRS so that a message he has 
written is sent. This method can only be used when sending information that does not 
require an immediate response, since even if a phone call were received in reply 
straightaway the youth would not be able to make decisions on the spot himself 
without the farmer who sent him. To deal with this problem a few farmers have 
arranged for their dalali or a relation to call them at a certain time on the same day(s) 
every week, making sure that they are at the NRS when the call is due. Yet if the 
NRS is far away a farmer risks wasting his time since he has to rely on his city 
contact remembering to call, and whether the contact does or not he still has to walk 
or cycle a long distance to do this and will therefore be away from the shamba for 
most of the day. Francis Mbegalo, one of the tomato farmers who has such an 
arrangement with his dalali says that he can lose a little of the advantage of having 
up-to-date knowledge of market demand through the phone call because of the times 
of day that he and his dalali can make this call. Francis is reluctant to be away from 
his shamba in the early morning when he does most of his farming, but the dalali and 
the market is most active at this time, meaning that when they speak in the afternoon 
– the only time the farmer can get away from the shamba to travel to the NRS – he 






Friends taking messages 
Rather than spending time away from the shamba, farmers often find that it is 
cheaper to wait for a dalali’s communication via the mobile phone without arranging 
a set time. Obviously the farmer cannot wait at an NRS indefinitely and 
children/youths again cannot correspond effectively with a dalali over information 
that may require intimate knowledge of farming and marketing. The farmer’s 
solution when he cannot be at the NRS is to leave his phone with – or use the phone 
of – a trusted friend who he can rely on to take calls from a dalali. This must be a 
friend based in an area where reception is fairly constant and, if the friend is to be 
responsive, he must also ideally be a farmer who will have experience of dealing 
with madalali and all the intricacies of the whole perishable food marketing chain. 
When a call or text is received by the friend on his mobile phone he will write it 
down and then either wait for the farmer to come by or, if they have a particularly 
close relationship, the receiver will send a ‘runner’ to deliver the note with details of 
the message from the dalali. Once more, the potential disadvantage of this method is 
that it relies on the goodwill and punctuality of others. As one farmer points out, 
however, these calls often take place just before harvest time when his money 
reserves are usually at their lowest and food stores depleted, so this method of having 
the dalali call him has the advantage that the urban-based dalali pays for the cost of 
the call or text, not the cash-strapped small farmer (Francis Mbegalo, 06/05/03). 
 
Costs and attitudes: owners, non-owning users and non-users  
The amount of cash a farmer has available to pay for the communication by mobile 
phone is a significant factor in a farmer’s decision whether to call or SMS, but this 
also influenced by the purpose of the call, whether he knows how to send / receive 
(and read) an SMS, and whether he is in range to make a call, or if not write to an 
SMS that will be sent when the mobile phone reaches a point of reception. This last 
point is a significant advantage of the mobile phone’s text function to farmers who 
are frequently out of range since, so long as the pending period does not expire, an 
SMS message can reach its intended recipient once he is back within range, up to 
five days later depending on the mobile phone operator. It also saves the cost of 
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speaking to somebody else who may answer the phone should the intended recipient 
not be there. Crucially, and this is perhaps the most attractive aspect of the mobile 
phone over the fixed line to the poor, a text message – that can be written in Swahili 
– is far cheaper than even the cost of a one minute phone call. It is for this reason 
that, for farmers and madalali alike, SMSs are more popular than calls. 
As might be expected, larger farmers send and receive more texts (and calls) than 
smaller farmers, and very big farmers will tend to call when busy to save time spent 
writing out and reading texts. Among those who use their mobile phones less 
frequently, texting tends to be used when farmers and madalali are only going to 
make a small profit, for example when sending orders. Conversely, it is also the case 
that where a larger profit is likely to be made a farmer or dalali will make a call. One 
large farmer (Berod Mhanga, 04/09/03), for example, who sends to Mombassa and 
Nairobi in addition to Dar es Salaam, makes 15 calls per day and receives 20, 
whereas a medium farmer (Dominicus, 06/09/03) receives around 10 calls per day in 
the busy season. An mfanyabiashara (Emmanuel Wilson, 22/05/03) calls 8 to 10 
times and receives twice as many calls, while a smaller farmer tends to only call once 
a week or less and, depending on their arrangements when out of network range, may 
only receive a call once every few weeks. The logical conclusion to be drawn from 
this evidence is that larger farmers have more contacts and more income to spend on 
mobile phone credit. 
 
It is more often the smaller farmer who will use a friend’s mobile phone to call a 
dalali, for which most farmers will pay their friend for the privilege. The huduma ya 
simu, where it is available, is the alternative means of gaining access but, because it 
is still not widespread in the most rural areas (because reception is not uniformly 
available), those entrepreneurs who offer the service do so at a rate far higher than 
the more competitive urban market. Businessmen in rural areas – who here are often 
successful farmers – are quickly seeing the potential profits arising from these 
services and, as we have seen of the ‘manufactured human NRS’ huduma ya simu of 





In general, those farmers who own mobile phones are large and medium farmers or, 
as one KMC source put it, ‘the educated: businessmen and emerging businessmen, 
not mere peasants. The peasant-businessman uses them’ (Nicanor Omolo, 27/08/03). 
These members of a minority of farmers who, in addition to being able to afford the 
cost of a mobile phone and credit, may also be linked to the national grid or in rural 
areas own a generator with which to charge their handset.34 When asked what 
influenced them towards buying a mobile phone most farmers replied that they saw 
the popularity of mobile phones when in Dar es Salaam and thought they would help 
business. This idea seems to have spread rapidly, probably because others have seen 
the advantages the first mobile phone-owning farmers gained, and now the majority 
of farmers are using some sort of access to mobile phones. In rural areas the 
popularity of the mobile phone is a more recent phenomenon, spreading roughly with 
available coverage, with most present owners now having obtained their handsets 
and SIM cards from 2003, as opposed to 2001-2002 in Dar es Salaam. In Kidamali 
village, for example, over the space of two months in mid-2003 four farmers 
purchased mobile phones, bringing the total number of tomato farmers owning 
mobile phones in the settlement to six (Exoni Manitu, 06/09/03). 
 
For some small farmers with meagre incomes the financial cost of mobile phone 
access, let alone purchase, is so prohibitive that any type of regular use is simply not 
feasible. This can be because there is no (known) NRS and the nearest point of 
access is a huduma ya simu in a nearby town where the costs of travel and being 
away from the farm are usually deemed such that the journey is not worth the small 
profit that could be made. Usually in tandem with this reason, though not 
exclusively, a couple of farmers (Petro Lyelu, 06/09/03 and Lukelo Mahenge, 
20/03/03) and one dalali (Kamwene Sanga, 17/04/03) have said that they do not use 
a telephone per se (i.e., they did not expressly state ‘mobile phone’) because they do 
not see its advantages: 
 
                                                 
34 In 1988 only 2% of houses in Iringa Region had electricity (URT 1997a: 84-85). Samuel et al 
(2005: 48) reveal a positive correlation between mobile phone ownership and access to electricity. 
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People talk much about the telephone these days, but personally I don’t see how it can 
help me.35 It is expensive to be told to bring my few tomatoes to Dar es Salaam for very 
little profit. I don’t need to be told by somebody in the city that I am making little 
money here farming tomatoes. (Lukelo Mahenge, 20/03/03) 
 
At a later interview the farmer went on to explain that by this last comment he meant 
that while he can be told to bring his small crop to Kariakoo the madalali there are 
‘greedy’ and know the small farmers will make little profit from it.36 
 
Huduma ya simu operators as information intermediaries 
Many huduma ya simu customers in significant potato and tomato trading areas such 
as Uyole and Kidamali are using the service to contact madalali in Dar es Salaam 
(Arafa Ismaeli, 08/09/03; Shem, 06/09/03; Swiga Wilson, 08/09/03). In Kidamali, for 
example, the average tomato farmer without his own mobile phone or access through 
a friend will use huduma ya simu four times a day during harvest times, spending 
something in the region of TSh2,600-3,200 at the fair rate of TSh400 (40 cents) per 
minute (Shem, 06/09/03).37 Farmers call their dalali to ask demand and price 
information, and also to inform him how many loads to expect and, when they have 
arrived, how well they are selling.  
 
In the same way that a farmer cannot afford to be away from his farm plot to be 
waiting indefinitely at an NRS to receive a call, it is also not practical for him to wait 
                                                 
35 That he says ‘these days’ could infer the mobile phone, which in its relative novelty in rural areas is 
a hotter topic of conversation than the fixed line, irrespective of its availability. Where the respondent 
refers specifically to the fixed line telephone this is made distinct in the text, otherwise telephone / 
phone refers to the mobile phone. 
36 One reading of this comment could be that by speaking directly to a Dar es Salaam-based dalali – 
who, we must not forget, is usually a successful farmer from the same area – this particular farmer is 
reminded of his inability to make the profits he once enjoyed. For reasons unknown to the author 
though clearly significant to his demoted position now as a small farmer, he no longer has cordial 
relations with an established Kariakoo dalali who, as we discussed in section 3:8, can offer a 
financially supportive role to the struggling farmer. 
37 The cost seems to be at the discretion of the owner, who charged TSh400 per minute to customers 
when the author was present and told me this was his usual rate. There was no price list on display, but 
a farmer living nearby claims to be charged TSh500 per minute when also calling Dar es Salaam. On 
average he uses three ‘$5’ Celtel cards a day, which he purchases for TSh5,000 in the local town 
(Exoni Manitu, 19/03/03)). TSh5,000 was worth almost $5 on the day of the interview). 
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for calls when he is not expecting them at the huduma ya simu he uses. It is then 
common for a farmer to give to his dalali the number of a huduma ya simu he 
frequently uses and to not be around when calls come in. In this event the huduma ya 
simu operator (often a women in larger settlements) may either ask the dalali to call 
back shortly if she thinks the farmer is within reach or, more likely, take a message 
and give it to the farmer when he comes by. She is not paid by farmers for receiving 
the calls, neither for asking around if farmers are nearby, nor for taking messages, 
but it is part of her job description since it maintains customer loyalty to her boss’ 
business, with farmers going back to the same huduma ya simu that deals with their 
messages. Although the operators will never make decisions on a farmer’s behalf, in 
some busy attended call huduma ya simu centres (Figure 8) in areas of high 
vegetable trading such as Uyole in Mbeya district where many farmers frequently 
use the same huduma ya simu the operators get to know the farmer’s individual 
trading operations well and have experience in what details farmers need to know 
from madalali. A favoured customer can even get the written messages sent to him 
personally by somebody a huduma ya simu operator can trust to deliver it. 
 
3:11. The effects of mobile phone access on agricultural trading 
Better knowledge of demand and improved coordination of supply 
12 of the 14 farmers expressed that the main benefit of the mobile phone for them is 
that it allows quick access to know the market demand and price, which allows the 
farmer to calculate more accurately when and how much to harvest and, in the case 
of large farmers away from their land, contact their workers to tell them to act on this 
information. Previously, when fixed line communication was difficult because it was 
unreliable, expensive and far from the village, a farmer either had to rely on the word 
of others (for example, asking a friend going to Dar es Salaam to say that his 
tomatoes are nearly ready and then having to wait for somebody to return with a 
reply), or he had to rely on letters. The reach of the postal service was (and still is) 
poor in rural areas, with postal boxes in local towns being the nearest a letter can be 
delivered without private assistance. Instead those wishing to deliver written 
correspondence still rely either on friends travelling to town, local bus companies or 
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the driver of the lorry in which the farmer’s goods were being delivered.38 The 
problem with this method is that letters are stolen, or the driver can sell a farmer’s 
crops to another dalali and say that the person he was supposed to deliver the letter 
to was not there and then say that he sold them for a lower price because it was all he 
could get them for. It is partly because of these risks of opportunism, believes one 
prominent dalali, that these days about 75% of Iringa tomato farmers use some form 
of access to mobile phones and have completely stopped using written 
correspondence (Bartholomeo Sanga, 16/04/03). 
 
While it used to be true that knowing the short-term demand in Dar es Salaam was 
immaterial for highly perishable crops such as tomatoes (Ponte 2002: 114), 
nowadays with better access to demand information from a dalali in Dar es Salaam 
farmers do not send their produce to the market blindly but can know instead to sell 
their produce to any mfanyabiashara or divert to Dabaga (where older tomatoes can 
be sent to be processed into other tomato-based products) for minimum profit more 
locally instead of maximum loss in Dar es Salaam (Nicanor Omolo, 27/08/03). Here 
the information available through the mobile phone offers an alternative for the 
farmer. Equally, if for some reason a glut occurs because of over-supply while their 
crops are on their way to Dar es Salaam farmers can also know to contact the driver 
of the lorry to get him to divert to one of the city’s smaller wholesale markets. In 
much the same way, with a mobile phone a dalali can also better coordinate his 
supply to ensure it is steady and, if they phone him with enough notice of the status 
of their crops, simultaneously maintain good relations with his farmers by telling 
some, for example, that if they are able to wait two days (or, for potatoes, to store 
them) he will favour their consignments when they arrive over those of other 
farmers. When making these decisions with a cellular phone the dalali is now able to 
be reached more easily for meetings if they are required and at the same time to be 
mobile, allowing him to spend more time on other aspects of his business rather than 
be restricted to the environs of his (highly unreliable and often disconnected) fixed 
                                                 
38 Local bus companies are increasingly charging for this service where previously letters would be 
delivered out of good will. This has long been a paid-for service offered by the bus companies 
operating between larger towns, cities and internationally and, though expensive for the largest 
companies such as Scandinavia Express, are consistently reliable. 
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line.39 In the same way the technology is potentially liberating for women 
intermediaries who tend to opt for the lower-risk intermediary trading over itinerant 
roles. These women are severely hampered by lack of transport and market 
information regarding town prices and demand (Bryceson 1993: 129) and because of 
their traditional familial obligations often restrict them to their villages, but the 
introduction of mobile phones may improve their position by allowing them access 
to price and demand information from those areas they are restricted to. 
 
Better able to keep track of consignments 
Both farmer and dalali are now able to keep a much better track of consignments 
when in transit and to know when exactly to expect arrivals, and to make decisions 
over what the driver should do with the perishable produce in the event of an 
accident or breakdown on Tanzania’s dangerous roads.40 This flexibility that the 
mobile phone offers should not be underplayed when a farmer’s livelihood is at risk. 
Similarly, the lorry owner can also keep in touch with his driver if there are problems 
or to direct him where to pick up a return load if he makes a new deal. When the 
lorry has arrived in Dar es Salaam and the goods are in the hands of the dalali the 
farmer can more easily check if his goods have been swapped for better ones. Taking 
all these advantages as a whole, the ability to know that his supply is more likely to 
safely arrive intact and unharmed lead one dalali to remark that he now has better 
peace of mind over whether he will be able to feed his family the next day 
(Bartholomeo Sanga, 11/01/03). The same can surely be said of farmers too, 
knowing that their crops have a much better chance nowadays of reaching the place 
of maximum demand. 
                                                 
39 Each dalali has access to his own office space in which there used to be a TTCL fixed line which 
farmers could (theoretically) reach him through, but the market was disconnected because of unpaid 
bills (Festo Mkilama, 15/04/03). The telephone access may have been supplied to shareholders by the 
trading companies which Van Donge (1992b: 199) reports were emerging in the early 1990s.   For the 
mobile phone operators the pay-as-you-go facility greatly improves the efficiency of revenue 
collecting and cancels any opportunity for customers to avoid payment of bills. 
40 Carrier (forthcoming 2005) observes how mobile phones are now being used in the trading of the 
highly perishable miraa stimulant throughout Kenya and the world. The substance begins to lose its 
stimulating qualities within about 24 hours, and the recent extension of the mobile phone network to 
the Nyambene Hills district where it is grown means that messages can be relayed far more easily back 
along the network to brokers acting on a trader’s behalf. 
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Less time and money spent on travel 
The other main benefit to the farmer beyond the money that can be saved ensuring 
his crops go to the right place is the money recouped in communication costs. While 
the cost of making a call is still high in Tanzania, even these costs are far lower than 
having no reliable access and having to travel personally to Dar es Salaam, or the 
risk of sending somebody else to make decisions that could just as easily be done in 
the village. The same holds true for wafanyabiashara, who previously took the risk 
of having to rely on uncertain transport arrangements in rural areas and of not 
knowing the availability of supplies and destination markets. This has been shown to 
be particularly costly where, in the absence of telephones, traders have to travel 
personally to obtain this information (Fafchamps & Gabre-Madhin 2001). On top of 
the transport costs are the higher costs of accommodation and food in the city, which 
of course increase if the farmer has to stay longer because he has difficulty in finding 
his dalali. As one farmer put it:  
 
Before the [mobile] telephone somebody accompanying their crops to Dar es Salaam 
would spend much money on travel and three day’s costs for a guest house and food, 
which would add up to a lot. Now the costs are much lower because you can just make a 
phone call. (Exoni Manitu, 15/05/03) 
 
With the expansion of cellular coverage to rural areas it means that money is also 
saved by not having to travel to a huduma ya simu fixed line to make calls, freeing 
up – in the same way as the dalali – more time for the farmer to concentrate on other 
business, especially farming. 
 
3:12. Beyond the exchange of supply and demand information: the 
decline of the mobile phone in communication between trusted 
partners 
Despite the crucial role mobile phones play in improving the exchange of supply and 
demand information between farmer and dalali, however, their use in all other 
aspects of the business relationship are limited, eventually reaching a point where 
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they are almost redundant: During stage one where the farmer seeks a dalali to 
supply to, he relies on local social networks of other farmers in his nearby villages to 
recommend traders with a good reputation. Having decided on a suitable dalali – 
who he may or may not have had telephone contact with – the farmer then usually 
travels to meet the dalali personally and then starts to send all his crops to that 
individual, with any telephone contact again being in the exchange of supply and 
demand information. 
 
If the farmer wishes to continue supplying the same dalali it is around this time 
(during stage two) that he may again then visit him personally in Kariakoo to sort out 
any teething problems that may have arisen and for the two to decide if they wish to 
carry on doing business together. After a period of months (perhaps a season) of 
repeated exchange at a distance with the farmer in the village and dalali in Kariakoo 
communicating supply and demand information by mobile phone, the farmer again 
visits his dalali at the marketplace to renew ties and exchange information about 
methods and the market. The flow of information seems to be mostly from dalali to 
farmer, although the dalali also learns about progress of other farmers in the 
surrounding villages and on growing conditions that help him predict further supply 
from the area. Both seem most comfortable with this ‘question and answer session’ 
being at a face-to-face level and indicate that the information could not so easily be 
exchanged so freely over the telephone. 
 
By this time (stage three) the exchange of goods has usually been smooth for some 
period and the relationship between the two more established, allowing the farmer to 
approach his dalali for financial assistance. Again (and certainly for the first time the 
question is raised), the farmer is most comfortable with discussing credit personally 
with his dalali, not over the telephone. Indeed, the round-about, almost indirect way 
that he may ask the dalali for financial assistance would not be so easy if the two 
were not alone together, speaking face-to-face. So here the mobile phone seems most 




If the relationship then develops into the mature, ‘permanently connected’ 
relationship. At this stage (stage four) the mobile phone plays a still more minor role 
as the farmer trusts his dalali to sell at the best price with barely any communication, 
and to handle many of the farmer’s finances in the city, depositing money into his 
bank account if he has one (or one belonging to a trusted friend) and paying 
remittances to relatives or others with whom the farmer is doing business. As some 
informants remarked, the dalali is caring for the farmer to the extent that it appears 
that he is a relation (Kuboja Ng’ungu, 27/08/03; Bartholomeo Sanga & Festo 
Mkilama, 17/09/03), so much so that one kiunganishi said the dalali he connects his 
farmers to is ‘like a father in Kariakoo’ for them (Geoffrey Sanga, 23/05/03). By this 
period neither have much reason to communicate frequently with the other unless 
perhaps they wish to exchange information about demand in another market for 
another crop that could bring them a good profit, or if for some reason they wish to 
meet face-to-face. 
 
This all relies on trust, but there is nothing conclusive from this case study (nor a 
recent study by Goodman, 2005: 64) to suggest that the mobile phone itself can 
actually facilitate the trust relationship between any type of farmer (small, medium or 
large) and his dalali. Although it does seem that those farmers with a closer bond of 
trust are less likely to be cheated by a dalali telling them lower prices, the reality is 
that the mobile phone cannot alter the trust and the dalali can still lie. We have 
discussed non-ICT methods of cross-checking prices, but where ICT is available it is 
surely better for farmers to have an independent source on the true value of his crops. 
IICD has a project which supplies market prices to cotton farmers in Tanzania (IICD 
2002), but like so many donor projects this runs the risk of being unsustainable when 
funding dries up. A better alternative may be to learn from the current success of a 
project with investment from the private sector. One such example is the Manobi 
private telecommunications company’s joint-venture with French and local 
entrepreneurs in Senegal, which uses Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) and short 
messaging service (SMS) technology via mobile phones to provide fishermen with 
up-to-date access to market prices for their perishable products (InfoDev 2003). This 
was inspired by the success of Manobi’s similar scheme for Senegalese fruit and 
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vegetable farmers, who at 29 cents a minute use WAP-enabled mobile phones to 
obtain prices that are updated in real time via a central processing and transmitting 
database by data collectors at various markets. Manobi and a similar service operated 
by the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE) provide transparency of 
prices inside the market that their Tanzanian counterparts lack, but prompts the issue 
of what happens to relations with madalali – the crucial creditors for many farmers – 
if the farmers decide to supply to different buyers every time they send their produce 
to market.41 The solution for farmers here may be to use more formalised banking, 
which in Tanzania is now slowly beginning to provide credit to small-scale 
customers (Andrew 2004). Alternatively, there is a market opportunity for mobile 
phone operators to target madalali – who generally have a much better record of 
getting credit to the rural poor than formal credit systems in low-income countries 
(Lyon 2000: 678) – as the pioneers of mobile banking services such as MTN 
Banking (Harrisson 2005).  
Personal relationships and success without a mobile phone 
That the mobile phone in this case study appears to have only one significant benefit 
in the trading of perishable foodstuffs – that of facilitating the flow of supply and 
demand information – raises a final question, whether it is still possible to operate 
successfully without a mobile phone? For the farmer, the answer is probably ‘yes’ so 
long as he is prepared to accompany his crops to Dar es Salaam and travel around the 
city finding better prices if the price offered to him in Kariakoo is not good, and this 
costs him time and money that could be saved using huduma ya simu to contact the 
market beforehand. For a dalali it would be more difficult, but one dalali does 
manage to do so successfully, if at times precariously, in seemingly frantic trading he 
conducts in Kariakoo and the countryside. Kamwene Sanga, a prominent and very 
popular Kariakoo-based dalali, is notorious for his refusal to use a mobile phone and 
mocked by his fellow madalali as a peasant (‘mshamba’) for it, explains his reasons 
for his personal rejection of the telephone in terms of how information he offers over 
                                                 




the telephone can spread so much that it becomes counterproductive to all and 
reduces prices: 
 
I don’t trust the telephone; it always lies.42 I can tell a farmer to bring potatoes because 
the price is high, but then when the potatoes are delivered to me he [the farmer] 
complains that the price has dropped. I receive calls at my office but I never call the 
farmers back… .They ask if they should pack, but when I answer and say ‘Yes, send me 
potatoes’, then many of farmers send me them, which lowers the price and the farmers 
then complain to me. (Kamwene Sanga, 17/04/03)43 
 
In contrast to farmers who during the early stages of a relationship will use the 
mobile phone to coordinate supply, this dalali chooses not to use a telephone and – 
through a combination of having many contacts to sell to in Dar es Salaam, and 
disappointing some farmers when he cannot sell their potatoes for a good price – he 
still manages to deal with whatever is sent to him in Kariakoo and to sell it quickly. 
Ordinarily this would make a dalali unpopular among those who send to him and do 
not get their crops sold for a fair price, but something about this particularly 
charismatic dalali enables him to get away with it and still receive a steady stream of 
potatoes. This, Kamwene hints at, lies in his genial relationship with suppliers and 
buyers and in being selective about who one tells, if anyone at all, about the need for 
crops in Dar es Salaam, where the demand is.44 Though farmers will share, when 
asked, information about market prices, farmers will not advertise that they are 
                                                 
42 Again, as with the farmer above this dalali makes no distinction between fixed-line and mobile 
phone. Unlike many madalali who tend to use mobile phones exclusively, this dalali uses only a fixed 
line located in his Kariakoo office and which he employs a secretary to answer.   Distrust of advanced 
technology is apparent in West Africa, too, where at recent conference mobile telephony in Ghana 
Professor Kwesi Yankah made the observation that in his country the mobile phone is called ahoma 
trofo, ‘the line that tells lies’ (Doris Yaa Aggrey, DataBank. 2005. ‘A Financial Analyst’s View of the 
TAP – GREAT Mobile Telephony Workshop’. Digital Divide Network discussion group, 
http://mailman.edc.org/pipermail/digitaldivide/2005-June/002802.html, 29 June 2005). 
43 As footnote 25, these comments are similar to those reported in Thomson and Terpend (1993: 19-
20) of grain traders who have expressed annoyance that grain which they had transported to the capital 
achieved lower prices than those stated on thrice-weekly radio broadcasts, presumably because, for the 
same reasons as here, the opportunity for profit had been recognised by a number of traders and the 
resulting inflow of grain had reduced prices. 
44 Such a high degree of confidentiality over market demand has been found among potato traders in 
the Northern Highlands of Tanzania who, functioning horizontally, work very closely with one another 
to maintain market domination (Sebastiani-Kuoko 1998: 57). 
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sending their crops when there is demand (Edward Sanga, 16/05/03). While it is a 
futile task to try to hide that they are preparing their crops because doing so often 
involves the help of many others and is highly visible, when demand information is 
first received is when it is most attractive to other farmers, and this is when some 
farmers say they are most selective about who they inform. As expected, those 
farmers who say they are selective about the demand information they offer to others 
will tend to choose to inform only those individuals who they have a close 
relationship with, which seems to partly explain the success of the above dalali who 
uses the telephone much less than others. While he is teased for shunning the 
telephone, Kamwene (the same dalali who is referred to above as being ‘like a 
father’ to his farmers) has personal relationships with many of the farmers in his 
home area who, along with fellow madalali in Kariakoo, widely respect him for his 
extra efforts to work at these relationships at a personal level. In a departure from 
Chijoriga’s (1992) observation that madalali ‘are stationed at the Kariakoo wholesale 
market and are only involved in receiving farmers who bring their produce to the 
market’ (Chijoriga 1992: 7) and will only travel when supplies are low, Kamwene 
takes the time to visit his farmers in the farming areas even when he has no shortage 
of supply. The author travelled with the dalali to the shamba and at all times he 
seemed popular and showed little signs of arrogance that can so often distinguish a 
successful businessman and lead to resentment, with Kamwene taking the time to 
drink the local komoni 45 with the farmers who supply him and in doing so re-new 
ties in the way many other madalali will only do in Dar es Salaam when a farmer 
comes to them. Glaeser et al (2002) sees these as social skills – among them a long 
list of contacts, charisma and popularity – that fit an individualistic definition of 
social capital. By drinking with them and discussing farming, trading and anything 
else the farmers wish to talk about, he applying his social skills to meetings with 
farmers that are little different to those in the marketplace, but on their home turf. 
That the big man who they supply potatoes to comes to meet and drink with them 
was not lost on the farmers, whose appreciation was expressed by one small farmer 
of a (rather drunk) group who had congregated around him: 
                                                 
45 A local bamboo-based homebrew. It is sometimes shunned as a poor-man’s drink by wealthy 




Kamwene comes to the shamba because he is a good dalali and he likes to drink komoni 
with us. Other madalali come to farmers when they want something, like a politician 
when it is time to vote. Kamwene comes many times and stays with us for a long time. 
(Geoffrey Sanga, 23/05/03)46 
 
Once again these empirical findings from Tanzania have a close parallel to those that 
have influenced the conceptual literature on trust, and in particular the work of Lyon, 
who regards what he terms ‘customer friendship’ as a one of the key mechanisms of 
trust in the relationship between farmers and traders. Here the division between 
social and economic activities is unclear, with farmers and traders visiting their 
customers when passing, and gift-giving and reciprocity (both on village visits or 
where the farmer visits the customer) serving different purposes for the different 
actors at different times. According to Lyon’s analysis of such a relationship, 
customer friendship can be seen to be economically functionist and is based on the 
same information and sanctions as working relationships (section 3:8), but also draw 
on shared concepts of morality and altruism based on culturally specific norms (Lyon 
2000: 672). 
 
The meetings also serve the purpose of facilitating his coordination which, by 
refusing to use a telephone, he cannot do easily otherwise. At times during the 
drinking in one very small hamlet Kamwene discussed with different farmers or 
groups of farmers when he wanted them to send their crops to him in Kariakoo, in 
negotiations that closely resembled those only a visiting mfanyabiashara would 
normally conduct but that, according to him, were not being conducted because he 
had supply problems. Rather, it would seem that by visiting the farmers as a dalali 
Kamwene is able to adopt the ‘outwardly-directed social lifestyle’ of the 
wafanyabiashara (Bryceson 1993: 141), a role he is comfortable with and that got 
                                                 
46 Kamwene Sanga will still entertain farmers when they come to him in Kariakoo. He is not difficult 
to coax into ‘business drinking’ as he once referred to my interviewing at nine o’clock, by which time 
he was drunk. Curiously, despite this lifestyle he is notorious for having managed to have sustained a 
high life while having not succumbed to starehe to the extent that it impinges upon his success as a 
dalali. As mentioned earlier, however, the great risk of starehe these days is not only dependency on 
alcohol but also greater exposure to HIV/AIDS. 
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him known throughout Kariakoo and among many farmers in his area. So while not 
having a mobile phone may make his job hectic and he loses some friends along the 
way when he is unable to sell farmer’s consignments to his many contacts in Dar es 
Salaam, it also manages to get him known locally and, crucially, recommended to 
emerging farmers (who may also have attended or heard of his meeting-cum-
drinking sessions in their local area). All farmers in the area he is from send to him 
(through his kiunganishi), which ensures Kamwene a constant supply of potatoes 
with which to supply the smaller markets of Dar es Salaam and further afield, and to 
make a good profit in the process. 
 
The point most worth emphasising from this dalali’s ability to operate without a 
telephone and still have a steady supply of crops from the rural areas and buyers 
throughout Dar es Salaam and further afield is that he has managed to build 
relationships with farmers and buyers so that they only consider supplying to and 
buying from him, not because they know of no alternative buyer or seller but because 
he takes the time to do business with them face-to-face, even when farmers are 
unable to come to him to do so. One large tomato farmer explains that, irrespective 
of the location, physically meeting people is still important: 
 
For us Africans often an explanation over the phone is not enough even when you've 
greeted one another. When you see each other again you start afresh, greeting each 
other again. Likewise in business even if you've talked on the phone a businessman 
feels like he's not satisfied so he likes to meet face-to-face so you talk and this satisfies 
him. That's a way to build faith in business. You know nowadays there's so much 
competition in this business, so we get customers through information. It's imperative to 
see each other. (Berod Mhanga, 04/09/03) 
 
The evidence of this case study on perishable foodstuffs trading supports Trulsson 
who notes that the telephone may be considered relatively unimportant because 
personal relationships are formed from meetings conducted in person. He offers an 
example of dealing with government administration where, ‘if one does not appear in 
their offices in person, the case will not be dealt with. Using a phone call or sending 
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a letter rarely generates the desired response. It is the personal encounter that matters 




In this chapter we have explored the effects of ICT on what can be a pervasive 
relationship between a farmer and his dalali. We have revealed that while the 
internet is not used at all by either party, through various innovative means of access 
mobile phones are being integrated into the existing business culture because of the 
crucial role they play in improving the exchange of supply and demand information 
between farmer and the wholesale market. This information can be useful in freeing 
a farmer from sending his produce to the market blindly by allowing him to know 
whether to divert his crops elsewhere for minimum profit more locally instead of 
maximum loss in Dar es Salaam. Mobile phones can be seen to provide multiple 
sources of information and the creation of new relationships to the market, but play 
little part in hugely strengthening current relationships. The overriding drawback 
here is that because the sample farmers are largely using their dalali to furnish them 
with supply and demand information, this relies on the dalali being truthful in what 
he tells his farmer. In the present situation, for many farmers dealing with madalali 
in Kariakoo the reality is that the mobile phone does not alter this trust relationship.
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4 Dar es Salaam’s Informal Construction Sector 
 
The challenge, now that so many government policies are finally on paper in favour of 
small scale and micro-enterprise, is massively to support this quiet revolution that has 
already begun to happen, and encourage this technological confidence to move up 
market, to go to scale, even to contemplate what may now seem a pipedream – the 
implication of new information technologies for the jua kali sector. (King 1996a: 189) 
 
Having looked at the use of ICT in trade and revealed the crucial role of face-to-face 
meetings, we now turn to the nature of business relationships in manufacturing, 
taking Dar es Salaam’s construction industry as a case study.1 Here again we seek to 
find how ICT really are being accessed, adopted and appropriated by the large 
amount of workers who are not directly influenced by donors. Given the important 
role in Tanzania – as in many other developing countries – of the informal sector 
(Commission for Africa 2005: 240), the responses of a sample of informal 
construction sector gang-leaders are used to look at whether linkages with the formal 
sector now benefit from the ability to use ICT to make contact with these potential 
sources of materials and employment. We also ask whether with mobile phones it is 
now any easier to stay in touch with private clients, the other important source of 
potential work. Does this mark a significant change in the ways informal sector 
operators find work and interact with clients so that they can make more profit? And 
does this have implications that can realistically apply to the significant majority of 
informal sector operators who do not use mobile phones for work? In attempting to 
answer these questions the chapter begins by stating the case for looking at the 
informal sector and, specifically, the informal construction sector. We then analyse 
                                                 
1 My thoughts on the development of the informal sector benefit from discussions and seminars with 
Kenneth King and Simon McGrath and Steve Kerr at the Centre of African Studies, University of 
Edinburgh. In Tanzania, Jill Wells (formerly Bureau for Industrial Cooperation, University of Dar es 
Salaam and construction specialist, ILO) provided an invaluable background discussion on the current 
state of the informal construction sector and an introduction – and eventually access – to the STICW-
Dar project. She also supplied later documents on the construction industry in developing countries. In 
addition, thanks go to Morten Lehmann, SME specialist at the ILO field office, Dar es Salaam, for 
kindly keeping me up-to-date on policy documents. 
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data obtained from semi-structured interviews with the leaders of 20 groups 
operating in the informal construction sector, opening with detail on the interview 
sample and background on the gangs covered. The fieldwork started with an 
investigation of their linkages with the formal sector which – though turning out to 
be fairly minimal – are discussed because they provide both a useful introduction to 
the use of mobile phones in the informal sector, and how the focus of the research 
changed to looking at why gang-leaders see the need to obtain mobile phones for use 
at work when much communication seems to be personal. In doing so, this section 
analyses the methods of communication over the entire process of a gang-leader 
finding, securing, and completing work. We then explore when and why face-to-face 
communication, calling, texting, and ‘beeping’ are favoured at different times during 
interaction with friends, clients, and other workers within the industry, and assess the 
applicability of government policy on ICT in the context of these findings. 
 
4:1. Why the informal sector of the construction industry as 
a case study? 
It is vital that we consider the informal economy because of its importance as a 
source of income to so many people who operate within it. While it is difficult to 
present precise figures on the scale of the informal sector today, not least in terms of 
employment because many households (and individuals within them) do not rely 
solely on any one source of income (Wuyts 2001: 425), it is widely accepted that it is 
gaining in importance worldwide (Hussmanns & du Jeu 2002; ILO 2002b).2 
Tanzania is no exception, for while the highest proportion of the economically active 
population are still engaged in the type of traditional smallholder agriculture 
investigated in the preceding chapter, the informal sector is by far the most important 
employer in non-farm employment activities (the carving industry in the following 
                                                 
2 Showing the increased significance of occupational pluralism, the government’s most recent Labour 
Force Survey (2000-01) devotes an entire chapter to employment in secondary activities – those 
activities that are next to the main activities performed by persons, and by definition occupying less 
time when compared with main activities (URT 2002b: 49). This indicates a growing awareness by the 
government of a hitherto largely ignored source of extra employment for a considerable proportion of 
the working population, up from 1.2m in the 1990/91 Labour Force Survey to over twice that amount 
(2.8m) in the year 2000/01(ibid.: 51). 
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chapter is one example).3 The most recent survey of Tanzanian labour (URT 2002b), 
for example, puts the total number of persons employed in the informal sector at just 
under 3m (URT 2002b: table 5.5), which shows that the informal sector is now well 
over twice as large as the formal sector in terms of those engaged in governmental 
and parastatal (423,000) and ‘other private’ employment (756,000) (ibid.: fig. 3.2).4 
Almost half of those working in the informal sector are doing so in urban areas, with 
Dar es Salaam accounting for 356,000 (30%) of the total urban informal sector 
workforce of 1,200,000 (ibid.: table 5.5), a noticeable rise from the 1995 Dar es 
Salaam Informal Sector Survey figure of 346,000 (URT 1995).5 This survey also 
shows that the sector had an output of TSh332billion and a value added of 
TSh205billion,6 generating an income per person which is about two and a half times 
the minimum earning of a government employee (ibid.). 
 
Part of the reason why it is difficult to present exact figures on the scale of the 
informal sector is because there is sometimes confusion over what the term refers to, 
and who and/or what exactly is being measured.7 A ‘universal’ statistical definition 
(ICLS 1993) was adopted at the 15th International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians in 1993 and has been effective in facilitating the tasks of national 
statistical agencies in carrying out informal sector surveys (e.g., URT 2002b), but the 
ILO (2002b) is slowly recognising the need for a redefinition as the sector grows and 
evolves into the new millennium, where already the real world dynamics of today’s 
labour markets outlined in the opening chapter are revealing the changing nature of 
the sector. In the ‘expanded conceptual framework’ the informal economy is now 
                                                 
3 See section 1:15 (especially footnote 32) on family farms being recognised as the most numerous of 
small enterprises. 
4 The most comprehensive survey of the informal sector in Tanzania, the National Informal Sector 
Survey (1991b), showed total informal sector employment to be 2,369,380 (ibid.: table 1). ILO (1993) 
acts as a good introduction to the studies (and estimates) that have influenced previous discussion on 
the contribution and importance of the informal sector to Tanzania’s macro economy until the recent 
publication of government studies (most notably URT 2002b) that are now providing more up-to-date 
statistics on some aspects of the informal sector. 
5 Hereafter DISS. Between 1991 and 1995, the increase in the number of people engaged in the 
informal sector in Dar es Salaam was around 9.5% (URT 1995). 
6 Just over $350m in July 1995.  
7 Studies have been based on a number of different parameters such as living conditions and capital 
intensity. See Hugon (1990: 71-72). Mead and Morrison (1996) have found only limited parallels 
between definitions based on different measures, leading them to conclude that the use of different 
definitions in multi-country analysis is fraught with difficulties. 
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seen as comprised of informal employment (without secure contracts, worker 
benefits, or social protection) both inside and outside informal enterprises (ILO 
2002a), which appears to reflect increasing acceptance that the formal/informal 
dichotomy is losing relevance as the boundaries are increasingly becoming blurred 
(ibid.) – especially with the growing recognition of the massive increase in linkages 
cutting across the sectors, and in particular subcontracting, an issue we turn to in 
some detail in section 4:8 when looking at groups of informal construction workers 
(ICWs) in Dar es Salaam’s construction industry.8 Given that globalisation is making 
new ICT available to an increasing number of people at the same time as the 
informal economy is expanding to take in even more Tanzanians, it is imperative that 
we understand how these technologies are being applied to the day-to-day business 
activities of those who operate within ‘the ordinary economy…that builds most of a 
nation’s houses, runs most of its transport, makes most of its clothes, and trains most 
of its young people.’ (King 1990: 145). The industry under investigation here is the 
informal construction sector; those people who erect most of the nation’s buildings. 
 
4:2. The informal construction sector 
Construction as an industry is deemed an important area to case study because of the 
crucial role it plays in socio-economic development (Wells 1986: 13-33), with its 
impact being felt in terms of its direct and indirect contribution and backward 
linkages (Mlinga & Wells 2002: 270). About one-tenth of the global economy is 
dedicated to constructing and operating homes and offices, and the industry 
consumes one-sixth to one half of the world’s wood, minerals, water and energy 
(UNEP 1996: 2). The industry contributes directly to output and employment 
(Mlinga 2000: 9.2.8) through construction activity – which in Tanzania grew at a real 
                                                 
8 The increasing blurring of the line between the sectors that has come with increased interaction 
through subcontracting is further confused by scant attention being paid to the heterogeneous nature of 
the informal sector, which can be conveniently used as a catch-all phrase to delineate any select group 
of enterprises that fit the definition that particular study chooses. The danger of not recognising the 
heterogeneity and vastness of the sector, the huge differences between countries, regions, between 
trades and even particular trades (e.g., King & Abuodha 1995) and the existence of a continuum 
among enterprises (1:22) makes the concept of an informal sector difficult to operationalise. 
Furthermore, as Fluitman and Momo (2002: vii) note when reporting the large extent of heterogeneity 
among micro-enterprises in Cameroon, it is an approach that should render any generalisation suspect 
and be evident in interventions aimed at them. 
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rate of 12 percent in both 2002 and 2003 (OECD 2005: 434) – and indirectly 
facilitates the growth of other sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and services 
by constructing the physical facilities they require for the production and distribution 
of goods and services. Even under economic reform in Tanzania where policy 
changes on construction employment under deregulation have been negative with 
respect to the safety of workers, the shift has had a good impact on employment, 
directly through labour jobs, and also on materials supply (Wells & Wall 2003: 329-
330). The industry also has great potential for generating further employment, 
through its backward linkages with other industries, notably those involved in the 
provision of financial services to the industry (Mlinga & Wells 2002) and with the 
production and distribution of building equipment and materials (Wells & Wall 
2003). In Kenya, for example, the increase in informal construction has been 
paralleled by an increase in employment in on-site jobs in stone dressing, and in 
stone quarrying (ibid.) where in Tanzania just under one-third of the jobs are held by 
women (URT 1991b: table 6.3).9  
 
In essence the informal construction sector, as a component of the informal sector, 
bears similar characteristics and constraints to the rest of the informal sector, 
including, inter alia, a scarcity of markets; lack of registration, working capital, 
tools, transport and adequate working premises; unfairly low payment and poor 
technical and business skills (Rana 2003b).10 In terms of ownership, Africans in the 
construction industry tend to be most represented in small firms that handle small 
jobs (Ngare 1998: 136). By the definition we use below these businesses are neither 
registered nor licensed, although about half undertake projects exceeding their legal 
                                                 
9 Lugalla’s survey of urbanisation and urban poverty in Dar es Salaam also found significant numbers 
of women in quarrying (1997: 439), as did Molony (2000c) in a rural area of the country. As ILO 
notes, however, ‘the spectacular growth of female participation in the labour market in the past two 
decades, and their enhanced access to wage employment, have not been paralleled by similar progress 
in terms of quality employment’ (2000a: 12). 
10 These constraints were raised at the STICW-Dar project’s ‘leading beneficiaries’ workshop on 24 
February 2003 and reported in the second workshop in Rana (2003b). Note that there is no specific 
reference to ICT here, although some leading beneficiaries did raise the issue of communication-
related limitations are absent from the summary of constraints presented in Rana (ibid.) – which leads 
one to the conclusion that the potential of ICT as a communication tool to facilitate marketing is 
apparently not significant to the agendas of the project’s executing agencies. For similar constraints on 
the informal construction sector in Kenya, see Ngare (1998: 138-141). 
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upper limit for operating without a license.11 Informal contractors are usually under 
sole ownership and – close to the group numbers of this study’s ICW sample (4:5) – 
made up of between two and five skilled and the same number of unskilled 
employees working on a part-time basis, operating from no fixed location or 
construction sites (Mlinga & Lema 2000; Mlinga & Wells 2002).12 The enterprises 
own only basic tools which are purchased over time, and generally do not own plant 
or machinery but hire from an informal supplier and obtain materials from the client. 
 
The main difference between the formal and informal construction sector, however, 
is the extent to which government regulations are observed. Yet as Mlinga and Wells 
(2002) argue, this difference often fails to create a cut-and-dry distinction since not 
only can it incorrectly imply that compliance to all government laws can be claimed 
by the formal and not by informal construction sector, but also regulation can take a 
variety of forms that fail to discriminate between sectors as it is. In the government’s 
attempts to regulate different aspects of the construction industry, for example, it 
targets enterprises (e.g., registration), labour (e.g., labour laws) and those that relate 
to the activity or product (e.g., planning), and these efforts often cut across – and can 
be avoided by – formal and informal sector alike. It is because of this segmentation 
in the regulation of the industry, argue Mlinga and Wells, that it important when 
discussing the informal construction sector to make clear what the object of analysis 
is (ibid.: 270-271). 
 
The definition adopted by the First Meeting of the International Council for Research 
and Innovation in Building and Construction ‘Task Group 29’ is a useful basic guide 
                                                 
11 It is a strength of the specialist surveys (e.g., Mlinga & Lema 2000; Mlinga & Wells 2002) (i.e., 
non-NISS and DISS), that they are able to reveal that around 12% of unregistered enterprises had a 
turnover of above the legal upper limit of TSh10m per annum, and some individual projects of over 
TSh5 where the full contract is undertaken for the private client’s complete house (Mlinga & Wells 
2002: 274). See Mlinga and Lema (2000: 2) for arguments on why the licensing ceiling requirements 
should be reviewed. 
12 Mlinga and Lema (2000) use URT (1991b), URT (1995) and their own 1999/2000 study on 
Tanzania 405 informal contractors (STIC) in four of Tanzania’s fast growing cities to reveal general 
characteristics of informal construction sector contractors. It is worth noting that of these three studies 
STIC is probably the strongest for detail because it was carried out (more recently) by specialist 
scholars of the industry, unlike the government-published studies which address the entire economy. 
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when differentiating between the industry’s two sectors.13 TG29 takes the enterprise 
or individual as the primary object of analysis, and makes the differentiation between 
formal and informal by: the size of the enterprise; whether the enterprise/individual 
is registered and whether individuals within the enterprise enjoy some degree of 
social protection (such as a minimum wages, health and safety regulations, etc.) 
(Mlinga & Wells 2002: 271). In the context of developing countries the informal 
construction sector is seen in TG29 to comprise, 
 
unregistered and unprotected individuals and small enterprises that supply labour and 
contribute in various other ways to the output of the construction sector. (ibid.) 
 
This appears to be the most widely accepted definition among those dealing with the 
informal construction sector in developing countries (e.g., Mitullah & Wachira 2003; 
Mlinga & Lema 2000; e.g., Mlinga & Wells 2002; Wells 1999). Nevertheless, there 
have more recently been calls (Mitullah & Wachira 2003: 7) to change the focus of 
the object of analysis to be in line with recent changes in focus on employment status 
(ILO 2002a) rather than the enterprise. This is because under the prevalence of 
outsourcing through labour subcontractors in the construction industry (ILO 2001) it 
is often the ‘formal’ employer – not the informal operator – who seeks to avoid his 
legal obligations (specifically registration and taxation), at the expense of the 
individual coming from the informal sector (English 2002b; WIEGO 2002). 
 
The definition of the informal construction sector used for the purposes of this study 
is a stripped down version of TG29 that was used during fieldwork to conveniently 
describe to informants the broad area of research. When briefing informants on what 
was being studied for this part of the research, the informal construction sector was 
said to embrace, 
 
                                                 




small, unregistered and/or unlicensed enterprises and individual, unprotected workers 
operating within the building construction sector, which includes building materials but 
excludes civil engineering.14 
 
The informal construction sector is regarded as particularly important to case study 
because of its huge growth and increasing role within the industry.15 Wells’ early 
study shows that in developing countries such as Tanzania much of the construction 
industry up to the mid-1980s ‘is not executed within the formal sector of the 
construction industry but takes place in the ‘informal sector’’ (ibid. 1986: 13). 
Subsequent studies show that in East Africa this trend has intensified over the last 
few years and, to some extent, this growth is captured in official figures.16 For 
                                                 
14 The addition of building materials is used by Wells (2003: 326) and is correct for this research given 
the STICW-Dar project sample includes building materials suppliers (e.g., Iddi Sunga; Nordin Chopa). 
I would always ask informants if they understood the informal construction sector to be anything 
different, and all were happy with my usage of the term. This was deemed important to ensure that 
when we were talking about the formal and informal sectors both of us meant roughly the same thing 
although, particularly in the context of the ease with which mafundi cross the boundary (if indeed there 
is one), I question whether the gang-leader always knows for sure which sector other mafundi are in. 
This is worth bearing in mind with the responses for not only this study but all studies using others’ 
views and experiences of the two sectors, and is an important area the literature seems to ignore. 
15 In both Kenya and Tanzania the rise in informal sector construction has been accredited to a fall in 
public sector construction as public resources for infrastructure were reduced with structural 
adjustment and public-sector building virtually collapsed (Wells & Wall 2003: 325-326), as Lwoga 
shows was the case in Dar es Salaam’s Gerezani carpentry and metalworking cluster, where work dried 
up as the government stopped requiring their services (1995: 15-17). In Kenya the private sector 
accounted for more than 90% of building construction output by 1999 (Mitullah & Wachira 2003: 2.1), 
and in Dar es Salaam alone the same figure now accounts for the amount of residential buildings built 
entirely by those operating in the informal sector (Presentation by Oddvar Jakobsen, Deputy Resident 
Representative of UNDP, Tanzania at ‘Inception “Leading Beneficiaries” workshop’, 24 February 
2003, UNDP, Dar es Salaam). In both countries the withdrawal of public sector construction has been 
accompanied by a reduction in effective regulation, which combined has created space for the growth 
of the informal sector (Wells 1999). The increase can be seen in other countries too, in Mexico 73% of 
employment in construction is informal, in India 94% (ILO 2002b: 35). 
16 As Mitullah and Wachira believe of the Kenyan figures (2003: 8), most government reporting on the 
scale of the informal construction sector – and probably the informal sector as a whole – are almost 
certainly underestimates. For this reason Wells believes there is little point in relying too much on 
national accounting data, in Kenya in part because the decrease in effective regulation of new building 
activities has led to less use of permits and is the reason the government has little idea on what is being 
built (2001: 272). Instead Wells looks more closely at output trend figures, which in Kenyan cement 
consumption suggests an expansion of unrecorded building activity showing private building thriving 
(2001: 268; 2003: 372), and in Tanzania takes an analysis of the revised national accounts which show 
a large amount of unrecorded building activity that was previously undetected (ibid. 1999: 3-5). A 
further method in Dar es Salaam has been to interpret the number of new buildings using aerial 
photography (ibid. 2001: 272fn), while in Mexico, Herbert and Pickering suggest comparing the 
number of new housing units financed to the estimated total construction volumes based on changes in 
the occupied housing stock (1997: 31). 
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Tanzania, Mlinga shows that the informal construction sector is growing and 
contributes significantly to the economy (Mlinga 2000), with Total Gross Output, 
Total Value Added and Total Capital Formation all increasing, by 185%, 244% and 
173% respectively (Mlinga & Lema 2000: 8). The importance of Tanzania’s 
informal construction sector is also shown in the employment figures, with the NISS 
in 1991 revealing that 163,438 operators and employees were working in informal 
construction (22,327 in Dar es Salaam, all of whom were apparently men) (URT 
1991b), while the number of employees in formal construction in 1994 was only 
22,000 for the entire country.17 In Dar es Salaam the number of people employed by 
the informal construction sector increased by 13% over almost the same period (URT 
1991b; 1995). Significantly, these figures do not include more recent figures that are 
now available on employment in secondary activities, which show that nationwide 
almost as many men, and as many women, engage in construction as a secondary 
source of employment. This effectively doubles the size of the workforce in the 
informal construction sector even before tertiary activities are taken into 
consideration: the latest figures (from 2002) show that 11.9% of 761,000 men and 
0.1% of 678,000 women (6.3% of a total of 1.5m) are engaged in informal sector 
construction as a main activity, while 0.9% of 724,000 men and 0.1% of women 
(0.5% of a total of 1,363,000) are engaged in informal sector construction as a 
secondary activity (URT 2002b: 62). In terms of hours most worked for a secondary 
activity, this accounts for 13.7%, second only to the transport industry (ibid.: 53). 
 
Dar es Salaam, urbanisation and ‘modern’ housing 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the most rapidly urbanising region in the world (UN-Habitat 
2003) and also has the highest demand for new infrastructure and buildings (Wells 
2001: 267). Within Tanzania, whose 5.4% rate of urbanisation is far above average 
                                                 
17 URT. 1996. Report of the Survey of Construction, Trade and Transport 1994. Dar es Salaam: 
Bureau of Statistics, President’s Office, Planning Commission; cited in Wells (1999: 6).   For Kenya, 
Mitullah and Wachira cite the government’s Economic Survey (ROK 1996) which shows that between 
1992 and 1995 informal construction employment increased by 75% while other private sector 
employment only rose slightly, then between 1995 and 1999 the amount of people employed in the 
informal construction sector almost doubled from 31,600 to 58,900 (and its contribution to GDP was at 
an average of 1.6%) (2003: 8-9). 
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for the continent (UN-Habitat 2004)), Dar es Salaam is one of the continent’s fastest 
growing cities, with the population almost doubling at the end of the last millennium 
from 1.4m in 1988 to 2.5m in 2002 (URT 1991c; 2004c).18 In the context of limited 
employment growth in the formal construction sector, an increasing number of these 
new urban job seekers go to the informal sector and, traditionally, the construction 
industry (Wells & Wall 2003: 326).19  
 
A good number of the city’s new houses are modern, built from manufactured 
concrete blocks to create buildings that house owners are now striving to own.20 
Clearly these modern houses have the higher standards of comfort and security and 
this confers a greater degree of status on the owner, but these aspirations are coming 
at a time when the gap between the price of modern and traditional materials has 
widened considerably. The informal construction sector, as well as contributing 
towards some of the city’s highest quality developments (Wells 2001), is showing 
itself adept at meeting this change in the taste towards modern housing that, 
compared with traditional swahili house built using poles, thatch and mud, requires 
more help to build and cannot be made so easily by the land owner. The client for 
these modern houses is usually a private house-owner (Mitullah & Wachira 2003: 3; 
Mlinga & Lema 2000: 7) who is building or repairing part of a residence and – 
irrespective his or her status – increasingly tends to employ various informal 
                                                 
18 As at January 2004, Tanzania was fourth in the world in terms of the amount of refugees it hosts 
(http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=tza), and many of these – particularly the male 
youth – travel to urban areas to make a living (Sommers 2001). Dyson (2003: 434) suggests that Dar es 
Salaam’s high growth rate might simply reflect a change in the designation of an ‘urban’ area.   
Africa’s annual average urban growth rate is 4%, twice as high as Latin America and Asia. 37% of 
Africans live in cities at present but this figure is expected to rise to 53% by the year 2030 in what has 
been calculated as the world’s highest rate of urbanisation (UN-Habitat 2003). 
19 This has long been the case in Dar es Salaam as Leslie (1963) reports of the immediate post-
independence period: ‘The employment of a large part of the 35,000 Africans reckoned by the Labour 
Department to be in regular employment depends, not on current business, but on active expansion, in 
that so many are deployed directly or indirectly on construction.’ (ibid.: 15). On the growth of Dar es 
Salaam in this period see also De Blij (1963). Fluitman and Momo show that in present day Yaoundé, 
Cameroon, the largest share (30%) of occasional wage workers in their sample of almost 700 operators 
covering 12 trades also work in informal sector construction firms (2002: 28). 
20 Ngare (1998: 138), for example, reports of Kenyan mafundi in traditional trades now being joined 
by those with the relatively new skills of terrazzo-laying and timber panelling. See Wells (1998) on 
more modest traditional housing and building materials in low-income settlements, and Kadonya et al 
for present day Dar es Salaam residential patterns (2002: 16-17). 
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construction enterprises to undertake their respective activities on a labour-only 
basis, rather than one enterprise to carry out all the building.21 
 
4:3. Marketing chain, players and processes 
4:4. The informal construction system 
Clients’ complete avoidance of the formal construction in favour of dealing solely 
with enterprises and individuals in the informal sector has been termed  the ‘informal 
construction system’ (Wells 2001), the result of a combination of the shift from 
public to private building, the decline in regulation (especially in planning control) 
and the fall in work passing through more formalised systems of production. Under 
these conditions clients have greater options in the design of their buildings, which in 
most cases are designed as the work proceeds, with minimal consultation of 
specialists who, because of the high costs involved, provide only plans at a small fee. 
Under the informal construction system clients are also adopting a more ‘hands-on’ 
approach as supervisors in the construction of their buildings by seeing personally to 
the purchase of materials and by dealing themselves with a tradesman – acting as a 
foreman – who oversees all the skilled and unskilled labour on site. The informal 
sector acting-foreman supplies the labour directly to the private client, using his own 
networks to find the necessary informal sector artisans to undertake the skilled work 
and who supply their own minimal select group of casual labourers to carry out any 
unskilled work in what under this system are more labour-intensive production 
methods (Mitullah & Wachira 2003; Mlinga & Lema 2000; Mlinga & Wells 2002; 
Wells & Wall 2003). While the methods for the construction of a modern house has 
more sophisticated demands, the organisation of the informal construction system is 
similar to that used in traditional house building: the construction is a project-based 
(rather than firm-based) activity, formed around temporary coalitions centred on 
informal agreements between owners and building workers, with mutual trust in the 
payment of materials, and labour replacing formal written contracts (Wells 2001: 
                                                 
21 An example of this system being used by a high status figure was observed when I was in the Dar es 
Salaam residence of Edward Lowassa (Minister of Water and Livestock Development), who was 
overseeing a group of informal construction mafundi adding a patio extension to his garden. 
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271-272).22 The system can be seen as a more appropriate, ‘Africanised’ approach to 
the construction of modern buildings, a departure from the highly formalised and 
regulated British model of organisation Kenya and Tanzania have both adopted since 
independence and where Asians now have a strong representation as contractors 
(Mitullah & Wachira 2003: 2.4; Ngare 1998: 136) (e.g., Coastal Steel Industries; 
Shapriya) alongside international firms (e.g., Noremco; CG Jensen; Skanska; and 
Bailey & Roberts).23 As well as being economically less expensive for the client, the 
informal construction system is also more accommodating towards the unpredictable 
cashflow of many Tanzanians since it allows for building to be more sporadic, 
starting when funds permit and stopping as they ebb (Wells 2001; Wells & Wall 
2003).24 
 
4:5. STICW-Dar project ‘target beneficiaries’ and ‘leading 
beneficiaries’ 
Interviews for the case study were conducted mostly from late June to mid-August 
2003 with 19 gang-leaders (and one labourer) who work in groups operating in Dar 
es Salaam’s informal construction sector.25 Their contacts were obtained from a 
                                                 
22 I am slightly uncomfortable with Wells’ addition of ‘mutual trust’ here. With no binding written 
contract in the informal construction system the client is well aware that there is more scope for 
dishonest behaviour and little comeback, particularly if he or she does not know the contractor. 
Mohammed believes that private customers – and in particular, wazungu (white people) – will use the 
formal sector if they can afford to because they perceive that they do a better job (Mohammed Ali) 
(presumably without knowing that the formal sector can be subcontracting the work to the informal 
sector) and, believes Alex, the perception among clients is that the formal sector can also be trusted 
more because they are registered (Alex Gerson). We see this distrust towards the unknown informal 
sector operator in the reluctance of the formal sector to lend equipment, the implication that a fundi 
without equipment is a cowboy (section 4:8) and in Abdi and Hamisi’s preconceptions towards an 
unknown fundi (section 4:10). See section 1:15 (especially footnote 32) also footnote 48 on mutual 
trust. 
23 Kinyanjui and Mitullah argue that the Asian representation is partly because of the preferential 
access to finance outside formal banking system. Kinyanjui, M. and W. V. Mitullah. 1999. Inter-Firm 
Dynamics in the Construction Sector. IDS Discussion Paper #296. University of Nairobi, Institute of 
Development Studies, Nairobi; cited in Mitullah and Wachira (2003: 2.4)). See Wells (1986: chapters 
3 and 7) for a history of construction ownership in East Africa since independence. 
24 See Nyanje (2004), however, on the Engineers Registration Board’s concern over ‘shoddy work’.  
25 ‘Group’ and ‘gang’ are used interchangeably in reference to the sample groups.   None of the 
leadership of Walindila Kijiwe were available so one of its members, so Said Dogore, a casual labourer 
from the group, was interviewed instead. Perhaps because he is not in the leadership, Said is the only 
ICW in the sample who does not use a mobile phone for work (according to him because he earns too 
little money). For this reason all replies relating to mobile phones only are therefore for 19 of the 20 
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sample collected by United Nations Volunteers (UNV) for their ‘Support for 
Informal Construction Workers in Dar es Salaam’ (‘STICW-Dar’) project with the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the University of Dar es Salaam’s Bureau of Industrial 
Cooperation (BICO).26 
 
The 20 workers interviewed for the case study are seen as broadly representative of 
informal construction workers (ICWs) in Dar es Salaam region, their names having 
been obtained from a sample population of ICWs whose problems are being voiced 
in dialogue between a select group of outspoken ICWs and governmental, semi-
governmental and private institutions stakeholders. The STICW-Dar project chose 
these groups from a survey it undertook between November 2002 and January 2003 
to locate as many ICWs as possible who operate in Dar es Salaam region. This 
comprehensive survey was conducted at ward level, with researchers visiting active 
formal and informal construction sites, vijiweni (labour pool hang outs/pick-up 
points), hardware suppliers and construction material suppliers in every single ward 
in the region and recording the numbers of trades at each location. The survey 
revealed a total of 26,323 ICWs in Dar es Salaam region (Rana 2003b). Of this total 
located ICW population, the project is working with a 5% sample of ‘target 
beneficiaries’ comprising 42 different groups covering a total of 1,321 workers of 
different trades (ibid.), and from which a core group of ‘leading beneficiaries’ has 
then been selected to represent the ‘target beneficiaries’ at the project workshops. 
The selection criteria for the leading beneficiaries group took into consideration the 
need for representation across trades, gender (with groups with larger numbers of 
female members being favoured), length of experience in the informal construction 
industry, interest in the project and good communication skills. Spokespersons were 
                                                                                                                                          
interviews conducted. This does not affect replies from the sample relating to the groups’ involvement 
in the informal construction sector, which includes Said’s responses and therefore remains at 20. 
26 Lasting three years, the objective of STICW-Dar is to facilitate dialogue between stakeholders and 
informal construction workers – who the project defines as any ‘individual or group who are not 
officially recognised by the government nor registered by [its] respective institutions’ (UNV/UNDP 
2003) – with a view to protecting and enhancing the position of ICWs, and to then produce and 
disseminate guidelines for the up-scaling and replication of the project (Rana 2003b). For more details 
on the project and its considerable success in supporting ICWs countrywide in such important ways as 
assistance in gaining legal recognition and with knowledge of their labour rights, vocational training, 
and access to health insurance, see Jason (2005). 
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then elected by the leading beneficiaries groups to act as their representatives on the 
project (Rana 2003a) and, despite females comprising 4% of the total identified ICW 
population (usually as unskilled labourers and female informal sector cooks) (ibid.)), 
are all male. 
 
The 20 informal sector construction workers who were interviewed for this research 
were chosen from the leading beneficiary groups. Around ten of the spokesmen were 
first approached at an inception workshop for the beneficiaries in February 2003 
where they agreed to be interviewed for this research at a later date and were then 
contacted later along with the remaining groups whose contacts were obtained on a 
list supplied by the STICW-Dar project leader shortly before the interviews for this 
research took place, between late June and mid-August 2003. The contacts list broke 
the 42 groups into municipality location (covering each district, 9 in Kinondoni, 13 
in Ilala, and 20 in Temeke) and gave the group name and in most cases a contact 
mobile phone number, but no further details. Of the 42 groups in the original 
contacts list obtained from the project leader, phone numbers were not provided for 
11 (although one was obtained later), two did not answer the phone after repeated 
attempts, for 9 groups the number was not in operation (possibly because it had 
expired), and one ICW was not interested in being interviewed, citing dissatisfaction 
with the project. Other than Walindila Kijiwe group (see footnote 25, page 149), the 
remaining 20 groups who could be contacted all agreed for a senior representative of 
the group to be interviewed, who usually emerged to be the gang-leader. 
 
4:6. Networks of knowledge: finding and securing work, and 
getting paid 
4:7. Sample gang structure 
Gang leadership normally consists of a treasurer who oversees accounting when it 
exists, and a chairman. Although he is a skilled tradesman, the gang-leader will not 
always carry out work himself but, as we discuss shortly, will spend much of his time 
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applying his experience, reputation and contacts to searching for jobs for the gang.27 
The remaining members compose gangs that in the sample range in size from three 
workers to around 200. If the two ‘labour pool’ groups (Chama cha Mafundi and 
Umoja wa Wajenzi) are removed then the mean average membership drops from 27 
to 12.28 The gangs cover a wide range of building trades (Appendix I), and of those 
informants who replied, 9 out of 20 have previously worked in the formal 
construction sector on a permanent basis (no = 6; not applicable = 5), while 10 have 
worked for formal sector contractors on a part-time basis (no = 3; not applicable = 
7).29 
 
Mobile phone ownership within sample gangs 
Irrespective of group size, only a couple of gang members – usually those in the 
leadership – own mobile phones that they use for work. If Bondeni Youth is excluded 
(where 18 of the 20 members own mobile phones that they use for work), only 46 
gang members of the 540 total represented in the sample own mobile phones that 
they use for work.30 Of the 20 interviewees, only Said Dogore had never used a 
                                                 
27 It would be useful in terms of the group dynamic and labour relations to find out how the gang-
leader is regarded by the other group members, whether he is seen as an employer, ‘one of the boys’ 
and on their side in the fair distribution of earnings to jobs found and work done, or whether he is 
thought as an exploitative middleman, and on how decisions are reached within the group. The 
sentiments of other group members on these issues would surely have implications for their 
willingness to take on other jobs ‘on the side’. 
28 The majority of enterprises qualify as MSEs because they have fewer than ten members (section 
1:15).   The definition of ‘group member’ is a slippery term, and it is not clear what criteria the groups 
set for membership and whether these are always kept to. This figure is still a larger number than the 
usual in Africa, with Fluitman and Momo recording the average enterprise size in Yaoundé, Cameroon 
as six workers, but they also acknowledge that workers in the informal construction sector are known 
to move frequently from job to job, and from firm to firm (2002: 27-28), rendering figures measuring 
these enterprises by size only short-term. Recognition that the amount of workers in these groups are 
rising has come from the Tanzania government, with the benchmark for the number of paid employees 
in informal sector construction recently being raised from five to a maximum of ten paid employees 
(URT 2002b: sec5.2). 
29 The trades carried out by each group are recorded here and in Appendix I as the primary trade the 
gang-leader saw the group to specialise in. In some cases the informant could easily say that his group 
only carried out one task (i.e., Mohammed Ali would say that Umoja wa Mafundi Almunium [sic] only 
fits glass), but more often than not the informant would list all tasks they were capable of carrying out 
and at times it was unclear whether these were tasks they specialised in or – with a ‘can-do’ attitude 
(section 4:10) typical of the resourcefulness and connectedness of the informal sector – tasks they 
could subcontract to non-group members without the client’s (or my) knowledge. 
30 I regret the error of having not asked the Bondeni Youth gang-leader why his group has so many 
members with mobile phones. This is a task for my next visit to the informants. 
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mobile phone for work. It is significant in terms of mobile phone ownership and 
usage that Said was the only interviewee who does not represent group leadership but 
is a casual labourer from a kijiwe (labour pool pick-up point) – suggesting, albeit 
from a small sample, that the further a worker is from the leadership of a group the 
less likely he is to own a mobile phone that he uses for work. According to gang-
leaders and some ICWs spoken to outwith the sample, the main reason for their 
colleagues not using mobile phones for work is that it is too expensive to purchase 
the handset (without usually mentioning the huge running costs). Offering further 
evidence that mobile phone handsets are expensive to most Tanzanians, over half of 
the interviewees own inexpensive Siemens handsets, which are generally regarded by 
Dar es Salaam’s fashion conscious youth as basic and affordable, at the expense of 
style. 
 
4:8. Linkages with the formal sector: waiting to be subcontracted 
One of the key research aims during the fieldwork for this case study was to 
investigate what part the introduction of mobile phones played in the linkages that 
Mlinga has exposed between the formal and informal sectors of the construction 
industry (Mlinga 2000; Mlinga & Wells 2002). 31 According to the informal sector 
gang-leaders the only significant linkages across sectors are backward linkages 
within the informal sector, which only occur to any significant extent in two areas: 
resource linkages, which are strongest in the supply of materials produced or used 
but no longer required by the formal sector; and market and employment linkages 
where formal and informal enterprises both cross the sectoral divide, with formal 
sector workers having second jobs in the informal sector, and unregistered 
enterprises carrying out subcontracting work, mostly on a labour-only basis, for 
larger formal sector contractors.32 Subcontracting is the only common link, however, 
                                                 
31 These linkages, which can be categorised as social/political, technological, consumption and credit 
financing, are covered in some detail in Mlinga (2000).  
32 Subcontracting and supply linkages are part of the structuralist ‘informalisation’ approach to the 
informal sector which regards the expansion of informal activity as part of the restructuring strategy of 
the formal sector. This is in contrast to much of the work on African informal sectors which comes 
from a neo-liberal perspective (a lead taken by the ILO and World Bank), emphasising the withdrawal 
of the state, independence and growth. Linkages with the formal economy are a key theme of the 
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and we start with a discussion of this because the unpredictable nature of many 
subcontracting  relationships shows how the research was guided away from the 
formal sector as a source of much work for gang-leaders and towards exploring their 
use of mobile phones in a more active search for employment. 
 
In Dar es Salaam the opportunity for subcontracting work is usually provided by a 
formal sector contractor first approaching the informal sector contractor, often at a 
labour pick-up point (kijiwe) or one of the city’s trade clusters such as Chang’ombe 
(carpentry), Gerezani (metalworking), or Vetenary (materials). This arrangement has 
for years so often been the case in other cities worldwide (e.g., King 1977: 74-79), 
where the opportunity presents the chance for a future relationship where the 
informal sector supplies labour to the formal sector33 – albeit only to meet the 
demand and often unfavourable (and legally uncontracted) terms and conditions of 
the latter. In Tanzania these linkages are mostly on a labour-only basis from small 
unregistered enterprises operating in the informal sector supplying to the rest of the 
construction industry (ILO 2001; Mlinga 2000; Mlinga & Wells 2002: 278), and 
according to this sample are the most common point of contact with the formal 
sector, with 14 of the 20 gang-leaders reporting that they had in the last month been 
working, or were currently working, for another employer (i.e., in a subcontracting 
relationship) (e.g., Africanus Pius’ gang of specialised concreters).34 
                                                                                                                                          
informalisation framework which sees that subcontracting eliminates incentives for technical progress, 
innovation and investment on the part of subcontracting firms. The neo-liberal perspective, on the 
other hand, considers linkages with formal sector, where they exist, as essentially benign and that 
forward linkages to the sector need to be strengthened by the increased patronage of informal sector 
firms which, it is assumed, will expand markets and improve the transfer of modern techniques to the 
informal sector (Meagher 1995). One reason this is not working and, suggest Liedholm and Mead 
(1987), a possible reason subcontracting has been much less prevalent in Africa and Latin America 
than in Asia, may be because of the propensity of the larger firms to import a large share of their 
needed inputs. 
33 As English has found in South Africa with the formal sector’s preference for former employees to be 
employed whenever there is work (2002b: 52), these examples from Dar es Salaam do suggest that – 
although none of these men admitted to previously working for these companies formally – formal 
sector companies do like to hire the same regular (outsourced) workers who they are familiar with even 
if they have only even employed them before in an informal capacity. 
34 Others (e.g., Haan 2001b: 15) have found subcontracting in construction industry noticeably higher 
than other MSEs because, as Rogerson shows of South Africa (and equally holds for Tanzania), with 
the dramatic decline in public sector building activity there are fewer large projects for the government 
and greater competition for the remaining jobs (1999: 89). Registered contractors in the construction 
industry have reacted in a similar fashion to other formal enterprises worldwide that have been affected 
by globalisation and have changed their organisation of production to a new employment model 
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Details of the nature of these relationships are not known for all of the gang-leaders 
to give anything near a representative sample. It is possible, given the amount of 
gang-leaders who say that they get work on individual houses for private clients 
(17/20), that some of the subcontracting jobs they work on are for a client/acting-
foreman on a private informal construction system job (or those ‘straddler 
contractors’ on the edge of the sectoral border who decide not to become formal),35 
and not always for larger formal contractors on sites where the main contractor is 
formal sector. Irrespective of the location, however, there are enough cases from the 
gang-leader sample to suggest that subcontracting to the formal sector (or at least to 
‘straddler contractors’) is happening. Despite the increase in this kind of 
subcontracting arrangement, it can by no means be relied upon to sustain many 
groups in regular employment since – although clients (both formal sector and on 
private informal construction system jobs) prefer to deal with the same gang-leader 
in future – the relationship appears to be unpredictable and at times ad hoc, with the 
gangs only getting work when/if the formal contractor approaches the smaller 
informal sector firm. 
 
Relations between formal and informal sectors: competition and antipathy? 
The existence of some form of employment linkage raises the question over the 
extent to which skills are being transferred during the course of these subcontracting 
relationships, particularly when little is known about the Indian entrepreneurs who 
                                                                                                                                          
relying on more ‘flexible’ employment arrangements (ILO 2000a: 12). (See chapter one for 
background on the changing world of work). In Tanzania and Kenya this has taken the form of 
‘casualising’ their workforce and relying on subcontracting work to the informal sector which has 
encouraged the growth of small-scale enterprises and self-employed builders (often specialised by 
trade) supplying labour and equipment. Bakuli (1994: 1610) and Ngare (1998) on Nairobi, Mlinga 
(1998) on Dar es Salaam; Wells (1999; 2001). 
35 Mlinga and Wells’ research has revealed an overlap in size and activities between formal and 
informal construction enterprises, especially between newly registered enterprises with few resources 
(which they term ‘small emerging contractors’), and enterprises with sufficient capital and equipment 
to register but that do not choose to obtain a licence and registration because they can operate 
effectively without them (‘established informal contractors’) (2002: 276-278). Such a comparison of 
what we might term ‘straddler contractors’ could not be made from this gang sample since details of 
capital assets were not recorded for most of the groups (because personal experience based on previous 
research of the informal sector in Tanzania (Molony 2000c) had pointed to the unreliability of replies 
to such a question). Asking the ‘start date’ of an enterprise was also not deemed a suitable question 
because, as King notes, the single start date of the business that researchers are always asking for is 
artificial owing to the gradual process involved in beginning a new enterprise (1996a: 146). 
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are well represented in the formal construction sector and are often highly 
educated/trained, with experience from abroad.36 Not knowing more about these 
opportunities and exploiting them holds serious risks for the future of those 
(predominantly African) small-scale operators who, as it is with the informalisation 
of the industry, are being affected by ‘a general lowering of the level of skill and, 
with the drop in people in permanent employment, far fewer opportunities for 
acquiring skills through apprenticeships and ‘learning by doing’.’ (Wells 1999: 7). It 
is therefore tempting to suggest here that measures could be taken to ensure that 
skills transfer is facilitated by policies that react to the increase in popularity of the 
informal construction system, at least perhaps by offering tax incentives to formal 
sector contactors who allow their qualified professionals to give advice on where 
procedures are incorrect or unsafe on these sites, or that recognise in the Contractors 
Registration Board qualifications where contractors meet certain standards of labour 
rights for their subcontracted employees. Yet the difficulty in expecting much more 
from the formal sector – for example, trying to get a formal sector firm to agree to 
having informal sector workers shadow their highly trained professional counterparts 
– lies in the fact that with the rise in informalisation the formal and informal sectors 
are increasingly in competition with each other, particularly since informal sector 
enterprises are showing themselves to be more adept in the construction of complex 
and much larger commercial buildings (Wells 2001), which are traditionally the 
preserve of the formal sector.37 When asked whether he ever borrows tools from the 
                                                 
36 Despite the disadvantages of the subcontracting relationship (section 4:8), it does in theory also hold 
the potential for skills transfer from the more formally educated/trained, as the STIC survey found 
occurs with informal sector carvers learning technical and managerial skills when working for big 
contractors (Mlinga & Lema 2000: 7, 9). It still appears to be the case, however, that the literature on 
skills transfer has not reacted to the call for more attention to be paid to interactions between Africans 
and Indians (King 1996a: 198) who have long been strongly represented in the formal construction 
sectors of both Tanzania and Kenya (Wells 1986, chapters 3 and 9), and in racial issues in 
subcontracting relationships more generally, particularly in foreign-owned formal sector firms (King 
2001: 7-8). 
37 This leads Wells to assert that the definition of informal sector as unregistered, unrecorded, 
informal, and often used in reference to poor quality rural housing, is no longer appropriate (2001: 
269-270). The increase in good quality ‘modern’ housing built solely by the informal sector can now 
be observed in all of Dar es Salaam’s most prosperous areas, and it is for these reasons that my 
opinion expressed in Molony (2000c) has changed and I am now less inclined to think that – in the 
construction industry at least – ‘the informal sector is generally subordinate to the formal sector and 
dependent on its productivity’ (ibid.: para.1.1). I would, however, stick to the comment that follows 
where I saw (admittedly, in a very different setting) a blurred distinction between sectors because of 
the existence of some formal-informal vertical links (ibid.). In some enterprises operating in 
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formal sector, Peter Makoye, a general builder, gives an indication of the competition 
from his own experience: 
 
…everybody is looking for food these days. When the formal sector sees somebody is 
looking for tools they won’t [loan] them but can go to the place where that person is 
working and say, “That guy’s not got the tools but I have them so I’m a better fundi and 
should be given the job instead because I can be trusted because I have all the tools for 
the work”. They’ll go to his job personally and say this. (Peter Makoye)38 
 
While this seems like an extreme example, there are indications, from the formal 
sector, of antipathy towards informal sector operators and at times towards the 
government’s double standards. Jaffer, for example, pays all his taxes and fees in full 
as a large formal contractor but is still pressurised into paying irregular contributions 
to inspectors who know he is successful and has the money to pay, while the 
government turns a blind eye to the illegal informal sector who pay no taxes (Jaffer). 
Job, despite his willingness to use many informal sector mafundi, shows contempt 
for the informal sector for different reasons: 
 
The [informal sector] fundi’s, they are cheap and can do the job quickly but you must 
watch them because they will cut corners. I know that if masons are laying more than 
150 blocks per day, then they are cutting corners – maybe they can not be watering the 
bricks properly. (Job Mbele) 
 
Nevertheless, many contractors do still use informal sector mafundi and in relations 
between the two much depends on the attitude of the formal sector firm towards its 
informal sector ‘partner’ and the terms of their affiliation, which in nearly all cases 
                                                                                                                                          
Tanzania’s construction industry the boundary only now exists in terms of adherence to government 
regulations. 
38 Details of the interview date and location are listed in Appendix I. Unlike chapters 4 and 6 where 
the date of the interview is given beside the reference to identify from the multiple interviews for one 
person, the informants for this chapter were only interviewed on one occasion; so it is therefore not 
necessary to list the interview date in the text. 
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sees the latter in a position of unequal bargaining strength (ILO 2000b: para.104).39 
As English (2002a) argues, subcontracting per se is not a negative practice since it 
can provide specialisation of tasks, higher productivity and lower costs, but in some 
situations subcontracting can amount to little more than sweated labour (King & 
McGrath 2002: 25) and it is here when regulations are not adhered to and rights of 
employees violated that the practice is negative.40 That this can be less the fault of 
the prime contractors as it is the fault of subcontractors (who are themselves 
employed for short periods of time) employing workers off-the-books on a short-
term basis, however, seems to be ignored by some of the gang-leaders in the survey, 
who still see the error lying in the formal sector as paying unfairly low wages.41 
Salutare puts the situation well when expressing his opinion on the main difference 
between the informal and the formal sectors of the construction industry: 
 
The formal sector bosses pay for their workers if they are sick, and if they have to hang 
around without work they still get paid. The informal sector can be paid anything 
because there are so many labourers available, so the formal sector exploit them, paying 
them small wages. (Salutare Minja) 
 
                                                 
39 ‘Relationship’ is used intentionally here rather than ‘contract’ because a physical contract may not 
exist, further weakening the informal sector firm’s recourse to legal justice when things go wrong. It is 
here that the ILO sees a place for government intervention through policies which ensure contractual 
arrangements, including subcontracting, are fair (which involves supporting MSE associations) 
(2000b: paras.104 and 125). Equally, this can go the other way with the informal sector enterprise not 
keeping to its side of the agreement, as was reported to have happened in some supply linkages to the 
formal sector observed in this case study. 
40 Indeed, the UNDP roadmap points out that labour laws in Tanzania are such that there is no 
disincentive to hire casual labourers (UNDP et al 2004: para.127). For examples of violations see 
English (2002a) on lack of safety procedures, failure to pay social security contributions and wages 
below the legal minimum in informal construction labour in the Western Cape, and for the same in 
Nairobi see Kinyanjui and Mitullah. 1999, op. cit. (fn23); cited in Mitullah and Wachira (2003: 9). See 
Thomas (1995: 55-66) for further discussion on backward and forward links between the urban 
informal and formal sectors and whether they are benign or exploitative. 
41 According to English, subcontractors are more likely than prime contractors to avoid issuing 
workers with written contracts and registering them with the relevant authorities, in order to evade the 
‘on-costs’ associated with employment. This, she points out, is often the motivation for the 
‘outsourcing’ of labour in the first place (2002b: 1-2). Demonstrating the reach of globalisation – as 
the word infers, at the global level –  Leonard reports exactly the same of formal firms subcontracting 
to the informal (including construction) sector in one of Northern Ireland’s most underprivileged 
housing estates where, under the increasing competition of subcontracting, off-the-books employment 
is regularly practiced as the most effective way of keeping costs low (1994: 174). 
 
 159
Where this comment is useful is the remark – echoed by others such as Hamisi 
Yusuf, Imani Sunga, and Juma Simba – that workers employed directly by a formal 
sector firm (i.e., not outsourced workers) are better looked after by their employers 
and receive benefits such as hospital treatment that informal sector workers have to 
pay for themselves. This came through as the most frequent response when gang-
leaders were asked the differences between the informal sector and the formal sector 
of the construction industry in terms of their uses of mobile phones. Mention was 
made of the gang-leader’s freedom over his formal sector counterpart in using his 
mobile phone in the workplace to arrange other work (Sulemani Vulale), but the 
most common response of those who saw a difference (7/8) related to formal sector 
mafundi not having to use their own money to pay for their mobile phone use for 
work purposes:42 
 
In the informal sector much effort is spent in finding work and getting hold of tools, 
spares and so on, but these are supplied in the formal sector. For all of this the formal 
sector fundi can be paid from the office for using his mobile phone for work. (Iddi 
Mnyongea) 
 
Or as Peter put it, 
 
Most mafundi [in the formal sector] get work and then they can put credit on their 
mobile phones because they know that they will get a salary at end of month. But I 
don’t know this, maybe I can be without a job for two or three months. (Peter 
Makoye)43 
                                                 
42 This difference is essentially that between wage-earning and self-employment as much as it is the 
difference between formal and informal sectors. 
43 It is unclear whether what gang-leaders say about formal sector mafundi getting money from office 
for mobile phone credit is true or just rumours. Equally, it has not been proven that since formal sector 
mafundi have a salary at the end of the month they are more likely to use their mobile phones than 
ICWs who can be without a job for a long period of time. However, one positive difference that 
Sulemani pointed out is that while the formal sector fundi has his mobile phone credit for work paid for 
(and both can use their mobile phones for obtaining work), the informal sector fundi can go anytime to 
secure a potential job he hears of while the formal sector fundi is restricted by set hours where he has 
to be at his job (Sulemani Vulale). Charles also regards the independence of the informal sector as an 




Peter’s remark helpfully sums up this section on cross-sectoral linkages by showing 
that despite the increase in the formal sector using the informal sector for its labour, 
the formal sector can by no means be relied upon to sustain many groups in regular 
employment since the relationship is unpredictable and at times ad hoc, with the 
leader only getting work when/if his gang are required by a formal contractor. The 
question this then raises is why when most communication seems to be personal, 
with Alex managing to ‘hear about a job’ when meeting up with people, Zahoro 
learning ‘from walking around and asking’, and formal sector and private customers 
simply visiting the workshop clusters in Chang’ombe, Gerezani or Vetenary, do 
gang-leaders see the need to purchase mobile phones? Do mobile phones help in 
finding work in the majority, private informal construction system jobs? 
 
4:9. Mobile phones in finding work: ‘cheaper than a sign’, ‘cheaper 
than a daladala’ 
When it came to the decision to purchase a mobile phone, most gang-leaders (13/19) 
state that they judged themselves – apparently without the influence of others – that a 
mobile phone is important for work purposes.44 The most cited example (12/19) of 
gang-leaders realising the potential benefit of a mobile phone for work was when 
they saw that they were losing potential customers who were looking for them.45 
Much like the large farmers we saw in chapter four, other ICWs like James 
emphasise the ability to stay in touch with their business associates while on the 
move: 
 
                                                                                                                                          
bring in enough money (Charles Matiku), and advantage which also applies for self-employment in the 
formal sector. 
44 Gang-leaders never mentioned their mobile phone’s non-work/social application. It is worth noting 
that it is difficult to judge from these replies whether the respondents obtained their mobile phones 
after seeing or being told of its possible benefits, or whether they now report the benefits 
retrospectively having started to use a mobile phone and seen its benefits themselves. 
45 This is supported by English whose survey of informal labourers in Cape Town shows that 




I decided myself to buy a mobile phone when I saw people would come to buy scrap 
and I wasn’t here and they would leave. And [now] when I travel customers know 
where I am and how they can do business with me. There can be somebody selling 
scrap in Dodoma, and that person doesn’t have to travel to Dar es Salaam to see me if I 
want to buy it. He can just talk to me on the mobile phone. (James Cuthbert) 
 
Having purchased a mobile phone all gang-leaders claim they notice that, in addition 
to being able to travel while keeping in touch with potential customers, mobile 
phones can also be of some help in finding work. For those with an employer (i.e., 
labour subcontractor) who finds work for them the mobile phone is a more reliable 
way of keeping in touch with him, saving time and money on finding him to see if 
work has come up: 
 
Before the mobile phone people were difficult to communicate with, but it’s much 
easier now. It’s easy to know where the boss is so he can call me and say where he has 
work. (Africanus Pius) 
 
For the gang-leader whose responsibility it is to find work, and for the self-
employed, some find that mobile phones cut the cost of having to travel to find work. 
This was mentioned by Imani: 
 
If I travel to the guy who is selling pallets and he’s not got any I can waste money and 
not make a profit. But if I text him and he doesn’t have any pallets I don’t lose much 
money, only a few shillings. It’s cheap to text on the phone, it’s cheaper than using a 
daladala! (Imani Sunga). 
 
Here the mobile phone seems to be more of an advantage when a gang-leader has 
many contacts to ask if they require work to be done, as we see with Sulemani, who 
uses numbers he has stored on his mobile phone to contact previous customers when 




I save [previous] customers’ numbers and call them to see if they have work. It’s like a 
big banner for my business. 
When you’re looking for work and call them, does this work? 
Sometimes. 
And if it doesn’t work, you are not able to get work, what do you do then? 
I ask people, friends, where work is. (Sulemani Vulale) 
 
From Sulemani’s description of the areas he often works in, and of his description of 
his relationships with customers, he seems to have created himself a network of 
wealthy clients who are pleased with the work he does.46 Once a gang-leader gets a 
good reputation, word can pass when a happy customer talks with his friends, as 
occurred before mobile phones became popular. The difference now, however, is that 
the fundi’s mobile phone can now be passed on too, as Hamisi recalls: 
 
You can't get work without a mobile phone. Before I just had a sign by the side of the 
road and used it to attract customers.47 
So you get more work now that you have a mobile phone? 
Before I used a motorbike to travel around to construction sites to find work. Now with 
a mobile phone I get work through people saying to other people that they should use 
me, and they write down my phone number and then maybe I can get a text saying to 
meet somewhere to discuss a job. (Hamisi Yusuf) 
 
Similarly, gang-leaders with friends (not necessarily in the construction industry) 
who have a good knowledge of where their services may be needed are able, as 
                                                 
46 When in the area of his customer base the following week I asked another electrician if he knew 
Sulemani, to which he replied that he did. Hoping to find what made him a good fundi I asked about 
his work and was told he is a good electrician and is very good with customers: ‘Ndiyo, yeye ni 
muuzaji hodari!’ (Yes, he’s a hardworking salesman!). 
47 The city council has imposed a ‘sign tax’ that, according to Massimo (an Italian ex-patriate 
informant in the vinyago trade), is so high that he is considering removing his sign (Interview with 
Massimo, 14 August 2003, ‘African Art’ shop, Mwenge).    Metod, of Nguvu Moja Group, wrote his 
mobile phone number on a sign he erected to advertise his business but removed it when the council 
tried to make him pay. He now relies on word of mouth for his reputation to be spread, but still uses 
his mobile phone, leading him to conclude that, ‘Bongo is crazy! Mobile phones are cheaper than a 
sign by the roadside!’ (Metod Bernard). 
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before mobile phones, to inform or recommend their ICW friend. Of course, this is 
not a new method of finding work, but the difference now is that the mobile phone 
means that they can more easily contact the gang-leader to alert him of the 
opportunity, as Iddi remarks of his friends informing him of work: 
 
It’s easier [with a mobile phone] to get hold of somebody. Now I can ask around, ask 
friends, if they know of jobs. 
Your friends, they are in the construction industry? 
No, they are just friends doing things to live. Before it was very difficult to get hold of 
people, but now I can just use [my mobile phone] them to ask if they know of jobs. 
(Iddi Mnyongea) 
 
Or Charles, the qualified civil engineer who has the advantage of contacts in even 
better networks: 
 
If I hear that there is a job that requires my work I need to communicate [with the 
potential customer] to get the job. 
Where do you hear this from? 
Friends from college and engineers I have worked with before call me to say that there’s 
a job that needs my work and I ask them for the number of that person and I then call 
[the potential customer] to arrange to meet to discuss the job. 
You couldn’t do this on a landline? 
You could, but in those days with TTCL there were many problems. The call with a 
mobile phone comes straight to me. (Charles Matiku) 
 
Yet while we have seen that the mobile phone now helps the gang-leader in that his 
contacts can inform him of potential jobs and his number can be passed on to 
potential customers, he is still no less reliant on being acquainted with the right 
people who know of these opportunities and who know him well enough to care to 
recommend and/or inform him. Therefore, according to Mitullah and Wachira, the 
gang-leader spends much of his time networking with relatives, friends and potential 
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clients in search of jobs (2003: 20), and it is here that his personal reputation as a 
skilled worker – and, to a lesser extent, the reputation of the other skilled workers 
who regularly work with him – is a key requirement in getting himself known to 
potential employers (ibid.: 21), be they private clients in the informal construction 
system or the person the client has assigned this task to (the ‘acting-foreman’).48 
 
The ‘graduate poor’ 
There is not enough data from the survey to draw satisfactory conclusions on how 
the groups are formed and how often their membership changes – with questions on 
ties between members often being met with statements that a group member is a 
‘brother’ (which can stretch to almost any male relation) or a ‘friend’ – but there is 
likely that the gang-leader has a favoured core of workers comprised of those he 
regards as the best and most reliable and to whom he gives priority to when jobs 
come up (although that these criteria may be ignored in favour of employing a 
relation). To fill one of these positions in the group a prospective new entrant seems 
to have to have some form of personal contact with somebody in the group, 
preferably the gang-leader, as this example from Manzese area gives from a mason’s 
apprentice:49 
 
To get work in the building industry is an enormous task especially for both skilled and 
unskilled personnel. For a casual labourer, for example, he has got to establish personal 
contacts with a mason and this takes time and involves mutual understanding. As far as 
I am concerned, my brother-in-law had (using his position as a Civil Engineer) to use 
                                                 
48 In an interesting parallel, Leonard (1994) shows how builders in Belfast’s informal economy 
similarly get most of their jobs through word of mouth recommendation, and are recruited through 
network of friends, neighbours and relatives already in informal employment who act as 
intermediaries. This, she argues, is especially conducive to creating bonds of mutual trust (Leonard 
1994: chapter 7). 
49 A large percentage of workers are trained through apprenticeships (often ‘assistants’) in the 
construction industry (Kinyanjui and Mitullah. 1999, op. cit. (fn23); cited in Mitullah and Wachira 
(2003: 9)) and is also the medium through which skills are learnt in other manufacturing (ILO 1993: 
21-23). Yet while a large proportion of master craftsmen obtain employment through developing 
subcontracting linkages with former apprentices (Haan 2001a), it looks likely that (at least in the 
construction industry) a worker’s chances of getting into the jobs network through apprenticeship and 
‘learning by doing’ will diminish if informalisation continues to reduce permanent employment (Wells 
1999: 7) and the opportunity for a skilled craftsman to work with on a regular basis. 
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not only knowledge about employment opportunities in the building industry but also 
his influence in facilitating my attachment to a local building company. The same 
applies to those labourers who seek casual work: one has got to be personally known to 
a mason before one is recruited for even daily casual work. (Mwami 1991: 66-67) 
 
From among the group members the gang-leader usually has the most experience as 
an artisan and has the best access to contacts (Mitullah & Wachira 2003: 20) to 
inform him of work opportunities and to find reliable workers, as we saw earlier with 
Sulemani’s ability to forge himself an excellent reputation that brings him a steady 
flow of customers in an affluent area of good quality housing.50 I would argue that 
because of their ability to produce high quality work and build themselves a good 
name as Sulemani has done, gang-leaders are often those who Lugalla (1997) has 
termed the ‘new poor’ but who I shall term the ‘graduate poor’ to emphasise their 
education. These are individuals who policy makers assume are unskilled or have 
acquired their skills informally but who in this sample are sometimes high school 
leavers (ibid.: 439-442) or – in the case of Salutare and Charles, and some of the 
mobile phone mafundi – college/university graduates who have been pushed below 
the poverty line as a result of structural adjustment. The graduate poor are distinct 
from the ‘chronic poor’ who have used the informal sector (particularly for young 
men, the informal construction sector) as a safety net for many years, often as 
labourers with a very flexible job description in informal employment (Leonard 
1994: 164) when they can get work but – because they are often unemployed – have 
poorer access to social networks for finding jobs (Meagher 1995: 268).51 The 
                                                 
50 It is a weakness of this study that data was not collected on the history of the gangs and how the 
gang-leaders managed to reach their positions in the groups, whether they established the groups 
themselves, rose to their position at the top of the hierarchy, or were voted in by the other members. 
Yet in general it does seem from speaking with these gang-leaders during the interviews that some of 
them – but not all – seem to possess a certain charisma (similar to that of some madalali in chapter 
four) that could be applied to good effect in marketing and also, in some cases (e.g., Salutare Minja), a 
sharpness in the ways of the industry as a whole that is unusual to the average fundi spoken to outside 
the interviews. However, that these characteristics appear to be common among some of the gang-
leaders may only be the result of the STICW-Dar project sample drawing on outgoing individuals, who 
might therefore be more forthcoming with their views than others not in the sample. 
51 It is these chronic poor who try to gain employment through a labour pool pick-up point (kijiwe) or, 
failing this, often physically come asking for work from gang-leaders in the hope that their 
trustworthiness will be assured by their assumed interest in earning money (Trulsson 1997: 250).   
There is a vast literature on how urban associations and networks (sometimes only claim to) represent 
their members at different levels of ‘getting by’. From urban studies, Lourenço-Lindell (2001) asserts 
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‘chronic poor’ are increasingly being relegated to labourers rather than owners by the 
new entrance of those who Lugalla terms ‘entrepreneurs’, wealthier individuals with 
more access to capital entering the informal sector above the even graduates (1997: 
442).52 
 
‘Networks of knowledge’ 
While maybe lacking the capital of Lugalla’s ‘entrepreneurs’, the graduate poor to 
which many gang-leaders belong are well connected in terms of promoting their 
enterprises and expanding (ibid.: 442-443), and because of their experience in the 
industry have wider ‘informal social networks’ (Hart 1973: 77) for getting work and 
contracts (Mwami 1991: 67,87-88), or what King has called, 
 
networks of knowledge connecting these new entrepreneurs to markets, to low-cost 
suppliers, sometimes to their old firms through subcontracts, and to other enterprises. 
Some of these are as much social as technical or business networks…. (1996a: 190)53 
 
In finding out about work opportunities the above comment seems accurate that the 
networks which count are as much social networks as any other, as can be seen in 
                                                                                                                                          
that informal networks of mutual assistance embedded in webs of social relationships are critical in the 
coping strategies of poor urbanites, allowing the poorest to gain access to the niches of the urban 
informal economy, find places to live and helping sustain them through crises. These can be compared 
with (more formal) associations, which can effectively exclude the poorest through participation fees 
(Tostensen et al 2001b: 23) but which are not always so effective in their stated aims. In Dar es 
Salaam, for example, Wenga et al (1995) show that many of the members of co-operatives and trade-
based societies rarely have their interests presented and defended by the leadership who, faced with the 
unpredictability of local government, are forced to conspire extra-legal agreements that prevent them 
from challenging patterns of dominance and subservience. From sociology/anthropology Ishihara 
(2003) shows how faced with such pressures and weak law enforcement slum residents in Kibera 
settlement, Nairobi, utilise ethnic ties and kinship relations in preference to cross-ethnic deals, not 
because of certain intrinsic attributes of social networks, but simply because of the risk in dealing with 
someone whose personal background is unknown. 
52 In the construction industry, Lugalla’s new entrepreneurial arrivals to the informal sector might be 
located somewhere in the upper end where Mlinga and Wells identify ‘small emerging contractors’ 
and ‘established informal contractors’ (2002: 276-278). Perhaps with the rise of the informal 
construction system there is more opportunity for these individuals to shed their new ‘poor’ label and 
graduate, if not to the formal sector then at least in greater earnings. 
53 My emphasis. De Graaf and Flap (1988) show this use of informal social resources to achieve 
occupational mobility in America and Europe. The next chapter looks at the relationship between 
social contacts and global markets for local products. 
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business elsewhere on the continent in ad hoc discussions between white 
Zimbabweans at sports events and business conferences (Fafchamps 1999b: 33) for 
example, or Asians having a casual conversation at the club or mosque, or a business 
discussion at a family gathering (McCormick 1997: 122). If situated in the social 
capital literature these networks of knowledge are probably closer to ‘bridging’ (or 
‘inclusive’) forms of social capital that link people to distant acquaintances who 
move in different circles from their own, than they are to ‘bonding’ (or ‘exclusive’) 
forms of social capital that are based around family, close friends and other kin and 
tend to be inward-looking and binds people from a similar sociological niche 
(Woolcock 1998). Or, to use the terminology that was originally applied to research 
into job seeking, the networks of knowledge these mafundi apply would be closer to 
Granovetter’s (1973) ‘weak’ ties that gave job seekers access to a wider range of 
information about a more diverse set of opportunities than ‘strong’ ties based on 
ascribed or earned trust developed over long periods of time. 
 
For a gang-leader, however, as well as ensuring he has a good reputation to react to 
demand when friends or previous customers recommend him or tell him of possible 
jobs, finding new work is apparently more about chance and in being in the right 
place and hearing things and reacting to them than about positioning himself in a 
situation where more likely to be able to exchange information. This research did not 
study what conversation occurs on-site between tradesmen and groups, but from 
chatting with mafundi and the interviews with gang-leaders it does seem that in their 
eyes their network for finding work is open, more keeping their ear to the ground 
wherever they are and being prepared to follow-up on opportunities (even if these are 
hear-say or rumour) than it is a business network, as Peter shows slightly guardedly 
and with some amusement: 
 
No, I don’t have networks of mafundi I meet up with [to discuss things about the work 
prospects in Dar es Salaam]! [Laughs]. I just get on with work when I have it, and look 
for work when I don’t have it! Life is hard, do you see? 
So you don’t discuss with anyone how you will get your next job? 
That is my business!…[Laughs]… 
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…How do you do your business? 
I talk with people who know about where work is. 
And who are these people? 
Friends. People I meet in the bars. I keep my eyes open for where [other mafundi] are 
working and where sites are starting. Life in Dar es Salaam is about brains, you know. 
That’s why it [Dar es Salaam] is called Bongo [‘brains’]! You have to use your common 
sense! (Peter Makoye). 
 
Despite these cases of gang-leaders being able to obtain work for their groups 
through friends, relatives and previous customers with whom they can keep in touch 
through their mobile phones, it is not surprising to learn that their contacts alone and 
acting on hearsay cannot always be relied upon as the sole source of getting work 
every time, particularly for those with fewer contacts. Clearly there are times when 
people the gang-leader knows do not require work to be done and do not know of 
work going on that requires their services. Indeed, none of the gang-leaders 
suggested that their contacts were so good that they had given up on what appears to 
be a common means of gaining employment in the informal construction sector, that 
of waiting for potential customers to come to them, either by relying on a customer’s 
knowledge of the city’s trade/service clusters and his or her ability to get to them, 
and/or from the customer seeing his advertisement (in the form of a sign or finished 
product (e.g., iron gates (Zahoro Maganga)) by the roadside. Nor did any gang-
leaders say that their contacts in combination with their stated advantages of the 
mobile phone now meant that they have ceased physically walking to sites 
themselves to ask if their services are needed. At this point we now turn to the gang-
leaders’ negotiating of work, during which time his mobile phone takes a more minor 
role to face-to-face contact. 
 
4:10. Securing work: negotiating the ‘contract’ face-to-face  
The on-site face-to-face meeting 
Irrespective of whether the gang-leader used a mobile phone in first contacting the 
customer or whether the first contact was face-to-face when he turned up on site, the 
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two parties must meet. This meeting is face-to-face and is crucial, firstly, for the 
gang-leader to see the prospective job or, as James reports of customers inspecting 
his supply, for the gang-leader to see the materials he is buying and, secondly, for the 
client to assess the gang-leader’s offer (and probably character) and for the two to 
negotiate a possible deal. 
 
The meeting may or may not be arranged, depending on whether the gang-leader is 
acting on a tip-off about a possible job, or whether he has had prior contact with the 
potential (or previous) customer. All the gang-leaders said that if they have the 
potential customer’s number they phone before the meeting (or are contacted first by 
the customer) in order to arrange the meeting time and place, which at this stage for 
informal construction system is usually the site. The customer appears to prefer – 
almost expect – to first hear the gang-leader’s quote (sometimes giving prices for 
both formal and informal sector manufactured materials (Hamisi Yusuf)) and, as 
Zahoro finds when he cannot sell his metalwork through contacts or relying on 
roadside advertising, he must be prepared for their possible interest: 
 
I visit houses close to completion…to see the owner and ask him if they would like 
some good strong gates for security. I’ll tell him, you know, “there are thieves in this 
area” or, “these gates would look ideal just here”, things like that, and I bring out my 
book [photograph album] catalogue with photos of the jobs I’ve done before. (Zahoro 
Maganga) 
 
Personality and trust 
The customer’s apparent openness (if not always receptiveness) provides the gang-
leader with a chance to establish a tie with a person who may be able to open an 
opportunity, somebody he may not easily comes across otherwise, similar to the ‘foot 
in the door’ he so often lacks in contact with the formal sector. Here apparently it 
pays for the gang-leader needs to present himself as if at an interview, answering 




You can’t tell if he’s going to steal, of course you don’t give him the opportunity to do 
that, but you can tell by talking with him if he knows about his work, and if you see you 
can trust him, maybe because of his character, if he looks like a wealthy man with good 
clothes then maybe he is getting work and maybe you can trust him.54 
So you need to meet him? You can’t just talk over the phone, come to a deal, if you 
don’t know him? 
Of course not; he can steal if nobody knows him! (Abdi Hoza).55 
 
As we have seen with some mafundi (and exemplified through Salutare), however, 
once a client trusts the fundi and he does a good job the client will use him in future 
and help spread his name among friends and admirers of the work – a beginning to 
the long-standing trusting relationship we discussed in the previous chapter. The 
attitude of the gang-leader, it would seem, is to go into the meeting with Obed’s 
approach quoted above, that he is the ideal person to do this work. This requires the 
gang-leader to promote himself as a skilled and experienced artisan, and to become a 
salesman by adopting a ‘can-do’ approach where he presents himself as capable of 
arranging workers for any required task – a good attitude which bears similarities to 
that King has seen in Kenyan artisans who possess the confidence in their own 
technological ability (1996a: xvi). But as a stranger it is difficult for the gang-leader 
to convey trust to the potential customer, although the potential customer can use the 
meeting to attempt to judge this as best he or she can. The disadvantage for both 
parties is that with a fundi who is unknown to the prospective client, none of the 
mechanisms of trust – networks of working relationships; customer friendship; pre-
existing networks; and intermediaries (Lyon 2000) – can easily be called upon to 
assess his trustworthiness or the character (tabia). 
 
                                                 
54 Unlike Abdi, most clients unfamiliar with building cannot easily tell about a fundi’s skill through 
talking with him about his work, so the customer may rely on the advice of others who do. As a former 
formal sector contractor Abdi is in a minority who could be able to judge this, and is clearly speaking 
hypothetically since he would have many contacts in the industry so would probably not employ a 
fundi from outside his personal networks. 
55 Peter also believes that the common perception among some customers and formal contractors is 
that informal sector contractors are less trustworthy because their profile is lower: ‘Informal sector 
mafundi don’t have visible offices like the formal sector, and they don’t have transport that you can 
identify them by. There is no address, no phone number.’ (Peter Makoye). 
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The verbal contract and pay 
If gang-leaders succeed in their negotiations to work on residential building work, 
they then enter into ‘verbal contracts with clients, which are not enforceable by law 
and are nothing more than “gentlemen’s agreements”’ (Mitullah & Wachira 2003: 
20).56 Some gang-leaders expressed the need at this point to raise the issue of an 
advansi (cash advance) before they start work, particularly for buying materials but 
also to cover the costs of the gang’s wages and transport. All six gang-leaders who 
mentioned advansi said it needed to be discussed face-to-face. Similarly, the vast 
majority (16/19) agreed that the price must be discussed face-to-face with the 
customer, and sometimes in the presence of another of the workers. Gang-leaders 
were also certain that they had to discuss pay personally with rest of group, and that 
this could never be discussed over the phone. Again, Peter put it clearly, 
 
[The other group members] don’t have phones, and if they did it would be bad to talk 
money over phone with people I work with. 
Why is that? 
It’s bad manners. (Peter Makoye) 
 
4:11. Selective communication when in work 
Cost-saving for the customer 
We have seen the mobile phone as an important business tool for the gang-leader in 
terms of not losing potential customers, and that it is also of some use for him in 
obtaining work. Equally, according to some mafundi, the mobile phone is also a 
popular communication device among customers once a fundi has started doing work 
for them, as Charles explains of a customer’s desire to not have to waste time and 
money searching for the fundi: 
 
                                                 
56 Lyon (2000: 676) regards the verbal contract as a ‘norm’. 
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These days a mobile phone is very helpful for work. The first thing [a potential 
customer] can ask you when you meet is whether you have a mobile phone…. So that 
they can contact you without problems…. Maybe without a mobile phone you won’t get 
the job. Having a mobile phone is very important these days. (Charles Matiku) 
 
Attitudes to time, commitments and priorities 
It is worth noting, however, that despite the advantage of mobile phones making it 
easier for the client to locate precisely where the fundi is and to arrange a meeting, it 
has no direct affect on the fundi’s timing and willingness to co-operate with the 
demands of a customer’s schedule. This is a danger of thinking only in terms of the 
working environment that the poor fundi is constrained by and less of how his own 
(/the collective) work ethic affects (and/or reflects) the environment that he works in. 
There is no doubt that the average fundi has great difficulty in maintaining a steady 
income because of a host of constraints that to a small degree are alleviated by his 
use of a mobile phone. Yet one must be careful not to ignore the reality that at times 
– even when he possesses a mobile phone – the environment that the fundi operates 
in (and so to a certain extent, the environment he helps create) is one that sometimes 
appears to accept unbusinesslike behaviour: that he may not come to work and he 
may not give an explanation for this in advance; that he cannot be reached even by 
mobile phone; and when he is contacted he can make promises about returning to site 
and continuing the work ‘sasa hivi’ (right now) yet he fails to appear for some time. 
Of course, as with anybody owning a mobile phone there are times when, for 
whatever reason, the fundi may not wish to be contacted by a client, but there are 
aspects of the work ethic that seem completely inconsistent with the notion of 
keeping the customer happy. As a businessman with former dealings in the 
construction industry both in Tanzania and worldwide (where he is bound to have 
experienced similar attitudes from construction workers), Abdi comments from his 
ideal view of seeing both sides of the situation, and makes it clear where his 
allegiances lie: 
 
Of course I use these [informal sector] mafundi because I know them. But with these 
other guys you get games, you phone them up, “I’m coming right now!” they say, and 
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you wait and … you have to keep chasing them but it makes no difference, you still get 
excuses. Or they can just switch their mobile phone off if they know you’re after them 
to do work they’ve not done properly. (Abdi Hoza) 
 
In defence of the fundi, it seems that when agreeing to take on work for a client in the 
informal construction system he applies his ‘can-do’ attitude to negotiations in 
getting the contract in the knowledge that jobs can sometimes be few and far 
between, and it is for this same reason that if other attractive work comes up 
unexpectedly in the meantime (as we have seen can be the case because of the ad hoc 
nature of his information sources on such matters) he will also take the work and go 
missing from one site because he is attending to the other. While doing this the fundi 
appears to see no need to inform the other client that he may not be at work and is 
particularly reluctant to make a call from his mobile phone to do so, but this is 
difficult to condone when much of the rest of the country appears to operate this 
way, and especially when there is in fact often no physical contract to enforce, only a 
verbal ‘gentleman’s agreement’. Clearly the fundi is adopting a risky plate-spinning 
strategy that could see him lose the custom of impatient clients more used to co-
operating around shared schedules, and in doing seems to rely as much on the ability 
to communicate as the inability to communicate and stay out of touch. 
 
Cost-saving for the fundi 
As well as the customers’ cost saving, and despite the high cost of mobile phone 
ownership, 14 of the 19 gang-leaders also pointed out that a significant advantage of 
mobile phones is that they help cut their travelling costs when he has work. This was 
expressed by Peter (who in Mjimwema is detached from the city by a ferry ride 




The mobile phone makes arranging my time easier. Yes, the difference before and after 
mobile phones is very big. Now I don’t have to [pay the daladala fare to] travel to 
Mwenge, for example, to say something to a customer about work. (Peter Makoye)57 
 
Mohammed the glass fitter also realised this when working in his last formal sector 
employment and now continues to use his mobile phone in his present work in the 
formal sector: 
 
When I was working for Dar es Salaam Glassworks I bought a mobile phone myself so 
that I could communicate with my boss, and with the site and the workshop. I bought it 
because it helped me to plan my travelling during the day, and it saved journeys back to 
my boss because I would sometimes get to him and then be sent back to near where I 
had came from. It was expensive on petrol when I was driving all the time. 
Does your mobile phone still help you now? 
Without a doubt; but it eats money, so you have to be careful! You have to make sure 
you only use it when it is important. 
When is it important to use your mobile phone? 
When you need money! (Mohammed Ali). 
 
 
4:12. Service culture and cost-saving: ‘the customer is richer than the 
fundi’ 
Minimal communication initiated by the fundi 
Although Mohammed did not divulge more details on when exactly he would judge 
it important to use his mobile phone, it is clear from the replies from gang-leaders 
below that the high cost of mobile phone airtime is a significant factor in whether it 
is used to communicate for work, and by which method (i.e., calling or texting). 
 
                                                 
57 The distance from Peter’s house across the harbour to Mwenge is about 12 kilometres. 
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The gang-leader’s decision on which method to communicate by his mobile phone is 
influenced firstly by the amount of credit he has available on his mobile phone, 
which is often very low. Of the 18 gang-leaders who answered when asked how 
much credit was on their mobile phone at the time, for example, five gang-leaders 
had no airtime credit on their account, and four has less than TSh500, while only two 
interviewees had more than TSh2,000.58 Secondly, assuming enough credit is 
available (the alternative being to use huduma ya simu or borrow a friend’s phone), 
the gang-leader’s decision on whether to text or call when using his mobile phone is 
influenced by his judgement on whether what he is set to gain through this 
communication can be justified in terms of its possible financial benefits. 
 
Frequency of mobile phone use per day 
When asked how often they normally use their mobile phone for making work-
related calls, most gang-leaders pointed out that the reply depends on how good 
business is at the time and so could not give an accurate ‘on average’ figure. The 
replies given are for ‘when business is good’, which is generally when they have at 
least one job going on that day. Seven gang-leaders said that they make around one 
or two work-related calls per day ‘when business is good’, four between three and 
five calls, while the remaining three make more than five work-related calls per day 
from their own mobile phone.59 The amount of work-related calls received are 
slightly larger (seven gang-leaders receiving three to five work-related calls per day, 
and six receiving more than five per day), these mostly being from customers when 
the gang has work or, as Nordin points out, from formal sector contractors if they 
require materials. When he is not in work, however, the number of calls received 
                                                 
58 50 cents and $2, respectively.   The current balance of course depends on when, how often and how 
much is charged to the account, and how often and for how long the phone is used for calling/texting. 
These figures give little firm evidence of how much money a gang-leader usually has available for 
phone credit because the question was only asked once, and it is possible that all gang-leaders 
happened to have little credit at the time they were asked. Cross checking these figures by asking the 
airtime balance of other mafundi (and non-mafundi), however, does suggest that most Tanzanians have 
little airtime balance charged to their account. There is also probably some significance in that, when 
asked their airtime balance, none of the interviewees needed to check because they already knew it – 
which suggests that they closely monitor their mobile phone use and that it is probably a significant 
cost to their budget. 
59 Three interviewees did not reply directly, two make one or two work-related calls a week. 
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drops to nearly no calls per day, and he has to start making calls himself. In terms of 
texts sent per day, these closely match the frequency of calls made, although five 
gang-leaders say that they never send texts because they risk wasting their money by 
not getting a reply (Metod Bernard; Obed Samwel). Juma, for example, said, ‘I will 
reply to a message by text if I am sent one, but if I need to get information I prefer to 
call because it wastes time waiting for a reply’ (Juma Simba). Gang-leaders receive 
slightly fewer texts than they send, perhaps because as James points out, ‘you don’t 
have to reply to every message you receive – you can give information that doesn’t 
require a reply, or a beep can tell the person “Yes”, “OK” or, “I agree”’(James 
Cuthbert).60 Furthermore, the recipient may not have the airtime available to reply 




Minimal communication with the client: being seen to have money 
Gang-leaders will choose to call direct when making first contact by mobile phone 
with a customer whom they have not yet met personally and need to meet (section 
4:10), and in all contact with a customer if in their eyes it is a ‘big job’ (Hamisi 
Yusuf; Mohammed Ali; Hassan Ndahili) because, as Peter put it, ‘you need to show 
the customer that you have money [to spend on a call] and are not a fundi who can 
send thieves to steal from them’ (Peter Makoye).61 This need to appear to have 
money to spend on airtime seems to be important because, suggests Metod, a fundi 
who does not have credit can create a poor impression on a potential customer: 
 
If you are talking with a customer [on the mobile phone] it can be bad to ask them to 
call back because it shows you have not got money, so you must pay for the call. If you 
                                                 
60 ~beepu (from the English, ‘to beep’) is when a call is made but the caller hangs up before the phone 
is answered, thus registering the caller’s details (name, number, and time of call) at no cost to either 
party so long as the caller’s account is in credit. Unless pre-arranged, however, the meaning of a beep 
can be unclear because it means different things to different individuals. ~flashi (‘to flash’) is also 
used, particularly in Kenya. 
61 What constitutes a ‘big job’ is unclear, with gang-leaders generally describing it rather vaguely as 
one that brings in good profit. 
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have no money [during the phone call] and must ask him to call back you can tell him 
that your money has almost run out and not allow the call to cut out because they may 
think you are not serious and are playing games with them, or you are a poor fundi with 
no money, which can make them think you don’t get jobs because you’re not a good 
fundi. So you have to use your brains and trick them, do you see me? Maybe you can 
say that your money is going to run out and you’re far from a shop to get credit, so you 
ask them if they can call you back quickly. You see, the customer is richer than the 
fundi – he is getting lots of nice things done to his house so he must be much be richer 
than me! I don’t have a house with big gates at the front like some of these guys with 
money! (Metod Bernard). 
 
‘Like writing a letter’: texting versus calling 
So long as credit is available, calling can be used if the gang-leader is in a hurry to 
communicate something to a customer or even another group member if they are 
elsewhere and their help is needed (Salutare Minja; Mohammed Ali) but, as we have 
seen with farmers in the trade of perishable foodstuffs conveying buying and selling 
information, gang-leaders use texting more often than direct calling as a means of 
communicating by mobile phone, primarily because it is cheaper (Africanus Pius; 
Hamisi Yusuf; Salutare Minja; Charles Matiku; Obed Samwel; Imani Sunga); Peter 
again: 
 
People are frightened of calling direct! 
Why are they frightened? 
They’re saving money. Maybe they plan to use only 5 dollars per month, so they are 
thrifty with their money. (Peter Makoye)62 
 
For this reason gang-leaders see it as acceptable to use texting when information that 
does not require a reply is being sent, such as informing a customer that their order is 
ready (Karanje Suleman; Vitus Sangade), and especially if it is a reply to another text 
(Alex Gerson; Juma Simba). 
                                                 
62 At the time of the interview Vodacom was still using the dollar denomination but after much 




The advantage of a direct call, on the other hand, seems to be that – so long as the 
conversation is brief – it is sometimes faster to speak, and easier to convey detail that 
involves discussion or opinion, than to text (Charles Matiku; Obed Samwel). As 
Peter again points out, speaking ensures immediate reply (Peter Makoye), while 
others stress that texting can often be ignored (Metod Bernard; Zahoro Maganga; 
Juma Simba) even if an answer is required, because the recipient can have no credit 
with which to reply (Nordin Chopa). In a very good parallel, James likened texting to 
that of relying on the postal service to communicate, which we have also seen in the 
preceding chapter is often an unreliable means of communication: ‘A text message is 
like writing a letter because you sometimes have to wait a long time to get a reply!’ 
(James Cuthbert). This helpfully highlights that however useful a mobile phone may 
be in terms of being able to communicate, for the average gang-leader sending and 
receiving information is expensive and, even where they are set to gain from the 
communication, the gang-leader cannot always rely on the goodwill of another 
person to reply because that person may also be on a tight budget. 
 
‘You can't beep a client’ 
Aware of the cost of communicating by mobile phone, well over half of gang-leaders 
(11/16) said that they use their phone to ‘beep’ when they need to communicate with 
somebody who knows what the beep signifies. In this situation the caller dials the 
number of the person they wish to communicate with (or the mobile phone that 
person too is borrowing) and hangs up just before incurring charges; thereby making 
it more likely that they can use a friend’s handset for free because the call is not 
charged to the owner.63 This is also a common means of communication between 
rural and urban areas, the idea being that the recipient then returns the call based on 
the number left on the handset, and since the rural caller typically contacts an urban 
resident who is wealthier than them the city dweller is often in a position to return 
                                                 
63 While a friend may not ask for remuneration, many huduma ya simu will charge for this service. 
Another act of intelligent consumption that Alhassan notes is chip switching to make cheaper calls 
through using the same network. This is carried out especially among wealthier urban mobile phone 
users in Dar es Salaam who can afford the initial costs of additional SIM cards.  
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the call. As one farmer interviewed for chapter four put it, ‘[the person being 
beeped] is a rich family member, because people contact relatives in town when they 
are looking for money’ (Shem, 06/09/03). According to recent research (Scanagri 
2005: 9), there is also evidence that the city dweller is willing to pay the costs for 
their rural relatives and actually call back.64 Of course the beep does not always act 
as a prompt to call the ‘beeper’ back, for to more advanced users it can signify any 
prearranged message, but it always relies on some form of beeping ‘etiquette’ (Scott 
2003) which determines who will beep, and to whom beeps will be returned. In 
Mozambique, for example, in personal or private interactions it is apparently not 
proper for a man to request a call back through a beep to a woman, even if he is 
completely broke (Chango 2004). In all cases this is largely based on financial 
resources since, even if the beep indicates a prearranged message that does not 
involve a call, it is only possible to do this if the beeper has credit.65 Figures from 
Uganda, for example, suggest that people from rural and low-income areas are less 
willing to pay for a call for, although the proportion of successful beeps made from 
personal phones is slightly higher than huduma ya simu (45% against 40%), huduma 
ya simu beepers are more economical with their own air time and call back only 34% 
of people who beep them (McKemey et al 2003: 36).  
 
In the case of the construction industry, beeping need not be with somebody the 
gang-leader is in frequent business contact with, but can be an ad hoc arrangement 
that in the following example from Zahoro ensures the person whom he beeps knows 
that he does not expect him to pay to get in touch: 
 
If the supplier is not there when I visit, I leave my number and ask the person I see to 
tell his boss to beep me when he comes back. This doesn’t cost the guy who beeps me 
because beeping is free, so he is able to do it. (Zahoro Maganga)66 
                                                 
64 The ‘beeping’ phenomenon is commonplace in rural China (Ulrich 2004: 28-29) as well as being 
widespread across Africa. According to one Dar es Salaam-based newspaper it is ‘an open secret’ that 
people in Tanzania have mobile phones just to receive calls (Daily News 10 June 2003). 
65 Vodacom Tanzania Limited now offers a ‘Call Me’ service that allows users to send a free message 
to another Vodacom subscriber requesting them to call back. A new ‘Credit Transfer’ service also 
allows users to send pre-paid credits to other Vodacom subscribers. 




Of the 11 gang-leaders who use beeping in business (i.e., outside social mobile 
phone use), all said that they would beep an ICW or somebody else working in the 
construction industry but, significantly, all but three gang-leaders who answered 
showed disapproval that a customer is beeped, apparently again because it implies 
the fundi has no money: 
 
If I have no credit on my phone and I need to speak with a client I will call from a 
friend’s phone or use huduma ya simu. You can’t beep a customer many times, it will 
annoy him! (Peter Makoye). 
 
This suggests a certain unwritten rule among gang-leaders that it is acceptable to 
beep other ICW or if they have made an arrangement, but it is not acceptable to beep 
a customer. This is not to say that the fundi will instead call a customer, rather that 
with the customer he will avoid communication that he pays for unless it concerns 
getting a job, getting materials to get the job done, and getting paid for the job when 
finished. 
Fundi initiates and pays for ‘essential communication’  
From the interviews with gang-leaders and conversations with other mafundi it seems 
that communication mafundi initiate on their mobile phone (i.e., which they would be 
paying for) tends to be reserved for the most essential communication, which falls 
into three general categories: making first contact with a potential customer (if the 
customer has not contacted him first) to arrange the face-to-face on-site meeting; 
secondly, communicating with the customer to make sure he obtains the materials for 
the work (if this is the agreement at their face-to-face meeting, section 4:10) so that 
he can then complete the work. Hassan, for example, appears willing to pay for 
communicating from his mobile phone when he needs something from a customer to 
get the job done: 
 
Sometimes I have a job but cannot get hold of the customer. I will use my mobile phone 
to say what [materials] I require if something new comes up and I need a certain 
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material. I can also tell the guy selling wood to contact me when he gets hold of it. Ah, 
yes, the difference [before and after getting a mobile phone] is very big. It saves time, 
before I did much walking and travelling in the whole of Dar es Salaam, it’s a big city, 
do you see, to contact customers about materials and possible jobs. (Hassan Ndahili) 
 
Thirdly, communicating again with the customer to pay him or her (the remainder he 
may be owed if given an advance, as agreed in the face-to-face meeting) on 
completion of the work. For Mohammed (who we saw above is wary of the costs of 
his mobile phone use), this point seems to be a time when he is willing to pay for the 
call, because it is cheaper than the alternative of travelling across the city: 
 
It takes an hour to get to a customer in Mbezi and back, so it’s easier, much less money, 
to phone to say the job is finished. (Mohammed Ali) 
 
Hassan gives a pointer for why it is now that communication by mobile phone is 
important; the fundi needs to get paid: 
 
You must have cash to pay for communication. For example, you will have to tell the 
customer the job is ready at the end and this is when you get paid – you need money to 
get money! But because at the end of a job you have been surviving on nothing the call 
can be from huduma ya simu. Or maybe you can ask to use a friend’s mobile phone if 
they have money on their phone and you don’t [have money on your mobile phone] 
because you haven’t been paid. 
Do you pay your friend for using his phone? 
It depends. Many times you will have to reimburse your friend when you are paid. 
Huduma ya simu don’t give credit, and these days money is so difficult in Bongo [Dar 
es Salaam / Tanzania] that friends will ask you to pay back the three hundred shillings 
for using their phone because they will need it to eat. (Hassan Ndahili)67 
 
                                                 
67 It is interesting to note that unlike in the rural Southern Highlands where huduma ya simu operators 
are willing to give credit and deliver messages and where we have seen that friends are willing to 
accept approximate repayment for the use of the mobile phone, this is not Hassan’s experience in the 
city. The immediate difference here is that in rural areas there are probably more local customers and 
trust is higher because customers are better known and more easily located if they defer payment. 
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Of course there are cases where mafundi will call outside this general pattern, 
especially those with more money, but this does seem to be a general trend among 
those in the ICW sample. When asked to comment on my hypothesis that mafundi 
will only tend to pay for communication when it is getting a job, getting materials to 
get the job done, and getting paid for it, James replied: 
 
Yes, you need to get work to feed the family and pay for school fees, so you cannot be 
talking to the customer on your phone like he’s your friend at the bar! I get work and I 
do work, but if I need to talk to the customer I make sure I do not waste my money on 
the phone! (James Cuthbert). 
 
Again, like Mohammed, James here does not go into detail on what calls he would 
regard as wasting money – whether he would see letting the customer know he 
cannot come to work as a waste of money, for example, is not clear – but it does look 
as if most gang-leaders seem reluctant to pay for communication that keeps 
customers up-to-date with progress reports, preferring instead for the customer to pay 
for contacting them.68 This appears to reflect a customer-service work ethic that is far 
from ideal and can imply, despite the apparent efforts mentioned above of mafundi to 
be seen to be wealthy and trustworthy, quite the opposite (particularly when bearing 
in mind the unfavourable impression a customer may be left with if a fundi is not on 
site and unreachable). Comments from mafundi about their reluctance to pay for all 
but the most necessary communication give some indication from the interviews of 
attitudes towards the customer, who in the eyes of the fundi is often perceived as the 
richer party and seems to be obliged to make the phone call where possible. 
 
Perhaps the most important point to take from this discussion on attitudes towards 
expenditure is that while mobile phones are useful for not losing potential customers 
and saving some costs, they are still not cheap to use for the self-employed fundi in 
the informal construction sector, so he will limit his use of the mobile phone, and the 
methods of communication he uses, to particular people and situations. This is a 
                                                 
68 It is questionable, of course, whether workmen in any other country would always keep customers 
informed with progress reports. 
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general trend to which there are surely exceptions, and the discussion of this trend 
here is not one that intends to cast judgement, rather to show how costly it is to use a 
mobile phone in Tanzania and why it is that at times it can seem to the customer that 
the fundi is deliberately incommunicado. What is interesting, however, is that 
although informal sector gang-leaders are generally regarded as offering a more 
reasonable deal for the customer, they are still very proud of themselves and 
confident in their abilities, and in no way subordinate to their formal sector 
counterparts. This seems to come across in their mobile phone use when in contact 
with a customer – particularly at certain times in their working relationship – where 
they appear to take action to avoid being perceived by the client as in any way 
‘poor’. 
 
4:13. ICT in Dar es Salaam’s informal construction sector: 
‘eyes and ears’ 
The chances of getting work are improved if the gang-leader is well known in the 
industry, both in the formal sector where he can increase his chances of getting 
subcontracts, and in the informal sector where he can obtain work from an acting-
foreman or direct from the client on a private informal construction system job. Since 
recommendation (closely linked with reputation) seems to be passed by word of 
mouth, the gang-leader with a mobile phone is still no less reliant on being 
acquainted with the right people who will care to inform him when opportunities of 
potential private customers arise. Although not enough is known about on-site 
networks, it does seem from this research and the work of Mitullah and Wachira 
(2003) that off-site the gang-leader spends time in his informal networks of 
knowledge, composed of friends and relatives (not exclusively those in the 
construction industry) who may have some ideas on where his gang’s services are 
needed. These networks are very open, with the gang-leader constantly relying on 
‘eyes and ears’ by listening to conversations in social settings (particularly bars) and 
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being prepared to follow-up on opportunities if they arise, and by continuously being 
on the look out for emerging sites through much physical searching for work.69 
 
Where mobile phones are of help in finding work is that they make it easier for 
previous customers to locate the gang-leader (where before, if unsuccessful, they 
would go to another fundi), and when recommending a gang-leader previous 
customers can also pass on his mobile phone number to potential customers. The 
other big advantage gang-leaders report of mobile phones is that they save time and, 
crucially, money spent on travelling to communicate with suppliers and employers, 
from finding work through to completion of the job. 
 
When the gang-leader has identified a job, the process of actually winning the 
‘contract’ involves negotiation, during which time his mobile phone takes a more 
minor role to face-to-face contact. This is important because while within the 
informal construction system the client appears to show a preference for hiring 
workers known within his or her personal network of contacts, when the prospective 
contractor is not known to the client and has not been recommended by his or her 
associates the gang-leader can use the opportunity of being with his potential 
customer to win the deal by presenting himself as a trustworthy, skilled and 
experienced artisan, ‘the best man for the job’ who can arrange everything without 
the client having to worry about hiring anyone or finding any equipment. Being 
present with the potential customer also allows the gang-leader to assess the job and 
negotiate on the price (and a cash advance), which can only be done face-to-face. 
Should the land owner accept, this is then enshrined in a verbal ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’. 
 
Once the work has started the mobile phone then comes into play again when/if the 
gang-leader wants to know something from, or confirm something with, the customer 
that does not require the customer being there – such as the purchasing of further 
                                                 
69 ‘Eyes and ears’ is a phrase used by a formal sector bricklayer when dispensing his advice on how to 
get ‘weekend’ (i.e., private, untaxed) jobs in the south of England. The author has worked in the 
construction industry in the London area (first for Irish ground worker gangs, then as a hod-carrier for 
English bricklayer gangs) for a total of 18 months between 1996 and 2000. 
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materials if it has been agreed that this is the gang-leader’s task. This saves both the 
client and again the gang-leader the costs (of time, and money on petrol) spent 
having to find each other in the city. However, because of the high cost of using a 
mobile phone the gang-leader is very careful in choosing when to use it for work and 
– depending on who he is contacting and for what reason – whether the method of 
communication is by calling, texting, or beeping. It appears that he must be seen by 
the client to appear to have money, so he calls or texts in this situation, but tends to 
restrict this to calls about one of three reasons concerning: finding a job, getting 
materials to get the job done, and getting paid for it. In communication with another 
informal sector construction worker, on the other hand, the unwritten rule seems to 
be that it is more acceptable to beep to communicate a pre-arranged message or to 
signal the need to return the beeper’s call.  
 
4:14. The mobile phone and the informal sector: real opportunities? 
Yet besides saving time and, most importantly, saving money, what real 
opportunities do mobile phones open up to the gang-leader? Is there really something 
pedestrian about the additionality of an informal sector operator having a mobile 
phone? A handbook on ICT for entrepreneurs in developing countries puts the case 
well: 
 
Mobile phones are particularly suited to business users. They let you answer customer 
calls immediately, and reach staff or business contacts while you are working away 
from your business premises. A mobile phone will give you greater flexibility, faster 
customer response and time savings…. For small businesses, answering a call 
immediately, rather than responding later, could make the different between winning or 
losing an order. If you spend a lot of time away from your business premises, on site or 
with customers, a mobile phone will allow people to contact you at any time of day. 
(Duncombe & Heeks 2001c: 19) 
 
The difficulty when reading such literature on advice in the development of MSEs is 
that while it supports advantages of the mobile phone that gang-leaders themselves 
report to have found, the advice it offers also exposes many of the fundamentals of 
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running a business that most of this sample (and probably the majority of informal 
sector operators) lack, such as keeping customers up-to-date. Duncombe and Heeks 
note that a telephone, for example ‘will be particularly useful for keeping customers 
informed about problems such as late deliveries or production problems’ (ibid.: 18), 
but we have seen that this is rarely the case when gang-leaders have not finished 
orders on time or are unable to come to work. This may have something to do with a 
slight culture of secrecy about the entrepreneurs’ affairs or the costs of 
communication that we have seen the gang-leader is so careful to monitor, but it may 
also be simply because many informal sector operators have low levels of marketing 
and commercial skills (section 1:15), especially when it comes to putting the 
customer first. The nascent Informal Sector Roadmap Study, with the example of 
businesses closing up for several weeks at a time for the operator to attend family 
functions such as weddings or funerals (UNDP et al 2004: para.154), sees the general 
attitude as a socio-cultural constraint hampering business growth.70 It may take a 
generation until a more customer-focussed culture is developed, and this can only 
come through basic business training of the type the government promises in its 
SMEDP (URT 2002d: 18). 
  
However, we have seen individuals taking initiative in promoting their businesses to 
customers through using ICT, such as Sulemani who uses his mobile phone to store 
the numbers of all his previous customers and calls them periodically to see if they 
have any work to be done or if they know of other potential customers. We have also 
seen Zahoro use his photograph album as a catalogue for promoting his skill through 
visual images of his product range. But at no point did any gang-leader have a 
business card with their group name, trade and space for a mobile phone number to 
be written (rather than printed on the card, since people commonly change their 
numbers) that could act for the entrepreneur as a powerful symbol of his seriousness 
                                                 
70 The Informal Sector Roadmap Study is sensitive to these social imperatives for entrepreneurs ‘which 
are essential to their identity and culture in the name of competitiveness’, and offers suggestions for 
strategies when businesses are closed for long periods (UNDP et al 2004: 155). The roadmap has been 
described by one of its main architects at as ‘an attempt to form indicators because since SMEDP the 
government has done no more than pay lip-service to the informal sector…. [The roadmap] is of little 
use though because the recommendations are just that – they’re not enforceable.’ (Anonymous. 
Strathclyde Graduate Business School, Glasgow, 29/07/05). 
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and professionalism that gang-leaders are so keen to portray in their manners and 
appearance when visiting potential clients.71 These cards can be well-made within 
the informal sector at minimal cost and handed to customers, and perhaps with one 
for a friend admiring the new building work done on their house. The use of business 
cards is common practice among taxi drivers in Nairobi, but not among their 
counterparts in Dar es Salaam nor in many informal sector trades with frequent 
customer interaction in the city, reflecting poor basic marketing skills that a different, 
more ‘advanced’ group of entrepreneurs in the following chapter on vinyago seem to 
have grasped to great effect. This small step for entrepreneurs running MSEs is 
possible when it is considered that only a few years ago mobile phones themselves 
were unheard of among informal sector operators, but we have seen how they are 
now a normal part of day-to-day business. 
 
Nonetheless, we must be careful to note that although mobile phones are increasingly 
being used in the informal sector – Africa’s ordinary economy – this is only by a 
small minority at present, with few gang members other than the leader using a 
mobile phone for work purposes. So is there evidence of the need for other group 
members not in the leadership to obtain mobile phones for work? No gang-leaders 
expressed great problems arising from members not having mobile phones and since 
the application of mobile phones within a group is largely towards obtaining work 
(the gang-leader’s task), then there seems little need for others to acquire them for 
work purposes. This is especially the case given that the price of the handset – let 
alone the running costs – is outwith the budget of many informal sector workers, but 
it does mean that the gang-leader still has to travel to the labour pool pick-up (or site, 
if they have work) in order to contact the gang members. Where the mobile phone 
may be more useful for gang members is when they might offer their personal 
contact number in advertising their individual services for out-of-hours work 
separate from their informal sector employer, as Said reports some casual labourers 
may be doing at his labour pool pick-up point. This may be regarded as underhand 
within the informal sector group and would probably affect group cohesion, but is 
                                                 
71 Vodacom includes in its prepaid package a ‘number for life’, meaning that there is no validity limit, 
no need to buy air time or recharge credit. It is no longer just pay-as-you-go, but only-pay-as-you-need 
without any time constraint. 
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something Alex admits to doing in order to undercut his formal sector employer and 
obtain jobs under the informal construction system. Rather than purchasing a mobile 
phone, however, a gang member doing this would probably judge that it is cheaper to 
have good relations with a local huduma ya simu operator or a friend (as Metod 
does), although such associations have not been studied here in the urban setting. Yet 
irrespective of the source of the communication, what is important again is that this 
offer for work is accompanied by delivered promises, reliability and quality work 
that help the businessman foster a good reputation, which Sulemani shows has 
enabled him to build a network of wealthy clients who are pleased with his work and 
pass on their satisfaction to friends. It is likely that this recommendation of the 
fundi’s good work will still travel by word of mouth, but for gang-leaders working 
both autonomously and in subcontracting relationships, and for the self-employed 
within the informal sector more generally, it does appear important to have a contact 
number too – not least in the savings many gang-leaders report they yield in terms of 
travel expenses, which critics seeing the mobile phone as offering only a ‘pedestrian’ 
benefit to MSEs would do well not to underestimate. 
 
The ownership of, or access to, a mobile phone and having business cards displaying 
the phone number applies more to the self-employed ‘graduate poor’ (who probably 
mostly already own mobile phones as it is) and not the walala hoi ‘chronic poor’ at 
the lower end of the informal sector spectrum to whom mobile phones are unlikely to 
feature in their list of priorities. Indeed, the stratified ownership of mobile phones 
along these lines is a good indicator of what is now perhaps the biggest split in 
employment in Tanzania, which is no longer the formal-informal dichotomy but 
increasingly that between a stratum of employers and middlemen (mostly using 
mobile phones), and a stratum of employees, apprentices, family labourers and 
marginal-owner operators (generally not using mobile phones), who constitute a 
majority ‘informal proletariat’ – a divide that is far wider than when Portes et al 
(1986) made this observation over a decade before the rise of subcontracting and the 
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emergence of labour subcontractors/middlemen we increasingly see in the informal 
construction system.72  
 
Government intervention in relation to ICT in business, where it exists, also appears 
to be aimed at the ‘employers and middlemen’ stratum, and among them those who 
use the internet, which in the construction industry seems to be the preserve of the 
formal sector (in Jaffer’s case, for e-mailing international suppliers and as a source of 
information on new designs. Although no gang-leaders reported using the internet, 
the government has plans in its Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy to 
create a national website for SMEs and a directory of service providers (URT 2002d: 
19). It still remains to be seen what form this takes in order to provide for the 
majority who will have to rely on government supply of these services, and also 
whether in reality the purchase and running of ICT can be prioritised over other areas 
of the budget such as education and healthcare, but it does seem as if the focus on 
enhancing service provision through e-commerce (ibid.) will benefit more those 
entrepreneurs we address in the following chapter whose connections branch 
internationally. For the new businessmen in construction and those others located in 
the ‘employers and middlemen’ stratum of the informal sector more generally, a 
local directory listing of MSE phone numbers by trade may be more appropriate, 
paid for by private advertising much like The Yellow Pages in Europe and North 
America. No such document exists in Dar es Salaam for the majority informal sector 
businesses, but if distributed adequately within the industry and to potential 
customers advertising the services of informal sector enterprises within the 
neighbourhood it would go some way towards helping the marketing needs of those 
operators who at present rely on waiting for employment opportunities or 
approaching would-be sources of employment. 
 
                                                 
72 The heterogeneity of enterprises in the informal sector, together with the linkages we discuss in 
section 4:8 – especially the propensity for subcontracting and inequalities this can bring – strengthens 
the call for the expanded conceptual framework (section 4:1) and especially the conceptualisation of 
the MSEs by the nature of employment relation (section 4:2). A study carried out by Lachaud 
distinguished five sub-groups based on this criteria, an approach that for purposes of more effective 
intervention would help better expose subcontracting and other forms of irregular and unprotected 






This chapter has analysed the communication involved in finding, securing and 
completing work in the informal construction sector, and reveals that since small 
enterprise development policy concentrates on use of the internet, much policy is not 
relevant to the majority of informal sector enterprises. When informal sector 
enterprises do use ICT, they rely almost exclusively on mobile phones as a 
significant cost-saving device in day-to-day business communication. We note that 
although mobile phones are increasingly being used in the informal sector – Africa’s 
ordinary economy – this is only by a small minority at present, with few gang 
members other than the leader using a mobile phone for work purposes. Despite 
having better communication with clients, however, entrepreneurs do not appear to 
have dramatically altered their unbusinesslike and seemingly carefree attitude 
towards keeping customers informed when prearranged timings cannot be met.
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5 African Blackwood Carvings: from mpingo tree 
to export carving 
 
At all levels of the [African art] trade, individuals are linked to one another by their 
vested interest in the commoditization and circulation of an object in the international 
economy. (Steiner 1994: 164) 
Due to lack of knowledge and capital, the [Mwenge] operators have not tried to market 
their carvings overseas. (ILO discussion paper on Dar es Salaam's urban informal 
sector; cited in Lwoga 1995: 19) 
 
This case study follows the entire market chain of Makonde carvings (vinyago), from 
the source of the hard, heavy wood of the African blackwood tree (Dalbergia 
melanoxylon in Latin, or mpingo in Swahili) to their export as marketed products. 
We use the findings of semi-structured interviews and open discussions with 11 
carvers and carving groups, 9 collectors, and 17 Tanzanian-based retailers in the 
vinyago trade to show how ICT really are being accessed, adopted and appropriated 
without the influence of donors. In doing so we first look at the three geographical 
areas where carvers work and we observe how they communicate with their only 
source of contact up the vinyago marketing chain, the collectors. Three sets of 
collectors are identified and we look at how they have appropriated ICT to suit the 
demands of their work, which for some can involve much long-distance travel 
because their job demands that they are physically present at both ends of the 
marketing chain, with carvers they buy from and retailers they supply. A particular 
focus is given to women retailers who – as we have seen in the perishable foodstuffs 
case study – in Tanzania are traditionally assigned more menial roles, and in the 
vinyago trade are not allowed to carve but may only polish figures or, in some cases, 
act as assistants in Dar es Salaam’s retail outlets. But where in other countries on the 
continent females working in the handicrafts industry are only engaged in the trade 
as long-distance suppliers (Steiner 1994: 41), in Dar es Salaam some women have 
also carved a niche for themselves in the high-profit area of export. Three 
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businesswomen with a special talent as retailers are profiled and their use of ICT is 
compared against that of their other counterparts in Mwenge crafts village, a location 
where ICT prove to have some considerable use in facilitating these women’s natural 
talents in business. 
 
5:1. Why African blackwood carvings as a case study? 
Studies looking at artisans in poorer countries often argue of the injustice cast upon 
carvers and other producers who, in order to sell their products to upscale handicraft 
boutiques, art galleries, and specialty import stores which pay high prices for 
traditional arts and crafts, have to work with parasitic middlemen – they are rarely 
called middlewomen – who mark up the prices significantly, leaving the local 
producer with a fraction of the profit. The export of goods made from mpingo is no 
exception. 
 
Mpingo leaves a fine rich dark finish, most often seen in the North in woodwind 
instruments, but in Tanzania it is usually expertly crafted into one of three main 
styles of carving (kinyago): binadamu, ‘human being’ naturalistic figures and 
themes; shetani sprit figures and themes and ujamaa, ‘family’ or ‘socialist’ 
composite works composed of a multitude of interlocking human figures (Figure 
13).1 Wealthier urban retailers – both male and female – then make a significant 
profit selling these beautiful carvings to buyers abroad. In recent years mpingo stocks 
in Kenya have been completely exhausted such that carvers must now obtain their 
wood from the local miombo scrub woodland of Mozambique and Tanzania where 
the tree only here reaches harvestable size in sufficient abundance to be a 
commercial proposition (Ball 2004: 1). Much unlicensed felling of this protected 
species goes unreported in local forestry statistics, however, and as the tourism 
industry in East Africa expands, demand for the wood is only likely to increase – 
                                                 
1 pl., vinyago. The term ‘Makonde carving’ is not used here since not all of the carvers of African 
blackwood sculptures are Makonde and the themes found in retail outlets are not always those 
traditionally associated with the Makonde, or styles that were originally designed by carvers of 
Makonde heritage. The term vinyago is preferred.   Under Nyerere carvers were sent around the world 
at government expense to exhibit the country’s socialist art as presented in the ujamaa figures 
(Saetersdal 1998: 288). 
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which, in the short term at least, is good news for those many carvers and carvers’ 
families in these economically depressed areas of rural Tanzania which depend on 
the wood as their sole source of income.2 At present it is also good news for the 
middlemen and women (‘collectors’) and retailers further afield who also benefit 
tremendously from the trade in the products of this precious commodity since, in one 
way or another, almost all blackwood sculpture is now exported out of Tanzania, 
often from Dar es Salaam’s Mwenge crafts village.  
 
With the spread of the internet and other information and communication 
technologies, development agencies dealing with handicraft markets (e.g., the World 
Resources Institute (2003), Gamos (2003)) now argue that artisans finally have an 
opportunity to access tools that give them a competitive alternative. However, there 
is very little evidence to date of non-donor funded appropriation of these new ICT. 
Indeed, while Kingdon (2002) has done some exceptional work on the emergence of 
Makonde sculptural forms and West & Malugu (2003) have done some work on the 
retail chain, no serious attempt to date has been made on investigating the 
communication between suppliers and their customers in this important market.  
 
Mtwara Region and the Makonde  
Mpingo trees are particularly concentrated in Mtwara Region, Tanzania’s southern 
most region that is largely inhabited by the Bantu-speaking agriculturalist Makonde 
tribe of Mewala, Tandahimba, Masasi and Mtwara rural districts on the inaccessible 
high plateau north of the Ruvuma river that separates Tanzania from Mozambique 
(URT 1997b). The last two generations of Makonde have migrated across the 
Ruvuma in increasing numbers at first to work on Tanganyikan sisal plantations, and 
later as refugees of the war of liberation waged by FRELIMO forces in Mozambique 
                                                 
2 There have been few conservation efforts to replenish the species, with the current extraction rate of 
20,000-30,000 trees per year diminishing the harvestable population at a rate of 5% per year. West & 
Malugu (2003: 28) calculate that the equivalent of 5,270 harvestable mpingo trees are used by Mwenge 
carvers alone. The African Blackwood Conservation Project (2004) website 
(www.blackwoodconservation.org) quotes from the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature/World Conservation Monitoring Centre, whose World List of Threatened Trees states that for 
African blackwood, ‘[l]evels of exploitation are very high and larger or suitably exploitable individuals 
are becoming scarce. There is cause for concern over genetic erosion in many populations’. 
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(Kasfir 1980: 67). Around the same time, in the early 1970s, the government 
favoured investment in industries and other large scale ventures in Dar es Salaam, 
Mwanza, Arusha and Mbeya, leaving Mtwara (and Lindi district, its northern 
neighbour), unable to attract significant amounts of investment from national budgets 
(Lerise et al 2001: 3). Mtwara has never been able to recover and has since remained 
isolated from Dar es Salaam by an extremely poor transport infrastructure and poor 
telecommunications coverage, which in 1997 had a maximum capacity of 1550 
telephone lines throughout the district (URT 1997b). At present the district is still 
cut-off from Dar es Salaam by one of the country’s worst main roads, and Mtwara 
and Masasi are the only towns with mobile phone coverage. 
 
5:2. Marketing chain, players and processes 
5:3. The supply of vinyago to Mwenge crafts village, Dar es Salaam 
According to Kingdon (2002: 66), the first non-functional Makonde objects were 
made specifically for the Portuguese market and invented by Nyekenya Nangundu in 
the Mozambican village of Miula, in Cabo Delgado, at some time in the 1920s.3 
Other Makonde men then learnt to carve ‘curios’ for sale because of the economic 
hardship caused by taxation under the colonial regime, and the carvings then evolved 
to represent their suffering and were later sold by the Makonde to bring in profit that 
was sent to finance FRELIMO against the Portuguese (Kingdon 2002). The 
marketing of wood carving was nationalised in 1970 (Kasfir 1980: 68) but the 
National Arts of Tanzania parastatal was beset with problems and shortly reorganised 
to form the Tanzania Handicrafts Marketing Corporation (Mwabuki 1978: 54). 
Nevertheless (and much like the persistence of foodstuffs trading in Iringa and 
Mbeya discussed in chapter four), trading in vinyago continued throughout the period 
of nationalisation, with collectors circumventing the regulations by travelling from 
Mtwara to Dar es Salaam with unfinished figures which they then had carvers 
                                                 
3 See Kingdon (2002: chapter 3) for discussion of patronage, particularly Mohamed Peera’s influence 
over the whole course of the development of the Makonde blackwood sculpting movement. I thank 




complete in the city before exporting the figures through their private channels 
(Origines, 30/07/03). Today the basic domestic supply chain moves the wood from a 
carver who produces a carving that he may sell to a collector or directly on to a 
retailer, who either sells the carving in Dar es Salaam or exports it. Both these 
activities usually occur through Mwenge, a collection of tiny shops selling 
handicrafts adjacent to one of the city’s main commuter bus terminals about ten 
kilometres northwest of the city centre.4 Taking advantage of good transport links 
and the size of the plot, other resellers and merchants (not carvers themselves) have 
subsequently moved to Mwenge to set up businesses selling vinyago, making the 
crafts village the continent’s hub for the retail of African blackwood carvings and a 
classic example of what the guidebooks could market as a success story in demand-
responsive African entrepreneurship. Close to 80% of sales at the market are vinyago 
(Bevan & Harrison 2003) supplied by over 1,500 individual carvers (West & Malugu 
2003: 16), most of whom are of Makonde ancestry. 
 
Interviews for this case study mostly took place during the months of January-
February and July-August 2003 and were conducted with 11 different carvers or 
carving groups, nine collectors, and 17 different retailers and exporters in Mtwara 
Region, Pwani Region (surrounding Dar es Salaam) and Dar es Salaam city.5 As 
discussed in 2:2, the idea of studying vinyago trade emerged during the first phase of 
the research after a particularly helpful interview with Hamisi Geddy and Dickson 
Wiva at the urban retail and export end of the vinyago trade, and who later 
introduced me to Mary Shirima in Mwenge crafts village. It was Mary’s suppliers in 
the township and villages surrounding Dar es Salaam and Mtwara who I then 
                                                 
4 Lwoga (1995) and West & Malugu (2003) differ slightly in their views of the structure of the two 
distinct groups that have now apparently emerged and are represented in Mwenge. Lwoga (1995: 18) 
sees a carvers’ group, Chama cha Wachonga Sanaa na Wauzaji wa Tanzania (CHASAWATA) and, 
representing the retailers who run the shops, the Mwenge Arts and Crafts Dealers Association. West & 
Malugu’s (2003: 18) (methodologically more sound) report, on the other hand, states that the 
community is registered as CHASAWATA (the Carvers Association), under which the groups are 
subdivided into the Mwenge Handicrafts Village of 36 carving co-operatives, and Mwenge Arts, 
comprising of merchants exploiting business opportunities. There was little evidence of group activity 
from either organisation during repeated visits to Mwenge but, as visible by their occupations, a clear 
distinction between carvers in groups and individual retailers was evident. 
5 Interview details are given in Appendix I. A more detailed account of the methods is supplied in 
sections 2:10 of chapter two. 
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travelled to, and it was Mtwara where I met Philipo Luvale who directed me to some 
of his carving contacts I traced throughout the region. Together these individuals and 
groups constitute a spread of points along the marketing chain of producers, suppliers 
and retailers of African blackwood carvings who I could then physically follow in 
order to investigate their use of ICT.  
 
5:4. Mtwara carvers’ use of ICT: ‘you can't eat a phone’ 
The carvers covered in the sample fall into three main groups based on their 
geographical location: those based in the villages of Mtwara region (five in sample); 
those in Dar es Salaam’s townships and the city’s surrounding villages (three), and 
carvers based in Mwenge crafts village (two), also in Dar es Salaam. Here we 
concentrate on the Mtwara-based carvers working in groups who, unlike Zaramo 
carvers and their Makonde brothers residing in villages around Dar es Salaam, are 
fixed in villages or the outskirts of town in Mtwara region and will rarely travel to 
Dar es Salaam.6 The mpingo wood is obtained from the bush around the villages, and 
can take days to reach. The carvers do seem to have some personal contact with at 
least one middleman, probably because collectors see their high quality and 
distinctive products as providing better profit than more generic ‘African’ curios 
such as whistles and traditional three-legged wooden stalls produced by other tribes 
such as the Gogo of Dodoma. However, this personal contact with collectors tends to 
be unannounced, especially in the many remote villages without mobile phone 
coverage, and frustrates some carvers who regard collectors as 
 
worthless (uchwara) because they are unreliable, you cannot prepare for what they want 
because they won’t tell you beforehand what they want, they just come without a 
message. (Makonde Carving Group, 17/02/03) 
 
                                                 
6 This is in contrast to the Mwimbe Handicrafts Workshop Group, an ethnic Gogo carving group in 
Dodoma, whose leader, Augustino, reveals that if business is slow and the group is rarely visited by 
collectors then one member will travel to Dar es Salaam to sell their handicrafts. 
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Masasi, President Mkapa’s birthplace, is the only town with mobile phone reception 
outside Mtwara, leaving Idanankalima’s 35 carvers in Ndanda and the Makonde 
Carving Group in Chikundi to rely on landline coverage. Collectors picking up 
vinyago from carvers in Mtwara’s villages prefer to base themselves in Masasi 
because of the ease with which they can contact Dar es Salaam by telephone 
(Makonde Carving Group, 21/07/03), and when in Dar es Salaam these collectors 
will sometimes try to contact mutual friends in Masasi to pass on messages when 
they need certain vinyago in a hurry. Even in Masasi, however, few carving groups 
use any form of telephone access (i.e., TTCL, huduma ya simu or private mobile 
phone) or other communication (i.e., e-mail, fax or letter) to contact collectors about 
demand, and are unwilling to travel to meet collectors. As well as cost, this may also 
have something to do with literacy, and with carvers’ apparent dislike of travelling 
far from their villages – a feeling that was expressed by a number of group members, 
including one carver in Chikundi: 
 
I am quite content to carve here. Why do I need to go to [Mtwara]? I don’t need to go 
there, so I certainly don’t need to go to Dar es Salaam. (Omari, Makonde Carving 
Group, 21/07/03) 
 
The alternative to not travelling outside the village, therefore, is to wait for collectors 
to arrive and to deal with them personally. As carvers in Chikundi have expressed it, 
however, even if there was reception in their village they think that some collectors 
would still rather visit carving groups personally because collectors like it that 
carvers are not aware of the market in Dar es Salaam. As one carver put it, 
 
When they [collectors] come personally to carvers we are kept busy carving and 
thinking that they will buy everything we carve, and this means we won't go looking for 
other buyers. (Makonde Carving Group, 21/07/03) 
 
This view is supported by carvers in Masasi who feel that collectors do not seem 
keen to encourage mobile phones because they want to keep their carvers in the dark 
about their profits: 
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I think that collectors don’t promote mobile phones because if carvers have mobile 
phones then the collectors have no job. But we know they make much money. The only 
time they want to contact the carvers is if there is a rush to produce vinyago for Dar es 
Salaam because they need to send vinyago to customers abroad. These messages are 
passed on to friends with mobile phones, who pass the message on to us. (Uvwima 
Carving Group, 22/07/03) 
 
What is particularly interesting is that the apparent monopoly collectors have over 
the many Mtwara carvers unwilling to travel or contact other buyers (even when they 
could use huduma ya simu or TTCL) does not seem to concern those carvers who 
were spoken to. Instead, their main complaint seems to be that collectors do not 
always buy what they have ordered the group to carve: 
 
I know that the collectors make much money. I don’t care, that is their business. All I 
want is a steady amount of work to carve so I can feed my family. Because some 
collectors don’t tell us what they want we just carve and then the collector comes and 
says, “I don’t want [this type of carving]. I want these”, and he buys what we have, but 
we have been carving [this style] because he bought them last time, and then we are left 
with little money for our family…. Those collectors who are using mobile phones are 
successful because they are sure that what they are carving will be sold. (Makonde 
Carving Group, 21/07/03) 
 
In defence of the buyers, one Dar es Salaam retailer explained that she believes that 
‘carvers in the villages don’t understand the concept of orders’ (Damaris, 15/08/03), 
so placing orders with carvers and receiving them as agreed is never a smooth 
process. But the above comments from Makonde Carving Group suggest that 
Mtwara-based carving groups sometimes lack buyers who are willing to give them 
specific orders that collectors will always collect in full and pay for when they are 
produced on time. Not being able to contact the market in Dar es Salaam directly 
appears to be less of an issue to the carvers, who clearly have a good grasp of how 
orders work under the basic principles of supply and demand economics. Indeed, for 
all Mtwara carvers covered in the survey the principal motive for their work seems to 
be economic, and this is doubtless more so the case in the post-structural adjustment 
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era, some 25 years since Kasfir (1980: 70) first argued the point. I would argue, 
therefore, that while, as Kingdon (2002: 166) suggests, some carvers are also 
motivated by challenges and self-discovery in their work and the desire for 
acknowledgement of their individuality, this is only true for the elite of fine master 
carvers who Kingdon spent much time with during his fieldwork. For many of 
Mtwara’s vinyago carving groups covered in this study, their work is becoming more 
commercialised as they are increasingly being told what to carve by collectors who 
supply Dar es Salaam retailers who, as we shall see, now have a better knowledge of 
demand because of their access in the city to ICT. Kingdon’s elite master carvers 
who apparently do not create work with ‘Western’ aspirations in mind (2002: 150), I 
believe, are a dying minority whose creativity and love of carving is being eroded as 
the market becomes more efficient thanks to retailer’s better knowledge of exactly 
what foreign buyers want. 
 
According to two Mwenge-based retailers (Mary and Justina) and Strattoni (a large-
scale exporter of handicrafts that end up in Northern department stores), the foreign 
demand is increasingly for large quantities of very similar vinyago pieces, and this 
can have the effect of reducing the carvers from inspired artists whose work reflects 
their soul to more of a worker on a production line.7 Whether under this system the 
carver receives more frequent orders and therefore makes more money is unclear, but 
the bottom line is that no carver in this sample could afford not to carve what the 
collector demands, and that any form of communication – and especially mobile 
phone communication – is very expensive, as the leader of Baymwone Carving 
Group explains: 
 
Collectors tell us what to carve and then they may not collect exactly what they have 
ordered, and we [the carvers] go hungry. But we have to wait for him [the collector] to 
call Dar es Salaam themselves. They know buyers there. Besides, a mobile phone is too 
expensive for carvers when we have to eat. You can’t eat a phone! (Andrea Ukoti, 
22/07/03) 
                                                 
7 See Kasfir (1999: 109-111) for an interesting commentary on whether Makonde sculpture is an ‘art’ 
or a ‘commodity’, and Kingdon (2002) for an in-depth discussion of innovations in the development of 
the Makonde carving blackwood movement. 
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5:5. Collectors’ use of ICT 
Long-distance collectors (e.g., Anna Mishiri; Audax; Imakulata) trade with the large 
tourist areas of northern Tanzania and Kenya from Mtwara or, more often, Mwenge. 
They stay in the carving location for the weeks or months it takes to amass a large 
collection of vinyago, then deliver them personally to retailers who have placed their 
orders with the collectors. Anna Mishiri, for example, a Chagga businesswoman 
from Machame in Kilimanjaro, travels about three times a year by bus from her base 
in Dar es Salaam, stays in Masasi for up to a month while her order is being prepared 
and then travels to Manyara and Ngorongoro in the northern circuit of Tanzania’s 
tourist game route to sell vinyago at high-class boutiques, a journey of some 1,500 
kilometres. Middle-distance collectors (e.g., Alex Milanzi; Bahati Mohamedi; 
Gaudance; Maiko Bakari) operate between Mtwara carvers and Dar es Salaam, while 
short-distance collectors (e.g., Audax; Mangwana) obtain vinyago from carvers 
working in Dar es Salaam townships and surrounding villages. Because of the shorter 
distances involved, shop owners also sometimes collect from these carvers 
themselves. These visits usually involve personal visits without prior 
communication, although Audax prefers to call if he can to ensure that the carvers 
are all present when he arrives to collect. This, he admits, is often not possible 
however, because although some of the carving locations have mobile phone 
reception not many of the carvers have mobile phones. The collectors themselves 
may also have no access to electricity for charging their handsets even if reception is 
available. Mangwana, for example, has Vodacom reception in Chanika but the 
village has no electricity for recharging, so he recharges when he goes to Pugu or 
Dar es Salaam, where he uses electricity at his friend’s house at no cost. When he 
returns to Chanika he leaves his phone on to receive calls about orders from traders 
in Mwenge, making sure not to use his phone for anything but important calls 
because this uses the phone’s battery: 
 
But what are ‘important calls’? 
Business calls. 
And how often do you make business calls. 
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Rarely. I let the buyer call me. 
Why? 
If I call them it wastes my battery and I pay for the call! (Mangwana, 21/01/03) 
 
Cost-saving measure and mobile phone ownership: ‘mobile phones are for 
people of the town’ 
Perhaps because of the good profit many collectors are making, few long- and 
middle-distance collectors complained about the cost of using mobile phones, and 
those who did complain certainly mentioned cost far less than farmers and informal 
sector construction workers in the other case studies. Nevertheless, cost-saving 
measures are still taken by collectors, most notably in using huduma ya simu for 
making calls. Imakulata, for example, contacts her buyers in Nairobi about their 
orders and uses huduma ya simu when in Dar es Salaam because the operator shows 
her a stopwatch which she uses to more accurately measure her expenditure than 
when using her own mobile phone. According to Davina (01/08/03) (who is the only 
huduma ya simu operator within the premises of Mwenge crafts village), huduma ya 
simu is popular among her customers because they can better restrict their call time 
when they can see it in front of them (while others use her service to call customers 
in Arusha and Zanzibar because they have no credit on their handsets).8 As we have 
seen in the perishable foodstuffs case study, however, the usefulness of huduma ya 
simu as a message-taking service does depend on good relations with the operator, as 
Maiko explains: 
 
Before I bought my mobile phone I used to use TTCL or huduma ya simu. But without 
a mobile phone I couldn’t be contacted easily by customers. For example, a customer 
wanted to give me an order and he would phone my brother but sometimes he [my 
brother] was not there. So I would use the huduma ya simu, but that was not reliable 
either because I didn’t have a good relationship with those people….They can take 
                                                 
8 Davina uses a Mobitel business line, which she chose because it was the first company offering a 
business line service. She makes a TSh100 (10 cents) profit per call, and averages about 30 callers per 
day, most of whom make calls lasting two minutes (Davina). 
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messages from Dar es Salaam but I wouldn’t always get the messages and this would 
annoy the customers and I would lose out on getting orders. (Maiko, 22/07/03) 
 
An alternative to using huduma ya simu when not owning a handset is to borrow a 
friend’s mobile phone, as Gaudance does when he is in Dar es Salaam: 
 
Why don’t you buy [a mobile phone] for yourself for when you are in Dar es Salaam? 
Being in the city eats my money! I don’t drink beer there, I drink beer in the village 
because that is where my friends are and the beer is cheaper! I am in the city to make 
money, not to spend it! So I use my friend’s mobile phone to call different possible 
buyers in the city….I pay [my friend] maybe every few days. He records how much I 
spend and I pay him when I make the call, or later when I make more money. 
So why don’t you buy a phone when you make money? 
A mobile phone is expensive and no use to me in the villages. Mobile phones are for the 
people of the town!....The mobile phone is no use to me here because it doesn’t work! I 
cannot waste my money on one if I am not using it! (Gaudance, 21/07/03) 
 
Gaudance’s comments as a rural-based businessman who often deals with urban 
customers reveal much about priorities and attitudes to money and new technologies 
across the rural-urban divide, an issue that we cover in more detail in the next 
chapter. His view of the uselessness of mobile phones outside Dar es Salaam is not 
shared by all, however, as Bahati – who lives in Mtwara town, where reception is 
available – explains now that she has managed to obtain a mobile phone ‘through a 
swap with somebody, a friend, in Dar es Salaam’ (Bahati, 19/07/03): 
 
Now I can know what customers want in Dar es Salaam, and when. Without a mobile 
phone I used to take my carvings to Dar es Salaam without getting an order, and maybe 
there's no demand or I bring the wrong designs for the demand and I have to accept a 





Need for face-to-face contact with retailers: ‘you must see the kinyago – you 
can't hear it over the telephone’ 
Mobile phone ownership does not preclude having to spend time with both carvers 
and retailers. For instance, although Imakulata is able to use her own mobile phone 
with a Kenyan SIM card when in Nairobi, she must stay in the city for a long time 
because her buyers often take weeks to pay her and she cannot trust them to send the 
money, ‘so I have to physically be there to ensure that they pay me’ (Imakulata, 
17/01/03). Alex makes a very similar comment that also explains why the collector 
and retailer need to meet to discuss carving styles: 
 
I must travel with the vinyago because retailers are not honest…. they [the retailer] may 
not have the money to be able to pay and cannot be trusted to send money. So I have to 
wait, and this can take a week. The buyer also has to show the collector exactly what 
style he wants for the order. You must see the kinyago – you can’t hear it over the 
telephone! (Alex Milanzi, 18/07/03) 
 
Gaudance makes the same point as Alex and Imakulata about the need to be with 
retailers, but also stresses that the collector must also spend much time with carvers 
for the same reason: 
 
Can't you just tell [the retailer that his order is complete] and then send the order on 
the bus with somebody you trust? 
They [the buyers] like to see me so that they can explain styles and adjustments to be 
made on future vinyago. They use examples to show me so that I know what they want. 
This can't be done with somebody else – it must be done with me because I supervise 
the carvers when I am with them in the village and explain to them what the retailer has 
told me. (Gaudance, 21/07/03) 
 
The process of supervising carvers can, according to Anna, take over a month 
(depending, obviously, on the size of the order) and is also necessary to ensure that 
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the carvers do not do work for other customers, and this requires paying for some of 
the work in advance (Alex; Gaudance).9 
 
5:6. Mwenge crafts village retailers and buyers 
Mwenge crafts village is a collection of handicrafts shops to the north of Dar es 
Salaam’s city centre, attracting tourists visiting Dar es Salaam on their way to the 
game parks, Kilimanjaro, Zanzibar or surrounding countries. The best profits in the 
vinyago trade can be made from export, however, with Mwenge-based retailers 
sending carvings and other handicrafts to other African countries and, for even better 
returns, to Europe, North America and the Far East. Most of these buyers are 
middlemen themselves, selling on to galleries and department stores, but some come 
to Mwenge in a more casual capacity as tourists or departing expatriates buying 
souvenirs and gifts for their return, and later decide to import vinyago for sale at 
home. As we shall see, many customers who import vinyago from Mwenge do so 
having been to the crafts village at least once before they make repeat orders from 
abroad through businessmen and through businesswomen owner-managers such as 
Damaris, Justina and Mary, women who are now so successful in their formal 




Damaris, a member of the Chagga tribe, owns shop 17 in Mwenge crafts village and 
describes herself as ‘a businesswoman with a keen interest in fashion, and an 
occasional exporter of vinyago’ (15/08/03).10 In terms of business ownership 
                                                 
9 It is puzzling that the Makonde Carving Group carvers complain above about not having much 
contact with ‘worthless’ collectors, yet two of the middle-distance collectors (Gaudance and Maiko) 
and one long-distance collector (Anna) were observed sitting with carving groups, waiting with them 
over a number of days to complete their orders. It is possible that these collectors were awaiting 
carvings from multiple groups in the area and visit each group for a few days to make their presence 
felt as ‘serious’ customers (Figure 14). 
10 Trulsson (1997: 316) notes the popular view that the Chagga are seen to be more prone to engage in 
enterprising activities than most of their Tanzanian brethren, but is quick to add that as ‘entrepreneurs’ 
they are little different from other Tanzanian entrepreneurs. 
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Damaris could be described as a true entrepreneur in the Schumpeterian sense 
(section 1:15), having moved into vinyago in 1997 as a way of bringing in dollars 
with which to buy the clothes from New York and London wholesale outlets which 
she sells as her main business in shops in Dar es Salaam city centre. Her eye for 
economic opportunities, grasp of current and future trends and eloquence in business 
English can be seen in her projection of the vinyago market: 
 
I see that worldwide the vinyago market is saturating, so I am paying little attention to 
it. The Japanese market is beginning to become over-supplied, and the European market 
is moving towards things people can use. (Damaris) 
 
That Damaris and other women like her in Mwenge are able to make projections, we 
later argue, can in part at least be put down to their foreign connections. 
 
Justina Matondane 
Justina (Figure 17), a Haya from Bukoba in north-western Tanzania and owner-
manager of ‘Kiwawe’ shop in Mwenge, started business in the 1980s selling 
vegetables from a small stall near the crafts village.11 In 1985 she then ventured into 
dealing in vinyago and other crafts having ‘suspected’ that Kenya was a good nearby 
market for vinyago and vitenge (cloth wraps), and where she would be able to learn 
from the women in business there who she knew were ahead of Tanzanians in terms 
of their knowledge of exporting. Justina took five vitenge samples to the ‘African 
Heritage’ shop weekly market in Nairobi and these caught the director’s eye and she 
soon received a big order from her. When Justina observed that African Heritage 
                                                 
11 The Haya are also regarded by many Tanzanians as having a strong entrepreneurial streak. For a 
taste of attitudes towards ethnic groups within the country see, for example, the exchanges between 
Tanzanians in a politics forum in an African web discussion: 
http://www.youngafrican.com/yaforum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=4368. 
As stated in section 2:4, no more than anecdotal evidence was obtained relating to ethnicity and 
business, so West & Malugu’s Mwenge survey is useful in this area by showing that the Chagga, 
Zaramo and Makonde dominate trading, and of the 42% of those surveyed who were Chagga, all bar 
one were female (West & Malugu 2003: 19-20). Also see an article by Dickinson (2004) on Tanzania 
women fuelling a brain gain: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3995027.stm. 
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were making a good profit through sending her products abroad she then made 
moves into exporting vinyago and other crafts herself. 
Mary Shirima 
Like Damaris, Mary (Figure 18) is also a Chagga from Kilimanjaro. She began her 
business in Dar es Salaam’s Mbuyuni area, on Bagamoyo Road, at the same time as 
holding her job issuing business licences at the Department of Trade and Industry. 
Mary established her ‘Star Art and Craft Company’ and in 1994 ‘felt’ that she had a 
good chance of making more money than in her government job and took a 
redundancy plan when it was offered. Mary moved into her present shop in 2000, 
which was owned by a businessman living in Bagamoyo and whom she paid six 
years’ rent in advance. 
 
Experience and fluency in English for business administration and face-to-
face bargaining 
What most immediately sets the women vinyago owner-managers apart from the 
other women (and men) working as suppliers and retail assistants is that the Mwenge 
women all have a strong working knowledge of English and are confident with 
conversing in the language with foreigners. Justina has managed this through taking 
English classes, while Mary initially puts her fluency down to strict teachers who 
ensured that she met the standard for government employment. This employment 
prepared her for dealing with accountancy and in all the administrative work required 
in running an export enterprise, which she thinks is more important to the customer 
than whether she comes from a carving tribe. Regardless of their ethnicity as non-
Makonde, all three women have more formal education and exposure to office work 
than any carver or collector interviewed for this case study. As Elkan (1958) has 
shown in an early article on carving in Kenya, individuals among the Kamba made 
use of their education to take advantage of the lucrative post-war American export 




Although the Kamba dealers lacked nothing in business sense, they were hampered in 
the development of an export trade by the fact that hardly any of them – not even the 
most successful – had had more than the most elementary education. This did not in the 
least interfere with their trade so long as it did not involve any paper work, but export 
trading required them to fill in many forms and to enter into lengthy correspondence 
with overseas clients.... The ability to write English and to fill in forms brought in a 
number who, though all of them Kamba, knew nothing of carving but were willing to 
try their hand at trade. (Elkan 1958: 321) 
 
In contrast to Northern stores, none of the Mwenge shops have price tags on their 
vinyago or other goods; so the customer is drawn into talking with the salesperson 
who states the price as a matter of fact and with little indication to the customer that 
this is open to negotiation. After informing the customer about the background to a 
kinyago, the face-to-face conversation between Mwenge shop owners and both 
tourists and foreign wholesale / bulk buyers has aspects of ‘performative’ bargaining 
(Steiner 1994: 72) because the seller, having purchased the object from a middleman 
or direct from a carver at some profit to himself or herself, has the advantage of 
knowing what an object is worth in the African trade having purchased from a 
middleman or even direct from a carver. At the same time it is also retail bargaining 
because the buyer is dealing not with a marketplace seller who – while all too aware 
of the foreigner’s wealth and purchasing power – may not always understand an 
object’s worth in the Northern market. Instead the buyer is dealing with 
sophisticated, worldly individuals such as Mary and Justina, who are more conscious 
of an object’s worth in the Northern market relative to its worth in the African trade. 
The shop retailer is in a more favourable position because she is able to straddle both 
African and Northern worlds by knowing a product’s real (economic) value in the 
African market and also by being attuned to the tastes and desires of the Northern 
market and how much foreigners are willing to pay for a product. Through dealing 
with foreigners the retailer is aware of the ‘foreign’ value of these goods and is able 






Accessing foreign markets for international exposure 
Along with talking to customers in their shops, Damaris, Justina and Mary also gain 
information in what Damaris describes as, ‘the places where the customers come 
from – the countries where the money is’ (15/08/03). All three journey abroad to 
international trade fairs (‘expos’) and have travelled throughout the world, something 
only a tiny elite minority in Tanzania are able to do. It is here, I would argue, that 
these women exercise their ‘linking’ social capital. When abroad they can reach out 
to new contacts entirely outside their community and who enable them to leverage a 
far wider range of resources than are available within the community where the 
horizontal ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ forms of social capital (section 4:9) reside. 
Linking social capital, by contrast, is a vertical dimension that consists of 
relationships up and down the social scale, and allows the entrepreneurs to leverage 
resources, ideas and information from contacts outside their own social milieu 
(Woolcock 1998: 13-14). Travel, believes Mary, was her highest learning curve in 
the export business: 
 
A trip abroad makes me remember “this is where the market is, [it is] not in Mwenge!”. 
I realised this when I first left Africa and I remember it every time I go on a trip. 
Visiting the countries I export to is the best way of learning about the export business. 
(Mary, 29/01/03) 
 
Damaris, who has attended expositions in Lisbon and China but concentrates on the 
Japanese market thanks to ‘Expo 2000’ in Hanover where she made some deals with 
large customers, agrees on the importance of international exposure:  
 
[Expo] fairs are the way into the export market, they are the best means of meeting 
serious foreign buyers, big buyers. Trade fairs bring in much more money than business 
in Mwenge, which has been badly hit by [repercussions of the terrorist attacks in 
America on] September 11th because there are less buyers who are coming from Arusha 
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and Zanzibar because tourists are not coming to East Africa since Osama started his 
business. (Damaris, 15/08/03)12 
 
Both Mary and Justina managed to find foreign buyers quickly during their earliest 
visits and so, having begun to achieve their objective of supplying their first export 
customers, also used trade fairs as an opportunity to sell on-the-spot. Justina believes 
that when abroad she was helped to ‘secure a market in Europe’ shortly after the first 
two exhibitions partly because fortune was on her side: ‘It was around the time of big 
corruption in Kenya, the time when the Kenyan shilling dropped heavily against the 
dollar’. Yet Mary, who on one trip to America met a business partner based in 
California and who she made ‘a good deal of business with’, puts her success less on 
luck and more on knowing the right people: 
 
It is so important to know how to do business with foreigners, because this is where the 
big money is….You must have good products, of course, really good quality vinyago 
are so important, but you must know how to do the exporting, all the business with 
forms and people here [in Dar es Salaam] who can make your life easy or difficult…. I 
first learnt it from a friend here [in Dar es Salaam] who helped me very much. She 
introduced me to the Board of External Trade. (Mary, 13/01/03) 
 
For Mary this contact at the Board of External Trace (BET) seems key to her entry 
into the export market while she was in her government job, and if it was not for the 
help she received from her friend at the BET, Justina also believes that access to 
foreign markets would have been much more difficult because her contact put her in 
touch with donors who helped her gain exposure: 
 
It was very difficult when I started. I knew the importance of foreign markets but I 
needed to find the right way of getting to the markets in Europe, America, Japan, in the 
                                                 
12 This is a reference to Al-Qaeda activities in East Africa. On 7 August 1998 the group detonated two 
bombs which destroyed the American embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and led many Northern 
governments to advise their nationals against visiting Kenya and Tanzania. 
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world. So I got much help from my friend [at the Board of External Trade] and this 
helped me meet the buyers in these countries. (Justina, 01/03/03)13 
 
Like Mary, who now tries to travel for business once a year, Justina is now able to 
use the money she has managed to accumulate from her exporting business to pay for 
her own travel abroad. After her visit to Germany she was invited again, and also to 
some paid trips to Japan, but many of her subsequent visits abroad she has managed 
to finance herself, so that in total she has visited Germany, Japan, Turkey and 
America 18 times, 10 of these visits as funded tours, the remaining 8 on trips that she 
has funded herself: 
 
Now that I can survive alone I can get big orders without any help, but this means that I 
have to keep going to exhibitions, to keep sharp about the trade and know how big 
buyers operate and when the buyers see that you are sharp they realise that you are 
serious and then you can maybe be trusted [by them] as a supplier. But if I cannot attend 
the professional shows – I could not go one time to Frankfurt because I have a problem 
with my knee – then you cannot get orders. You have to be there to show you are 
serious. Big buyers who I make money from, they have to see me for me to get orders. 
(Justina, 01/03/03) 
 
Factors influencing the Mwenge women’s graduation in enterprise 
How then did Justina and Mary progress from small-scale traders (in Justina’s case, 
selling fruit from a stall in Mwenge) to major vinyago exporters? Is there anything 
unusual about their ability to graduate? In the first place, both were sure after a short 
period of trading that exporting was the key to higher profits, and they would surely 
have known this because they had seen other dealers in Mwenge doing so from their 
                                                 
13 With both women their contact at the BET was able to help them in their early vinyago exporting 
pursuits, particularly through putting their names forward to foreign donors. This bilateral donor 
assistance took two main forms, firstly in seminars where Mary was sponsored by USAID to attend 
separate study trips and seminars in America. Justina, through contacts at the Chamber of Commerce 
who offered her advice on licensing, insurance and freight charges, also attended study tours, 
sponsored by the German bilateral development agency, GTZ. After completion of the seminars, or 
sometimes in conjunction with them when the study tour was abroad, the donors’ second form of 
assistance with Mary and Justina’s entry into the international trade fair circuit was financial, either by 
paying for all expenses at expos, or by contributing to participation fees. 
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shops. Mary and Justina also both indicated that the profits are far higher when 
exporting to foreign buyers who distribute, and that the best chance of meeting these 
buyer is by going to expositions, not waiting in Mwenge. However, it was not until 
the idea of attending international trade fairs was suggested to them (at different 
times) by a friend at BET that they started to make moves into foreign markets, and 
this was only made possible by their friends’ ability to put them in touch with donors 
who would sponsor them, since getting to expositions requires capital that neither 
had when they started looking at the international export market. Having received 
this help they then made contacts abroad who took large orders and were then later 
able to finance their own international business travel.14 
 
While Mary and Justina’s graduation was not one from economic necessity to 
business since both are married to wealthy men who could at the time have ensured 
that they were never destitute, a brief look at three factors Olomi (2001) identifies as 
influencing this transition among owner-managers in Tanzania also helps to explain 
why these individuals were able to progress from having a small turnover to 
businesswomen making far higher profits from international customers.15 Olomi first 
identifies resources that are under the control of the owner-manager, and Justina and 
Mary both believe that capital is what allowed them to progress before they entered 
the exporting market. As mentioned in chapter one, limited access to finance is – 
from the entrepreneurs’ perspective – the most common constraint to MSE progress, 
and the vinyago market is no exception, with Mangwana and Imakulata both 
attributing the high capital costs involved as explanation for why they have not been 
able to venture into exporting. However, it is the ability to build capital that Mary 
emphasises when asked what made capital more accessible to her: 
 
It was not banks I got my money from, it was saving my own money! Banks don’t give 
you money for free! People do not [save their money] in Tanzania, that is the problem, 
even when they make money they come to you and say they have none and this is 
                                                 
14 Burkinabé agro-exporters (Freidberg 2005) appear to make similar use of sponsored trips abroad to 
broaden personal social networks and sources of income. 




because they drink, men drink, these carvers [pointing outside] drink and spend money 
on women when they get money! Or they are so poor that they cannot save money, they 
do not earn much money, and they do not know how to save! (Mary, 13/01/03) 
 
Mary is also in a privileged position because her husband’s connections enable him 
to help her with much of the export side of her business at the port or airport. This is 
the only other contact she mentioned besides her BET friend, but it is likely that she 
knows others, particularly from her previous job at the Department of Trade and 
Industry, who can help her with business when problems arise. As Damaris put it in a 
comment that demonstrates how the informal sector pervades the formal sector 
(section 1:1) (and which acts as but one example from the fieldwork of the 
corruption that the Report of the Commission for Africa (2005: 16) seeks to address), 
‘in Tanzania, anyone you know who is in government, in any job, they can help you 
because they get paid so little these days!’ (15/08/03).16 The majority of Tanzanians 
without these connections, those who Mary refers to earlier who ‘are so poor that 
they cannot save money’, are at a disadvantage because they do not know the right 
people, and this is probably due in some part to Olomi’s second factor influencing 
transition, that of the owner-manager’s business concept, ‘a mental image of the 
business in its ideal form’ (2001: 300). Olomi sees that this concept is closely related 
to the entrepreneurs’ level of education and managerial experience (which, by turn, 
are also positively related to growth motivation and then actual firm growth). All 
three are all educated women and have some experience (with the exception of 
Justina) in white collar employment, if not in management.  
 
This ties in with Olomi’s third factor, that of environmental conditions, which those 
with contacts to people in business and government are likely to be in a better 
position to influence, in the way Damaris eludes to above regarding proximity to 
those in any positions of power. Yet as Justina points out, this need not be access to 
people who will help in business by doing something dishonest, for it can be access 
to people whose job it is to help businesses:  
                                                 
16 Mwenge businesses are deemed formal because the owners are required to obtain government 
licenses for their businesses. Similarly, carvers are legally required to be members of groups which 




Customers were complaining about freight charges and other things, so I went to the 
Chamber of Commerce and other associations and government offices, and they gave 
me information on licensing, and what I needed. The government is good if you get a 
good person and you become their friend….[When dealing with BET] I felt that the 
government was serious about dealing with problems. (Justina, 01/03/03) 
 
This is not the view of the average entrepreneur, particularly those in the informal 
sector who feel that the government in doing little to help them, but seems to reflect 
the view of women in a more elite position in Tanzanian society who are able to 
become friends with people of influence who can affect the business environment, at 
least for themselves when the need arises.17 Indeed, one could even argue in Justina 
and Mary’s case where they were helped by their friend at the BET that, since civil 
servants are so poorly paid as Damaris explained (15/08/03, and as we discussed in 
greater length in section 1:1), they work especially hard where their clients are 
promising entrepreneurs entering lucrative markets and who – unlike entrepreneurs 
in the lower echelons of the informal sector – are potential business partners or 
sources of information.18 
5:7. Retailers’ use of ICT 
We have seen how mobile phones have been applied in communications between 
Mwenge and the source areas of vinyago in the villages of Mtwara and the townships 
and surrounding area of Dar es Salaam. We have also seen how women retailers have 
used their local networks to gain exposure to international vinyago buyers, 
apparently without the use ICT since neither technology was easily available in Dar 
es Salaam in the mid-1990s and earlier when they were working on these links. We 
now turn to how these women have adopted new ICT for use in their dealings with 
their most important customers, foreign buyers. 
 
                                                 
17 The women retailers in Mwenge who Kamuzora (2003) profiles have all worked in high profile 
positions for employers such as the World Bank.  




Sample female retailers’ use of ICT: internet use, almost exclusively for e-
mail 
To communicate with foreign customers Damaris, Justina and Mary all use fax, 
mobile phones and e-mail. They tend to reply by the means they are communicated 
by and this varies depending on the customer. Damaris, for example, gives her fax, 
phone and e-mail contacts to customers, and her customers tend to use fax to contact 
her. Mary does the same and her customers prefer e-mail. If they initiate the 
communication themselves, however, for short messages the women favour texting 
by mobile phone and, for longer correspondence, e-mail. Whether it is by landline or 
mobile phone, says Justina, calling internationally is far too expensive, and since 
most communication concerns ordering, all three women believe that e-mail is 
sufficient for this purpose. 
 
Before e-mail was accessible in Dar es Salaam, international business 
correspondence by these women used a combination of fax, letters and landline 
phone calls, either using their own home or business lines or, on occasion, using call 
centres. The telephone was avoided as much as possible because of the high cost of a 
call, and letters were regarded as the most affordable means of communication but 
were shunned in favour of fax which, though more expensive, was far faster and, 
significantly, deemed more ‘professional’, as Justina explains: 
 
I learnt that I was taken more seriously when I started trips abroad, customers would fax 
me when I gave all my details at trade fairs in those days, they would use fax and they 
would not use other [means of communication]…. [Fax] shows the customer that you 
are serious….it means you have committed yourself to business. Anybody can have a 
post office box number. And with a fax the customers knows that you can do business 
quickly with them, supply them when they have demand. Then the customer can rely on 
you and you get more orders. (Justina, 01/03/03) 
 
As we shall see in a comment from Frank Morenje, e-mail nowadays has a similar 
impression on customers but, from the perspective of the female Mwenge-based 
retailers here, the motivating factor is not only customer’s preference to use e-mail 
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for contacting their suppliers but also its speed and the ability to store previous 
correspondence, as Mary remarks: 
 
…customers like to use e-mail, and so do I because I can reply to them quickly, and I 
know that I will be getting a reply from them quickly, and then I can know that I’ll be 
getting orders, and I can place my orders with the carvers. The business is quicker this 
way, and I know my buyer prefers it.19 
So e-mail is fast. Are there other ways it helps your business? 
Yes, I can use it to store messages that I receive and send to customers. This is easy and 
I don’t have to do anything, it just saves the message [automatically]. (Mary, 13/01/03) 
 
Although, as might be expected, all women replied that internet access should be 
cheaper, none regard it to be so expensive that they cannot use it. All three women 
are now wealthy enough from their business pursuits to afford regular access to the 
internet. In using this form of ICT, cost is apparently now less of an issue, perhaps 
because of their ability to be able to spend more on communications nowadays or 
maybe because internet has become such an important means of communication that 
the costs are worth paying. This is not to suggest that the women are wealthier 
because they use the internet, nor should it be thought that the internet is used 
exclusively for work. Justina, for example, uses e-mail as much for corresponding 
with her children in Manchester as for her vinyago business. Nevertheless, Damaris 
and Justina all regard the internet to be important enough to have their own access at 
home, and Mary sees it necessary to check her account in an internet café every 
couple of days where buyers will usually be making enquiries about the state of their 
order or payment. Having accompanied Mary to the internet café on a number of 
occasions, however, it does not seem that her use of the internet is for anything more 
than e-mail. Damaris and Justina report similar usage, although they do consult 
media websites occasionally and also sometimes look at the sites of other vinyago 
dealers they know who are based in Mwenge to see what carvings they are selling. In 
                                                 




the main, though, other than some occasional non-vinyago web browsing, the 
women’s use of the internet is primarily for e-mail.  
 
What is most remarkable about the three Mwenge-based women’s use of ICT is that, 
despite their regular use of the internet, none have their own websites. This could be 
in part because they rarely use websites themselves and therefore do not fully 
appreciate the use of them, although none of the women admitted to this. When 
asked why they did not have websites, each woman gave very similar replies – some 
giving the same reply a year after they were first asked – stating that they did want to 
get a website or were ‘planning’ to do so, but had not got round to it.20 
 
 
Sample male retailers’ use of ICT: limited success with the web and frequent 
use of e-mail 
While the three female Mwenge retailers in the sample do not have their own 
websites for their vinyago businesses, it is notable that some of the men covered in 
the sample do. Ahmadi (‘Mochiwa’) Mnungwana, with a degree in electrical 
engineering from a Canadian university, started trading vinyago in 1984 when two 
American colleagues at the NGO he was retrenched from suggested he entered the 
market in the United States. He did this for six years with no premises until in 1990 
he bought a shop in Mwenge. Ten years later he then had a website made 
{africawoodartist.netfirms.com}, and in this sample is the only owner-manager 
African retailer with an active website. Overall the website is reasonable, although 
some links have been ‘under construction’ for a long time. 
 
Frank Morenje (Figure 16), whose parents started their family shop in 1986 after 
realising (much like Mary) that there was more profit to be made in vinyago than in 
their government jobs, is the other owner-manager Tanzanian retailer in the sample 
                                                 
20 The planning does not seem to have come to anything in more than a year, although Justina did 
approach the University of Dar es Salaam (where she did a two week basic computing course) but the 
quote was too expensive for her. 
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with a website {africancrafts.tripol.com/70}, although his has not been operating for 
over a year, despite him still advertising the URL on his business card. 
 
In addition to these two owner-managers in the sample is Massimo, an expatriate 
Italian businessman whose business next to Mwenge crafts village was approached in 
order to cover a high-profile foreign-owned enterprise that may help explore any 
possible differences in the approach to ICT-use.21 Massimo has an active website 
{africaart.co.tz} for his business, that he advertises in a prime location to attract other 
expatriate customers on the main road leading to the city centre from the most 
luxurious houses in Msasani. 
 
Gwalugano Ayubu, born in Dar es Salaam of Maasai and Nyakyusa parentage, is an 
artist and the Public Relations Officer at Nyumba ya Sanaa arts house where he 
oversees the NGO’s website {catgen.com/sanaa/EN/}, which has active links 
throughout and a well-designed, clear layout. Like Massimo’s business, Nyumba ya 
Sanaa is well-advertised to expatriate customers through advertisements in areas 
which foreigners frequent, and is also well-advertised in tourist brochures and 
guidebooks, perhaps more so than Mwenge.  
 
Whatever their background, all four retailers except Gwalugano at Nyumba ya Sanaa 
(which is well known among the expatriate communities) say that they receive very 
few orders from their sites, and seem to be disappointed by the lack of response. 
Frank, for example, says that he paid ‘too much’ to have his website constructed 
since it bears little fruit, while Massimo puts the poor customer interest in his website 
down to the payment restrictions in Tanzania: 
 
My customers are all over the world and want to pay by Visa, but they cannot pay by 
Visa because my business is in Tanzania, unless I call Nairobi every time there is a 
transaction in the shop, and this costs me money and I cannot get through to [the Visa 
office in] Nairobi sometimes. And the international customer cannot pay easily online – 
                                                 




they have to send an e-mail to me, and this all takes time and they can just go to other 
websites and pay straightaway using Visa or American Express or MasterCard. 
(Massimo, 14/08/03)22 
 
All four men arrange for payment through the prospective customer e-mailing them 
and agreeing on the method of payment, which can be an international money 
transfer company such as Western Union or MoneyGram, as Mochiwa offers on his 
website (Figure 15). Difficulties of payment does not seem to affect Gwalugano, 
however, who reports that, unlike Mochiwa, Frank and Massimo’s enterprises, orders 
through the internet are a common source of Nyumba ya Sanaa’s business. 
Gwalugano, who has secondary school education, advertises Nyumba ya Sanaa’s 
website quite well to the centre’s current visitors, but believes that his success in 
sales through their website has been boosted by using the internet to contact previous 
visitors, those who over the past ten years or so have visited the centre for any of the 
reasons given above. Gwalugano’s marketing strategy – far more active than any of 
the other retailers in the sample – has been to use the Google search engine to locate 
previous visitors and customers whose business cards his predecessors have collected 
over the years. Although most of these cards are too old to have an e-mail address 
listed on them and the name of an individual on the card is often no longer with the 
company, the Google search does tend to reveal an e-mail of the company, who he 
then sends a brief opening letter to. He finds that these business enquiries receive 
enough responses to make his searching worthwhile.  
 
Despite the disappointment of websites in terms of orders from new customers, 
however, Mochiwa has no regrets for having had a website constructed since some 
existing customers use it as an electronic catalogue to check new products: 
 
                                                 
22 One Tanzanian bank currently provides point-of-sale card acceptance services (primarily at ‘Travel 
and Entertainment’ merchants) through Visa Kenya. Visa now has five member banks in Tanzania and 
expects over the next 12 months that 2 more banks will expand their Visa services to include Visa card 
acceptance at a broader retail base. ‘We believe that within two years, Visa card acceptance at retailers 
will become a ‘way of life’ in Tanzania as is the case in countries such as Kenya with over 600,000 
Visa cards in issuance and over 7,000 Visa acceptance locations’. Personal communication by e-mail 
with Gavin Young, Sub-Saharan Africa Business Development Manager, Visa, 28 October 2004. 
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I get some orders from the website, but not many. I think that customers go to it when 
they want to see my products before they come to the shop to make orders, but not 
many do this. And [regular international] customers use it to see if I have made any 
changes to my collection before they make another order. (Mochiwa, 13/08/03) 
 
Origenes, who has no web-presence at present because he is first waiting to build up 
a ‘healthy stock’ of vinyago to meet the possible rise in demand, is probably 
therefore realistic about his customer’s future use of his forthcoming website, mainly 
as a catalogue: 
 
I want customers to see what I have, and to then come to visit the gallery itself. It is 
good having photos [on the website], but the serious buyers will want to see the 
vinyago. So the internet for me will give my business a higher profile in America, 
Europe, Japan and these countries…but I’m not sure if I’ll get many orders. (Origenes, 
30/07/03) 
 
This wish for a higher profile to create a favourable impression on customers, is also 
expressed by Mochiwa, who regards his website as  
 
showing that I am professional in this business. Customers will know that Mochiwa is 
dealing crafts in Tanzania and he is serious!....It shows that I care for my business, that I 
am wanting to do business throughout the world! (Mochiwa, 13/08/03) 
 
Of all the sample Mwenge-based retailers with and without websites, only 
Gwalugano in his searching for potential customers uses the internet anywhere close 
to its potential. For those retailers with websites, one reason for this may be because 
the internet has not proved itself as a useful source of orders, while e-mail bears 
more fruit and is used extensively. As one exporter put it, 
 
I don’t know if I need a website, I get business from e-mail and this works well. I hear 
that it costs much money to buy a website and to change it many times, and I don’t 
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know how to do this….But I can use e-mail, it is easy, I can send and receive messages 
with customers anywhere! (Hamisi, 10/01/03) 
 
This response is curious since Hamisi and his close friend, Dickson (who also 
exports vinyago from Mwenge) have shown a willingness to learn to use e-mail after 
an important customer insisted on this method of communication, and Dickson now 
believes that because of this their strongest ties are with agents who they supply to in 
America and Denmark, with whom ‘being in contact by e-mail is better than 
anything before’ (Dickson, 01/08/02). What is more surprising, however, is that 
regardless of the considerable time they spend accessing their e-mail accounts in 
internet cafés, neither Hamisi nor Dickson have ever used websites to actively search 
for prospective customers by exploring for shops and galleries to export their 
vinyago to. As with the other 20 or so dealers in Mwenge who Hamisi says use 
internet cafés to e-mail customers who they have met in Mwenge, both Hamisi and 
Dickson wait in Mwenge for customers to come to them first. Before they used e-
mail, Hamisi and Dickson would use call shops to fax and call their customers, but 
this proved very costly and, they now notice, far too slow when compared with their 
present use of e-mail. Nevertheless, they will still use call shops now if they need to 
speak urgently with customers who are overseas (mobile phones are too expensive 
for this), but avoid doing so because of the high costs.  
 
Frank also now finds that checking his e-mail account about three times a week in 
any of Mwenge’s 20 or so internet cafés where the server is efficient is cheaper than 
any previous methods, and Mochiwa is now so busy with e-mails that he cannot 
afford to wait when the server is slow, so has chosen to have internet at home. Even 
this expense, he thinks, is cheaper than using letters and phone calls because of the 
speed with which he is able to respond to enquiries. Again indicating his wish to be 
perceived as a ‘serious professional’, Mochiwa sees having an e-mail address not 





Having e-mail at home is important because I can check my account every night 
without problems, I get about ten business e-mails a week, but at the internet café I can 
be waiting for up to an hour. With internet at home I can reply straightaway, and this is 
good for the customer, he [sic] knows that I really want to do business, and that I'm 
going to send his order or…let him know how long his order will take. This is 
important, for the customer to know quickly what is happening with his order, and if I 
can give this information quickly then it is good….The customer knows that I am able 
to do business efficiently. (Mochiwa, 13/08/03) 
 
The need to give the right impression to customers is also felt by Frank who, 
although he uses e-mail as his main source of communication with customers abroad, 
still wants to purchase a fax machine ‘because some customers prefer to use fax – 
and I like to be able to communicate the way customers want because [then] they 
know that I have an office and I'm not just a guy on the street’ (Frank, 01/08/03). 
Mochiwa, whose fax machine is at home with his internet access, sees the need to 
keep his machine because although a single fax to Europe costs as much as US$3 and 
internet access in a café as little as 50 cents an hour (and far cheaper still when the 
service is hired from an ISP), he prefers to make business agreements by fax since a 
fax is acceptable by Tanzanian law as an authentic transaction document, while e-
mail is not. Customers also forwards letters via fax too, which he finds easier instead 
of having to go to his postal box every day (Mochiwa, 13/08/03). 
 
As with the wish to adopt fax to be able to communicate with customers using the 
medium they prefer, some retailers who now use e-mail were also influenced to do so 
by their customers. We have seen how Hamisi and Dickson were directly encouraged 
by a customer to use e-mail and took it upon themselves to do so because the 
customer indicated – almost insisted – that this was a requirement to them continuing 
in business together. Others decided themselves to learn to use e-mail and to obtain 
an account because they realised its importance for their work, and this also seems to 
be motivated by their customers’ use of the technology. Mochiwa, for example, was 
asked by a number of customers what his e-mail address was and he ‘went to town 
and asked somebody at an internet café to open an account because I realised that 
this is now the way that business is done internationally’ (Mochiwa, 13/08/03). Mary 
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has a similar version of why she obtained her accounts, for she regards e-mail as ‘the 
way that the wazungu gave their names [i.e., contacts] to each other at expos’ 
(Mary, 13/01/03). Gwalugano, who taught art for a brief period in Finland, also 
realised the popularity of e-mail when he was asked for his address at the college he 
was attending: 
 
It became clear very quickly that e-mail is the way to communicate, not by giving your 
address where you live, or a letter or meeting people as much as we like to do here [in 
Tanzania], so I learnt how to use e-mail so that I could communicate with people at the 
college. (Gwalugano, 31/07/03) 
 
While the desire to learn to use e-mail appears largely to be driven by foreigners’ use 
of the technology and retailers’ wish to use the same medium, the retailers have used 
local informants to teach them. Hamisi, Dickson, Mary and Mochiwa first went to 
internet cafés in Dar es Salaam to learn, Gwalugano consulted a friend in Finland, 
Frank learnt at college (in the relatively early year of 1996), and Justina and Origenes 
were taught by their children, who themselves had also learnt basic ICT applications 
at college in Tanzania. 
ICT for customer relations 
Other than Gwalugano, who is active in finding customers, it emerges from the 
(albeit few) replies from retailers that the search capability of the internet is not used 
to find potential customers, and those with websites find that they do not entice many 
new clients. New clients buying in bulk tend to be found abroad by those retailers 
who are able to attend international trade fairs, and the remaining customers are 
found in Mwenge. In most cases these customers are one-time buyers (tourists and 
expatriates) visiting Dar es Salaam principally for reasons other than buying vinyago 
or, in rarer cases but purchasing far larger orders, foreign vinyago dealers who visit 
Mwenge every few years to inspect the entire range of vinyago and other handicrafts 




come from abroad because they don't know the choice in Mwenge – not everybody [in 
Mwenge] has websites and there are many styles of handicrafts and the dealers. They 
come about two or three times, tell the retailers what they want sent and then replicate 
their order. (Mochiwa, 13/08/03) 
 
Unlike Steiner’s (1994: 46) account of art and handicrafts trading in West Africa, 
these customers mean that some retailers such as Hamisi and Dickson can make 
some currency from repeat sales.  
 
For Mwenge-based retailers it is in communication with these repeat foreign 
customers – bulk buyers who they meet at expositions or who visit Mwenge on a 
number of occasions – that ICT prove to be most useful, not in making customers 
since this is done face-to-face in Mwenge or at expositions, but in keeping customers. 
Mary, for example, sees e-mail and SMS as, 
 
like being face-to-face with an mzungu in their country, but I am here in Tanzania, 
ready to find any vinyago the customer needs because e-mail or text is fast. And so [the 
customers] come to me every time, I am their person in Tanzania and because I have e-
mail and it is fast, the customer always uses me and so I can keep my customers. (Mary, 
13/01/03) 
Using ICT to keep international customers is achieved through having e-mail access 
and SMS with which to receive their messages (about obtaining the vinyago for an 
order, for example), reacting swiftly to this information and replying using the same 
medium. In this respect the ICT is a technology that both customer and retailer 
employ to ensure that a message is communicated in the most efficient way possible 
so that both parties make a profit, and is a cheaper and usually more reliable method 
of conducting business that was first established when both parties met face-to-face. 
Yet nothing here is particularly unusual about the way that these technologies are 
applied in business dealings elsewhere in Tanzania, between Tanzania and other 
countries, or between businesses in the North. What is new to the use of the ICT by 
the Mwenge entrepreneurs when compared with their other means of communication 
is that e-mail and SMS is being used to convey the typically Tanzanian gesture of 
frequent greetings, allowing them to strengthen their relationship with their 
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customers. Because a text or e-mail is comparatively cheaper, more reliable and far 
less hassle than direct calls, fax and the postal service, retailers can send a brief 
greeting to their customers in the same way that they visit a colleague or customer in 
Dar es Salaam, as Frank explains: 
 
I use text or e-mail to greet my customers, maybe every few months, to say “How are 
you? How is your family? How is business? I hope that you and your family are well!”, 
these greetings that we have here in Tanzania. And customers like this, I think it makes 
them remember … how we are friendly and [that Tanzanians] will ask these 
greetings…and the customers will reply and sometimes they make an order. It reminds 
them of our friendship. (Frank, 01/08/03) 
 
Justina also uses the term ‘friend’ when referring to business customers to whom she 
sends Easter and Christmas greetings by e-mail or text. She calls these recipients 
abroad her ‘customer-friends’, contacts who later questioning reveals appear to be 
international customers who she is friendly with but who she first met through 
business. However, she appears to have little other social contact with these ‘friends’ 
other than as buyers she sends goods to and, on the odd occasion, buyers who she 
will sometimes meet again at expositions. Justina’s motivation for these greetings, it 
emerges, is so that the customers will remember her name. By couching the 
communication in social terms through referring to ‘friendship’ in greeting business 
customers, we see here that ICT is being used as a tool for ‘keeping up appearances’ 
where frequent personal face-to-face contact (whether it is business or social) is not 
possible. 
 
These greetings through e-mail or text probably have at least two effects that benefit 
the Mwenge-based retailer. The first is that it allows for further learning about 
international markets and tastes, as Frank shows: 
 
I try to be friends with my customers by greeting them [through e-mail or texts], and 
when I am friends with them, then I can learn about the market and what they think 
about the vinyago business….I can ask them a question when I text…a question like 
“How are vinyago selling in America?” or “What are the [buyer’s customers] liking this 
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year?”, and I learn from this. This way I also learn about the markets in different 
countries. (Frank, 01/08/03) 
 
Secondly, given the high costs of international flights, the northern customer will be 
aware that frequent personal contact between the two cannot reasonably be expected, 
so the occasional text or e-mail greeting from a Tanzanian supplier who the 
northerner may well regard as a poorer – but very friendly – African probably goes a 
long way in personalising and strengthening the relationship between the retailer and 
at least some international customers. Friendships, whether social or business, are 
made by face-to-face contact but require continual reworking and are vulnerable to 
changes in the life-course and strategies of the participants (Seierup 1994: 12), which 
are all the more likely at a distance such as that between retailers in Mwenge and 
customers around the world. Through using e-mail and text these brief messages of 
greeting are used to reinforce relationships with customers, with the possibility that 
‘friendships’ may bring with them more trade, or at least better market information. 
 
There may also be some significance in Frank’s remark that when he contacts his 
foreign customers he wishes for them to remember the warm reception that they 
receive from those who are ‘suffering in Tanzania’. Although it is unclear if he is 
referring to his own position (which could hardly be described as one of misery when 
compared with much of the population living in abject poverty), it could be argued 
that this comment is indicative of some retailers’ acute grasp of common Northern 
perceptions of Africans as the wretched downtrodden (Green 2000), and that these 
emotions are sometimes being manipulated for gain by those such as Frank who have 
good contact with wealthy customers through their access to e-mail and mobile 
phones.23 
 
In a similar vein, it could also be argued that the three female retailers in the sample 
choose to avoid using websites to sell their produce not because they cannot afford 
web construction, nor because they are illiterate – they are, after all, members of the 
                                                 
23 These perceptions are being furthered by agencies’ use of the internet to promote what has been 
termed by Sankore (2005) as ‘development pornography’. 
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wealthy elite who have best access to the internet and its applications (Mwesige 
2004) and to education. Rather, these women choose to avoid using websites because 
they prefer to trade at the personal level that we have seen they excel at, for example, 
by gaining the upper hand in face-to-face negotiations because they are able to play 
in English with their knowledge of the value of a product to foreigners. This 
bargaining process cannot be achieved so easily on a website without a retailer’s 
good knowledge of web management and e-commerce – although it can be done 
through price negotiations over e-mail or text, which are mediums that the 
businesswomen do apply for their business dealings. And this contact between the 
women and their customers is first made at the face-to-face level where the women 
are able to use their considerable skills as saleswomen in their shops and at 
expositions to establish warm relationships with their international customers – 
relationships that are then developed at a distance through texting and e-mails to deal 
with orders more efficiently and at less cost than when using other methods of 
communication such as fax, landline and the postal service, and to also keep in touch 
at a personal level through timely greetings with ‘customer-friends’. 
 
5:8. ICT across the vinyago marketing chain 
Across the geographical areas covered in this study – Mtwara, the Dar es Salaam 
townships and surrounding villages, and in Mwenge itself – few carvers or members 
of carving groups use any form of telephone access. Many carvers are too poor to 
afford handsets and mobile phone credit, and are often based in areas where there is 
no electricity to charge the handset. Even where a landline is available, this is rarely 
used. Not being able to contact the market in Dar es Salaam directly appears to be 
less of an issue to the carvers who, especially the Mtwara-based carving groups, are 
more concerned that they sometimes lack collectors who will give them specific 
orders and who will always collect in full for carvings that are produced on time. 
 
Collectors visit carvers personally without prior communication and have to spend 
time with them to ensure that their work is ready when agreed and to the exact 
specifications of the retailers who they supply to. They will inform retailers that they 
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are coming with vinyago when they have collected from carvers, with some using 
huduma ya simu because it allows them to better know their call time and cost. 
Collectors must also spend time with retailers to know specifications to convey to 
carvers and to ensure payment for their services. Neither carvers nor collectors 
reported using the internet. 
 
The female retailers in the sample all speak good English that helps them in their 
face-to-face selling of vinyago – a combination of ‘performative’ and ‘retail’ 
bargaining – that allows them to learn from their shop customers about demand. 
Damaris and Mary have also brought to their business an experience in 
administrative tasks that they learnt in their previous white-collar employment. 
Perhaps because of the contacts met through this previous employment and the social 
/ business circles they operate within, these women are in networks where they can 
better access crucial gatekeepers who have provided them with the opportunities for 
exposure to foreign markets. Their ability to exploit international market 
opportunities through travelling abroad sets them apart as an elite minority of 
entrepreneurs. They can also be set apart from many other Tanzanian entrepreneurs 
by showing that they are able to build on these opportunities by accumulating capital 
and being able to be self-sufficient, graduating beyond their previous reliance on 
donor-funding. This is shown most clearly in their ability to pay for their own (often 
yearly) international travel to expositions, a source of many of their business 
contacts.  
 
All sample retailers – both men and women – have adopted ICT for more efficient 
communication with foreign customers. Because users do not have to own their own 
ICT to use them, however, all vinyago retailers can access ICT, not just the elite, and 
this gives the opportunity for retailers with less capital to also access foreign buyers. 
We have seen that Hamisi and Dickson use ICT to access the market without the 
need for international travel. 
 
Internet is accessed either at home by wealthy retailers or in internet cafés, where e-
mail is used as a fast and relatively affordable means of communication with foreign 
 
 228
customers about current and future orders. The internet is used much less for 
accessing websites. Along with texting, e-mail has also been appropriated by some 
retailers as a customer relations tool for ‘keeping up appearances’ through brief 
greetings to remind foreign buyers of their personal (business) relationship where 
frequent personal face-to-face contact is not possible. E-mail and text therefore allow 
for information-exchange through communication with those outside the immediate 
business community of Mwenge. Murphy (2002) has shown that in Tanzania loose 
connections to a diversity of people and communities are especially important as 
they enable some entrepreneurs to track market changes, to obtain novel bits of 
information, and to identify new business opportunities ahead of the competition, and 
ICT do appear to facilitate relationships with these sources of information outside the 
country. 
 
5:9. ICT as ‘the office’ 
Retailers choose to adopt for business a combination of fax, mobile phones and e-
mail so that their customers can use any of the technologies for contacting them. As 
useful as these technology are for communicating with customers, it also seems 
important for retailers to show their customers that they have access to these 
technologies. To Mochiwa, for example, a website shows his customers ‘that I am 
professional in this business’, while using e-mail – which he refers to as ‘the way 
that business is done internationally’ – lets his customers know ‘that I really want to 
do business’. Even fax (an older ICT which, at least among Mwenge-based retailers, 
appears not to be threatened with redundancy by newer technologies) to Justina’s 
customers still ‘means you have committed yourself to business’ because, Frank 
believes, it shows customers that the retailer has premises with which to operate 
from. Sample retailers such as Hamisi and Dickson, however – and who are not in 
the connected elite where they may gain access to international markets through 
visiting foreign countries – have shown that while access to these technologies is 
crucial to their retail trade, an entrepreneur need not actually have a physical shop or 
office space to run an exporting business. Dar es Salaam’s many internet cafés 
provide access to e-mail and the web and many also provide facilities for sending 
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and receiving fax.24 Retailers also need not have their own premises with which to 
register a telephone line that goes directly to them since all have their own mobile 
phones that, as we discuss in section 8:6, can be acquired through various means that 
can avoid the high costs of paying for a new handset. The mobile phones can be used 
for local calls, and huduma ya simu for longer-distance calls where necessary, 
allowing the retailer to closely monitor time spent on the telephone so to keep costs 
to a minimum. Through more affordable forms of access than actually purchasing a 
fax, landline telephone and internet connection, the triumvirate of ICT (fax, mobile 
phones and e-mail) enables many entrepreneurs to operate without premises, thereby 
saving costs on rent and allowing the enterprise to remain informal, beyond the reach 
of government registration and taxation.25 
 
Physical premises and physical products 
Physical premises are still important, however, because it is the very existence of the 
cluster of shops and carvers in Mwenge that attracts so many customers in the first 
place, some of whom become buyers that retailers such as Damaris, Mary and Justina 
establish long-term supply relationships with, while others visit carvers who then 
approach Hamisi and Dickson to arrange their exports. Buyers – whether tourists 
attracted to the spectacle of Mwenge and purchasing souvenirs, or foreign 
wholesalers and international dealers coming to establish ties with retailers – 
‘experience’ Mwenge, have a chance to ask about the background to carvings that 
they are able to handle and inspect, and to ask about the history and culture of the 
carvers around them, all the time learning (usually in English) from the retailers. This 
provides retailers with an opportunity to interact with foreigners, in turn to learn 
about their tastes and to bargain over the physical products surrounding them. None 
of this is done so easily using website, the limited success of which among those 
                                                 
24 Some internet cafés also provide VoIP. 
25 Research during the first phase of the fieldwork revealed individuals purposefully making use of 
public ICT because they allow for more anonymity in transactions and make the authorities’ tracing of 
illicit deals more difficult. One individual who was employed for a formal mining company was 
interviewed in an internet café and later at a huduma ya simu brokering a deal with buyers of precious 
minerals he had managed to smuggle out of the mine he was working at. He was using these forms of 
access, he explained, because both the prospective buyer would have more difficulty locating the 
source of the stone and his employer would have more difficulty in tracing the identity of the thief. 
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Mwenge traders who have had them constructed may explain why others in the 
cluster – most notably Damaris, Mary and Justina, who excel as saleswomen – have 
not established their own sites.  
 
5:10. Retailers’ web-presence and Northern perceptions: a brief 
experiment 
The absence of websites for these women’s exporting ventures calls for a more 
critical analysis of the ways in which other vinyago retailers have presented their 
businesses (and suppliers) on the web. We have already introduced Mochiwa, Frank, 
Massimo and Gwalugano’s efforts to present their businesses to the international 
market, and now compare Gwalugano and Mochiwa’s Tanzanian-based sites with the 
web-presence of rival retailers based outside Africa in the hope that it may provide 
some answers about why Tanzanian-based retailers report low sales through their 




Critical analysis of Tanzanian-based and non-Tanzanian vinyago websites 
The websites of vinyago retailers based outside Tanzania were chosen using 
www.google.com, the world’s most popular search engine and one that a potential 
buyer on the internet may use to search for vinyago.26 The interest was in finding 
non-donor driven websites, but the search terms did not exclude these because of the 
difficulty in determining the ownership of the business when searching. The initial 
search in English on 11th November 2004 used the terms “Tanzania Makonde 
vinyago”, which revealed only seven sites (two of which were repeat sites). The first 
listed entry was, remarkably, Gwalugano’s Nyumba ya Sanaa site, while the 
                                                 
26 It is recognised that using a Web browser search tool can prioritise a general selection towards 
those who pay the most to have their site appear first. Nevertheless, this method of selection was 
chosen because it is one a potential buyer could use. 
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remainder were excluded because they were non-commercial sites.27 A second search 
was then carried out on the same date using the terms “Tanzania Makonde carving”, 
which generated 728 hits. The sites chosen for analysis here are those three different 
commercial enterprises (two of which are repeated twice) on the first Google page of 
ten hits and which offer vinyago for sale. 
 
‘Art Tribal’, New York, United States 
The first listing is for ‘Pilot Guides’, a website ‘for the curious traveller’ who can 
enter an ‘ethnic shop’ website {www.pilot.co.uk/Shopper_files/Shop_Ethnic1.html} 
that offers some background on Makonde carvings. The information about the 
craftsmen is scant and impersonal although, despite the name of the site, it does not 
sell vinyago directly itself. For purchasing vinyago links are given to the ‘African Art 
Collection’ site {www.arttribal.com, now offline, and www.zyama.com} where the 
‘authentic African art’ of any of about 150 ethnic groups can be bought. Some crude 
background on the Makonde is offered here and a virtual visit to their ‘tribal home’ 
can be made, although this link appears to be dead and is now dominated by symbols 
advertising their acceptance of Visa, MasterCard and American Express. Curiously, 
no carvings made of African blackwood are for sale, with pieces instead being the 
‘genuine, traditional and old’ that Saetersdal (1998) sees provide most interest to the 
Northern buyer. The cheapest Makonde article, for example, a ceremonial bowl and 




                                                 
27 The past tense is used here because the Google entries are subject to change, so may not be the same 
on later dates. 
28 The other link provided in ‘Pilot Guides’, blandly entitled ‘Makonde’, takes the prospective vinyago 
buyer to the private collection of Captain Felix Lorenz where inside his cowry auction site we find a 
tribute site to the Makonde {www.cowries.info/makonde/main.html} and can view his exceptional 
collection, listed not by style but by carver. Some of these carvers are the elite master carvers Korn 
(1974) and Kingdon (2002) discuss, and through another link we are presented with photographs of 
some of these prestigious carving gurus. None of these splendid carvings are offered for sale, although 
the fact that Felix does offer his contact details suggests that he might be open to negotiation, 
especially since he has other auction sites selling his foreign acquisitions. 
 
 232
‘Africa Direct’, Denver, United States 
The second Google listing is for ‘Africa Direct’ {www.africadirect.com}, a business 
run by two Denver-based wholesalers selling to stores, galleries and collectors 
through their website and eBay, where they auction such African treasures as ivory 
tusk trumpets and Ethiopian Coptic crosses. The homepage speaks passionately 
about their love of Africa but we learn nothing about the artists themselves, only 
repeated three-line ‘full descriptions’ telling the prospective buyer little more than 
that the Makonde live in Tanzania and Mozambique and that the ‘ebony’ carvings for 
sale on the site bear no resemblance to other ‘airport art’ pieces. The goods vary in 
price from $95-995. 
 
‘Zebra Crafts’, Saskatchewan, Canada 
The ‘ebony’ carvings listed on the third site listed on Google range from $38-198, 
and are sent to the buyer from ‘Zebra Crafts’{www.zebracrafts.com} in Canada. The 
company director, Margorie, sells handicrafts she has obtained herself from 
collectors all over sub-Saharan Africa, and features a select artist for each of the 
types of craft she offers under a ‘Faces’ link. These artists themselves also feature 
under some of the product category pages, with the name of Bernard Pius – the only 
carver of vinyago who Margorie uses – drawing the customer’s eye to the centre of 
her ‘woodcarvings’ page. 
Generalisations about the three sites are difficult because they all seem to present 
vinyago from very different motivations. With the ‘Africa Direct’ and ‘Zebra’ sites 
the sense is that we are dealing with an individual trader and, especially with 
Margorie, an individual who has had some connection with traders or carvers in 
Tanzania. On the other hand, with the owners of the ‘African Art Collection’ site the 
feeling is that the prospective customer is dealing with a company run by a couple of 
mass collectors who are plundering the African continent of its heritage and offering 
this booty for sale. Equally, however, it is difficult to generalise about the 
motivations of the buyers of vinyago – and African art / artefacts more generally – 
and how they are attracted or repulsed by the origins of the goods on sale. Either 
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way, there does appear to be a market for these products, and one that Mochiwa and 
Gwalugano also seek to supply as Tanzanian retailers. 
 
‘Nyumba ya Sanaa’, Dar es Salaam 
From a Northern prospective customer’s perspective these Tanzanian-based vinyago 
retailers fail to provide much online competition for the Northern retailers. 
Gwalugano’s Nyumba ya Sanaa site {www.catgen.com/sanaa/EN/}, while found 
immediately for this web-based survey was only located easily because the Swahili 
word ‘vinyago’ was used, a term that few prospective customers would enter in a 
search engine. Similarly, few customers would be able to translate the detailed 
descriptions of the carvings from the Swahili, nor would many bother to trudge 
through the poor English, and are unlikely to rise to Gwalugano’s offer to e-mail him 
for clarifications before they dismiss the site as unprofessional. 
 
‘Africa Authentic Handcraft Carving and Export’, Dar es Salaam 
Mochiwa’s site {www.africawoodartist.netfirms.com} also displays some fatal flaws 
that may detract a prospective Northern buyer in favour of another source of vinyago 
from the internet. One of the first things that is clear upon entering the site is the 
dubious English which, when taken with some of the poorly lit photographs of 
Mochiwa’s products, give the website an unprofessional feel. The carvings are not 
given a description, labelled or even priced, so it is impossible to match them to the 
abstract numbers on the order form. Although the ordering system appears simple, 
the lack of any labelling on most products makes ordering online difficult since the 
buyer has no idea what, for example, a ‘WE012’ listed on the order form is. The 
prospective customer is therefore left to contact Mochiwa, who on his site is 
presented in a passport-like photograph as a sombre, lone figure – a poor reflection 
of the charismatic, intelligent businessman that he is. 
 
Knowing Mochiwa and Gwalugano personally, however, should not be allowed to 
influence any judgement on which of these five sites I, as a hypothetical prospective 
customer from a Northern country, would chose to purchase vinyago from. Should I 
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be concerned with ethical trading – and no research has been done for this study on 
whether this is the case for prospective customers – my inclination would be to 
purchase my vinyago from a Tanzanian site, purely because the money appears to be 
going directly to Africans rather than foreigners. Yet we learn nothing about the 
carvers from the Tanzanian sites, nor from two of the non-Tanzanian sites where the 
producers are not only faceless but completely invisible, and only appear in the 
abstract as ‘tribesmen’ who produce mythical figures for rituals and ceremonies. 
Only Margorie concerns herself to present the producers as people, individuals such 
as Bernard who are profiled with care. 
 
This decision by Margorie to profile the producers may make paying a small fortune 
for a fine carving that little bit easier. Again, because research has not been 
conducted for this study on prospective Northern customers’ willingness to pay an 
average of over $300 for a carving, it is not known whether customers are put off by 
these prices, but the existence of websites asking these sums does suggest that the 
businesses make at least some profit through such sales. The same judgement cannot 
be made with the Tanzania-based sites, however, since neither offer prices, leaving 
the prospective customer to take the time and expense of contacting the retailer 
personally – an action that, eventually, the customer has to do in order to secure 
payment with any of the five retailers.29 This is the point at which the retailer needs 
to give a fast, clear response. 
 
Critical analysis of vinyago retailers’ e-mail correspondence 
To assess the response time and overall quality of correspondence, a business 
enquiry from the account of a fictitious Mr.Karl Ving in Stockholm was e-mailed to 
each of the five retailers using the address given on their websites.30 A mid-priced 
carving was selected from each site and an e-mail was sent to the retailer asking how 
                                                 
29 All of the businesses in question could benefit from a direct link to a secure payment method such as 
PayPal. Some of the best e-commerce website have these links on every single page where their 
products are shown. 
30 A fictitious identity was chosen to ensure that the two Tanzanian retailers who know the author 
reacted no differently than the other non-Tanzanian retailers. 
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long it would take to have the piece sent to Sweden, which methods of payment are 
accepted, and requesting a little information on the origin of the carving. On the basis 
of this information alone, which business would I, as a prospective vinyago buyer 
with about $330 to spend on a gift, chose to purchase from? The e-mails were all sent 
out at the same time on 12th November 2004 and, hypothetically, the carving had to 
arrive in Stockholm by 30th November 2004. 
 
The first reply was a ‘bounce-back’ automated response within minutes from the 
mail delivery subsystem announcing that the Nyumba ya Sanaa e-mail address I had 
used had permanent fatal errors. Fortunately, Gwalugano had taken the precaution to 
list three contact e-mail addresses on his website, all of which I had used. Yuri 
Raskin of ‘African Art Collection’ in New York then replied within four hours, 
offering to deliver within six to ten days the ‘Makonde ancestral female figure’ 
which he 
 
received…directly from the Makonde cultural area in Tanzania. I do not know the name 
of its author, the exact place where it was produced or used. When it concerns African 
ceremonial art, these facts are really never known (E-mail from Yuri Raskin, 12/11/04). 
 
The delivery time is subject to complete payment by credit card or international 
money order, he explains, which includes a $150 shipment and handling fee that he 
makes no profit from. Despite the complete reconstruction of his website, however, 
he then acknowledges in an impersonal, businesslike tone, that it is still not possible 
to pay online and asks – somewhat disconcertingly – for all my credit card details to 
be sent in a message. A couple of hours later Margorie Cline sent a friendly reply, 
answering that she has never shipped to Europe before but offered all the possible 
options to get the piece to Stockholm through a credit card transaction over the 
phone or via email. She mentioned the carver she uses, Bernard, adding that all his 
carvings come with a photograph and information about him. This personal touch is 
engaging and acts as a powerful value-added to her retail business. Late on the 
following day a reply was received from Sara at ‘Africa Direct’ giving to-the-point 
answers to the questions, in a message that was fairly similar to Margorie’s, although 
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with no mention of the origin of the piece, nor of carvers. Two advertisement e-mails 
were then received from Yuri two days later, then an e-mail from Gwalugano in 
which he promised to write later with the price of the piece in question. The English 
was far from perfect, but the basic message about methods of payment could be 
interpreted.  
 
Which business to buy from online: a decision based on risk assessment? 
It is difficult to simplify the profile of a typical online vinyago buyer so it is 
impossible to know what aspects of the websites and correspondence would 
influence the decision over who to do business with. My decision would be biased 
through knowing the two Tanzanian retailers and my personal desire to support a 
Tanzanian business, but on the basis of the websites alone I would not have been 
impressed as a prospective buyer by either of the Tanzanian websites, nor by the 
‘African Art Collection’ site’s apparent lack of engagement with individual 
producers and suppliers (who they surely use, as Yuri expressed in his e-mail 
correspondence). As outlined above, the Tanzanian websites have an unprofessional 
feel to them, marked by a lack of prices and no clear, immediate means of payment. 
Alongside the disorganised websites, the tardy responses of the Tanzanian retailers 
compounded the feeling that they may be informal, less sophisticated businesses, 
perhaps run by novices with little exposure to doing business with foreigners – 
although this is clearly not the case with Mochiwa who I later learnt from our 
personal correspondence has a CitiBank account in America. The prospective 
customer looking to purchase vinyago online would not have the benefit of knowing 
that both Tanzanian retailers are veteran suppliers with years of experience in 
supplying carvings around the world. Their websites do not advertise this, while 
Margorie – whose clear and simple site gives the impression of familiarity with 
worldwide exporting – admitted in her correspondence to having never supplied to 
Europe before. 
 
Ultimately, the decision for the prospective Northern customer is one between 
purchasing from a Tanzanian or a North American supplier. In part this would be 
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influenced by price and – working on the assumption that a foreign retailer would be 
seeking a larger profit because of greater overheads – the expectation is that the 
Tanzanian retailer would demand lower prices.31 Again, this cannot be verified from 
the Tanzanian sites because neither mention prices, which may influence a 
prospective buyer to instantly cast them aside in favour of the North American 
suppliers. Though probably asking higher prices for similar products, by being 
upfront with their prices the North American suppliers immediately come across as 
more transparent individuals. Furthermore, as Humphrey et al (2003: ii) remark of 
the developing country e-commerce ventures that they assess, not only do most of 
these sites not accept any liability for transactions, they also do very little to build 
trust between potential trading partners. The situation bears similarities with that of 
the potential client assessing the character of an unknown fundi (section 4:10) and 
where none of the mechanisms of trust – networks of working relationships; 
customer friendship; pre-existing networks; and intermediaries (Lyon 2000) – can 
easily be called upon to assess his trustworthiness. In this situation, access to 
information about credit history, annual turnover and previous trading associates 
would be desirable before entering into a financial transaction with a stranger 
(Humphrey et al 2003: 13). This links with trust and Northern perceptions of Africa 
and Africans which, for those who have never visited the continent, is fed by the 
Northern media and is largely negative (Green 2000) and for those buyers not used to 
dealing with Africans would surely influence the issue of perhaps having to deal with 
a possible breach of contract with an African they have never met. Given this risk, 
the Northern buyer may be inclined to take the easier option and to deal with a fellow 
North American with whom they may perceive there is less likelihood of contractual 





                                                 
31 It could be argued that anybody seriously interested in importing in bulk or fair trade and the plight 
of the invisible carvers would visit Tanzania themselves and forge their own ties with carvers and 
exporters based nearer the source, rather than dealing with a Northern middleman. 
 
 238
5:11. ICT in the transition from personal to impersonal exchange 
To many Northerners any business with Africa is perceived as a risky venture.32 For 
Northerners this barrier to trade is not necessarily one of lacking trust in individuals 
in Africa who they do not know, but a concern that if contracts do fail – as they can 
in any transaction – in much of Africa the recourse to the courts is more difficult and, 
in the case of a few carving exports, probably not worth pursuing, resulting here in a 
loss of at least $300. In the absence of large corporate and governmental institutions 
capable of dealing fairly with contract enforcement, ICT counts for little when 
dealing with unknown businesses in an unpredictable world where contracts are not 
always likely to be respected. This is perhaps where the two levels of trust identified 
in the literature now converge. Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) regard ‘minimal’ trust 
as being concerned with the fulfilment of explicit promises required for basic market 
transactions, the minimal basis for an effective market economy. By extension, 
‘extended’ trust requires that minimal trust operates, but is concerned further with 
diverse commitments that arise in collaborative arrangements between enterprises 
seeking to compete in international markets (Humphrey & Schmitz 1998). Since they 
supply to many customers outside of Tanzania (some of whom are themselves 
retailers), it is suggested that Tanzania-based vinyago retailers are expected to 
demonstrate this new level of extended trust within the international market – a level 
of trust that we have not yet encountered in the previous case studies covering 
domestic enterprise. The relationship does not seem as complex as the 
interdependencies described by Humphrey and Schmitz (1998: 41), however, where 
retailers who supply to the international market make commitments in the 
expectation that the other side is committed to developing the relationship. The most 
common relationship here seems to be largely demand-led and in this respect a 
relationship that is based only on minimal trust. It works best where ‘networks of 
working relationships’ exist (section 3:8), based on a long-standing trusting 
relationship of continued interaction where each party collects information on the 
capability of the other to build up confidence, and is facilitated by ICT.  
 
                                                 
32 See, for example, Clark (2004). 
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Online Mwenge trading portal 
An opportunity to combine both women’s skill at bargaining with the global reach of 
the internet and to also engender potential customers with a greater feeling of trust 
towards potential suppliers may be to create a trading portal that visually 
encompasses all the shops in Mwenge crafts village.33 The market could be presented 
on the website in the four rows of shops that exist on the ground, with the business 
names clearly shown as they appear on the front of the shops and, to personalise the 
enterprise, a photograph and profile of the owner – much like on Marjorie’s website. 
The shops could be clickable, linking to a visualisation of the carvings as they appear 
for customers in the shop. The carvings could then be selected individually, with 
detail providing the e-shopper the background of the carving and the carver or 
carving group involved in producing the piece. With a uniform set of links for each 
shop following the same format (i.e., clickable photograph of shop and owner  
clickable range of carvings within the shop  background to each carving), the e-
shopper anywhere in the world would be able to browse the entire market for 
carvings while virtually experiencing the market to a far better degree than is 
currently possible online with the few bland sites that are available at present. Paid 
for by an equal contribution from each participating shop owner and using a large 
competitive gateway such as that offered by the Tanzania Development Gateway 
(Balancing Act 2004c; Mkundai 2004), the portal could be managed full-time by a 
competent web-designer who is fluent in English (the most common language of the 
internet) and who ensures that all links are maintained, shop sites are up-dated as 
new products are introduced, and correspondence from customers is forwarded to 
shop owner’s e-mail account for them to then communicate with the customer using 
whatever medium the customer desires. This overseer could also ensure that the 
portal has a high profile on the internet, with a high-ranking on the Google search 
engine and links to it from other related websites. The value-added of this trading 
portal is that, like the Mwenge shops on the ground (and unlike the few websites 
                                                 
33 West & Malugu (2003: 32) suggest internet advertising as an area to be exploited by Mwenge 
carvings market. The idea presented here draws on a proposal put forward by African Lakes 
Technologies (2001) where all members of the Association of Makers and Exporters of Gifts and 
Allied Articles of Kenya are brought together in some form of virtual marketplace and classified 
according to their area of specialisation. 
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Mwenge retailers have had constructed), no prices appear on the carvings, thus 
allowing for negotiation by e-mail, telephone or fax between the shop owner and the 
prospective customer. The negotiations could be initiated through an invitation for 
the e-shopper to ‘make a reasonable offer’, to which a counter-offer can be made, 
much like on the ‘Inside African Art’ {insideafricanart.com} website where the 
canny young American seller tempts the shopper by asking ‘what’s it worth to 
you?’.34 Put crudely, this proposed trading portal presents a wonderful opportunity 
for Mwenge traders to use their sales skills to profit from the ignorance of some e-
shoppers who – engrossed by the beauty of an African product – are likely to wildly 
over-estimate the real cost of the carving, at the same time as creating a chance to 
make a steady trade with more seasoned traders. Trust, a key issue in dealing with 
unknown suppliers, could be better ensured through feedback rating and comments, 
prominently displayed on each retailers’ site, much in the way sellers create 
reputations on eBay where customer feedback is encouraged because it ‘fosters trust 
between people by acting as both an incentive to do the right thing and as a mark of 
distinction for those who conduct transactions with respect, honesty, and fairness’.35 
 
Since Mochiwa finds his website of most use for customers only wanting to check on 
new styles to his collection, the same consortium could also produce a catalogue on 
CD-ROM to act as an effective and cheap (50 cents a piece) advertising tool that 
customers in Mwenge are able to take back overseas with them, a physical gift from 
the physical shop. In the event of customers wishing to purchase a new addition, 
however, Gwalugano finds that some prospective buyers abroad then ask for a 
sample vinyago to be sent by mail for them to then inspect. This need to examine the 
prospective purchase or sample is perhaps the biggest drawback with the portal and 
CD-ROM as marketing devices, an argument which is supported by surveys that 
indicate that people like to touch and feel a product before making the decision 
whether to buy it or not, so much so, reports Batchelor (2002: 2-3), that some 
alternative trading organisations have decided not to use ICT to try to sell products 
                                                 
34 The best guide to how the trading is meant to work, and where the most information can be found 





because they have found that people who enter a shop (and have a shopping 
experience) are ten times more likely to buy something than those who just see a 
photograph on the internet. As we quoted Origines earlier, ‘the serious buyers will 
want to see the vinyago’ (30/07/03), so there is a risk that some customers will not be 
attracted by this proposed application of ICT to new marketing methods. 
 
Digital images across the digital divide 
Conspicuous by their absence in all these plans are the carvers, but the reality is that 
at present the collectors and certainly the retailers know the market much better than 
the producers. As Strattoni put it: 
 
The producers have a poor interpretation of demand. We don’t use somebody to stay 
with the producers because it is expensive and we cannot afford to lose somebody from 
the Dar es Salaam office, but we do use contact people [i.e., collectors] to ensure that 
the goods arrive before the export deadline – the middleman is crucial. (Strattoni, 
14/09/03) 
 
There are plenty of examples of NGOs and alternative trading organisations 
supporting artisans with training on markets (e.g., World Resources Institute 2003), 
but the hard-nosed capitalist view may be that until the point is reached when carvers 
can show themselves competent at marketing – and plenty of retailers such as 
Strattoni have argued they have yet done so, despite many opportunities – they 
should stick to do what they do best, and that is carving fine vinyago. Indeed, we 
have seen that few carvers showed any inclination to trade as it is, with members of 
the Makonde Carving Group even regarding any Makonde who trades vinyago (even 
if he is able to carve) as a ‘non-carver’. So long as mobile phone reception eludes the 
remote villages where many of the carvers work, collectors will still have to visit 
those carvers who are reluctant or unable to travel to meet collectors or retailers to 
receive payment and discuss specific styles for future orders. Where new ICT may be 
of more use in a way that they have apparently not yet been applied is in digital 
photography to communicate specific styles to carvers, either using digital cameras 
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that store images (thus avoiding the time and cost of producing an actual print) or, 
cheaper still, cameraphones, sales of which are set to explode in Europe (PriMetrica 
2004c) and which are now already available at competitive prices in Dar es Salaam 
through the Tanzanian informal economy. The image does not need to be sent (which 
is where the cost lies), only captured on the cameraphone and shown to the carvers 
when they are visited by a collector. Such technology may soon render obsolete 
Alex’s comment that ‘you must see the kinyago – you can't hear it over the 
telephone!’, but in reality the question is back to the digital divide where we began in 
chapter one. The question is still whether new ICT can really be accessed by the 
poorest (in this case study, the carvers), or whether those who will benefit the most 
from ICT will continue to be those who have the best access (the retailers, or the 
‘connected’ elite) to them. This may depend to whether anybody other than donors 
are interested in how ICT may capture the trickle-down effects from the wealth that 





The role of ICT and trust in business relationships has been a recurrent theme of this 
chapter. We have witnessed an intensity in use of ICT with proximity to Dar es 
Salaam (and beyond) but, as with the previous case studies, ICT does not appear to 
appreciably improve the trust relationship between people in Tanzania when they 
conduct business; much travelling within the country is still done in order to ensure 
that deliveries are made on time, to the correct specifications, and that they arrive at 
their destination intact. Again, as in the previous case studies, face-to-face interaction 
is important at points throughout the marketing chain although, as Fafchamps (2004) 
shows, we do see evidence in the vinyago trade that under even the crudest 
institutional environment contract agreements at a distance can work, so long as they 
can depend (to a greater degree than in more developed economies) on social 
networks and personal trust, revolving around personal exchange based on long-term 
personal relationships. This is precisely what we have seen Damaris, Janet and Mary 
accomplish through using their local social networks to enter foreign markets where, 
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by exploiting their personal contacts with people whose job it is to help businesses, 
they have positioned themselves in markets where they have met their buyers and 
gained their trust by reliably supplying them with carvings over the years. They are 
now using ICT to maintain that trust by managing to respond quickly to business 
enquiries from these regular customers and through applying ICT as a tool to 
frequently update this ‘friendship’ when they feel the communication and 
relationship may need refreshing. The experience of these women suggests that the 






Much of the promotional literature on ICT cast them in a very optimistic light, as 
technologies that hold much transformative potential for poorer areas (e.g., DOI 
2001; Gerster & Zimmermann 2003; UNDP 2001). This study was motivated by a 
more pragmatic view that is aware of the considerable challenges of ‘development’; 
that the digital divide is not a problem in itself, but a symptom of greater 
development divides. For this reason it has not attempted to look at the 
‘transformative’ effects of ICT. The debate over whether ICT should be chosen over 
other development imperatives (e.g., Weigel & Waldburger 2004) has fortunately 
shifted from one of trade-offs to one of complementarity, and few policy makers 
believe that ICT is a magic bullet to replace sound developmental investments. The 
study has also made no claims at contributing towards the challenging task of 
measuring the effects of the technologies on the macro Tanzanian economy. Such an 
undertaking is the work of multiple scholars inclined to quantative analysis and with 
unhindered access to a great deal of reliable data from before these new ICTs were 
introduced. 
 
Instead I have chosen to conduct a more qualitative, enterprise-level analysis of the 
effects of new ICT on Tanzanian MSEs, adding to the hitherto sparse detailed 
literature of the adoption and appropriation of these technologies in the majority, 
non-assisted African-run enterprises. It is felt that these changes are best observed 
through immersion into the physical locale and, over an extended period, getting to 
know the individuals whose business pursuits compose three separate subsectors that 
in turn contribute towards the larger economy. The case studies were chosen with a 
view to achieving some representation of the national, macro picture, with an upper 
limit of three case studies so as not to dilute the research. The entrepreneurs cover a 
wide geographical range and both genders, while their businesses provide different 
degrees of formality, along with elements of both itinerant and sedentary, urban and 
rural, ‘flyer’ and subsistent, niche and market-saturated, and perishable and durable, 
and with accounts from ICT-users (of various degrees and means of access and 
appropriation) and those who do not use the technologies at all. Subsector analysis is 
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used because of its focus on the movement of the product or service through its 
various stages, in particular the attention it pays to vertical linkages between buyers 
and sellers. Together with the spread that the case studies offer, this approach is 
seldom the experience of those who inform policy because they rarely have the 
luxury of time to conduct such an in-depth study. The research programme was 
therefore designed to ensure that time was devoted to engaging with people on the 
ground, allowing for the crucial exposure to how people interact and how business 
operates. It is felt that this more personal approach over time offers an informed view 
of how ICT has been adopted and applied (or not) to business activities in the 
‘ordinary economy’, the source of livelihood for many Tanzanians. At this level we 
are able to reveal changes to the way business is done. 
 
Such an approach offers fresh detail to earlier work by Bryceson and Ponte on 
Tanzania’s domestic agricultural trade, by Mlinga and Wells on East Africa’s 
informal construction system, and West and Malugu (and, to a lesser extent, 
Kingdon) on the retail chain of vinyago. How, when and why new ICT is used in 
these specific subsectors – and, indeed, throughout Tanzania’s economy – is a new 
topic, and the interface between information and communication technology and the 
country’s business culture has hitherto been neglected. This study is the first to treat 
these issues in parallel with interpersonal networks of knowledge and other 
traditional forms of communication. 
 
The changes that new ICT has had on business may not seem particularly original to 
the outside observer who – if imposed by the promotional literature on ICT – may be 
expecting greater benefits. To the entrepreneur operating today, however, the 
changes can be very significant when compared with the situation in Tanzania before 
the introduction of these technologies. This is an important point that can be lost on 
those whose lifestyles are used to accessing affordable and reliable information and 
communication technologies such as the landline telephone. True, the effects of new 
ICT that this study reveals are not groundbreaking. What is groundbreaking for the 
Tanzanian entrepreneur is that he or she can now make calls where before this was 
not easy, and that it is now possible to access sources of information from anywhere 
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in the world where before it was not. The exchange of information has been domestic 
for the most part, but it has meant that domestic business is changing. This final 
chapter assesses these changes by tying together some of issues that have arisen in 
the three case studies with themes from the first chapter. We began with the 
fundamental changes to the ‘knowledge economy’ and outlined worries over the risk 
that the highly exclusionary networks of  the global economy have the potential to 
further marginalise areas that are seen as non-valuable. We discussed the important 
contribution of micro and small enterprise to Africa’s social and economic 
development and outlined how, like all enterprises, micro and small enterprises in 
Africa make use of information, have information-related problems, and – potentially 
or actually – make use of ICTs. We discussed the digital divide and, following 
Duncombe and Heeks (2001b), suggest that access to information and ICTs and use 
of information and ICTs are two quite different things. We then considered the 
importance to African MSE economies of direct, personal contact and noted that in 
the absence of formal mechanisms to sanction contracts, interaction cultivated 
through extensive face-to-face contact is so highly valued that poorer enterprise 
owners will only act upon, and trust, information delivered on a personal level. Trust, 
however, is largely absent from the ICT literature. We now address these issues 
through the research questions, considering first how ICT is being integrated into the 
existing business culture, then assess the changes this is bringing to the existing 
business culture, and lastly suggest how ICT may be better applied for business use 
in Tanzania’s particular setting. 
 
6:1. ICT: integration into the existing business culture 
Before doing so, however, it is important to emphasise that it is clear from the study 
that while the term ‘ICT’ has been used here (as in much of the literature on 
developing countries) to refer to the new information and communication 
technologies of mobile phones and the internet, the difference in the uptake of the 
two technologies is so great that, in the Tanzanian context at least, it is perhaps no 
longer useful to refer to them together as ‘ICT’. Even in areas where the 
infrastructure exists to make the use of both technologies possible, for the average 
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Tanzanian entrepreneur the constraints towards accessing the internet are so much 
greater than those of accessing mobile phones that from the outset placing the two 
together for analysis as potential business tools is not reasonable. Of the three case 
studies, for example, only vinyago retailer elite entrepreneurs in Dar es Salaam use 
the internet (and that is largely for e-mail communication with foreign contacts). Far 
greater numbers use mobile phones across a wider range of the subsector product / 
marketing chains. Indeed, mobile phones are now so much more accessible than 
landlines ever were that in everyday Swahili these new technologies are referred to 
simply as simu, ‘phones’, and less as simu ya mkononi, ‘handheld [i.e., mobile] 
phones’. For entrepreneurs the two technologies of the internet and mobile phones 
are so different – not least in terms of coverage outside urban areas, ease of use, and 
affordability – that any analysis of ICT should always take the two technologies 
separately. 
 
This difference can be seen when reviewing the benefits that the two technologies 
bring to those who use them. It is clear that mobile phones are the preferred tool of 
domestic business. Irrespective of whether entrepreneurs are inclined to use the 
phone, this is probably because in many areas it is the only new ICT available. To a 
minority retailer elite who do use the internet, we have seen that e-mail is mostly 
used as a fast and relatively affordable means of communication with foreign 
customers about current and future orders. To far more entrepreneurs, however, it is 
the mobile phone that acts as the crucial cost-saving tool. Similar information about 
supply and demand is passed between farmers and the wholesale market, allowing 
the farmer to know whether to divert his crops elsewhere for minimum profit more 
locally instead of maximum loss in Dar es Salaam, giving the dalali greater 
coordination of supply, and enabling both to keep better track of consignments as 
they travel to market. It is here in more reliable exchanges of supply and demand 
information without having to rely on intermediaries that mobile phones hold the 
most benefit for both farmer and dalali because they allow for the first-hand 
exchange of timely information while it can still be acted on. In the construction case 
study we also see mobiles allowing for quicker communication between potential 
customers and those mafundi with a mobile phone whose number can be passed on in 
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a recommendation and who they can straightaway contact for work. Once this 
contact is made, the other main advantage gang-leaders report of mobile phones is 
that they save time and, crucially, they save money spent on travelling to 
communicate with suppliers and employers, all the way from finding work through 
to completion of the job – although they must still travel to the labour pool pick-up to 
contact the many gang members without mobile phones. These savings on most 
journeys that farmers and mafundi alike report are one of the most significant 
benefits they attain from using a mobile phone, and one of the seemingly ‘pedestrian’ 
benefits of the technology that is underrated by its more promotional literature.  
 
That these gains are possible is thanks largely to investment from the surviving 
mobile phone operators – Celtel, Mobitel, Vodacom and, recently, Zantel – for 
whom high competition between them has ensured that the service received by 
customers is usually of good quality. The race for the market share between Celtel 
and Vodacom in particular has brought in some useful payment options such as per-
second billing, and has led to the rapid expansion of coverage for potential markets 
in smaller towns and, eventually, many more rural areas. Where other African 
countries have been slower to open their markets (Coyle 2005) and where calls for 
liberalisation are still being made across the developing world (Economist 2005b), 
the Tanzanian government can also take some credit. The Mkapa administration has 
succeeded in attracting investment by embracing privatisation of the 
telecommunications market at a very early stage and, under a progressive-minded 
regulator, has created the necessary enabling environment for the sector to flourish.1  
 
In the application of ICT we have seen these technologies being used by 
entrepreneurs to help portray a certain image about their abilities in business. For the 
Mwenge-based retailers in particular it seems important to show their foreign 
customers that they have access to certain technologies with which to communicate. 
In Mochiwa’s eyes, for example, his website (though largely ineffective) to him 
gives his customers the impression ‘that I am professional in this business’, while e-
                                                 
1 The term ‘progressive-minded’ is used instead of ‘competent’ because of TCRA’s moves towards 
developing capacity. Personal communication by e-mail with David Sawe, (Director, Management 
Information Systems and e-Government, President’s Office), 29 April 2005. 
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mail (‘the way that business is done internationally’) lets his customers know ‘that I 
really want to do business’. Even fax, which according to Justina means to her 
customers that ‘you have committed yourself to business’, is still in Frank’s opinion 
worth having since it shows customers that the retailer has premises to operate from. 
The same can be said for the landline, which gives the impression of permanency and 
that the business can easily be found at a certain location. Having a website can also 
suggest to the customer an up-to-date, sophisticated business – so long as the site is 
of the highest standard, with good visual images, clear English and working links, 
but we have seen that this is not always true with the few websites being offered by 
entrepreneurs covered in the case studies. In fact these entrepreneurs are operating 
some of the more established businesses, are well-known in the areas they do 
business and have physical premises that make locating them relatively easy. This 
contrasts with a growing number of MSEs run by individuals such as Hamisi and 
Dickson who use a triumvirate of ICT – mobile phones (owned, or not owned) fax 
and e-mail (from internet cafés) – to enable them to operate from a mobile ‘office’, 
without premises (thereby saving costs on rent and allowing the enterprise to remain 
informal, beyond the reach of government registration and taxation, and if necessary, 
also allowing for the rapid reinvention of a business identity). The notion of ‘ICT as 
the mobile office’ heralds a considerable change in the working practices of informal 
sector operators who have hitherto gone unnoticed, and calls for a reconstruction and 
redefinition of at least a part of the informal sector. As ICT becomes more available 
in rural areas, the growth in their use as the tools of the mobile office is set to 
increase. This is most likely to happen first with mobile phones in those areas 
currently without service where TCRA creates geographically-defined district 
licences to spread coverage (Balancing Act 2004d) to supply the substantial unmet 
demand for telephony in the countryside (McKemey et al 2003: 52).  
 
When ICT is available in new areas the decision over whether to use them is 
ultimately taken by the individual who, if not always in the best position to judge the 
potential of a technology (an ‘intelligent intermediary’ (Heeks 1999: 18), could help 
with this), is in the best position to judge whether a technology is affordable. 
Whether it is by using promotions or new services offered by mobile phone operators 
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to make communication more easy for a smaller budget (such as Vodacom’s launch 
in May 2005 of TSh500 airtime vouchers) or through any of the methods we have 
discussed above, even when they have access to very little money the poor will find 
ways of using mobile phones if they see a need to use them to their advantage. 
Realistically the use of mobile phones – particularly for calling – will probably be 
small when compared with developed countries, but we have found in the case 
studies that people are seeing benefits in using mobile phones. There is little reason 
to think that when mobile telephony rolls out to rural areas new customers will not 
also use the services if they judge them to be of use and affordable. Similarly, if the 
internet becomes available in rural areas and it is shown to be of use to people with 
very small disposable incomes, then it will be used, although it is clear as we 
discussed in chapter one that the hurdles are far greater than those with mobile 
telephony. Technologies are being developed to overcome these challenges, with one 
application that seems to hold some promise in providing affordable access to the 
internet in rural areas being VSAT, a two-way satellite communication system with 
antennas that use a specific (Ku-band) frequency. The total equipment costs no more 
than $2,000 and service charges are less than $100 per month, so an internet café or 
other successful small business can get connected to the internet regardless of the 
distance to the nearest connection to the terrestrial telecom infrastructure. Combined 
with WiFi (wireless local area network application), the costs could be shared by 
other local users. 
 
For now, and on the basis of these three case studies, the difference between mobile 
and internet demand in Tanzania is largely one between domestic and international 
information and communication. VSAT may therefore be first popular in areas where 
individuals and businesses have a desire to connect with others outside the country. 
In the meantime, mobile phones will probably remain Tanzania’s most popular ICT. 
Indeed, argues Støvring (2004: 22), the growth of network operators and subscribers 
has been so spectacular and mobile telephony is now such a popular form of 
communication that it is fast becoming the dominant form of network in twenty-first 
century Africa. A weakness of SMEDP in this respect is that it makes little of the 
continuum of SMEs, and apparently treats the informal sector as an homogeneous 
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mass whose constraints – including access to ICT – it can attempt to tackle 
comprehensively. While laudable, SMEDP’s efforts to create a national website for 
SMEs and a directory of service providers should bear in mind that when we talk of 
the majority of small enterprises with access to ICT, we are talking about mobile 
phones, not the internet. If getting entrepreneurs to use the internet is the goal, then 
SMEDP needs to make moves to ensure that access to the technology begins by 
promoting the national website to first-time users of the internet as a service that 
offers some of what has made mobile phones appeal to those who use them: simple 
and relatively affordable, demand-driven information. 
 
It is still important that we do not lose sight of the fact that while this thesis is on the 
use of ICT in business, in Africa, as elsewhere, mobile telephony is used for far more 
than enterprise alone. We must not be seduced by those who in the North rarely 
portray mobile phones in poor countries as anything more than development tools; 
witness Vodafone’s (2005) recent report on the impact of mobile phones in the huge 
untapped market of Africa which, while rightly considering their economic effects, 
still underplays the huge use of the technologies as networking tools beyond 
business. Even in the final section on ownership, Africa: the Impact of Mobile 
Phones never gets beyond social capital to discuss the purely social use of the 
technology.2 This overly developmental perspective of mobile communication 
ignores the fact that in addition to business communication (where a short piece of 
information concerning maybe an agreement on a date, place or delivery is 
transmitted), in Africa as in anywhere else in the world many customers also engage 
in ‘the other antipode of mobile communication’ (Roos 1993: 457) that is the highly 
personal, intimate communication with a lover, friend or relative. 
 
The importance placed on this latter form of communication in Africa is supported 
by research from Botswana, Ghana and Uganda which shows that in rural areas by 
far the most common use of mobile phones is for communicating with friends and 
family, while far less communication relates to business matters (McKemey et al 
                                                 
2 Vodacom’s (2003) preceding report, by contrast, considers regulating call termination in markets 
closer to home, not how mobile phones might play a role in Britain’s development. 
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2003: 34). Again, this seems very far from the new post-Fordist demands of the 
knowledge economy discussed in the opening chapter, and it is tempting here to 
conclude that the literature is indeed too firmly grounded in the thinking of the 
advanced capitalist economies. As Simon wrote when debate on the importance of 
the knowledge economy began to take hold,  
 
The current wave of writing on post-Fordist flexible accumulation, the hypermobility of 
capital…is certainly of little relevance to large regions of the Third World, especially 
Africa, where increasingly poverty, dislocation and scarcity and immobility of capital 
are the principal features. (Simon 1992: 12)  
 
As we have also discussed, those following the ‘Fourth World’ account of 
globalisation would argue that for a region such as Africa this state persists precisely 
because information and communication technologies, the principal tools of 
globalisation, are not being utilised by many African businesses to their maximum 
potential. This may be true where ICT is concerned – we can hardly expect otherwise 
given the massive obstacles to efficient access that many face – but individuals are 
prepared to be active in accessing these technologies and to develop their own 
solutions to the opportunities that they offer for their particular needs. We have seen 
this, for example, in individuals renting out their phone lines, and in beeping being 
used to convey messages between urban and rural areas. Such communication is then 
commonly used (McKemey et al 2003: 35) as the starting point for a transfer flow of 
capital in the form of remittances from the former to the latter. The increments may 
be miniscule when compared with capital flows conducted in the North and by 
African businesses with international connections, but they do show that even at the 
poor and less visible reaches of the global economy, ICT is being used to keep 
capital mobile.  
 
These transfers are almost exclusively flowing to rural areas from the towns and 
cities that for many Africans provide the spiritual and material link into the world 
economy. For most inhabitants of African cities this engagement with the global 
economy has in recent years largely been minimal, but we have found a number of 
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individuals in the vinyago case study who are now able to use the internet to do 
business with physically-distant participants of the world economy. For many more, 
however, the flourishing informal economy of ICT – especially mobile phone – 
acquisition and sale, coupled with ingenious means of ensuring coverage where it is 
not originally intended, allows a new reliable means of communication for domestic 
business. We are led to conclude that the challenge now is perhaps less one of getting 
people connected through wide coverage and accessible handsets, but more one of 
affordable services.3 The good news is that analysts do expect prices to drop over the 
next year or so (Balancing Act 2004a). 
 
6:2. ICT and trust: a changing business culture? 
Should interconnection prices fall, it is likely that Tanzania will experience an 
increase in mobile phone use as people take the opportunity to stay in touch with 
others – for business or social purposes – who prices currently prevent them from 
easily communicating with. This is most likely to be those people who customers are 
separated from by great distances. In fact, although writing before the internet began 
to spread, Trulsson (1997: 136) believes that the long-distance role of 
telecommunications is their only significant use in business in Tanzania. Of course, 
as with the ‘Fourth World’ pessimists, Trulsson did not anticipate large-scale private 
investment into the country’s ICT infrastructure and the ability for, and inclination 
of, people to communicate by such hugely popular cost-saving methods as text 
messaging. Yet even with such facilities, entrepreneurs are unlikely to greatly reduce 
personal visits to those they are doing business with (or may potentially do business 
with), particularly when the distance between them allows for them to meet. Even 
when the distance is greater – between the Southern Highlands and Dar es Salaam, 
for example – it is likely that although mobile phones will be used for the exchange 
of supply and demand information, personal links will still be crucially important and 
we will still see much face-to-face contact. This is a good explanation for the above 
finding of McKemey et al that many more people stay in touch with friends and 
                                                 
3 For those who can still not afford access to the hardware, manufacturers are planning affordable new 
handsets for the market in developing countries (BBC 14 February 2005).  
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family by mobile phone, but when it comes to business-related matters mobile 
phones are used much less frequently. 
 
Put simply, much business in Tanzania is still a personal business and requires face-
to-face communication. The remarkable disproportion in the availability of fax and 
e-mail and their actual usage helps testify to this. While 36% of the enterprises 
surveyed by Nielinger (2003a: 3) have access to a fax-machine and one-third have 
access to e-mail, both means account for only 10% or 9% of total business 
correspondence, leaving an outstanding 81% of business correspondence to 
traditional, non-electronic means – much of which is face-to-face. We have seen this 
throughout the working relationship between farmer and dalali, from the farmer 
using local networks to find out who is a recommended dalali to supply, in their 
agreement to do business together and in subsequent meetings to re-new ties, share 
advice on farming and, crucially, in the farmer asking a dalali for credit. All this 
must be conducted face-to-face and, aside from the exchange of supply and demand 
information and so long as there is trust between the two, the mobile phone plays a 
fairly more minor role in their business relationship. Loose connections to a diversity 
of people and communities are also important as they enable some entrepreneurs to 
track market changes, to obtain novel bits of information, and to identify new 
business opportunities ahead of the competition (Granovetter 1985). In the case of 
the women exporting vinyago, ICT appear to facilitate relationships with these 
sources of information outside the country, but domestically the relationships are 
often instigated and maintained by meeting people personally in local social or 
business networks. We have also observed how off-site the gang-leader will spend 
time in his informal and very open networks of knowledge composed of friends and 
relatives who may have some ideas on where his gang’s services are needed, and this 
relies on being with and around people, on his ‘eyes and ears’ in social settings. The 
process of actually winning the contract also involves negotiation, during which time 
his mobile phone takes a minor role to face-to-face contact. The same is true for 
vinyago collectors who visit carvers personally and have to spend time with them to 
ensure that their work is ready when agreed and to the exact specifications of the 
retailers who they supply to. Retailers further down the supply chain also place much 
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value on face-to-face communication with customers in their shops. As well as 
helping to sell items, face-to-face interaction provides them with a chance to learn 
about demand, and in Tanzania this cannot be done effectively by any means other 
than through personal interaction. 
 
In the case of one dalali we have seen that it is still possible to operate successfully 
without using a telephone at all and to rely exclusively on personal interaction. By 
adopting the ‘outwardly-directed social lifestyle’ of the mfanyabiashara, Kamwene 
has managed to build relationships with farmers and buyers so that they only 
consider supplying to and buying from him. His success is not because they know of 
no alternative buyer or seller, but because he takes the time to do business with them 
face-to-face, even when farmers are unable to come to him to do so. Kamwene is 
perhaps an extreme example because of his complete rejection of the use of a 
telephone, but on balance his overall preference for personal communication does 
seem to be closer to the way much business is conducted by the majority of 
entrepreneurs across the case studies. These case studies tell us that mobile phones 
are fast becoming a new form of network in twenty-first century Africa, but they are 
still far from being the continent’s dominant form of network as Støvring (2004: 22) 
contends. The internet, access to which is growing in Tanzania but at a far slower 
rate than mobile phones, is even further from this position of dominance over more 
traditional forms of communication. This may explain why Mercer (2004: 9) has 
found that the idea of meeting strangers in cyberspace, a popular motif of much of 
the literature on cyberspace in the North, holds little appeal in Tanzania.  
 
One potential problem of the supremacy of traditional forms of communication in 
business is that effective use of the internet in domestic business networks relies on 
the sharing of information between participants who are operating in the same local 
environment, and for this to flourish the participants benefit from networks wider 
than those individuals they already know. The risk in Tanzania, however, is that the 
local information society is hindered by a culture of secrecy where entrepreneurs are 
reluctant to share business information with strangers (Chango 2004) – presumably 




The other dilemma that has cropped up throughout the case studies, concerns the 
trade-off between these new technologies and the challenge of trust. In the 
entrepreneurs eyes, this dilemma might seem as a series of constant decisions 
between the advantage of being mobile with a cellular phone (or with access to e-
mail through internet cafés) and so away from aspects of business, and of having to 
trust and rely on the integrity of others in an environment where being wary of 
transaction failure is often the most sensible approach. As we suggested in a 
Northerner’s possible reluctance in sending money to an African-based vinyago 
exporter who they do not know personally, this applies as much for the internet as it 
does for mobile phones. We have seen that to help guard against potential transaction 
failure it is often beneficial to use others’ experiences for screening to save on 
transaction costs, but that at times this is not practical, such as when a farmer has to 
rely on a lorry driver’s goodwill to use credit on his mobile phone to inform the 
farmer (as well as the lorry owner) of a breakdown en route to Kariakoo. Yet we also 
revealed that those who could be considered outsiders in the business relationship 
and who have little to lose if they do not help can co-operate even if there is no 
financial benefit for them in doing so, as we saw is for some huduma ya simu 
receptionists and fellow farmers who take messages for a farmer when he cannot be 
at the phone. However, these acts of generosity seem only to stretch to those 
individuals who the entrepreneur has an established face-to-face (but not necessarily 
business) relationship with, and the mobile phone is certainly no way of getting to 
know potential business associates in Tanzania’s very personal society. 
 
On prices in particular, reliable information relies on trust and this usually requires a 
face-to-face relationship, even when ICT is employed to relay the information. We 
have suggested that mobile phones can help farmers with supply and demand 
information, but noted that this is only so long as there is trust between the two – that 
the dalali is truthful in what he tells his farmer. In this respect, mobile phones can be 
seen as a facilitating technology for existing, trust-based relationships. Yet for many 
farmers dealing with Kariakoo the reality is that the mobile phone does not alter this 
trust, for there is nothing conclusive from the perishable foodstuffs case study to 
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suggest that the mobile phone itself can actually facilitate the trust relationship 
between a farmer and his dalali. As we remarked in chapter six, in the absence of 
large corporate and governmental institutions capable of dealing fairly with contract 
enforcement, ICT can count for little minimal trust – let alone extended trust. 
 
Personal exchange based on long-term personal relationships can help however, as 
we have seen where Damaris, Janet and Mary use their local social networks to enter 
foreign markets where, through their personal contacts, they have gained the trust of 
buyers by supplying them reliably over time. Another area of future research is a 
more focussed study looking specifically at the background of how these women 
have broken into international trading and how these influences can be combined in 
policy with the potential of the internet café using youth (section 8:14) who are more 
proficient in their use of the technology and are the country’s future e-commerce 
entrepreneurs. These women now use ICT as a tool to maintain that trust by staying 
in touch by ‘keeping up appearances’ at a friendly, social level – albeit it at a 
distance. With the help of ICT to deal with these relationships, these women are 
managing to do what Fafchamps (2004: 483) sees institutions are yet to achieve, and 
that is to move from personal to the impersonal exchange. This transition remains to 
be made by the institutions, while Damaris, Janet and Mary – in the face of 
competition from non-traditional, foreign-based vinyago retailers such as Margorie – 
are now faced with the challenge of dealing with a new wave of foreign customers 
online who they cannot easily meet personally. This is the challenge many other 
African businesses will also have to come to terms with as the internet becomes an 
ever more important global trading tool. 
 
6:3. ICT: better application for business use 
Perhaps the competitive advantage that these women have is not the products they 
offer (others sell the same vinyago across Dar es Salaam) or their access to ICT 
(other retailers have websites and use e-mail and texting), but quite simply that they 
put their customers first. Africa is full of companies whose competitive offer is all 
too often marked by low quality and low service, and we have suggested in chapter 
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five that business growth is sometimes hampered not only by the familiar constraints 
of the difficult operating environment, but also by a socio-cultural constraint that 
fails to always put the needs of the customer first. Basic business training of the type 
the government promises in its SMEDP should go some way to developing a more 
customer-focussed culture, but this is so important that it should also be added to 
basic or secondary school curricula. The ICT that the women exporting vinyago 
employ are nothing more than enabling tools, enhancing the importance that 
communication holds in their attitude to business.  
 
We have suggested that ICT may be further exploited by such women whose skill at 
bargaining could be used through the global reach of the internet to create a trading 
portal that visually encompasses all the shops in Mwenge crafts village. There is still 
some scepticism of the applicability of e-commerce to developing countries 
(Humphrey et al 2003; Molla 2004), and one area of future study here that can be 
used to make changes to African-based websites is to learn about and react to 
potential customers’ worries. This study has had to rely on the author’s own 
speculation of what may detract westerners from purchasing online from the African 
market and has made assumptions about perceptions of trusting unknown foreign 
suppliers. Future studies should interview potential customers in markets throughout 
the world to better inform current small businesses in Africa that are beginning to 
sell their products (and not just vinyago) online. Yet while there is no denying that 
commercial barriers exist, there is no need to offer e-transactions. Once a simple 
website has raised awareness of a business and connected it with international 
markets, initial contact with a potential customer can then be made by any means, 
and other ICT can then be used to facilitate payment. As Russell Southwood has put 
it, ‘there are all the attendant obstacles of how you market and deal with 
international business but that makes it difficult, not impossible to achieve’ 
(Balancing Act 2003b). This would hold for the hitherto unexploited use of the CD-
ROM act as an effective and affordable advertising catalogue for foreign customers 
visiting Mwenge, and in the use of cameraphones by collectors and retailers to show 




These technologies may be too inaccessible for many MSEs, but ICT application for 
use in business need not be so hi-tech. Entrepreneurs using mobile phones could 
better advertise their services by simply printing business cards and leaving a space 
to add their (latest) contact number. SMEDP might consider that directories of 
tradesmen and their services will also facilitate locating these individuals and their 
businesses by listing mobile phone numbers and e-mail addresses, and even websites 
where they have them. Again, it is essential that the service that is advertised is 
delivered to the highest standard and that commitments are met, for instance in price 
quotations. We have suggested that a way around this problem in the particularly 
risky operating environment of agricultural trading would be to provide more 
transparency of prices through an SMS pricing service which is currently unavailable 
in Tanzania. A pilot using the trading networks this thesis has become familiar with 
could provide valuable information on the possibility of up-scaling such a scheme 
countrywide to those towns and villages ICT is yet to reach – areas that, at the 
current rate of expansion, will soon be covered. 
 
6:4. Main findings and key theoretical claims 
This research did not set out to assess social capital, and I am wary of adding to the 
confusion of the ‘sack of analytical potatoes’ that combine to form the concept. But 
we have seen how trust – a variable associated with social capital – is an important 
issue in the use of ICT in micro and small enterprise. It is for this reason, and also 
because the empirical analysis of some of the much-quoted studies of social capital 
have been called into question (e.g., Durlauf 2002 on Narayan and Pritchett, 1997), 
that as a concept of analysis I would argue that at times it is useful to completely 
disassociate trust from the murky waters of social capital. This approach is supported 
by Lyon’s study (2000: 677) that found that while there are difficulties in trying to 
examine or measure the stock of social capital, much can still be gained from trying 
to understand how trust is produced. Even if it can be extracted from its relationship 
with other factors, at best trust can be regarded as a product of social capital and not 
as a component (Field 2003: 137) because, as with reciprocity, it does not exist 
independently of social relationships (Woolcock 1998: 185). There is no harm, 
 
 260
empirically, in dealing with trust as an independent factor and leaving out questions 
of the cause and effect relationship with social capital. This is especially the case 
because the social capital is nearly always a term that means little to Tanzanian 
entrepreneurs (or, for that matter, entrepreneurs in any country), while trust is a more 
readily understood concept in any economy. However, there are aspects of the social 
capital literature, such as ‘bridging’, ‘bonding’ and ‘linking’ social capital, that we 
identify as being helpful for future research into the influence of ICT in business 
interactions, or what has been termed ‘sociotechnical capital’ – productive resources 
that inhere in patterns of social relations that are maintained with the support of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Resnick 2004: 401). As yet 
social capital – let alone trust – is largely missing from the ICT scholarship, but 
before this can develop there is a pressing need to clarify what exactly it is we 
understand by social capital. Doing so should make it a more useful analytical tool 
for those seeking to explore the ways in which these new technologies are being 
applied for use in developing country micro and small enterprises. Nevertheless, 
there are some claims that we can make at this early stage: 
 
• The first is that, for all the interest in social capital and the potential or actual 
developmental impacts of ICT, mobile phones in particular seem to be more 
often put to social use than they are explicitly for the generation of capital. 
 
• Yet despite the ‘Fourth World’ account of globalisation, the evidence from 
Tanzania suggests that individuals are prepared to be active in accessing ICT 
and to develop their own solutions to the opportunities that they offer for their 
particular needs. These increments may be miniscule when compared with 
capital flows conducted in the North and by African businesses with 
international connections, but they do show that even at the poor and less 
visible reaches of the global economy, ICT is being used to keep capital 
mobile.  
 
• Communication via huduma ya simu or the less formal renting of phone lines 
by individuals is commonly used as the starting point for a transfer flow of 
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capital in the form of remittances from urban to rural areas. ‘Beeping’ is 
sometimes used by rural dwellers to initiate contact with their friends or 
relatives in the city. 
 
• In the application of ICT we have seen both technologies are being used by 
entrepreneurs to help portray a positive image about their abilities in 
business. 
 
• The notion of ‘ICT as the mobile office’ heralds a considerable change in the 
working practices of informal sector operators who have hitherto gone 
unnoticed, and calls for a reconstruction and redefinition of at least a part of 
the informal sector. 
 
• Yet for many entrepreneurs the two technologies of the internet and mobile 
phones are so different – not least in terms of coverage outside urban areas, 
ease of use, and affordability – that any analysis of ICT should always take 
the two technologies separately. 
 
• It is clear that mobile phones are the preferred tool of domestic business. 
Irrespective of whether entrepreneurs are inclined to use the phone, this is 
probably because in many areas it is the only new ICT available. In general, 
the hurdles in accessing the internet are far greater than those in accessing 
mobile telephony. 
 
• To a minority retailer elite who do use the internet, we have seen that e-mail 
is mostly used as a fast and relatively affordable means of communication 
with foreign customers about current and future orders. To far more 
entrepreneurs, however, it is the mobile phone that acts as the crucial cost-
saving tool. 
 
• If getting entrepreneurs to use the internet is the goal, then the government’s 
Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy needs to make moves to 
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ensure that access to the technology begins by promoting the national website 
to first-time users of the internet as a service that offers some of what has 
made mobile phones appeal to those who use them: simple and relatively 
affordable, demand-driven information. 
 
• Mobile phones are fast becoming a new form of network in twenty-first 
century Africa, but they are still far from being the continent’s dominant form 
of network. The internet, access to which is growing in Tanzania but at a far 
slower rate than mobile phones, is even further from this position of 
dominance over more traditional forms of communication. 
 
• On prices in particular, reliable information relies on trust, and this usually 
requires a face-to-face relationship – even when ICT is employed to relay the 
information. This works best where ‘networks of working relationships’ exist, 
based on a long-standing trusting relationship of continued interaction where 
each party collects information on the capability of the other to build up 
confidence. 
 
• In the absence of large corporate and governmental institutions capable of 
dealing fairly with contract enforcement, however, ICT can count for little 
minimal trust – let alone extended trust. 
 
• Entrepreneurs entering the export market are now faced with the challenge of 
dealing with a new wave of foreign customers online who they cannot easily 
meet personally. This is the challenge many other African businesses will 
also have to come to terms with as the internet becomes an ever more 




7 Appendix I: List of Interviews 
7:1. Fieldwork, Phase I (April - August 2002) 
The following individuals answered oral questionnaires or took part in semi-
structured interviews. The interviews were only partially purposive, with the 
intention for them to act only as background to the use of ICT in Tanzania. This 
phase one served to influence the decision over which case studies to research during 
the second phase of fieldwork. All these meetings took place in Dar es Salaam, in the 
workplace or on the street when mobile phone users were approached there. No 
name is given where interviewees decided to remain anonymous. The list of 
additional interviews that were conducted with others whose activities were not 
researched during the second phase (e.g., with NGOs, the second-hand motor vehicle 
industry, etc..) are available on request. 
 
COSTECH staff 
Emmanuel Kaale. Scientific Officer II, COSTECH. 9 May and 12 July 2002 
 
Enock Mpenzwa. Senior Systems Analyst II, COSTECH. 24 July 2002 
 
Matthias Masawe. Senior Scientific Officer II, COSTECH. 9 May 2002 
 




ISP, telecommunications, and computer software and hardware retail staff 
Ajali Juma. newafrica.com, Mikocheni Light Industry Area. 15 July 2002 
 
Bill Sangiwa. then Managing Director and I.T. Manager, CyberTwiga, Lugoda 
Street. 16 July 2002 (now I.T. consultant, AfriConnect (Tz) Ltd.) 
 
Emmanuel Nnko. TTCL (Simnet), Extelecoms House, Samora Avenue. 17 July 2002 
 
Eugene Chimpondah. Sales and Marketing Manager, Africa Online, NIC House, 
Mirambo Street. 15 July 2002 
 
Mussa Kissaka. Head, Department of Telecommunications and Engineering, 




Nisha Sanghvi. Acex Systems Limited, Morogoro Road. 17 July 2002 
 
Nivatus Zimamoto. Technical Staff, University Computing Centre, UDSM. 16 July 
2002 
 
Vijay. internet Africa, CRDB Headquarters, opposite Posta Mpya. 15 July 2002 
 
Peter Ulanga. Principal Telecommunications Engineer, Tanzania 
Telecommunications Commission. 24 July 2002 
 
 
Internet café staff 
Alphonce. Manager, TRT internet café, Kijitonyama. 19 July 2002 
 
Atirio. Technician, Moa internet Café, Bagamoyo Road, Mwenge, close to Bus 
Terminal on Kijitonyama side. 29 July 2002 
 
Dorine Luta. Manager, Alpha internet café, Garden Avenue. 30 July 2002 
 
Technician. H. Abdullah internet café, Bibi Titi Mohamed Road / Morogoro Road, 
H. Abdullah. 30 July 2002 
 
Jacob Suila. Manager, Izungo internet Café, Mwenge Bus Terminal. 29 July 2002 
 
Joseph Kifunta. Manager, Interwebbers internet café, Jamhuri Street. 27 July 2002 
 
Lloyd. Technician, Moa internet Café, Bagamoyo Road, Mwenge, close to Bus 
Terminal on Kijitonyama side. 29 July 2002 
 
Majid Aboud. Technician, Mkwepu Telecommunications Centre, Mkwepu Street, 27 
July 2002 
 
Manager. Moonlight internet café, Liganga Street / Chang'ombe Road. 31 July 2002 
 
Manager. Sab Cyber Café, Bagamoyo / Shekilango Road, Mwenge. 29 July 2002 
 
Mariah. Manager, Salva internet Café, Africa Sanaa Road, Mwenge. 29 July 2002 
 
Pamella. Manager, Tibet internet café, Bibi Titi Mohamed Road. 30 July 2002 
 
Rose. Manager, Prestige internet café, Jasmina Street, Kijitonyama. 27 July 2002 
 
Samuel. Manager, Mkwepu Telecommunications Centre, Mkwepu Street, 27 July 
2002 
 
Internet café customers 




Hamisi Geddy & Dickson Wiva. Customers, Salva internet café, Africa Sana, 
Mwenge, Makonde and art dealers. 1 August 2002 
 
Customers (3). H. Abdullah internet café, Bibi Titi Mohamed Road / Morogoro 
Road, H. Abdullah. 30 July 2002 
 
Jesse Rutahigwa. Mkwepu Telecommunications Centre. 1 August 2002 
 
Mwita Winani. Mkwepu Telecommunications Centre. 31 July 2002. 
 
Saidi. Moa internet Café, Bagamoyo Road, Mwenge, close to Bus Terminal on 
Kijitonyama side. 29 July 2002 
 
 
Huduma ya simu staff 
Eleanor Secretarial Services, Mwenge Bus Stand. 29 July 2002 
 
G.G. Express, Dar es Salaam Development Co-operation, Chang'ombe Road, 
Chang'ombe. 1 August 2002 
 
International Electronics Centre Limited, SIDO Complex Building, Bibi Titi 
Mohamed Road, Upanga. 30 July 2002 
 
Louis Communications, Mwenge Bus Stand. 29 July 2002 
 
Media Communications Centre, Chang’ombe Road, Chang’ombe. 31 July 2002 
 
Moka Call Shop, Afrika Sana, Sam Nujoma Road. 29 July 2002 
 
Mustafa’s Secretarial Bureau and Telecommunications, Mafunganyo Street. 30 July 
2002 
 
Sab Cyber Café, Bagamoyo Road / Shekilango Road. 29 July 2002 
 
Shazia Telecommunication Centre, Nyamwezi Street, Kariakoo. 7 August 2002 
 
Topaz Trading Company, Jamhuri Street. 30 July 2002 
 
Worker’s Development Co-operative. Mkwepu Street. 30 July 2002 
 
 
Huduma ya simu customers 
Customers (2). Dar Phone Centre, Mkwepu / Jamhuri Street. 31 July 2002 
 





Mustafa’s Secretarial Bureau and Telecommunications, Mkwepu Street. 30 July 
2002 
 
WDC. Mkwepu Street. 30 July 2002 
 
Edward Michael. Dar Phone Centre. 31 July 2002 
 
Emmanuel Masabo. Dar Phone Centre. 31 July 2002 
 
Mustafa Shabaan. Dar Phone Centre. 31 July 2002 
 
Rocky. Dar Phone Centre. 27 July 2002. 
 
 
Mobile phone users 
Amani Ally. Perishable foodstuffs mfanyabiashara, Nyamwezi Street. 7 August 
2002 
 
Damas Nilalu. Dealer in gemstones, Tanzania-American Mining Agency, interview 
on Asia Street. 6 August 2002 
 
Max. Restaurant and bakery, Mkwepu Street. 6 August 2002 
 
Mayur Mandaria. Selling phones, cars, houses, No office. 6 August 2002 
 
Michael Mpupua. Agrochemicals and Veterinary Drugs Salesman, India Street. 6 
August 2002 
 
Modestus Fabian. Basement overseer, Kariakoo Market Corporation. Kariakoo 
market basement. 7 August 2002 
 
 
Mobile phone and computer technicians (other computer technicians listed as 
internet café staff above) 
Mobile phone technician. Cabinet shop outside Food World. Azikiwe Street. 7 
August 2002 
 
Deo Saleh. Computer technician. Kofa Traders, Motomoto Offices, Mansfield Street 
(off Mkwepu Street). 6 August 2002 
 
Krus Line Camp. Mobile phone technician, Garden Avenue. 2 August 2002 
 
Master S.. Mobile phone technician, Kijitonyama. 27 July 2002 
 
Mshauri. Mobile phone technician, Sham Electronics, Jamhuri Street. 2 August 2002 
 
Nangumbi Mapua. Mobile phone technician, Fast Communication Centre, Jamhuri 




Pius Howle. Mobile phone technician, desk shop near Askari Monument, Samora 
Avenue. 6 August 2002 
 
Savio. Apple Mac technician. Mekon Arch Consult, Kijitonyama. 1 August 2002 
 
 
Mobile phone acquisitions 
G.E.. Jangwani, Ilala. 6 August 2002 
 
M.B.. Grey Street on corner of Msimbazi Street. 7 August 2002 
 
S.A.. Msimbazi Road, Ilala. 6 August 2002 
 
 
7:2. Fieldwork, Phase Two (October 2002 – September 2003) 
 
The following semi-structured interviews or discussions are referenced in the text of 
the case study chapters. Depending on the informant’s wishes, these were usually 
conducted at the individual’s or group’s place of work, in a bar or at their home. A 
small number of the discussions were conducted in English, the rest in Swahili, 
usually with the help of a research assistant.1 
 
● Chapter Four, Perishable Foodstuffs 
 
Farmers 25 interviews with 15 different farmers: 
 
Angelo ‘Manigula’ Kilave. Angelo’s place, Mtitu village, Iringa Region. 18 March, 7 
May and 5 September 2003 
 
Bahati Mahenge. Roderick Mahenge’s farm, Mawambala village, Iringa Region. 8 
March 2003 
Berod Mhanga. Berod’s place, Ilula Mazomba village, Iringa Region. 28 March and 
4 September 2003 
 
Berod Pilla. Tomato packing station, Ilula Isele village, Iringa Region. 28 March 
2003 
 
                                                 
1 See section 2:15 for discussion on the use of a research assistant and section 2:12 on how I later 
conducted interviews without assistance. 
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Dominicus. Roadside, Kidamali village, Iringa Region. 6 September 2003 
 
Edward Sanga. Makosa Bar, Iringa and Edward’s place, Kidamali village, Iringa 
Region. 20 March and 6 May 2003 
 
Exoni & Mama Manitu. Exoni’s place, Mangalali village, Iringa Region. 19 March, 
15 May and 6 September 2003 
 
Francis Mbegalo. Francis’ place, Ukumbi village, Iringa Region. 18 March, 6 May 
and 5 September 2003 
 
Jimson Sanga. Jimson’s place, Ntokela village, Mbeya Region. 23 March 2003 
 
Jose Mwakatage. Potato storage depot, Uyole, Mbeya Region. 25 March 2003 
 
Lukelo Mahenge. Lukelo’s shamba and Lukelo’s place, Mangalali village, Iringa 
Region. 20 March and 16 May 2003 
 
Mrisho. Mrisho’s place, Ntokela village, Mbeya Region. 23 March 2003 
 
Nyambala. Cats Restaurant, Iringa. 20 March 2003 
 
Petro Lyelu. Roadside, Tosamaganga junction, Iringa. 6 September 2003 
 




Wafanyabiashara 6 interviews with 4 different wafanyabiashara: 
 
Emmanuel Wilson. Potato storage depot, Uyole, Mbeya Region. 22 May and 8 
September 2003 
 
Galuce & Msemwa. Container Bar, Njombe, Iringa Region. 26 March 2003 
 
Geoffrey Sanga. Kariakoo market basement, Dar es Salaam and Geoffrey’s place, 
Ntokela village, Mbeya Region. 15 January, 23 March and 23 May 2003 
 
 
Madalali 11 interviews with 5 different dalali: 
 
Festo Mkilama. Kariakoo market basement, Dar es Salaam. 15 January, 12 March 
and 17 September 2003 
 
Kamwene Benedict Mlelwa Sanga. Kariakoo market basement, Dar es Salaam. 15 
January and 17 April 2003 
 




Bartholomeo Sanga. Kariakoo market basement, Dar es Salaam. 11 January, 16 April 
and 17 September 2003 
 




Other informants include 21 interviews with 17 different individuals or groups: 
 
Alex Mzagila, transport worker. Rose Staki’s car, Iringa. 14 March 2003 
 
Arafa Ismaeli, huduma ya simu operator. Upper Mnasi Attended Call Centre, Uyole, 
Mbeya Region. 8 September 2003 
 
Austak Mushi, agro-inputs retailer. Masaleni Liner shop, Uyole, Mbeya Region. 25 
March 2003 
 
Charles Mboya, agro-inputs retailer. Mboya Agrochemicals shop, Uyole, Mbeya 
Region. 25 March 2003 
 
Davis Mahenge, agro-inputs retailer. Davis’ car, Uyole, Mbeya Region. 25 March 
2003 
 
Eliab Chijoriga, foodstuffs marketing expert and Director of Administration and 
Finance, Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). Eliab’s office, 
COSTECH. 3 and 6 January and 11 and 15 April 2003 
 
Gama Jordan, Organisation officer, ADP-Mbozi Trust Fund. ADP offices, Mbozi, 
Mbeya Region. 26 May 2002 
 
Gerald Mgaya, Liaison Officer, VECO. VECO offices, Mbeya. 21 May 2003. 
 
Joachim Kessy, Regional Supervisor of Agricultural Statistics, Mbeya Region. Kiti 
Moto Bar, Uyole, Mbeya Region. 22 and 24 March 2003 
 
Lorry drivers (11). Kidongochekundu lay-by for Southern Highland-bound lorries, 
Dar es Salaam. 14 April 2003 
 
Kuboja Ng’ungu, General Manager, KMC. Kuboja’s office, Kariakoo, Dar es 
Salaam. 27 August 2003 
Moses Makori, Senior accountant, KMC. Makori’s office, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam. 
27 August 2003 
 
Nicanor Omolo, Senior statistician, KMC. Omolo’s office, Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam. 
27 August 2003 
 




Swiga Wilson, huduma ya simu operator. Lower Mnasi Attended Call Centre, Uyole, 
Mbeya Region. 8 September 2003 
 
Taissamo, legal officer, KMC. KMC. 27 August 2003 
 
Tandy Boy, transport worker. Back of Chachu’s lorry, road between Mtitu and 
Kibaoni, Iringa. 18 March 2003 
 
 
● Chapter Five, Informal Construction Sector 
 
Gang-leaders 19 interviews (and a number of very informal discussions, principally 
at the ‘Inception “Leading Beneficiaries” workshop’, UNDP, Dar es Salaam, 24 and 
28 February 2003): 
 
Africanus Pius, Mnazi Mmoja Group/Umoja wa Wajenzi (concreting). Masai [sic] 
Café, Kariakoo. 26 June 2003 
 
Alex Gerson, Kitunda Construction (carpentry). Kitchen King Café, Yombo Vituka, 
Lumu. 10 July 2003 
 
Charles Matiku, Tujikomboe Group (engineering). Mealz, Mkwepu Street. 8 July 
2003 
 
Hamisi Yusuf, Kibaoni Plumbers (plumbing). KKM Bar, Tegeta. 27 June 2003 
 
Hassan Ndahili, Kasole Ubwele Group (carpentry). Mtoni Mtongani. 10 July 2003 
 
Iddi Mnyongea, Mbagala Group (welding). Transit Bar, Mwenge. 14 August 2003 
 
Imani Sunga, Limpopo [formerly Jua kali] Group (general building). Vetenary. 6 
August 2003 
 
James Cuthbert, Mkwajuni Group (materials supply, scrap metal). Viwanda Street, 
Gerezani. 10 July 2003 
 
Juma Simba, Chama cha Mafundi (general building). Dr. Tamba café, Mikumi 
Stand, Magomeni. 12 July 2003 
 
Karanje Suleman, Umoja wa Mafundi Kirumba (general building). Vasco da Gama 
Inn, Pugu Kajungeni. 11 July 2003 
 
Metod Bernard, Nguvu Moja Group (labour pool, kijiwe). Corner Camp Bar, 
Temeke. 9 July 2003 
 
Mohammed Ali, Umoja wa Mafundi Almunium [sic] (glass). Congo Street and 




Nordin Chopa, Kidimuni Group (materials supply, aggregate). Msomi Shop, 
Kipepeo, Mjimwema. 8 July 2003 
 
Obed Samwel, Kigamboni Group (painting). La Patisserie, Mkwepu Street. 8 July 
2003 
 
Peter Makoye, Sanet Group (general building). Peter’s house, Mjimwema. 8 July 
2003 
 
Salutare Minja, Mtu Kwao Group (carpentry). Landmark Hotel, Mandela Road, 
External. 27 June 2003 
 
Sulemani Vulale, Studio Electric (electrical). Sulemani’s shop, Studio. 30 June 2003 
 
Vitus Sangade, Umoja Workshop (general building). Marungura Bar, Kinyelezi. 11 
July 2003 
 
Zahoro Maganga, Bondeni Youth Group (general building). Vetenary. 6 August 2003 
 
 
Other informants include 
Abdi M. Hoza, former lower category formal sector contractor. Abdi’s car, Mombo, 
Tanga Region. 14 September 2003 
 
Arthur Jason, Tanzania National Construction Council (NCC). NCC, Dar es Salaam. 
22 March 2005 
 
Job Mbele, JKM MultiConsult: architecture and general contracting. Maili Moja, 
Kibaha, Dar es Salaam. 5 March 2003 
 
‘Jaffer’, formal sector category 1 contractor of Asian origin. Jaffer’s residence, Dar 
es Salaam. November 2002 
 
Jill Wells, formerly Bureau for Industrial Cooperation (BICO), University of Dar es 
Salaam and construction specialist, ILO. Sea Cliff Hotel, Dar es Salaam, 29 October 
2002 and Kentish Town, London, 13 August 2004 
 
Ninatubu Lema, BICO, University of Dar es Salaam. BICO, Dar es Salaam. 8 
January 2003 
Ramadan Mlinga, BICO, University of Dar es Salaam. BICO, Dar es Salaam. 8 
January 2003  
 







● Chapter Six, African blackwood carvings 
 
Carvers and carving groups 14 interviews with 11 different individuals or groups: 
 
Andrea Ukoti, Baymwone Carvings Co-operative. Group workshop, Masasi, Mtwara 
Region. 18 February and 22 July 2003 
 
Ally Mwalim, Bondeni Shop. Carving with group in back of shop, Mwenge crafts 
village, Dar es Salaam. 17 January 2003 
 
Augustino Mwimbe & Charles Mamba, Mwimbe Handicrafts Workshop Group. 
Sunset Bar, Dodoma. 5 February 2003 
 
Bakari. Bakari’s place, Zinga Kwa Mtoro, Bagamoyo. 29 January 2003 
 
Idanankalima Carving Group. Group workshop, Ndanda, Mtwara Region. 17 
February 2003 
 
Kostodi Ilikaume. Kostodi’s place, Kibaha, Pwani Region. 23 January 2003 
 
Makonde Carving Group. Group workshop, Chikundi, Mtwara Region. 17 February 
and 21 July 2003 
 
Mtongani Carving Group. Group workshop beside mosque, Mtongani, Dar es 
Salaam. 24 January 2003 
 
Ras Tindimo. Rented carving space outside shop, Mwenge crafts village, Dar es 
Salaam. 17 January 2003 
 
Saidi Lilama. Yarabi Salama Carving Centre, Kinyangu Market, Mtwara. 13 
February 2003 
 
Umoja wa Vijana Wachongaji wa Masasi (UVWIMA) Carving Group. Group 
workshop, Masasi, Mtwara Region. 18 February and 22 July 2003 
 
 
Collectors 10 interviews with 9 different individuals: 
 
Alex Milanzi. Alex’s place, Mbawala Juu, Mtwara Region. 18 July 2003 
 
Anna Mishiri. Baymwone Carvings Co-operative workshop, Masasi, Mtwara Region. 
18 February 2003 
 
Audax. Railway Line Bar, Vingunguti, Dar es Salaam. 14 January 2003 
 




Gaudance. Idanankalima Carving Group workshop, Ndanda, Mtwara Region. 17 
February and 21 July 2003 
 
Imakulata. Bar TBC, Mwenge. 17 January 2003 
 
Joka. Joka’s place, Zinga Kwa Awazi, Bagamoyo. 29 January 2003 
 
Maiko Bakari. UVWIMA Carving Group workshop, Masasi, Mtwara Region. 22 July 
2003 
 
Mangwana Sazari. Mangwana’s place, Chanika, Pwani Region. 21 January 2003 
 
 
Retailers / Exporters 15 interviews with 17 different individuals: 
 
Damaris Dandi, owner, shop 17, Mwenge crafts village, Dar es Salaam. Damaris’s 
place, Masaki, Dar es Salaam. 15 August 2003 
 
Frida, owner-manager of ‘La Botiki di Mami Dirado’, Kiwengwa, Zanzibar. Railway 
Line Bar, Vingunguti, Dar es Salaam. 14 January 2003 
 
Frank Morenje, owner-manager of ‘African Experience’ shop, building 70, Mwenge 
crafts village, Dar es Salaam. Frank’s shop. 1 August 2003) 
 
Gwalugano Ayubu & Kassanda Abdallah, Public Relations Manager & Marketing 
Manager, Nyumba ya Sanaa Arts House. Nyumba ya Sanaa, Ohio Street, Dar es 
Salaam. 31 July 2003 
 
Hamisi Geddy & Dickson Wiva, owner-managers, ‘Banana Fibre’ & ‘Tumaini’ 
shops, buildings 31D & 31A, Mwenge crafts village, Dar es Salaam. Various 
locations in Mwenge. 1 August 2002, 10 January and 1 October 2003 
 
Ismaeli Mungi, shop assistant, Kiwengwa beach shop, Kiwengwa, Zanzibar. 
Ismaeli’s shop. 30 January 2003 
 
Janet Mbene, occasional exporter. NDC Building, Dar es Salaam. 31 July 2003 
 
Justina Matondane, owner-manager of ‘Kiwawe’ shop, building 77, Mwenge crafts 
village, Dar es Salaam. Justina’s shop, and questions asked by research assistant; 1 
March 2003 and 14 October 2004, respectively 
 
‘Strattoni’, general manager of major handicrafts exporting company, Dar es Salaam. 
Stratonni’s shop. 14 August 2003. (Asked not to be identified). 
 
Mary Shirima, owner-manager of ‘Star Art and Craft Company’, shop 8. Mary’s 
shop, Mwenge crafts village, Dar es Salaam; Mary’s shop and car on way to 





Massimo, owner-manager ‘African Art’, New Bagamoyo Road, Mwenge. Massimo’s 
shop. 14 August 2003 
 
‘Mochiwa’ (Ahmadi Mnungwana), owner-manager of ‘Africa Authentic Handcraft 
Carving and Export’ shop and Secretary-General of Mwenge crafts village, building 
39, Mwenge crafts village, Dar es Salaam. Mochiwa’s shop, 13 August 2003 
 
Origenes Uiso, former carver and owner of ‘Karibu Art and Crafts’ shop, Samora 
Avenue, and ‘Karibu Art Gallery’, Bagamoyo Road, Dar es Salaam. Origenes’ shop. 
30 July 2003 
 
Paul Hokororo, occasional exporter. Paul’s place, Shangani West, Mtwara. 19 July 
2003 
 
Philipo Luvale, former carver and joint-director with Douglas McFalls of ADEA 
(Centre for African Development through Economics and the Arts), Magomeni, 
Mtwara. ADEA building, 14 and 16 February 2003 
 
 
Other informants include 
Davina Matemu, huduma ya simu operator, Mwenge crafts village, Dar es Salaam. 
Davina’s huduma ya simu stand. 1 August 2003 
 
Gavin Young, Business Development Manager for Sub-Saharan Africa, Visa 




Anonymous. Informal Sector Roadmap Study co-author. Strathclyde Graduate 
Business School, Glasgow, 29 July 2005 
 
Bill Sangiwa, Tembo World Ltd./AfriConnect (Tz) Ltd.. Jackie’s Bar, Msasani, 13 
March 2005 
 
David Sawe, Director, Management Information Systems and e-Government, 
President’s Office, Public Service Management. Jackie’s Bar, Msasani, 13 March 
2005 
 
Simbo Ntiro, Head of ICT, KPMG Tanzania. Jackie’s Bar, Msasani, 13 March 2005 
 
Theophilus Mlaki. Director of Information and Documentation, COSTECH. Mlaki’s 
office, COSTECH. 22 February 2005 
 
Vincent Msofe, Site acquisitions, Vodacom Tanzania Limited. Videx Video Shop, 





8 Appendix II: Telecommunications Systems 
Market Commentaries: mshindi soap and ‘mobitel’ 
women 
8:1. Basic telephone operators 
On the mainland the National Telecommunications Policy paved the way for the 
privatisation in June 2000 of the state-owned Tanzania Telecommunication 
Company Limited (TTCL), which was granted a four-year monopoly of the fixed 
line sector until February 2005.1 The government quickly sold 35% of its enlarged 
share capital for $120m to a consortium comprising MSI Cellular of the Netherlands 
and Deutsche Telepost Consulting GmbH (Detecon), a subsidiary of Deutsche 
Telekom, although a dispute over uncollected debts between incumbent telco TTCL 
and its strategic investor went to court in London (Balancing Act 2003d), and later 
reverted to government management after failure by TTCL to fulfil its obligations 
(Balancing Act 2005).2 It is rumoured that the government intends to sell another 
29% tranche of TTCL to international financial institutions (15%); national financial 
institutions (10%) and TTCL employees (5%). On Zanzibar, Zantel Telecom Limited 
(‘Zantel’) began offering services in 1999, with the smallest share (18%) owned by 
the Zanzibari government, and larger shares going to Etisalat (34%); Meeco 
International (24%) and Kintbury Investment (24%). In February 2005 the TCRA 
handed the company a licence to operate on the mainland when TTCL’s monopoly 
over the fixed line sector ended. Their operations in the mainland mobile phone 
market is now expected to lead to affordable tariffs to customers (Sultan 2005), 
especially since the company entered into an agreement of co-operation with 
                                                 
1 The Deputy Minister for Communications and Transport, Maua Daftari, is on record saying in May 
2004 that the TTCL exclusivity will not be extended (Cairo 2004). 
2 The move to replace the CEO with a Tanzanian (George Mbowe, a seasoned local CEO who is the 
immediate former chairman of the Presidential Parastatal Reform Commission (PSRC)) is seen by 
some as a move by the government to recover management control of TTCL, which had been 
surrendered to the strategic investor (PriMetrica 2003a: 200). 
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Vodacom Tanzania Limited in July 2005 whereby the former utilise Vodacom’s 
infrastructure on the mainland (Andrew 2005). 
 
8:2. Mobile cellular operators 
In addition to Zantel are three larger mobile operators, Celtel Tanzania Limited 
(‘Celtel’), MIC Tanzania Limited (‘Mobitel’) and Vodacom Tanzania Limited 
(‘Vodacom’), which all cover areas of the mainland and Zanzibar.3 The first operator 
was Milicom International Cellular (MIC of Luxembourg) who started providing 
cellular services as Mobitel in 1994, charging a $1,000 network connection fee, a 
daily service fee of $1 and between $1.25 and $1.50 for three minutes of airtime 
(Mbogora 2002) ( 
 
Figure 2). Tri Telecommunication Limited (‘Tritel’) then entered the market in 1996 
and by scrapping fees for receiving calls forced Mobitel to re-evaluate its charges. 
 
Figure 2: MIC Tanzania (Mobitel) coverage map, May 2005 
 
 
                                                 
3 I am grateful to Tania Harvey of PriMetrica, CIT Publications, for providing the Tanzania chapter of 
the Yearbook of African Telecommunications 2003 (PriMetrica 2003b) which some of this section 
draws from. For a brief history of the jostling between mobile phone companies in the early 
liberalisation period see also (Mbogora 2002). The official list of all licensed ICT operators and 
contractors is supplied at: http://www.tcra.go.tz/Market%20info/mobile.htm. 
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Significant changes only came to the market with the entrance in August 2000 of 
South African operator Vodacom (a subsidiary of Vodafone, the British market 
leader and world’s biggest mobile operator, in Tanzania as a joint venture with two 
local shareholders) who injected impetus into what had been a flagging mobile 
market (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Vodacom Tanzania coverage map, May 2005 
 
 
In the two years to the end of 2002 the subscriber base more than tripled to 618,000, 
and Vodacom quickly became the clear market leader with a 48% market share at the 
end of 2002 that grew to 49% by 2004 (Table 1).4 
Table 1: Mobile cellular market share by percentage of active subscribers 













TTCL 141,835  0.4 8.5 
Zantel Telecom Ltd. 70,847  0.2 4.3 
MIC (Tz) Ltd. 276,755 0.8 16.6 
Vodacom (Tz) Ltd. 816,169  2.4 49 
Celtel (Tz) Ltd. 360,977 1.0 21.6 
Total 1,666,583  4.8 100 
*An active subscriber is a customer who has made or received a call within the past 60 days.  
                                                 
4 The common names in Swahili for the three main operators in Tanzania are ‘Voda’, ‘Celtel’ and 
‘Mobi’ (also known as ‘Buzz’). 
 
 278
Source: Adapted from URT (2004b: 9), which is based on submission from operators. 
 
Celtel, the Dutch MSI Cellular’s brand name throughout Africa, has used the 
financial muscle of its parent company TTCL to launch an aggressive expansion 
programme that has seen it to rollout services to almost all the regions (Figure 4), 
aided by the signing in May 2005 of an agreement with Ericsson for the expansion 
and upgrade of its Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) network 
(TeleGeography 2005a).5 Both these operators benefited from Mobitel’s 
organisational hiccups attributable to the reorganisation of its parent company MIC. 
Tritel, which had been lagging behind, eventually ceased operations in February 
2003 after its licence was revoked by the then TCC. 
 
Figure 4: Celtel Tanzania coverage map, May 20056 
 
 
                                                 
5 The government is now aiming to ensure Celtel operates as an independent entity so that it can 
compete with other service providers on an equal footing (The East African 2005). Under the terms of 
a new possible $53 million investment deal, the roles of Celtel and the government’s TTCL will be 
redefined, with Celtel focussing on driving mobile operations and TTCL focussing on providing 
modern backbone infrastructure and broadband solutions (TeleGeography 2005c). 
6 Coverage maps downloaded from the website of the GSM Association at: 
http://www.gsmworld.com/roaming/gsminfo/index.shtml. The original maps at this address are 
clickable, allowing for zooming into the areas marked by coverage. I have altered the colour in these 
maps to correspond with the brand logo colours of the mobile phone operators (Celtel, red; Mobitel, 
yellow; Vodacom, green and blue) and to allow for better comparison in the merged map ( 
 
 
Figure 1, page 120). 
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8:3. Mobile cellular tariffs 
While Tanzania has no shortage of mobile phone operators when compared with 
other African countries, in the main, competition has not brought lower prices. 
Compared with mobile phone users in both Kenya and Uganda their counterparts in 
Tanzania pay the highest tariffs in the East Africa Community (EAC), with an 
average call costing almost 40 cents per minute.7 This is judged by analysts to have 
acted as a brake to individuals’ network subscription and has apparently restricted 
mobiles to the reserve of those living in the urban centres and with reasonable 
disposable income (PriMetrica 2003a: 201). 
 
One explanation for the high prices that is frequently voiced by ‘concerned mobile 
phone users’ and editors in the print media (e.g., Daily News 10 June 2003; e.g., 
Magubira 20 June 2002) is that, quite simply, both the government and the service 
providers are greedy. The retort of operators, particularly Vodacom (Kasumuni & 
Nyanje 2004), is their high operational costs, which are fuelled by high taxation and 
unnecessarily high interconnection charges levied by the TTCL. These charges came 
under scrutiny recently at a Public Hearing on Interconnection Rates (Karimjee Hall, 
Dar es Salaam, 22-23 September 2004), after which the TCRA has set 
interconnection charges to fall from $10 in October 2004 to $8.90 in March 2005, 
$7.90 in January 2006 and $6.90 January 2007 (URT 2004b) – a decision that has 
angered Vodacom who make no secret that they have felt strain of aggressive price 
cuts from its competitors (Vodacom 2005) and who have called for a lighter touch 
from the regulator in the long-term interests of the industry (Kasumuni & Nyanje 
2004). In tune with the government’s desire to lessen the digital divide by making 
ICT more accessible to a greater proportion of the population than at present (URT 
2003b), the TCRA’s rationale for reducing the interconnection charges is that it will 
lead to a decrease in retail prices, expand the market and subscriber base, increase 
data traffic volumes and so better utilise capacity and lead to lower costs and prices 
in the future (URT 2004b: 6). The mobile phone operators, it was argued, depend too 
                                                 
7 Calculated using TCRA’s telephone tariff list (URT 2004d), taking the mean average charges 
(exclusive of 20% VAT) made by Celtel, Mobitel and Vodacom operators for calls to own mobile and 
to other mobile networks. Curiously, despite mobile phone operators all now setting tariffs in 
Tanzanian shillings, TCRA still operates in United States dollars. 
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much on high interconnection rates and should instead focus on revenue from the 
services they provide to their subscribers.8  
 
Calls have also been made (Nyanje 2003b) for the mobile phone operators to adopt a 
uniform and more transparent tariff system. The first reason is because high prices 
are masked by billing in foreign currencies, the second because some would-be 
mobile phone users are discouraged by tariff differences that cannot easily be 
compared between operators who charge in United States dollars and those who 
charge in Tanzanian shillings (TSh).9 This has recently been settled by the mainland 
mobile phone operators, however, all of whom have responded to public criticism 
(Celtel was first) and now state tariffs in shillings (Muchumu 2003; Mwambande 
2004; The African 2003). Yet despite this move by the mobile phone operators and 
the government’s own move to reduce interconnection rates, a 5% excise duty on 
airtime has been in place since 2002, in addition to the chargeable VAT at 20% 
(PriMetrica 2003a: 201). 
 
The upshot of this situation is that many consumers are now looking for cheaper 
ways to communicate. As with mobile phone operators’ decision to state tariffs in 
shillings, all mainland mobile phone operators have also taken on board public 
pressure expressed in the media (e.g., (Guardian (Dar es Salaam) 2003b) and now 
offer subscribers the option – this time pioneered by Vodacom – to be billed per 
second (Cellular Online 2003; Guardian (Dar es Salaam) 2003c; Nyanje 2003a). 
Customers have also turned increasingly to short messaging service (SMS) in order 
to avoid the high call tariffs, offered by all operators as a value-added service. 
Mobitel (with mybuzz.co.tz) and Vodacom (Vodataarifa) have taken the further step 
of creative SMS products offering information services, although it is not known 
how popular these costly extras have been with the vast majority of their customers 
with low disposable incomes. 
 
                                                 
8 Claes Rosvall, TCRA Resident Advisor, at Public Hearing on Interconnection Rates, Karimjee Hall, 
Dar es Salaam, 22-23 September 2004, reported in (Guardian (Dar es Salaam) 2004b). 
9 All currency conversion from Tanzania shillings (TSh) to United States dollars ($) gives current 
prices using www.oanda.com/convert/classic for the date concerned. 
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8:4. Mobile cellular uptake and penetration 
Even with such relatively high prices, the mobile cellular operators have still 
managed to achieve impressive customer growth rates. From a base of 37,900 in 
1998, the subscriber rate rose to 180,000 in 2002 (ITU 2002) and then surged to 
800,900 by 2003, a compound annual growth rate of 88% over the five year period 
(ITU 2004b). And although that is still only 2.52% of Tanzanians, a recent study 
reveals that 97% of 223 respondents interviewed could access a mobile phone if they 
wished to, whereas only 28% could access a landline somewhere in the community 
(Samuel et al 2005: 45),10 while those regularly using the services of mobile cellular 
operators now stands at 85.7% of total phone subscribers (ITU 2004a). These figures 
alone would suggest that a deficit in a traditional infrastructure sector can in fact be 
‘leapfrogged’ by the development of new wireless information technologies (section 
1:23). Similar stories for other countries on the continent also add weight to the claim 
(Støvring 2004: 12) that the telecommunications sector in sub-Saharan Africa is 
indeed one of the most dynamic sectors of development, and is likely to attract more 
investment from foreign investors.11 
 
What sets the mobile cellular subsector apart from the once docile monopoly arena is 
liberalisation, which was absolutely necessary because in almost every sub-Saharan 
African country the national main operators could never reach acceptable penetration 
levels for the general population (Støvring 2004: 22). With liberalisation and the new 
technologies that fresh competitors brought to the market – technologies that incur 
bring only marginal costs when adding new subscribers – incumbent suppliers were 
provided with hitherto non-existent incentives to improve their quality of service, 
spurring longer-established mobile operators to upgrade their analogue networks to 
digital ones. Again, Tanzania is a point in case here when in July 2004 the Minister 
                                                 
10 This statistic seems unusually high, and the authors later qualify their results when adding that they 
make no claims for the sample being fully representative of the rural population in the communities 
they cover. 
11 Unknown. 2005. ‘Africa becomes acquisition target as subscriber growth continues’. Middle East 
and Africa Wireless Analyst. London, Informa Telecoms & Media. The article was obtained by e-mail 
as a GSM Africa mail circular authored from Corrie Thompson, 5 July 2005. The author of the article 
was not included in the e-mail and the journal (and website with journal listing) is only available at 
corporate rates to subscribers. 
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for Communications and Transport, Mark Mwandosya, issued a directive for TTCL 
to immediately change all their operating systems from analogue to digital (Marenga 
2004) – evidence of the theory (Støvring 2004: 23) that in this country at least 
multiple market entrants would serve to strengthen those charged with regulating the 
industry. 
 
Of equal importance to a credible regulator are the new operators who have acted as 
the main drivers of the boom and set the market dynamics. As the ITU (2001: 3) 
acknowledges, the lesson of the growth of the sector – and yet again Tanzania is an 
excellent example of this – is that it is not state-owned incumbents, multilateral 
donors and large multinational who are building Africa’s telecommunications 
networks. Instead, it is a new breed of pan-African mobile companies working with 
external investors, stringing together regional networks and shattering the 
conventional wisdom that the problem with Africa is a lack of investment.12 These 
niche operators ‘have dared to tread where larger companies will not’ (Economist 
2002), a message that the Sudanese-born Mohamed Ibrahim, founder and CEO of 
Celtel – who recently sold out an 85% share to the Kuwaiti cellco MTC-Vodafone 
for $2.84billion (TeleGeography 2005d) – has been keen to convey to the 
international media (e.g., Clark 2004; Cronin 2004b; Gikandi 2004).  
 
In Tanzania, Celtel, along with their rival entrants Mobitel and Vodacom, have all 
proved capable of erecting mobile cellular networks rapidly and have quickly proved 
claims (e.g., Ferguson & Ballantyne 2002: 15) that they would provide incumbent 
suppliers with a new inducement to expand infrastructure to previously neglected 
market segments. Much of the advertising of Celtel and Vodacom in particular seeks 
to emphasise these gains as their networks reach new areas of the country. True to 
the public’s interest in all three companies’ dealings (as we have pointed out in 
successful efforts to bring in per second billing in shillings), the companies have 
shown no qualms in approaching print media journalists to advertise ‘exclusive’ 
                                                 
12 External investors are willing to suddenly pull out, however, as was evidenced in June 2005 when 
Ericsson reversed its decision to invest in the regional connectivity programme of the Common 
Market for Southern and Eastern Africa (COMESA). COMESA is attempting to establish an 
18,000km fibre-optic and microwave network – Comtel – linking the networks of national 
telecommunications companies in 21 African countries (Southwood 2005). 
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articles about local coverage gains in new areas.13 As may be expected, this coverage 
is mainly concentrated in the largest towns and cities, and coverage reduces with 
distance from these centres. The pressure to grow and provide greater national 
coverage has now seen the companies begin to invest in networks not only along the 
country’s main artery roads but also linking smaller regional towns and villages 
where most Tanzanians live. In what is now almost a two-horse race to win over as 
many potential customers in new towns as possible, Celtel and Vodacom are 
gradually erecting thin lines of transmitting towers – known as base stations – that 
are increasingly criss-crossing Tanzania’s vast and varied landscape.14 Both 
companies have recently been commended for their efforts to roll out to rural areas, 
while Mobitel and TTCL have been criticised for being only urban-based.15 
 
8:5. Pre-paid services 
Clearly the mobile phone operators are investing for profit and not altruism, and so 
would not be investing if they did not see a prospective market for their services. In 
Tanzania this market is not because of a sudden realisation among many of the non-
elite of the potentialities of telecommunications. Rather, as the continent-wide 
commentary on telecommunications development by Henten et al (2004: 4) observes, 
under the monopoly system many people did not bother to even attempt to subscribe 
to services because they knew that the waiting lists were long and the services were 
poor. In Tanzania TTCL was privileging the elites, and even this monopoly service 
was poor at best. So when a more reliable service became available ordinary people 
jumped to the opportunity of being able to communicate without having to deal with 
corrupt staff who would often only offer services for a bribe. The figures reveal that 
                                                 
13 See Guardian (Dar es Salaam) (2003a; 2003d) for example, although the operators’ websites provide 
the most up-to-date information on coverage. In addition to buying media space to advertise their 
services, the mobile phone operators also manage to influence editors to print their apparently 
newsworthy stories about their latest promotions, competition draws and the like. One example is 
Guardian (Dar es Salaam) 2004c. 
14 See Cronin (2004a) on the local economic effects of the new base stations. 
15 Jansi Sinkamba (Marketing Executive, ATMA Electronic and Software Ltd., Dar es Salaam) at 
Public Hearing on Interconnection Rates, Karimjee Hall, Dar es Salaam, 22-23 September 2004 
(Guardian (Dar es Salaam) 2004b). 
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over 85% of total telephone subscribers are now cellular subscribers (ITU 2004b).16 
Yet mobile services are still generally more expensive for Tanzanian subscribers than 
fixed network services. A one minute fixed line local call in Dar es Salaam, for 
example, costs 4 cents, against the same call from a mobile phone which costs 40 
cents (URT 2004d). As Henten et al (2004: 4) note of other African countries, this 
suggests that segments of the population can indeed afford mobile services if they get 
the possibility to be quickly and fairly judged to be able to subscribe to a new 
service. The ITU (2001: 1) puts this rise in demand for services since the mid-
nineties down to a general growth of the African economies of 4% per year. 
 
Africa’s mobile phone operators reacted to the mistakes of the fixed line operators 
and quickly learnt that in order to make profit from the vast numbers of new but – 
relative to Northerners – poorer subscribers, they would have to cater to their 
customers’ lifestyles. Where fixed-line operators spent much of their energies 
chasing up post-paid subscribers on their bill payments (i.e., where the customer pays 
after using the service), the mobile phone operators quickly concentrated their 
marketing efforts on prospective pre-paid (‘scratch’) card customers who pay before 
using the service. By 2001 alone in Africa four out of every five subscribers were 
using pre-paid (almost twice the global average) (ITU 2001). Post-paid customers do 
account for a significant slice of Tanzanian mobile phone operators income (because 
they are less inclined to closely watch their phone use (Vincent Msofe, 27/07/04)), 
but the majority of new potential customers now lie among those who would not 
normally qualify for a post-paid service (i.e., do not have a street address, fixed 
identities, bank accounts and a regular income over a certain level). This does come 
at a cost to the pre-paid customer, however, since per-use costs tend to be less 
competitive than the fixed cost of post-paid subscription services. Yet in an economy 
                                                 
16 Tanzania’s figure is well above even the African average of 67% (ITU 2004b), and it is worth noting 
that of the total landlines operated by TTCL only 60% of these are active (PriMetrica 2004d). In 2003 
Africa became the first continent to have more mobile users than fixed line customers, by which time 
there were more than 52m mobile subscribers in the continent, 13m of which were added during that 
year, compared with around 24m landline customers (PriMetrica 2004a). Presumably, therefore, the 
comment made by the Minister for Communication and Transport, Mark Mwandosya, that Tanzania 
can achieve by 2008 its target outlined in the 1997 telecommunications policy of providing 
telecommunications access at the ratio of one telephone to six people by 2020 (as reported in Marenga 
2004) could be made thanks to the success of the mobile phone operators and not TTCL. On poor 
telecommunications services under TTCL before liberalisation, see Trulsson (1997: 125-126). 
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where cash upfront is generally the preferred means of payment, pre-payment does 
allow these individuals to have a mobile service where normally they would not have 
any easy access to a telephone, at the same time as it reduces the operators’ risk of 
bad credit.17 And as the price of making a call drops (as is laid out in the 
government’s ‘Determination on Interconnection Rates Among the Fixed and Mobile 
Telecommunications Networks’ (URT 2004b: 10)) so, in theory, more Tanzanians 
will be able to afford pre-paid services. The prize of most customers will probably go 
to the company that manages to attract customers in new rural areas by making their 
services available first and, countrywide, the company that manages to run their 
services efficiently and consistently offers low prices to its customers. As Mwijarubi 
(14 January 2003) has noted and Nielinger (2003a: 9) suggests from research in 
Tanzania, amid all the promotions these companies are offering in the battle to attract 
new subscribers, in low-income countries it is lower interconnection prices that wins 
customers. 
 
8:6. Style and the personal transactional economy 
Mobile phones are also popular in Tanzania because they are cool. The handset itself 
can be a mark of status for the owner and confer a certain sophistication, particularly 
in the rural areas where they are less common and suggest connection with the city. 
The city is the location to where material remittances in the form of handsets and 
other fashion items are sent from the North. In the Ghanaian capital Accra, the 
recipients are frequently those who have been termed digital flâneurs (Alhassan 
2004: 208-209), avant-garde, intelligent consumers seeking participation in 
modernity whose access to digital goods is not determined by the economics of their 
own labour but through gifts.18 Their Dar es Salaam counterparts are often the 
cosmopolitan children of the Tanzanian elite who themselves have had the 
opportunity to travel abroad and have returned home with the latest clothes and 
electrical goods. Digital flâneurs in Dar es Salaam can also be those who have strong 
                                                 
17 Most likely as a reaction to this, TTCL has recently launched a pre-paid system for fixed lines in 
Dar es Salaam (PriMetrica 2004d). 
18 Alhassan (2004: 208) provides an introduction to descriptions of Baudelaire’s 19th century Parisian 
flâneur, a transitory figure located in the city arcades, at the heart of modernity. 
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links to other social networks in the North and these friends or relatives bring these 
items as gifts on their visits home.19 
 
Following Ferguson’s (1999) description of ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals’ on the 
Zambian copperbelt, Mercer (2004: 14) suggests that the consumption of the internet 
in Tanzania can be interpreted as a cosmopolitan act in much the same way because 
it enables consumers to ‘reach out to and signify affinity with an outside world 
beyond the local’ (Ferguson 1999: 212). It is argued below that only a small elite are 
able to access the internet, so her assertion that this affects many young Tanzanians 
is not entirely accurate, but that the internet ‘highlights the excitement and kudos 
associated with forging connections to ‘other’ peoples and places’ (Mercer 2004: 15) 
does hold for the mobile phone too. In contrast to the internet which at its most 
public access point can only be visible to others in a cyber café, the mobile phone is 
a more desirable ICT for these cosmopolitans – if not to use, then to own. For them 
the mobile phone is a more displayable and (by its very definition) is a more mobile 
gadget that can be shown off to a greater number of people (or targeted individuals) 
in still more public of arenas such as the bar or on the street.20 To the flâneur the 
mobile phone is an embodiment of the experience with modernity, so much so that 
some people will walk with a dysfunctional handset on display in an attempt to 
participate, if only by simulation, in the increasing practice of digital consumption.21 
Whether functioning or not, a visible handset is status on display, although as in 
Britain the smaller (and therefore less visible phones) are the most sought after since 
they can imply the owner is wealthy, sophisticated and with-the-times. Again as in 
Britain, in Dar es Salaam a bulky handset is called a brick (tofari), or is given the 
                                                 
19 Gift-giving on trips back home for economic migrants or students who have worked part-time is an 
opportunity for the giver to perpetuate their reputation as a wealthy breadwinner. The reality hidden 
from their relatives is often that while their money goes far back in Africa, when abroad the giver 
works in some of the most demeaning of jobs where they have little chance to apply the skills they 
study at college and where their place in the new global division of labour is still very low.  
20 Wireless local area network application (WiFi) is now becoming available in some of the city’s fast 
food outlets and hotels, but there are few public places where owners would feel comfortable of openly 
using laptops without fear of being mugged. 
21 In Accra these ‘dummy’ phones are often sourced from North America where, in a bid to create a 
market, service providers have offered handsets for free or almost free. These are sent to relatives 
demanding mobile phones back home, but are not GSM compatible so cannot be used in Ghana 
(Alhassan 2004: 206).  
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local name of ‘mshindi’ after a popular brand of household soap sold in 12 inch 
blocks. In Accra the owner of the bulky handset is known as a ‘battle commander’, 
while in Lagos the person is called ‘super glue’ because their old phone cannot be 
prized out of their hand to purchase a more up-to-date version.  
 
It is difficult to tell whether concern over having the latest handset is generated by 
the fashion-conscious in Dar es Salaam who themselves judge what is cool and what 
is not, or whether demand is influenced within Tanzania by the mobile phone 
operators (whose marketing staff are often expatriate) or by foreign handset 
manufacturers. Most likely it is a combination of the two, although handset 
marketing outside Tanzania must also play a part in generating demand for what are 
often perceived as newer and ‘better’ European products. As with BMW and 
Mercedes cars, handsets produced by European-owned companies such as Ericsson 
and Nokia are more desirable to many Tanzanians because they are seen to be better 
made – even where the reality is that the components are sourced from the Far East 
and only some part of some models are manufactured in Europe. The marketing, 
which is far more visible and doubtless influences a greater number of customers into 
using mobile telephony than the handset manufacturers and fashion-setters, is carried 
out by the mobile phone operators themselves in conjunction with advertising 
agencies. As with handsets, mobile phone services in Tanzania are frequently 
marketed as something cool, in a similar style as cigarette advertising with visual 
images in newspapers, on television and billboards are of beautiful, successful 
urbanites – entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs alike.22 The themes on the 
advertising hoardings and front-page banners promote an operator’s new area of 
coverage, advertise new services or simply explain how calling (which yields the 
                                                 
22 See Stewart (2004) on how in the North the parallels between mobile phones and cigarettes stretch 
much further, and 
http://www.vodafone.com/mc_search_results/0,3227,FNC%253D2%2526MT_ID%253Dim%2526CA
TEGORY_ID%253D211%2526LANGUAGE_ID%253D0%2526CONTENT_ID%253D-205,00.html 
for evidence that Vodafone UK might rightly be called ‘the new Marlboro’. (Vodafone UK owns 35% 
of Telkom, a 50% owner of Vodacom, and which is likely to be rebranded in future into ‘Vodafone 
Africa’ (Masango 2005)). 
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companies more revenue than texting) can keep users in touch with friends and 
family.23 
 
The mix of what influences potential customers to use a particular brand is complex 
and space does not allow for such an analysis here but, taken with the perceived and 
real uses of mobile telephony, there is little doubt that image is all important to many 
urbanites. As the owner of a small restaurant in Dar es Salaam explained in a 
comment that could equally have been said by a British parent, he thinks that image 
is especially important for the youth:  
 
…for the youth these days it’s important for them to show that they have money, so 
they buy these expensive things like mobile phones, wasting their money, so their 
friends and girls will think they’ve got a lot of money. Not like us [of his generation], 
who save the money we earn. They’re wasting their money on mobile phones and these 
expensive things like the [Timberland] boots my son wears. (Owner, Farmer’s View 
restaurant, Kijitonyama, 24/08/03) 
 
It is not only to the urban youth that mobile phones have become weapons in what 
Appadurai (1986: 21) and later MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000: 137) 
describe as ‘tournaments of value’ in the construction of reputation and status. One 
successful Chagga architect in his mid-forties who owned a mobile phone that was so 
expensive its theft featured in a newspaper article (Keregero 2002), always makes a 
point of upgrading to the latest handset on his trips abroad, ‘…so that I can organise 
myself well and I don’t look like a peasant [mshamba] when I’m doing my business’ 
(Moses Mkony, 27/07/02). Moses purchased his first mobile phone in 1999 but, 
relative to the early pioneer customers such as Abdi Hoza and Jaffer (chapter five) 
for whom the costs of running a mobile phone in Dar es Salaam were tremendous 
                                                 
23 One of the most original adverts which ran for a number of years was a huge Vodacom billboard on 
the main road heading to Dar es Salaam’s most affluent areas of housing depicting a lion with the 
slogan, ‘The Lion Rules the Serengeti. Vodacom Rules the Rest’. Shortly after this advert was posted 
Celtel posted their own with a young Maasai warrior on a mobile phone with the slogan, ‘Lion’s 
Nightmare’ (and a rather patronising, ‘We’ve got him talking’ in smaller text at the foot). Another 
advert that ran for a shorter period at the exit to Dar es Salaam International Airport advertised 
Siemens with two panels, the left panel with a handicrafts producer in a rural area, the right panel of a 
buyer in an urban setting and a mobile phone connecting the two.  
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and the status of owning one was equally high, it is increasingly felt (e.g., Mbogora 
2002) that in Dar es Salaam mobile phones are no longer a sign of such wealth 
because these days they are so easy to get hold of and more affordable to run. But 
this has deterred neither Moses nor Abdi, who both attempt to better their opponents 
by regularly purchasing the most expensive phones in a tournament resembling the 
consumer habits of Zimbabwean elites during the post-war economic expansion who 
sought status in expenditures on automobiles and the consumption of ‘European’ 
lager beers (Burke 1996: 183). Both Abdi and Moses would fit into this top income 
quintile being members of the wealthy, Mercedes-Benz -owning elite known as the 
‘wabenzi’ (Shivji 2005) who each own more than one top of the range cars and who 
insist on the most expensive products money can buy.24 Moses, for example, only 
drinks Heineken, by far the most expensive beer on the Tanzanian market. 
 
It is this market where it is rumoured that the mobile phone operators have begun to 
make inroads into reaching people’s disposable income that for many has hitherto 
been spent on beverages (both alcoholic and non-alcoholic). The drinks companies 
have apparently been concerned for some time, however, that they are making less 
profit because Tanzanians are spending their money on airtime instead.25 The 
challenge to Coca-Cola and South African Breweries has come in successful bids for 
the sponsorship of popular events imitating European versions, such as the Vodacom 
football league and beauty contests. Throughout the county Vodacom has now taken 
the place of Coca-Cola in providing branded road signs, and both Celtel and 
Vodacom are replacing beer companies in providing bus shelters. Vodacom has even 
managed to convince COSTECH – the government’s main research body into ICT – 
to allow them to paint the COSTECH building with Vodacom’s distinctive brand 
colour scheme, minus only their operating name, and thus giving the perception that 
the government favours the mobile phone operator over its rivals. Yet where in other 
                                                 
24 The wabenzi phenomenon has recently been discussed in the British press in relation to what Bob 
Geldof has referred to as ‘the corruption thing’. See, for example, Hartley, A. 25 June 2005. ‘How 
African Leaders Spend their Money’. The Spectator. London. 
25 Hard evidence is obviously difficult to obtain from the drink companies themselves. One well-
placed source informs me that the board papers of an organisation potentially investing in mobile 
phones in Nigeria reveal that sales of Coca-Cola dropped significantly when mobile phone airtime 
vouchers entered the market. Personal communication by telephone with senior British academic and 
international development adviser, 9 May 2005. 
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parts of Africa product branding has been such that in Zimbabwe toothpaste has 
threatened to become ‘Colgate’ (Burke 1996: 213) in the same way as in Britain the 
vacuum cleaner has become ‘Hoover’, no mobile phone operator has yet managed to 
achieve such intense brand identification that their name is used as the generic name. 
The closest example of another good or service in Tanzania is the petrol station, 
which is always ‘Sheli’ even if it is owned by Caltex or Oilcom, but the mobile 
phone has only been used in less flattering parlance. In Dar es Salaam slang, a 
physically small and attractive women who can be readily ‘displayed’ in public is 
known as ‘portable’, ‘mobile’ or, after the first GSM operator, ‘mobitel’. 
 
The sexuality of these ‘mobitel’ women – or, for that matter, any other women – is 
often their best and only resource to bargain with (Wight 2005). In Tanzania, as 
across much of Africa, transactional sex is common and by no means comparable to 
or associated with prostitution (Silberschmidt & Rasch 2001: 1821-1822), so sex is 
often given by girlfriends to boyfriends or ‘sugar daddies’ in return for gifts (Dinan 
1983) which can be listed as ‘the C’s’: use of a car, chicken, and the latest popular 
item to be exchanged for sex – a cell phone (Dale 2003).26 Cash, of course, is also on 
this list, although credit for mobile phone airtime is an increasingly acceptable form 
of payment as more cell phones enter circulation.27 
 
The handsets given as gifts need not necessarily be new, for recipients are often 
grateful for any means of communicating – possibly in networking with others who 
may act as future sources of gifts. Indeed that Tanzanians living in rural areas are 
willing to pay on average 50,000 shillings (approximately $50) for a handset 
(Scanagri 2005: 7) when a new mobile cannot easily be purchased for this price 
                                                 
26 Dale (2003) documents how in Zambia young girls are willing to have unprotected sex with much 
older men in exchange for the latest mobile phone and a steady flow of top-up airtime cards. She 
quotes Chileshe Banda, a young girl who says, “Many of the girls at my school want those small cell 
phones, not the big ones, and the only way to get them is to have sex, often without a condom, with 
these older men.” That poverty is not always the motivation, however, can be seen in a very similar 
case from Japan where girls from middle-class backgrounds involved in enjo kosai (‘compensated 
dates’, prostitution involving high-school students and middle-aged men) usually spend their 
discretionary income on expensive designer clothes and use it to pay their keitai (cellular phone) bills 
(Kingston 2004: 26-27). 
27 HIV/AIDS prevention projects have tried to add condoms to the list of ‘C’ items that their research 
reveals many young African women have a particular interest in (Kesby 2004). 
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suggests that second-hand phones must be acceptable to many users.28 As users 
upgrade to new models, old mobile phones are also commonly recycled through 
friends and relatives, but purchased handsets are frequently acquired from the 
flourishing ‘not-new’ (i.e., reconditioned and/or stolen, in Tanzania or abroad) and 
‘not-original’ (i.e., counterfeit) mobile phone market that operates in Dar es Salaam 
and which can supply almost any mobile phone to order.29 As with much of the 
informal economy it is impossible to know the scale of this trade since it is difficult 
to know the legitimacy of a handset that is not purchased from an accredited dealer.30 
 
It is widely known across Dar es Salaam, however, that many ‘not-new’ handsets 
that are sold in the city are stolen. Some are stolen in Britain and exported by gangs 
to Africa (BBC 2003), a trade that one mobile phone fundi alluded to when he 
explained that ‘second-hand’ mobiles he obtains from a Zanzibari refugee in the 
southern English town of Reading (where a large Tanzanian population resides) are 
shipped to Dar es Salaam via Zanzibar and concealed inside refrigerators stored in 
containers (Nangumbi, Mchafukoge, 02/08/02). To meet a huge demand for the 
mobile phones that police believe fuel crime in Dar es Salaam (Hangi 2002) other 
handsets are stolen in armed raids that specifically target shops selling mobile phones 
(Guardian (Dar es Salaam) 2004a), by pickpockets who target customers at daladala 
(commuter bus) stops (Kamwaga 2002) and recently in a spate of druggings in 
Oyster Bay where the owner was found to be colluding with thieves waiting outside 
her bar.31 
                                                 
28 Prices vary between sellers, with one interviewed pickpocket willing to part with a Siemens C25 (in 
UK worth almost $80 new in 2002) for as low as TSh20,000 (then $21.50), while his colleague would 
not sell the same model for less than TSh50,000 (then $53.80) (Jamhuri Street, 31/07/02 and Congo 
Street, 07/08/02). 
29 In July 2005 the Kenyan government announced plans to ban GSM handset manufacturers from 
‘dumping’ refurbished handsets in the Kenyan market (TeleGeography 2005b). The reasons for this 
are not clear as of 7 July 2005. 
30 Motorola, the world’s second-largest handset-maker, has in July 2005 agreed to supply up to 6m 
handsets, with a standby time of two weeks, for less than $40 each. A month earlier, Philips, the 
Dutch electronics firm, announced a new range of chips designed to take handset costs below $20. 
Nevertheless, as Kai Oistamo of Nokia (the world’s largest handset-maker) notes, people in poor 
countries still have to spend a far larger proportion of their income than those in the rich world to buy 
even the cheapest brand (Economist 2005a). 
31 Moves are being made to block stolen phones (Balancing Act 2003c), but Dar es Salaam’s informal 





Thanks to this thriving informal economy of mobile phone acquisition and sale, the 
challenge with mobile phones is now perhaps no longer one of persuading people to 
use the technology and acquiring the necessary hardware, but one of making 
interconnection affordable for more users and potential users. Another challenge is 
how investments in wireless networks can be leveraged to provide affordable access 
to the internet, which we now turn to.  
 
8:7. The emergence of the internet in Africa 
Although the internet is now not as widespread in terms of access to the population 
as cellular telephony, in Tanzania, as across much of Africa, the internet preceded 
the mobile phone explosion, having had greatest impact at the top end of business 
and in wealthy families, primarily in the larger urban areas. Ironically, however, in 
Africa it was academic institutions and NGOs of the non-profit sector that pioneered 
the use of the internet in the early 1990s, fuelled by their need for low cost 
international communications, and only later was the internet taken up by private 
ISPs and national telecom operators (Jensen 2003: 66). 
 
8:8. Data service operators and ISPs 
Data services in Tanzania used to be the preserve of Datel, a former subsidiary of 
TTCL, but the TCRA has issued five further public data communication services 
licences to Wilken Afsat, Equant Tanzania, Simba Net Tanzania, Soft Tech 
Tanzania, and Fastcom Africa, and these companies are now allowed to install 
infrastructure for data communication purposes. International VSAT32 services are 
permitted and at least three operators have been granted licences. ISP licences lasting 
for a period of five years have been granted to 21 companies, of whom the main 
actors (with subscriber estimates by Balancing Act (2003d)) are: Raha.com (which 
has sold a 50% share to Computacentre, one of Tanzania’s largest PC dealers, 3000); 
                                                 
32 Very Small Aperture Terminal, a two-way satellite communication system with very small dishes 
(antennas) about one metre across that use a specific frequency (Ku-band). 
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Catsnet (2500); Internet Africa (2200); Africa Online (2000); Tele2 (formerly Cyber 
Twiga and bought by Mobitel, 1000); University of Dar es Salaam (500); Habari.net 
(Arusha, 450) and Zanzinet (250). These companies, among other smaller ISPs, 
supply to 5,534 internet hosts (that is, the number of computers directly connected to 
the worldwide internet network), of whom it is thought only around 1,500 of these 
subscribers are outside Dar es Salaam (Balancing Act 2003d). Together they account 
for 250,000 internet users nationwide, covering around 200,000 PCs (ITU 2004c). 
 
These figures are very different from the estimates of internet subscribers for 
Tanzania (which vary widely from between 15,000 and 20,000 (Balancing Act 
2003d)), and this disparity owes much to the fact that a comprehensive study of the 
diffusion of the internet in Tanzania is yet to have been conducted. As with many 
other African countries, the task of measuring the total number of internet users in 
Tanzania is compounded by the large number of shared accounts, along with the 
relatively high and rapidly growing use of public access services. And as Jensen 
(2002) notes, while for many African countries the number of dialup subscriber 
accounts is readily available, these figures are only a partial gauge of the size of the 
internet sector and should be looked at along with other factors such as the quantity 
of international traffic each country generates.33 
 
8:9. The internet market: private customers, pricing and connections 
At present the three main customers within the internet post-paid market are the 
mining, banking and NGO sectors, and hopes are high that government will be the 
next new big customer. The corporate market, however, estimated at 250 companies, 
is currently the area of greatest competition as more companies are being attracted 
into Tanzania by the liberalised economy growing at a GDP growth rate of 5.6% 
(World Bank 2004b). Within the pre-paid market, Raha.com now offers a pre-paid 
scratch card system which nearly all its individual subscribers use, although growth 
in internet users has been hit hard by the doubling of TTCL’s rates to TSh40 (4 
cents) a minute (Balancing Act 2003d). Nevertheless, overall Tanzania’s internet and 
                                                 
33 Detailed guidelines for such an enterprise are provided by Wolcott et al (2001). 
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data markets have shown continuous, if unspectacular, growth since the mid-1990s – 
and this is only now showing signs of slowing down (Balancing Act 2003d). 
 
Internet access rates in Tanzania vary between $30-50 per month plus the charge for 
phone access time, while wireless charges are slightly higher (because of additional 
equipment costs) and achieve an average bandwidth speed of 64 kbps outgoing and 
256 kbps incoming. In 2003 the international internet bandwidth connected to 
African countries rose by 67%, but despite this growth Africa’s share of global 
internet capacity remained virtually unchanged at 0.2% (PriMetrica 2004b) – while 
the rest of the world has continued to expand at a much faster rate (McKemey et al 
2003). Karl Socikwa, CEO of South Africa’s parastatal Transtel, argued at the Africa 
Telecom 2004 conference that because of this growth outside Africa, broadband must 
be the African continent’s aim: ‘Just as the growth of mobile is closing the gap 
between developing and developed countries in basic telephony, so the lack of 
broadband access is widening a new digital divide.’ (Berger 2004)34 
 
Tanzania has recently made great improvements in its connection speeds with the 
launch of the Tanzania internet eXchange (TiX) which acts as a shortcut to the 
internet by using the fastest route possible to connect peering ISPs to each other, and 
effectively resembles a ‘Tanzanian’ internet.35 By July 2004 the exchange had 
attracted nine peering ISPs: Raha, Africa Online, SimbaNet, Cats-Net, Bank of 
Tanzania, SatCONet, COSTECH, BOL, and AfSat (Habicht 2005). TiX holds the 
potential savings in the order of $3,000 per month, has greatly improved the potential 
for local content development and hosting (over half of which for Africa is still 
connected to Europe (PriMetrica 2004b)) and has already made access to local 
content up to 60-times faster. The price for internet users is unlikely to drop until 
local content rises, however; which creates something of a chicken and egg situation 
                                                 
34 I thank Sara Rich-Dorman, Department of Politics, University of Edinburgh for bringing this article 
to my attention. 
35 This section benefits from a lengthy discussion with senior members of the eThinkTankTz: Simbo 
Ntiro (Head of ICT, KPMG Tanzania), David Sawe (Director, Management Information Systems and 
e-Government, President’s Office, Public Service Management) and Bill Sangiwa (Tembo World 
Ltd./AfriConnect (Tz) Ltd., and regarded as the founder of the internet in Tanzania). Jackie’s Bar, 
Msasani, 13 March 2005. 
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given that in order for local content to develop in Swahili (which is where demand 
lies) a fast connection is required. The service should improve if SimuNet, TTCL’s 
data company, joins the exchange because the company has the infrastructure to 
extend services beyond Dar es Salaam, although they have continued to show 
reluctance (Hare 2004). Their lack of enthusiasm may well be because, as Socikwa 
notes of incumbents across the continent, these operators ‘are often the fiercest critics 
of disruptive technologies and will often choose not to deploy appropriate 
technologies for fear of eroding their existing revenue and infrastructure base.’ 
(Berger 2004)36 
 
8:10. Points of public access to the internet 
If TiX does lower prices, for all but a tiny majority of Tanzanians the cost of using 
the internet will still be such that it is simply not possible to gain access at home – 
even if electricity and other infrastructural necessities were abundant. For many 
Tanzanians the insurmountable costs of private access places them at the far end of a 
much larger domestic digital divide for the internet than for the mobile phone. 
Personal ownership of handsets is attainable for a larger section of the population 
than personal ownership of all the equipment required to be online at home. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Tanzania is witnessing the emergence of what Alhassan 
(2004: 196) sees in Accra as a ‘digerati’, a new elite of digitally literate individuals 
who can afford frequent access to the internet.  
 
In theory (e.g., Gómez et al 1999), points of public access to telecommunication and 
information services serve to bridge this domestic digital divide by offering access 
without transferring to the user the costs of purchasing the required equipment. These 
points of public access to the internet and other services including telephony, known 
as ‘telecentres’, were first were established in Scandinavia in the mid 1980s 
(Oestmann & Dymond 2001) and have subsequently been copied elsewhere. In 
developing countries this has been most notable since the mid-1990s after a call from 
                                                 
36 This view is shared by one of Tanzania’s foremost telecommunications analysts who is involved in 




the ITU that led to the Buenos Aires Action Plan (1994-1998) to ‘develop best-
practice, sustainable and replicable models of ways to provide access to modern 
telecom facilities and information services, particularly to people in rural and remote 
areas’ (Ernberg 1998). Two main types of telecentre now exist in Tanzania in the 
form of donor-funded telecentres and micro-enterprise telecentres.37 
 
8:11. Donor-funded telecentres 
Large donor-funded telecentre initiatives in Tanzania include internet access points 
at refugee camps in Kasulu (Kigoma Region) (see Nielinger 2003b) and Ngara 
(Kagera Region), and village ICT projects in Dakawa (Morogoro Region) and 
Lugoba (Bagamoyo Region). All these projects are overseen by COSTECH, which 
also receives support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 
the International Telecommunications Union and UNESCO for its Multipurpose 
Community Telecentre (MCT) in Sengerema (Mwanza Region) in an initiative that 
offers public access to internet-connected computers, photocopying, secretarial 
services and telephones as one of six MCT pilot projects located in small and 
medium-sized towns across Africa.38 Opened in December 2001 and planned to run 
on financial assistance from donors for three years, by 2003 Sengerema’s internet 
café offered six internet-connected PCs, a printer, and secretarial services, and 
housed two training rooms where a further 15 computers were located, and offices 
(Mercer 2004: 5). Yet as at the beginning of the decade when it was reported that no 
donor-funded telecentres have proved to be sustainable and capable at best of 
covering operating costs (Benjamin 2000a), Sengerema has not been able to buck the 
trend. As the three-year project funding draws to an end, there are plans for financial 
contributions beyond those initially made by local business, community and 
government leaders to be stretched now to a district-wide household levy to keep the 
                                                 
37 Further to this basic distinction made by Benjamin (2000a), the IDRC has developed a brief 
typology of telecentres that depicts six main categories: Basic telecentre, Telecentre franchise, Civic 
telecentre, Cybercafé, Multipurpose community telecentre, and the Phone shop. Colle (2000: 424-426), 
suggests that to this list two additional models can be added: the Communication Technology Centre 
and the Community Communication Shop.  
38 Assistance is also provided by UN’s Special Initiative on Africa and the African Information Society 
Initiative. The other pilots are Malanville, Benin; Timbuktu, Mali; Manhiça and Namaacha, 
Mozambique; Nakaseke, Uganda.  
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project alive, despite the development project being too expensive for the majority 
population to use it (Mercer 2004: 13).39 
 
8:12. Entertainment centres for the cyber elite? 
By contrast to funded telecentres, micro-enterprise telecentres – more popularly 
known in Tanzania, as in the north, as ‘internet cafés’ – have no explicit commitment 
to wider developmental goals. In Dar es Salaam these are all private and are often 
family-run ventures of just one café, based in rented premises. The businesses started 
by offering basic telephone services and then moved rapidly into fax and internet 
services as the market developed. No figures exist on the number of internet cafés in 
Tanzania, however, with the government stating that they ‘are reputed to be over 
1,000, more than any sub-Saharan African country’ (URT 2003b: 7). According to 
Miller Esselaar (2001: 17), estimates by industry insiders for the number of internet 
cafés in Dar es Salaam range from 100 to 1000, and their assessment that the most 
realistic estimate is probably something in the region of 300-400 seems about right 
for the time their survey was conducted in 2000.40 This figure may have at least 
doubled by now, although many cafés find it hard to survive with the high costs for 
electricity and I.P. addresses and either close down or are forced to increase their 
prices. This was the case for Interwebbers internet café in Dar es Salaam, which 
changed hands three times in two years and was only able to survive a little longer by 
illegally sub-renting their I.P. address to two neighbouring cafés.41 And where 
income only through internet sales is almost equivalent to the ISP fees, others have 
survived through exploiting the demand for cheap international telephony by quietly 
offering VoIP to known customers – a service that until recently was illegal.42 Where 
                                                 
39 For work on the Sengerema MCT, see also Nielinger (2003b) and Nnafie (2002). 
40 A similar estimate was given by the owners of two internet cafés interviewed for Tanzania’s 
Channel Ten Facets television programme, broadcast on 20 July 2002. Nnafie (2002: 41) puts the 
figure at around 250 nationwide, with over half of these in Dar es Salaam, and Balancing Act (2003d) 
gives similar estimates.  
41 Interview with Joseph Kifunta, manager of Interwebbers internet café, Jamhuri Street, Dar es 
Salaam, 27 July 2002. The café had shut down altogether when I revisited it in 2005. 
42 Voice Over Internet Protocol (i.e., internet telephony) was prohibited by the regulator until February 
2005; again, it is thought by some analysts, because the government feared the challenge to its existing 
revenue base. (Simbo Ntiro, Jackie’s Bar, Msasani, 13 March 2005). Operators still need to work with 
licensed international gateways to stay within the regulations (Balancing Act 2004d). 
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these services are not offered, business failure in both urban and rural areas has been 
fairly high ever since internet cafés first started to become popular in the late 1990s. 
A nationwide study by COSTECH (URT 2002c: 10), for example, shows how three 
internet cafés in a rural location operating from 1999 all closed by October 2001 
because of exorbitant dial-up connection costs, while in Dar es Salaam a number of 
the internet cafés visited while conducting initial research in Dar es Salaam during 
2002 had closed by the time they were revisited in 2003. Nevertheless, by 2005 new 
internet cafés under different management have again cropped up in the same and 
different premises across the city. As expected, the greatest density of internet cafés 
is in the middle of Dar es Salaam, to then thin out with distance from the centre. The 
most appropriate way of describing from casual observation the spread of the many 
internet cafés across the city is to say that they tend to be located along or nearby the 
most popular larger roads covered by the local daladala bus network, and since this 
means of transport is often used by commuters, the cafés can also be found in 
middle-income residential areas such as Chang'ombe, Kijitonyama, Magomeni and 
Sinza. From casual observation it seems that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the poorer 
residential areas such as Manzese, Mbagala, Mwananyamala and Tandika appear to 
be less well connected.  
 
The features of the internet cafés are fairly standard, with several computers that are 
connected to the internet and which are often divided by boards between the 
terminals, situated in an air-conditioned room with chairs for waiting in. 
Photocopying and printing and usually provided, as are rudimentary secretarial 
services, often offered by a (young and usually female) secondary school or college-
educated assistant who may hold a certificate covering the range of basic Microsoft 
applications. In some internet cafés drinks and snacks are served by the assistant. As 
well as acting as a typist and waitress, the assistant can often usually offer help to 
beginners and give instructions to customers who face problems when browsing. It is 
the assistant to whom customers turn to seek help, and not customers or other ‘local 
experts’ known to them for, apart from students who frequently come with friends, 
other customers tend to come alone so do not have a companion to ask for help. 
When the internet café staff themselves need help with problems that they are unable 
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to fix they turn either to the ISP if it is a network problem, or a local fundi if it is a 
problem with a virus or with hardware. These technicians, who usually have at least 
I.T. certificates in computer maintenance and are almost exclusively male, tend to 
have been initially located by the owners of the business. The technicians do not 
usually stay in a single café, instead providing an on-call service only when there is a 
problem. The source of problems is frequently caused by viruses that are transmitted 
through customers accessing games and pornography websites. The other frequent 
problem in internet cafés is power failures and poor network connections, both of 
which cause much inconvenience for customers in terms of time wastage and when 
data is lost.43 
 
Despite the existence of internet cafés in most areas of Dar es Salaam, they are still 
out of reach to the majority of the population since an hour’s surfing in one of the 
city’s cafés at the typical price of around TSh1,000 is roughly equivalent to an 
average Tanzanian’s daily income.44 This suggests that even those who can afford to 
access Dar es Salaam’s public internet facilities are a minority, members of a group 
who have been referred to elsewhere in East Africa (Mwesige 2004) as the ‘cyber 
elite’.  
 
Mwesige’s study sees the typical Ugandan internet café user as a young educated 
male who not only has the disposable income but also the wherewithal to be online 
(2004: 99).45 This closely resembles his counterpart in Dar es Salaam who is often a 
male student in his teens or early twenties, is capable of reading and writing some 
English, and who can afford to access the internet in a café at least weekly.46 That he 
                                                 
43 After a number of frustrating months spent having to negotiate with intermittent connections in 
many of my local internet cafés I established friendships with staff at COSTECH who kindly allowed 
me as a researcher, friend and neighbour to use their offices and connect my computer directly to their 
much more reliable electricity and internet connections. 
44 Based on a per capita GDP of $290 (World Bank 2004b), or 80 cents per day. Half hour prices are 
also available, varying from 20-70 cents. Some internet cafés are more competitively priced by the 
hour, offering prices as low as 50 cents. Hotels frequented by Northerners, on the other hand, charge 
anything up to $8 an hour. 
45 On the use of internet cafés in Uganda, see also Gitta & Ikoja-Odongo (April 2003). 
46 This and the following observations are based on the mid-2002 survey (section 2:4 and Appendix I) 
and are supported by similar studies of telecentres in Tanzania conducted by Mungunasi (2000), 
Nnafie (2002), Nielinger (2003b), Balancing Act (2003d) and Mercer (2004). They also closely match 
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is fairly well educated and has access to disposable income would therefore set him 
apart from the average Tanzanian as one of the cosmopolitan African, Arab or Asian 
Tanzanian elite. Indeed, he may resemble more closely a member of the Senegalese 
internet café clientele – ‘individuals of some means, and young people from 
financially well-off families, for whom surfing the net at a cybercafé is a “must”’ 
(Sagna 2000: 44) – than one of his own country folk who cannot afford to access the 
internet. As in this example from Senegal, and in Uganda where Mwesige (2004: 99) 
argues that these individuals are not the country’s average ‘ordinary’ citizens, so too 
in Tanzania internet cafés may actually be increasing the domestic digital divide (as 
predicted by Benjamin 2001) by effectively excluding a large section of those who 
are not the elite or upper-middle income earners from gaining regular access to the 
internet. Although there is no hard evidence to support the notion that this is because 
prices are too high for those below the upper-middle income bracket to partake, 
Mercer’s (2004: 12) survey of Sengerema town shows that those who are excluded 
from using the internet café tend to be engaged in informal, low paid economic 
activity. This is surely true also for informal sector operators in Dar es Salaam who, 
as we discover in chapter four’s exploration of the use of ICT by workers in the 
city’s construction industry, use only mobile phones as an electronic source of 
information and means of communication – and this relatively cheaper ICT itself is 
only used minimally because of the high cost of doing so. Furthermore, Nielinger 
(2003b: 16) notes in his study of Tanzanian internet cafés that while each income 
group is apparently fairly represented, the high quantity of students who are using the 
internet cafés have relatively lower disposable incomes and so reduce the average 
income distribution from the upper middle-income segment towards the lower 
income groups. Presumably members of this group acquire the funds from their 
parents as ‘pocket money’ and as such those with parents who are able to make such 
donations again suggest that they are among a limited group of privileged 
Tanzanians.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Mwesige’s (2004) findings from Kampala, and some of the details Alhassan (2004) provides of the 
users of Accra’s internet cafés. 
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Given that many of those who frequent Tanzania’s internet cafés are the young, 
particularly students, it is surprising that there is not among this group a greater 
interest in using the worldwide web as a rich research resource for studying. This 
observation was also made by the TCRA Public Relations Manager, Isaac Mruma, 
who recently cited a study carried among some 400 secondary school students in Dar 
es Salaam which showed that, in the absence of internet access arrangements at most 
schools, students only spent an average of 11 minutes per hour in internet cafés on 
school-related web searches, and the remaining time engaged in games, pornography, 
chatting, desk-top shopping and music (Cairo 2004).47 Such websites, which Mruma 
termed ‘online poisoning’, are common among many online sources of information 
from and about the outside world.48 The small and partially purposive survey of 
internet café staff, customers and terminals conducted for this study in mid-2002 as 
background to the use of ICT in Tanzania (section 2:4 and Appendix I) revealed 
remarkable similarities to other studies of internet use in Tanzania (Balancing Act 
2003d; Mercer 2004; Nielinger 2003b; Nnafie 2002) which appear to reflect the 
interests of young people in global (usually Northern) popular contents. Websites 
that are commonly accessed in internet cafés cover sports and entertainment, and 
especially ‘official’ sites or news sites covering the English football premier league, 
and ‘celebrity’ and download sites dealing with African-American hip-hop and rap 
music.49 Pornography is also common, as are international (but less local) news sites, 
while websites dealing with opportunities to study abroad, usually in America or 
Britain, often encourage prospective students to apply and send their CV’s 
                                                 
47 Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & Nyaki-Adeya (2004) show that the user environment in Kenyan and Nigerian 
universities is arid, with initial investment costs of end-user equipment limiting the ownership of PCs 
and high costs limiting full internet access, thus compelling many university teaching staff to use 
internet cafés alongside their students. 
48 As in Kenya (Werner & Hook 2003), the local media in Tanzania like to run ‘panic’ stories about 
how youths are using internet cafés to view pornography. 
49 The mobile phone operators have realised customer interest in this culture, as is evident in a 
document I obtained that was written by a Dar es Salaam-based advertising agency to its client, the 
Celtel mobile phone operator, in which a ‘Surf and Talk with Celtel’ promotion was being discussed 
before it was to be aired on the radio. ‘Stings’ to be mentioned include: ‘Time for you to get to college, 
go surf with Celtel’, ‘Visit your favourite Bongo [Dar es Salaam / Tanzanian] website and learn your 
artist with Celtel’, ‘Awards are taking place in the United States, find out with Celtel’ and, ‘Hear your 
artist’s new song over and over again with Celtel’. 
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electronically.50 For this and other reasons, most notably keeping in touch with 
friends (often students who have successfully gained a place in a Northern higher 
education institute) and relatives outside the country, web-based e-mail is also a 
common use of the internet.  
 
Mercer (2004) argues that in post-socialist and liberalised Tanzania such 
‘undevelopmental’ use of the internet enables those individuals with the resources to 
frequent cafés to develop and demonstrate their modern selves and helps produce 
what Weiss (2002: 100) calls contradictory ‘fantastic geographies’ – exhilarating 
possibilities for personal betterment that are unrealised by the vast majority of 
Tanzanians as anything but possibilities. Yet while it is true that this does contrast 
sharply with the dominant discourse on internet technology and development 
discussed in chapter one, we must be careful of assuming that attempts by youths to 
express themselves as ‘modern’ or ‘Western’ is little more than physical or mental 
escapism because we do not know how these efforts are being transferred – for better 
or for worse, culturally – into a local context.51 The youth who downloads the latest 
American hip-hop from the internet and then sells it on pirated compact discs or 
cassettes that then get played in hair salons and nightclubs to attract customers, for 
example, or the young entrepreneur who downloads images of Chelsea Football 
Club’s insignia from their website that he then uses to make car stickers for sale in 
the city’s market are both, after all, using their privileged access to this global 
medium to eventually make a financial contribution to the local economy.52 
 
                                                 
50 According to a teacher providing I.T. skills training at COSTECH, dealing with sponsorship and 
application procedures is a big motivator for individuals to take his class. Interview with Enock 
Mpenzwa, COSTECH, 24 July 2002. 
51 Miller and Slater explore various dimensions of the internet in the Trinidadian context, including 
the dynamic of objectification between the internet and identity. They argue that this can be thought of 
in two interrelated ways, the first being in terms of expansive realization where the internet is viewed 
as a means through one can enact a version of oneself or culture that is old but can finally be realised. 
In the expansive potential encounter, on the other hand, the encounter with the expansive connections 
of the internet allows one to transcend mundane identities and envisage a novel vision of what one 
could be (Miller & Slater 2000: 10-11), much like Weiss’ ‘fantastic geographies’ (2002: 100). Though 
a valuable area of study, my fieldwork concentrated on entrepreneurship and time did not permit an 
investigation of these dimensions in the Tanzanian context. 
52 Interview with Jesse Rutahigwa, Mkwepu Telecommunications Centre, Mkwepu Street, 




8:13. Internet cafés for income-generating activities 
Unfortunately these examples of the use of internet cafés for a business purpose are 
more often the exception than the rule, for while one would also imagine 
considerable interest in using the worldwide web as a rich research resource for 
business, other studies suggest that this is not the case. Nielinger (2003a) provides 
evidence of this from his study of ICT diffusion among Tanzanian SMEs in the food 
processing, textile and tourist sectors of Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza, Zanzibar, 
and Mara regions where while 38% of respondents recognised the cell phone as ‘very 
significant’ or ‘significant’ and where computer-based applications are led by e-mail 
(28%), the worldwide web as a market research tool is cast in last place with only 
12%. This has not matured, he concludes, either because of a lack of knowledge or 
simply because of the non-existence of such information (Nielinger 2003a: 7) – a 
conclusion that Werner & Hook’s (2003) study of Nairobi internet café users also 
reaches, noting the unmet demand in the fact that while 29% of customers claim that 
business are one of their interests in using internet cafés, only 4% of this kind of 
browsing was actually logged. The small survey of African and Asian-run internet 
cafés conducted for this study in mid-2002 suggests a similar trend, with the 
evidence of internet café assistants and an examination of recently viewed websites 
at various terminals revealing that only a small number of patrons were using the 
internet for any type of business (and this was mostly through web-based e-mail with 
individuals outside Tanzania and often outside Africa, not websites). This is similar 
to the results of studies conducted in internet cafés in other African countries 
(Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & Nyaki-Adeya 2004; Werner & Hook 2003) and in Britain 
(Lee 1999), however, which show that users tend also not to use the cafés for 
research, but for e-mail and keeping in touch with friends. 
 
Nevertheless, some cases of customers using internet cafés for income-generating 
activities were revealed during the mid-2002 research, and can be categorised into 
‘import’ and ‘export’, and also ‘other businesses’. An example is of a journalist 
working for a large Tanzanian news corporation who regards ‘conference-going’ as 
her side business. This lady searches the internet to find out about national and 
international conferences and seminars she wishes to attend concerning development 
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issues, applies to a foreign or international donor organisation to pay both her 
attendance fee and expenses and, once accepted, does research to substantiate the 
little knowledge available to her in Tanzania on the subjects to be discussed. She also 
uses the internet to search for background on stories she covers in one of the media 
corporations’ daily Swahili newspapers, and to keep abreast of general issues 
concerning journalism and mass communication.53 
 
Those identified as using internet cafés to import goods are all middlemen – no 
middlewomen were found – who locate and purchase items for customers in Dar es 
Salaam who, presumably, do not have the ability to do so themselves. The goods 
range from single items to bulk purchases, including household electrical appliances 
from Dubai, solar products from America, second-hand cars from specific custom-
made Japanese and Dubai-based websites, and mobile phones from the Far East.54 In 
the export of goods from Tanzania search engines were found to be used to great 
effect by an entrepreneur who breeds insects for clients in the UK. The man e-mails 
his customers to ascertain future demand so that he can collect a male and female of 
the required species, and since the reply always comes with the English and Latin 
name of the species he then runs searches on what they are called in Swahili and, 
failing this, searches for pictures of the creatures so that he can recognise which ones 
he should look out for.55 Similar use of the internet in cafés is also reported of dealers 
in minerals, semi-precious and precious stones and, as we investigate in more depth 
in chapter six, the trade of African blackwood carvings.56 
                                                 
53 Interview at Mkwepu Telecommunications Centre, Mkwepu Street, Mchafukoge, Dar es Salaam, 31 
July 2002. 
54 www.japanesevehicles.com is a popular website, although see 
http://news.bbc.co.UK/1/hi/UK/1456337.stm for the fraudulent sale of stolen Japanese cars through 
Dubai. The latter example is of Mwita Winani (Mkwepu Telecommunications Centre Mkwepu Street, 
Mchafukoge, Dar es Salaam, 31 July 2002), who turned out to be a useful lead into the ‘not-new’ and 
‘not-original’ mobile phone business in Dar es Salaam. 
55 www.allafrica.com (2005) reports that a bid to have African languages join English and French in 
the internet is being blocked by information experts from the North as lacking in commercial value. 
Microsoft sees a market, however, and has announced plans for a Swahili version of its Windows 
operating software to cater for a growing number of users in Africa (BBC 2004). In December 2004 
the Open Swahili Localization Project, also known as Kilinux,  announced the first ever release of a 
free office suite software in Swahili, called ‘Jambo OpenOffice’ (Balancing Act 2004b). 
56 Interview with Joseph Kifunta, manager, Interwebbers internet Café, Jamhuri Street, 27 July 2002. 
Hamisi and Dickson, two dealers in African blackwood carvings, were interviewed in Mwenge on 1 
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8:14. ‘Cosmopolitan’ agents of change 
The fact that for most café users in Tanzania it is costly to access the internet 
(whether for business or academic research, or for entertainment) may account for 
the limited use of these places for browsing. E-mail, on the other hand, is a cheaper 
alternative since the user can prepare in advance exactly what is required. A message 
can be drafted by hand before. Or as Philipo Luvale does on his Sony Vaio laptop 
before e-mailing customers concerning his African blackwood carving business 
(chapter six), an e-mail can be written on a computer and saved on a disk that is then 
used in the café to transfer the text to an e-mail.  
 
Philipo is a former carver from Mwanza who is now based in Mtwara where he is 
establishing with an American expatriate the Centre for African Development 
through Economics and the Arts (ADEA) for the domestic and international African 
blackwood carving market. Through working at different levels in the business and 
in different locations for a long time, Philipo has had much more exposure than most 
carvers or traders to people who he can learn from about how the business works: 
 
From doing business with people I meet here [in Tanzania] I see that using these 
technologies is important, so I started to use the internet…. In those days there were not 
many internet cafés and they were expensive, but I can see from communicating with 
businessmen and foreigners – Douglas [his American business associate] is one of these 
people – that using e-mail is important for business. (Philipo Luvale, 17/02/03) 
 
In the Tanzanian context, and especially when compared with many of his colleagues 
in the carving (‘vinyago’) business working in remote areas such as Mtwara, Philipo, 
is an individual who networks outside his social system. He travels much and is well 
aware of events outside his close social network (Rogers 1995: 200), and as such 
should be seen as another of the cosmopolitans who pioneers the diffusion of 
innovations such as laptops and the internet. A further cosmopolitan is the computer 
fundi (technician) who frequents cybercafés and acts as an opinion broker through 
                                                                                                                                          
August 2002 thanks to Mariah, the manager of Salva internet café, Mwenge, who was interviewed on 
29 July 2002.  
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his strong links to other social networks or other external information sources. 
Computer fundis such as Savio (a Goan Indian who comes to his customers in Dar es 
Salaam personally to fix their Apple Mackintosh computers) and Majid (a Zanzibari 
trained in Ireland who moonlights from his TTCL job as a switch engineer to fix 
computers in internet cafés with skills he taught himself when studying in Britain) 
seek advice from other technicians and computer enthusiasts who they may not 
always know personally and whose help is sometimes obtained through chat rooms 
on the internet.57 They are also similar to the ‘local expert’ identified in the Northern 
literature who provides personalised knowledge based on a flexible, convenient and 
trusted relationship with their friend-client (Stewart 2001: chapter 8), and it seems 
that for some customers the computer fundi does also provide an on-going role in the 
support of other technology users. Where the computer fundi differs from Stewart’s 
local expert, however, is that he does not usually end up doing this ‘expert’ work for 
free or in exchange for another service. 58 In Majid’s case he works for friends at a 
(apparent) discount, but most of the other technicians tend to make most of their 
money from contacts – not usually friends – whose computers they fix in the 
evening, after they have finished their more formal job. As with Stewart’s 
observations, the fundi is not necessarily a formally trained professional (I.T. or 
engineer), but has come to be and is seen to be, an innovator and expert on the use 
and applications of ICT relative to those around him, having in some cases 
developed his expertise through a combination of hands-on learning-by-doing and 
formal training.  
 
The title of ‘agent of change’ could equally apply to some owners of internet cafés 
and some internet café managers who use their experience of travel outside Tanzania 
to enhance their knowledge of ICT, which eventually filters down to their customers. 
Jimmy (the owner of Ronnie’s internet café in Kinondoni) or Isaac Masalla (owner of 
Interwebbers internet café in the City Centre), for example, brought back money and 
                                                 
57 Interview with Savio, Mekon Arch Consult, Kijitonyama, 1 August 2002; Interview with Majid 
Aboud, Mkwepu Communications Centre, Mkwepu Street, 31 July 2003. 
58 I use ‘he’ intentionally because of the domination of men in all the high positions in the Tanzanian 
ICT economy, a result of the gender imbalance on ICT courses in higher education. It would be 
interesting, however, to see whether females tend to seek advice from other females experts when they 
are available, while males stick to consulting men. 
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ideas for the setting up of their cafés from spending time living and working in 
Denmark and Sweden respectively, while internet café managers such as Alphonse 
Nzeyi (manager, TRT internet café, Kijitonyama) and Pamella (manager, Tibet 
internet café, Bibi Titi Mohamed Road), gained a thorough knowledge of internet 
applications from I.T. courses taken when studying in France and America.59 What 
has not been explored is how these individuals’ exposure to more diverse forms of 
ICT-related knowledge from a number of different groups may be better used in the 
effective application of information and communication technologies throughout the 
country. An example of where their experience could benefit the sector may be in the 
area of e-commerce which research shows is currently underdeveloped in Tanzania 
(Balancing Act 2003d) and other African countries (Nyaki-Adeya 2003). They can 
also be helped by the younger elite who are spending their time at present browsing 
websites and sending and receiving e-mails for less ‘developmental’ motives but who 
are, nonetheless, proficient at using the internet and who tend pick up new ICT 
applications far faster than the elderly.60 By the time this generation enter the world 
of work they will be more familiar with the underdeveloped yet crucial application of 
e-commerce. This new generation should also be able to develop it more effectively 
than some of the business operators we meet in chapter six whose underutilisation of 




In this chapter we have discussed Tanzania’s ICT policy, which is one example of 
the present government’s attempt to remove itself from previous hostility to private 
business and to provide a more favourable operating environment. Given the 
constraints to much of the economy, the National Information and Communications 
Technologies Policy is realistic and, with an effective regulator, has helped to create 
a vibrant market for mobile communications and data and internet service providers. 
Competition has not brought significantly lower prices to consumers, however, 
                                                 
59 Interview dates, 2 August 2002, 27 July 2002, 19 July 2002 and 30 July 2002 respectively.  
60 This observation was made in Bridges (2003) by Goretti Zavuga, Director of the Uganda chapter of 
the Council for the Economic Empowerment for Women of Africa (CEEWA), when commenting on 
her experience of their Women's Information Resource Electronic Service (WIRES) initiative. 
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although in the mobile market there are some signs that this will change. 
Nevertheless, mobile cellular operators have still managed to achieve impressive 
customer growth rates, and we have suggested that this is because mobile phones are 
more easily accessible to consumers than any previous means of using a telephone – 
in part thanks to the informal economy of ‘not-new’ and ‘not-original’ handsets – 
and because mobile phones are perceived by many Tanzanians as being much sought 
after, sophisticated and stylish technologies. We have also considered the internet 
and data markets which, while achieving continuous (if unspectacular) growth over 
the last decade, can be contrasted with more ‘democratic’ mobile phones as elitist 
information and communication technologies. Where there is evidence of the internet 
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